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Abstract 
 
The thesis uses Taiwan as a case study to examine the following argument: both the 
changes to the capitalist world-system and the political dynamics of domestic state-
capital-labour relations determine national capitalist development and ascent 
trajectory. Taiwan was chosen as a case study because it demonstrates the particular 
developmental trajectory of semi-peripheral ascent (ascent from the semi-periphery) 
and of a rising East Asian economy. I study the case by firstly analysing Taiwan’s 
peripheral ascent (from the periphery to the semi-periphery) in the historical process. 
Secondly the thesis studies three sectors as a national case, namely the industrial 
sector, the financial sector, and the labour sector. The three sectors demonstrate the 
dynamics of a semi-peripheral ascent trajectory as they represent the development of 
industrial production, financial expansion, and anti-systemic movements, which are 
all keys to influence semi-peripheral ascent. The thesis finds that although there are 
opportunities for Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent, Taiwan has not yet ascended to the 
core. The reasons are (1) the state’s restrictions on the overseas expansion of 
Taiwanese industrial capital and financial capital, in particular to China; (2) 
Taiwanese industrial capital and financial capital still rely on capital from the core 
zone.  The thesis therefore contributes to the study of semi-peripheral ascent by 
adding analysis of domestic state-capital-labour relations into the context of a 
changing capitalist world-system.  
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Chapter One：Introduction 
As a developing country, Taiwan’s economy experienced a great leap in terms of 
economic growth, industrialisation, increase in trading volume and accumulation of 
wealth during the first three to four decades of the post-war period. Taiwan has 
shifted from an export-led agrarian economy to an export-led industrialising economy 
in a mere 20 years (1945-1965). The gross national product (GNP) per capita 
increased from US$196 in 1952, to US$3,297 in 1985, and again to US$18,020 in 
2008. Taiwan was the 16th largest trading country in the world in 2008. This 
economic achievement has demonstrated the possibility of a peripheral country 
becoming a semi-peripheral state in the world economy. Various development studies 
and East Asian studies have researched the specific developmental experience of 
Taiwan.1 This thesis is concerned with not only how Taiwan ascended from a 
peripheral economy to a semi-peripheral economy, but also how Taiwan continues to 
struggle to ascend further, possibly to ‘core’ status. Taiwan has continued its 
economic ‘upward’ movement since the late 1980s (e.g., the beginning of capital-
exports, a shift from labour-intensive to technological and capital intensive and 
export-led industrialisation). Whether Taiwan has ascended to a core economy or has 
remained at a semi-peripheral status is the concern of this thesis. What kind of 
strategies has Taiwan used, what are the opportunities and constraints that Taiwan has 
confronted, what are the key actors to drive the change, and what are the obstacles to 
ascend to the core? 
What do I mean by the term ‘ascent’? The term ‘ascent’ includes a double 
meaning of development. In the first meaning, ascent is a change of position in the 
capitalist world-system, for example, from the periphery to the semi-periphery. In the 
second meaning, ascent is a general national change, a change of capital 
                                                 
1
 The literature has gone through a number of different academic phases and modes of analysis. 
Attention was first paid to Taiwan by modernisation theorists in the 1970s. They have focussed on 
Taiwan’s transition from a ‘traditional economy’ to a ‘modern industrialising economy’, as well as 
studying the long-term evolution of economic growth (Galenson 1979; Ho 1978). In the 1980s and the 
1990s, the research into Taiwan’s political economic development (and East Asia’s development in 
general) has shifted to neo-classical economic theories (Balassa 1989; 1991; Rhee 1989); state-centred 
approach (Evans 1995; Evans et al. 1985; Gold 1986; Haggard 1990; Rodrik 1995; Wade 2004[1990]); 
regulation theory (Hsu 2002; Huang 2002); and the new institutionalist approach (Clark and Chan 1994; 
Evans 1995; Fields 1997; Moon and Prasad 1994). The main concern in their approaches was how 
Taiwan could ascend from being an ‘underdeveloped’ (or less developed) economy to become a newly 
industrialising economy.  
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accumulation’s structure, a change of social formation, a change of political economic 
system. Several approaches have attempted to explain the key factors that have 
influenced national ascent. I have divided these into two main schools. The first 
approach is the national model of development (including modernisation theory, the 
school of ‘varieties of capitalism’, and the developmental state approach) which argue 
that a peripheral state is able to ascend once they have found a correct policy or 
institutional arrangement domestically. The other approach is the world-system 
perspective, which mainly concerns the overall structure of the capitalist world-
system and how that structure affects national development. This thesis contends that 
although the national approach has provided detailed discussion on the domestic 
context of development (e.g. state-business relations, institutional frameworks, state 
policies), it has placed insufficient emphasis on the international context that enables 
a state to develop (or not). Although the world-system perspective is a good starting 
point to understand national development, the perspective needs to add analysis of the 
domestic social relations of capital accumulation in order to understand the dynamic 
picture of national ascent.  
      Taiwan is chosen as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, Taiwan’s post-war 
developmental experience presents the process of peripheral ascent, namely ascent 
from the periphery to the semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system. Secondly, as 
a newly industrialising economy (NIE), the case of Taiwan has demonstrated one of 
the successful experiences of development in East Asia in terms of economic growth 
and the progress in export-led industrialisation.2 However, Taiwan’s developmental 
process and its changes is not a single isolated experience. It demonstrates the 
particular course of national ascent and the dynamics of East Asian development. 
Taiwan’s capitalist development has a special historical and geopolitical context, and 
the aim of the thesis is not to generalise a universal model of national development 
based on Taiwan’s experience. The aim is rather to analyse the factors that influence 
the trajectory of ascent and to use the case of Taiwan to examine the analytical 
framework for understanding national capitalist development. This thesis will thus 
engage in debates over peripheral and semi-peripheral ascent, and East Asian 
development. The specific historical and geopolitical context of Taiwan’s 
                                                 
2
 EOI means an economy with industrial exports serving as leading or main sectors; the import-
substitution indusrialisation (ISI) means an economy that attempts to substitute products which it 
imports so that it can reduce dependence on imports. 
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development also implies that national ascent needs to be put into a wider 
international context. Thirdly, as noted above, since Taiwan has successfully 
graduated from peripheral ascent (i.e. from a periphery to a semi-periphery), what has 
happened to Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent? Has Taiwan ascended to the core or is 
it struggling to maintain the status quo? Further, the analysis of the semi-peripheral 
zone is a complicated subject (and also one with insufficient analysis) in world-
system analysis, and the case of Taiwan will provide a useful study in mapping the 
complexities of semi-peripheral ascent.  
     Drawing from the case study of Taiwan, my thesis aims to examine the following 
argument: to understand national capitalist development and ascent, it is necessary to 
study both a country’s structural position in the capitalist world-system and domestic 
state-capital-labour relations. This argument has two intentions: firstly, to 
demonstrate that the national model approach, which explains national development 
and change mainly from a national context, is insufficient. The international context 
that enables some countries to develop is under researched in the national model 
approach.  This thesis will thus agree with a world-system perspective which views 
the dynamics of capitalism as a world-system and places national development and 
change within the context of the hierarchical structure of capitalism (i.e. core-semi-
periphery-periphery nexus) and of the structure of politics (i.e. the interstate system). 
Secondly, the central argument will also show that although the world-system 
approach is a useful framework of analysis with which to explain national capitalist 
development from a wider international context, it has not always paid sufficient 
attention to the domestic context.  In particular, it places insufficient emphasis on the 
political dynamics of state-capital-labour relations. Accordingly, my research follows 
the basic framework of world-system analysis but adds new analysis (domestic state-
capital-labour nexus) into the study of Taiwan. Some analysis of the national model 
approach is, however, useful in looking at the domestic context of social relations, in 
particular the role of the state. The thesis thus intends to break the dichotomy between 
the national model approach which mainly focuses on domestic context and the 
world-system approach which mainly pays attention to the international context.  
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1-1 Analytical Framework 
 
How will I analyse the two key aspects of national capitalist development and ascent, 
namely the structural position of a nation-state in the capitalist world-system and its 
domestic level of state-capital-labour relations? For the first aspect, the world-system 
perspective views capitalism as a world-system that crosses national or state 
boundaries (e.g. Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1989). National-states are structured 
as one of the analytical units of capitalism, rather than complete and independent units. 
World-system analysts categorise the hierarchical structure of capitalism into three 
economic zones: core, semi-periphery, and periphery (Wallerstein 1974; 1979; 1984). 
National capitalist development and its path of ascent are conditioned and constrained 
by the hierarchical structure and the political system of the capitalism world-system 
(i.e. the interstate system). Therefore, the trajectory of national capitalist development 
needs to be situated in the context of the country’s structural position and links within 
the capitalist world-system, rather than being viewed as an ahistorical and isolated 
national experience. Accordingly, the first aspect of national capitalist development 
can be analysed via the understanding of a nation-state’s structural position and 
methods of incorporation into the capitalist world-system. Key questions include: 
what is the state’s political-economic position in the capitalist world-system? What 
are the relationships between the state and other states, in particular how has the 
hegemonic core state influenced the development of that state? How is that state 
incorporated into the capitalist world-system (e.g. through trade or finance) and how 
does such incorporation reshape the developmental trajectory of the state?  
     The above framework of analysis focuses on the influence of the capitalist world-
system on a particular state, such as Taiwan. However, can capitalism as a world-
system itself fully explain the trajectory of ascent of any given individual state? Is the 
state merely a passive actor, being changed by the whole system? If national 
development is only determined by the world structure of capitalism, then all the 
states which are located in the same position will share the same developmental 
trajectory. In this respect, developmental trajectories will be limited to three main 
types, core, semi-periphery and periphery. I do not agree with the idea that capitalism 
is a simple and rigid structure, nor do I believe that world-system analysts deny the 
diversity of developmental trajectories. The point is that we need to add an analysis of 
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the domestic social relations of capital accumulation into the research on national 
development.    
The domestic social relations of capital accumulation are state-capital-labour 
dynamics. Why is that? To begin with the concept of ‘capital,’ I agree with the world-
system perspective’s definition that capitalism is a system of ceaseless accumulation 
of capital. As Chapter Two will discuss, although the perspective disagrees in part 
with the definition of capitalism by Marx, the perspective shares some agreement with 
Marx’s definition of capital (e.g. Wallerstein 2004). In Marx’s (1956[1893]) argument, 
‘capital’ has two important meanings: Firstly, it is more than the accumulation of 
money and wealth. Capital is used for the consumption of goods which brings about 
an increase in the value of the goods, and these goods can be sold for the realisation of 
profit. Secondly, as to how the increase of value of goods is possible, Marx argued 
that neither the purchase of goods (e.g. raw materials) nor the sale of the finished 
goods that adds value, but that special commodities can increase the value of goods, 
namely ‘labour power’(also called variant capital). Labour power can produce more in 
a day than is needed to survive. The consumption of labour power is a labour process, 
and the new value being created is surplus value. As such, capital accumulation is not 
merely a ‘stock of consumable goods, machinery, or authorised claims to material 
things in the form of money’, nor is it merely ‘accumulated wealth’ (Wallerstein 1983, 
p.13). It is also a configuration of social relations in order to pursue capital expansion.  
Why is the state a key to the social relations of capital accumulation? The 
possibility for the capitalist to appropriate surplus value from labour is the 
subordination of labour to capitalists. In this process, less resistance from labour will 
strengthen its subordination. For Marx, this is the role of the state in a capitalist 
society.  Marx argued that the state is a product of class struggle: as he puts it in the 
Communist Manifesto, ‘political power properly so called, is merely the organised 
power of one class for oppressing another (Marx and Engels 1848).’ In this respect, I 
agree that the role of the state is not pre-given or neutral, but a consequence of the 
power struggle among social forces (e.g. capitalists, wage labour, and peasants). Yet 
the state still plays a primary role, as in Wallerstein’s (2004) description, ‘a state is a 
bounded territory claiming sovereignty and domain over its subjects, now called 
citizens…A state claims the legal monopoly over the use of weapons within its 
territory, subject to the laws of the state (Wallerstein 2004, p.97).’ I agree that the 
state acts as a ‘legal monopoly’, and as a ‘national-legal, administrative agency of 
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coercion’ (Wallerstein 2004, p.97; Woo 1991, p.6), and these features distinguish the 
state from capital and labour. Furthermore, differently from Marx, the world-system 
perspective views the role of the state as one that is also limited by the world-system. 
As Chapter Two will discuss, the capitalist world-system needs a special political 
system to prevent the world-economy from becoming a world-empire, namely a 
competitive interstate system. States are not equally powerful: the hegemon and the 
core zone tend to be relatively stronger than others. This is the context in which a 
state relates to other states. As such, I do not view the functions of a state as pre-given 
and static, since the ability of the state is both constrained by its position within the 
interstate system and its relations with other social forces (i.e. capital and organised 
labour). The ‘state’ in this thesis is a concept related to two aspects, the interstate 
system and domestic social relations. Thus, by adding analysis of the state-capital-
labour nexus, we will be able to analyse the specific developmental route and how 
domestic social relations impact upon this route. Above all, national ascent is a shift 
of position within the world-system, and it is a change in the national social formation. 
As such, the political dynamics of the state-capital-labour nexus will be the second 
aspect of the analysis of national capitalist development. 
      In sum, the national trajectory of ascent is determined by both the structure of the 
capitalist world-system (including the accumulation structure and the interstate 
system) and the domestic state-capital-labour nexus. With respect to the first aspect, 
world-system analysts have developed an analytical framework to analyse the 
dynamics of capitalism and its structure of accumulation and politics, and I will 
discuss the analytical framework in detail in Chapter Two. By adopting the world-
system perspective, this thesis intends to contribute to the debate on national ascent as 
it will place national ascent in a historical and international context rather than view it 
as an isolated model of development. Moreover, the originality of this thesis is that 
the approach is different from the world-system perspective in the way that I view 
national ascent as not only a change of structural position within the world-system but 
also as a change in national social formation.  The contribution of the thesis lies in my 
adding the analysis of the domestic state-capital-labour nexus into a world-system 
perspective. 
      How will I analyse the political dynamics of domestic state-capital-labour nexus? 
Firstly, with regard to the role of the state, literature from East Asian development 
studies and from semi-peripheral studies both view the state as acting in a significant 
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interventionist role to promote national ascent (see the discussion in Chapter Two). 
Yet, I agree with the findings from world-system analysis that the role of the state 
cannot be generalised but should be examined through their different positions in the 
capitalist world-system. My intention is not to discuss a universal role of the state in 
national development but to explore the particular role of the state in a semi-
peripheral position, and how a semi-peripheral state attempts to ascend when it is at a 
crossroads between interstate state struggle and global capital accumulation. To 
ascend to the core, it is not as simple as the state merely supporting capital and 
oppressing labour, nor does the state merely regulate economic order.  The reality is 
more complicated. As ‘ascent’ has a double meaning: it is the state, not capital or 
labour, that needs to find a balance between its role in the interstate system, in the 
structure of capitalism, and in the domestic social formation. Secondly, this thesis 
argues that the dynamics of capital needs to be analysed in its various forms. Capital 
takes different forms depending upon its various functions in the capital accumulation 
process. Capital is agricultural or industrial capital when it produces agricultural or 
industrial goods; capital is financial capital when it takes on a loaning function to earn 
interest. The social relations of these forms of capital also varies, e.g. in the 
agricultural capital, the social relations of capital accumulation is between the 
landlord and peasants (or slavery). In the historical study of Taiwan, both agricultural 
and industrial capital played an important role in Taiwan’s peripheral ascent (from 
periphery to semi-periphery); more recently, however, industrial capital and financial 
capital have become the two main dominant forces in semi-peripheral ascent. My 
distinction between industrial capital and financial capital is based on Marx 
(1956[1894]) and Hilferding’s (1981[1910]) analysis of loan capital and functioning 
capital, as well as on the world-system perspective’s discussion of hegemonic cycles. 
Industrial capital controls industrial production which has been viewed by world-
system analysis as the primary force used to ascend.  The role of financial capital and 
the degree of its expansion are significant both to national capitalist development and 
to the semi-peripheral state’s ascent trajectory.  
     Thirdly, although labour is another part of the social relations of capital 
accumulation, most national model approaches have mainly studied domestic state-
capital relations and overlook the role of labour in the capital accumulation process, 
especially in the power struggle of social forces. Few world-system analysts have 
researched the dynamics of organised labour as a social force that influences national 
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development and as part of an anti-systemic movement that resists capitalism (e.g. 
Beverly J. Silver). Labour is not only a productive force in the process of capital 
accumulation, its organised form can offer resistance to the dynamics of capitalism.  
In particular, my thesis is concerned with the questions, what is the role of labour in 
national ascent and development? Can organised labour act as an anti-systemic 
movement while labour is engaged in the trans-nationalisation of production (e.g. 
transnational corporations) in the capitalist world-system? 
 
1-2 Application to the Case Study of Taiwan 
 
Although Taiwan’s development has been influenced by a specific geopolitical 
conflict (i.e. China-Taiwan relations), as Chapter Four will show, its developmental 
trajectory is nevertheless a case of peripheral ascent and of East Asian development. 
On the other hand, the historical particularity of Taiwan’s development implies that it 
is misleading to generalise to a universal model of development among other 
countries, even though they are in similar positions within the capitalist world-system.  
I will analyse the historical development of Taiwan’s capitalist development since the 
beginning of its integration within the capitalist world-system. All the present 
achievements are the consequence of historical development. The historical study can 
also explore the factors that contributed to Taiwan’s ascent from a peripheral to a 
semi-peripheral economy. The thesis will also discuss the main changes to the 
structure of the capitalist world-system in the last two decades on which the study will 
focus, as these changes have conditioned Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent.   
After reviewing Taiwan’s historical development and the changes to the capitalist 
world-system in recent periods, I will discuss how the structural changes to the 
capitalist world-system and the dynamics of the state-capital-labour nexus have 
shaped Taiwan’s capitalist development. This thesis develops a particular way of 
analysing the dynamics of the state-capital-labour nexus in the case of Taiwan, 
namely to study three sectoral cases (industrial sector, financial sector, and labour) 
within one national case. The three sectors demonstrate the dynamics of semi-
peripheral ascent trajectory, as the three sectors represent the power of industrial 
production, finance, and anti-systemic movement. As noted previously, the 
development of industrial capital and financial capital are keys to determining the 
position of a state within the capitalist world-system. For a semi-peripheral state such 
17 
 
as Taiwan, the expansion of industrial capital and financial capital domestically and 
internationally is the main method with which to ascend to the core. In particular, I 
will pay attention to the electronics industry when I discuss the industrial sector, as 
this industry has dominated Taiwan’s production, export, and overseas investment 
since the 1990s. Taiwan’s shift of position within the global production chain (the 
term will be introduced in Chapter Three, section 3-2-1) in the electronics industry 
also shows a special feature of semi-peripheral ascent. In each sectoral case study, 
how state-capital relations and the structure of capitalism affect the dynamics of the 
sector will be examined. We will find that in Taiwan’s case, the state has different 
attitudes towards industrial capital and financial capital, and these differences lead to 
dissimilar development. Overall, the study of the industrial and financial sectors 
explores how the dynamics of state-capital relations and the change to the capitalist 
world-system influence Taiwan’s industrial production and financial expansion. The 
third sectoral case study, labour, will demonstrate how labour as a productive force 
contributes to national development and capital accumulation through the changing 
labour process, but on the other hand as an organised social force resists the logic of 
capitalism. Without analysing this “double” role of labour, we cannot capture the 
dynamic of national social formation.    
With regard to the period covered by the research, the thesis focuses on the recent 
period because the main concern is how the economic status of Taiwan has changed 
in the capitalist world-system and how this struggle involves changes to the social 
formation. The period 1987/88-2007 is chosen for several empirical reasons. 
Although Taiwan achieved semi-peripheral status in the 1970s (as will be discussed in 
Chapter Four), it was not until the late 1980s that Taiwan built its own peripheral 
links via outward investment. The years 1987/88 mark the beginning of Taiwan’s 
political democratisation, cross-strait exchanges, economic liberalisation, and capital-
export.  In other words, the period covers the deepening of Taiwan’s links within the 
East Asian region and the world-system, and the start of rapid changes to national 
social relations3.  
                                                 
3
 In 1987, Martial Law was lifted, the control of outward capital flow was relaxed, and the exchange 
rate of the NT dollar against the US dollar appreciated by 16% relative to that in 1986. In January 1988, 
Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese-born President, after the death of former President Chiang 
Ching-kuo. The lifting of Martial Law and the decline of the Chiang family’s political power indicated 
the loosening of the control of the authoritarian KMT regime. In 1987, after the lifting of Martial Law 
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The year 2007 is chosen to be the end of the research period. From the context of 
capitalist world-system’s cyclical movement, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009  
is a serious challenge to the current downturn B-phase of capitalism. From Taiwan’s 
perspective, some studies (Hsu 2002; Huang 2002) choose the year 1999 as a 
significant date to analyse Taiwan’s structural transformation or the changing role of 
the state because the ruling KMT party lost the presidential election in March 2000. 
Taiwan’s first political change in ruling party was called ‘bian-tian’ in Chinese, 
meaning ‘the sky is changed’. This political change was seen as critical to the future 
political economic regime at the time, 2000/2001. However, from the present 
viewpoint of 2008, the political changes of 2000 have not been very significant to 
Taiwan’s political economy. The main reason is that the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) followed similar policies to the post-1996 Lee Teng-hui administration, 
in terms of cross-strait relations, economic liberalisation, financial reform, and 
relations with local factions.4 I will further discuss this in following chapters. Here I 
will only give two brief examples. After Lee left the KMT in 2001, he established the 
Taiwan Solidarity Union Party (TSU), which together with the DPP, formed the pro-
Taiwanese-independence ‘pan green’ political group.5 Tsai Ying-wen, chairperson of 
the DPP since May 2008, was one of Lee’s core political advisors in the late 1990s 
with regard to cross-strait relations and national security. Accordingly, although 
belonging to different parties, I argue that the DPP administration was the political 
successor, rather than an alternative to, Lee’s (post-1996) administration. In March 
2008, the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won the presidential election. This seems to 
be a turning point for changes in cross-strait relations and of capital accumulation in 
Taiwan,6 but it is too early to tell and is not the concern of the thesis.   
                                                                                                                                            
and an isolation of 38 years, the Taiwanese government lifted the ban on Taiwanese nationals visiting 
mainland China.   
4 Taiwan held its first presidential election in 1996 and Lee won the election as the first democratically 
elected president of the ROC. Lee’s policy on cross-strait relations then became more ‘pro-
independence’ in stance, for example, the statement on “a special state-to-state relations” and the 
policy of ‘no haste; be patient’ towards Taiwanese investment in China.   
5
 Based on the colour of the party flag, the “pan green” political group is composed of the DPP and the 
TSU, and the ‘pan blue’ political group refers to the KMT and the PFP (a spin-off of the KMT after 
2000).  
6
 In April 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou appointed a core member of the TSU (also a core member of 
Lee Teng-hui’s political staff), Lai Shin-yuan, as the Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC). Many KMT politicians fiercely opposed Lai’s appointment, arguing that Lai, as a pro-Taiwan-
independence politician, would be an‘executive’ for Lee Teng-hui’s views.     
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1-3 Research Method 
 
The research methods I mainly used are: library-based research, document analysis, 
and twenty-three semi-structured interviews with elites.  The secondary and tertiary 
sources7 in Chinese were collected during two field trips to Taiwan. During my 
second field trip (June-September 2007), I was a visiting PhD student at the Academia 
Sinica, where I was able to access much Chinese language research material. As for 
the interviews, during my first field trip to Taiwan (from December 2005 to April 
2006) and a field trip to Geneva in June 2006, I conducted 21 semi-structured 
interviews in Taiwan and two in Geneva, respectively. The interviewees included 
high-level government officials, trade union staff and NGO activists. The full list of 
interviewees is given in Appendix One. In addition to the interviews, my direct 
involvement with the labour movement and trade union activity from 1999 to 20068 
also contributed to my primary and insider observations with regard to the subject of 
labour in this thesis.   
I chose document analysis as it can partly demonstrate empirical observation 
during an extensive period of time. These documents include reports (from 
government, non-governmental organisations, and international institutions), statistics, 
manuscripts, media reports, published biographies and diaries and so on.  As Johnson, 
Reynolds, and Mycoff (2007) argue, the advantage of using the written record is that 
the information might have existed for a long enough time to allow academic analysis; 
and the information also permits researchers to access subjects that may be difficult to 
research via direct or personal contact (e.g. some historical event). In my view, the 
method of document analysis also provides a basic structure to empirical observation 
for any further research (e.g. interviews). The disadvantage of the method, in the view 
of Reynolds, and Mycoff (2007), is that the written record content maybe biased by its 
                                                 
7 According to Burnham et al (2004), the most common categorisation of research sources is: (1) 
primary sources, which were produced by the event in question and are of restricted circulation; (2) 
secondary sources, which were composed of evidence, made after the event and were published in 
public; (3) tertiary sources, which comprise of all the literature that intends to interpret the event. 
8
 I worked for Ching-Jen Labour Service Center and was also the Assistant Consultant of Labour 
Dispute Settlement in Taipei County Government from 1999 to 2001. Then I worked as the Director of 
Communication, and the European Affairs Coordinator in the Chinese Federation of Labour between 
2001 and 2006. During my career, I have also attended various international labour conferences, 
workshops and executive board members meetings held by the ILO, international and regional trade 
unions, e.g. ICFTU (ITUC), ICFTU-APRO (ITUC-AP), PSI, ITF. 
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author and may only show selective information.  Some written records are even 
unavailable. As such, the thesis adopts the second method to supplement the method 
of document analysis, namely semi-structural interviews of elites.  
The method of elite interviews is chosen for the purpose of (1) supplying 
information that was not available from library-based research and document analysis; 
and (2) obtaining primary observations from interviewees who were key policy-
makers, trade-negotiators, and labour-organisers. Burnham et al’s (2004) discussion 
of ‘elite interviewing’ is very useful as my interviewees were experts in the topic in 
which I am interested. The interviews were conducted in the following way: I first 
identified my targets, and then sent a fax or email to each target and attached a two-
page question list comprising 10-15 questions together with a short introduction to 
myself. In my case, providing a short introduction of the interviewer was a useful tool 
as giving the interviewees some information about the interviewer may help them 
decide whether they would agree to be interviewed or not. Another helpful method 
was to tell the target that I had already successfully approached some key 
interviewees.  
 Each interview was conducted using a different question list according to their 
specialism and experience. In this research it was very important to provide the 
question list to interviewees before the interviews, because my research covered a 
long period of policy change; so it was appropriate for the interviewees to have time 
to think about the questions. In most cases, the high-level officials asked their staff or 
secretaries to prepare related materials or documents. However, my interviews did not 
merely stick to the question list; the interview was flexible, depending on the 
interaction process. Each interview lasted from one to three hours. The limitation of 
elite interviewing (especially high-level government officials) is that sometimes they 
answered my question in a very cautious and official way. Accordingly, I tried to 
frame the questions put to high-level government officials so as to cover a long period 
of policy change or major historical events, because currently these questions would 
not be so sensitive, and the high-level officials had experienced a longer period of 
policy change than junior officials. I asked questions concerning current policy issues 
to senior, but not high-level, government officials, as they are often more open than 
high-level officials to discuss current issues. 
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1-4 Chapters Abstract and Main Arguments 
 
Chapter Two will give the specific theoretical and analytical framework that I shall 
use to analyse semi-peripheral ascent. I will first review and critique the various 
literatures which concern national capitalist development in the domestic context, 
including modernisation theory, the school of variety of capitalism, and East Asian 
development studies. These studies provide detailed analyses of domestic policy, 
institutional arrangements, and state-capital relations. However, their fundamental 
assumption is mainly that a developing country should try to find and follow a 
‘correct’ national model. I will argue that this approach places insufficient emphasis 
on the international context of development and misunderstands the dynamics of 
capitalism. As such, the second section will introduce the world-system perspective 
with which I agree. This perspective views capitalism as being an international 
movement since its inception and having incorporated states into its structure of 
accumulation and politics. The study on national capitalist development needs to be 
first placed in such a structure rather than being viewed as an independent national 
system. Several key frameworks from this perspective will be discussed in this section.  
However, the chapter notes a problem when the perspective is adopted for the analysis 
of national development, namely that the perspective tends to overlook the dynamics 
of the domestic social relations of capital accumulation. Since capital accumulation is 
not only a material action or existence but a configuration of social relations, under-
researching this means that the perspective cannot capture fully the dynamic change 
of national social formation but merely views the national state as a passive actor, 
influenced by the structure of capitalism.  In the third section, I will add a new 
framework to the world-system perspective, which is the analysis of the political 
dynamics of the state-capital-labour nexus. I will argue that the capitalist world-
system (including the structure of accumulation and the interstate system) and the 
domestic state-capital-labour nexus determine the trajectory of national ascent. The 
first factor (the capitalist world-system) provides the opportunities for national 
development, but also embeds the conditions of or limits national ascent. How to 
make use of the opportunities and how to overcome the limits will lie in domestic 
state-capital-labour relations.  
After developing the new combined analytical framework, Chapter Three will 
concentrate on the structural changes to the capitalist world-system over a particular 
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period (1967/1973-2007), which will be referred to as the Kondratieff wave B-phase 
(the term will be introduced in Chapter Two). The examination of the structural 
changes to capitalism will focus on the shift of the structure of capital accumulation 
and changes to the interstate system. Capitalism in the period under examination has 
experienced a downturn phase in terms of the declining profit rates in the industrial 
sector and sluggish economic growth in the core zone. However, in order to prevent 
the decline of profit rates in the industrial sector, the centre of capital accumulation 
has expanded from the core to semi-peripheral and peripheral regions (in particular 
the East Asian region) via global industrial restructuring, and from the industrial 
sector to financial sector via the process of financialisation. In accordance with the B-
phase is the relative decline of the US as a hegemonic power in economic and 
financial areas, which has indirectly facilitated the ‘rise’ of East Asian economic 
power. The East Asian region is now a new centre of capital accumulation (in 
addition to the EU and North America), but it is not yet a world political-military 
centre. Furthermore, the complex political economic relationship between the East 
Asian region and the US also imposes uncertainty to future hegemonic order.  
After discussing the bigger picture of structural changes to capitalism in the last 
two or three decades, Chapter Four will move on to the case of Taiwan and will begin 
with a historical study. This chapter has two intentions, firstly, to demonstrate that 
Taiwan has been incorporated into the capitalist world-system, not since the K wave 
B-phase, but in fact since the seventeenth century. Secondly, the chapter will discuss 
how Taiwan had ascended from the periphery to the semi-periphery in the post-war 
period. This chapter will also show that historical continuity and achievements are 
significant to Taiwan’s current development. Taiwan’s periods of changes (Dutch 
colonialism, Chinese rule, British influence, Japanese colonialism, the US-supported 
KMT authoritarian regime) are linked to historical cyclical change and hegemonic 
transitions highlighted in the world-system perspective. Taiwan’s capitalist 
development reflects regional and global changes. How Taiwan was affected by the 
capitalist world-system and what the social formations were, as well as the 
development and achievement of each period, will be briefly examined.  
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven will examine Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
development during 1987/88-2007 via analysis of two key aspects: Taiwan’s 
structural position within the capitalist world-system and its methods of incorporation, 
and the dynamics of state-capital-labour relations. Chapter Five will focus on the 
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industrial sector as the international expansion of Taiwanese industrial capital has 
deepened Taiwan’s semi-peripheral status and has led to Taiwan becoming further 
engaged in the international division of labour of production. The development of 
industrial capital needs to be analysed in the context of the changes to the capitalist 
world-system and the state’s industrial policy. Firstly, neo-liberalism, in terms of 
liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, has caused a collapse of Taiwan’s 
bureaucratic-corporate capital9  and has limited the guiding and interventionist role of 
the state in Taiwan (in particular because the state no longer acts as a capitalist itself). 
Secondly, global restructuring has led to Taiwan’s industrial capital expanding their 
overseas production: China in particular has become the largest destination and 
trading partner for Taiwanese industrial capital. However, the state has been cautious 
in exporting Taiwan’s capital to China. Thirdly, the dominant industrial capital, the 
hi-tech electronics industry, demonstrates how a guiding and interventionist role of 
the state (even if its functions have been limited) has promoted Taiwanese industrial 
capital to take advantage of global restructuring, namely to upgrade Taiwan’s position 
from processing production to contract manufacturing as part of a global production 
chain in the electronics industry. Such a path, however, limits the development of 
Taiwanese industrial capital as the dominant force in this industry, and in the wider 
capitalist world-system, thus becoming one of the obstacles in ascending to the core. 
Chapter Six will examine Taiwan’s financial sector as its development is key to 
ascending to the core in the capitalist world-system. The development of Taiwan’s 
financial capital has also been influenced by changes to the capitalist world-system 
and the state’s financial policy. Firstly, financialisation has led to the liberalisation of 
Taiwan’s financial sector and the state no longer acts as a source of financial capital 
to directly fund industrial capital. However, the speed of financial liberalisation and 
privatisation has been slow due to the state’s caution (security concerns and a lack of 
access to international financial institutions), cross-strait relations (the delay of 
Taiwan’s accession to the WTO), and resistance by labour groups (e.g. anti-
privatisation campaigns).  Secondly, global restructuring also brings about a pattern of 
financialisation of capital, which can be observed in Taiwan. Yet, Taiwan’s financial 
capital has not yet dominated the non-productive financial sector but instead relies on 
                                                 
9
 The term will be introduced in Chapter Four. It was created by Liu Jin-qing (1975) to refer to 
Taiwan’s KMT state bureaucrats and private capitalists are combined together to dominate the 
industrial and financial sectors in the post-war period.  
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foreign financial capital’s innovation. Thirdly, the state promotes the concentration of 
financial capital but limits overseas expansion of Taiwanese financial capital into 
China. Financial capital is not able to increase transnationalisation, nor does it become 
influential in guiding industrial capital. 
Chapters Five and Six reveal that although the capitalist world-system offers an 
opportunity for the expansion of Taiwanese capital as well as the state promoting the 
ascent of industrial and financial capital, Taiwan’s industrial and financial capital 
nevertheless confront limits on their development due to the restrictions by the state 
and the interstate system. Chapter Seven will look at another restriction to the 
development of industrial and financial capital, namely resistance from organised 
labour. To study the dynamics of organised labour, I begin with an analysis of the 
labour process of Taiwanese labour (e.g. the labour market, working conditions) as 
this pattern reflects how labour is structured in the capital accumulation process. I will 
analyse what the impact of changes to the capitalist world-system has been on the 
pattern of labour. In the first section, I discuss how the changes of the capitalist 
world-system bring about changes to the labour pattern and process, namely the rise 
of skilled labour in the hi-tech sector; the imports of migrant labour; and the rise of 
overseas cheap and low-skilled employment. The position of Taiwanese industrial 
capital in the global production chain has linked Taiwanese labour with hi-skilled 
labour from the core zone on the one hand and with low-skilled labour from the 
peripheral zone (both migrant labour and overseas employed labour) on the other 
hand. Secondly, industrial restructuring and neo-liberalism have had a negative 
impact on the domestic labour pattern in terms of increases in unemployment and 
flexibility. Thirdly, with both the challenges and opportunities created by neo-
liberalism and global restructuring, Taiwanese organised labour has successfully 
resisted or prolonged the negative impact on domestic labour patterns. However, the 
structure and organisation of the Taiwanese labour movement has not been 
transformed and strengthened in confronting the new employment structure and 
labour process. Taiwanese organised labour has neither significant political influence 
over the state and capital, nor does it play an active role as an anti-systemic movement.   
    Chapter Eight is the conclusion. This thesis uses the case of Taiwan to evaluate the 
argument that the structure of capital accumulation, the interstate system, and the 
domestic state-capital-labour nexus determine a national ascent trajectory. The first 
two elements provide the opportunities but put constraints on national development. It 
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is unrealistic to assume that all national states follow the developmental trajectory of a 
core state, such as the UK or the US. We need to analyse the structural position of the 
state in the capitalist world-system. However, we cannot assume that the world-
system only has three kinds of development (i.e. core, semi-periphery, and peripheral) 
and view national states as merely passive actors affected by the world-system. This 
thesis argues that ascent is also a result of national social formation; in particular, the 
state-capital-labour nexus is the core of social formation. As such, the full picture of 
national ascent can be analysed using the three elements mentioned above.  
Taiwan is both a case of semi-peripheral ascent and of a rising East Asian 
economy in the capitalist world-system. Taiwan’s ascent opportunity, strategies and 
obstacles are both conditioned by its structural position within the world-system and 
by its domestic social relations. As Chapter Four shows, Taiwan has been 
incorporated into the world-system since the 17th century. During the K wave A- 
phase (1945-1967/1973) and the early stage of B-phase, Taiwan rose from the 
periphery to the semi-periphery. Its ascent was a consequence of a ‘development by 
invitation’10 from the capitalist world-system, as well as domestic social relations 
facilitating such an ascent, namely a strong and authoritarian state that both guided 
capital and oppressed labour. As Chapters Five to Seven show, with the structural 
changes to the capitalist world-system in the B-phase (i.e. the increased global 
restructuring, financialisation, and the changes to the interstate system) and the 
transformation of domestic social relations (i.e. the increasing power of private capital, 
the decline of state capability, and the increasing autonomy of organised labour), 
Taiwan’s ascent trajectory has also changed. Although a strong state guiding function 
and the oppression of organised labour were once the conditions of Taiwan’s 
capitalist development, recently democratisation and the increase of labour autonomy 
since the 1980s does not limit/restrict Taiwan’s capitalist accumulation. However, 
Taiwan has not yet become part of the core, even if the state has continued its attempt 
to upgrade the structural position of Taiwan. The obstacles to Taiwan’s ascent are 
mainly due to the limits on Taiwanese industrial capital and financial capital, as well 
as Taiwan’s weakening role in the interstate system. This case study demonstrates that 
ascent trajectory needs to be understood as both national social formation and as part 
of the structural changes to the capitalist world-system as a whole.     
 
                                                 
10
 The term is from Wallerstein (1979, p.80).  
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Chapter Two: Rethinking National Capitalist Development  
Introduction 
 
This thesis adopts a modified world-system perspective by adding the domestic state-
capital-labour context to examine national capitalist development, and uses Taiwan as 
a case study. In this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical framework of the analysis 
and demonstrate that it is better than other approaches which concern national 
development. I shall clarify the concept of “ascent” or “development”, as it is not 
merely defined as an increase of national wealth, the growth of a national economy, or 
degree of industrialisation; rather, this chapter will argue that national ascent should 
be defined as both a change of position in the world-system (e.g. from the periphery 
to the semi-periphery) and a change of national social formation. Firstly, the change 
of position means that ascent is a relational concept; that, in other words, the ascent 
and descent of national economies are not isolated national affairs but relate to other 
states and the whole capitalist system. Ascent and descent also relate to the changes in 
resources and power that national states can control politically and economically 
within the world-system. The chapter intends to locate national ascent in the context 
of the capitalist world-system. Secondly, ascent is not only a change of position 
within the world-system, but also represents a change of social formation, for example, 
a change from agricultural capital to industrial capital as the dominant productive 
force in a society, or a change of state autonomy over society.  
      In the first section of this chapter, I will review the literature relating to the issue 
of national capitalist development mainly from the domestic context, including 
modernisation theory, the school of varieties of capitalism, and the East Asian 
developmental model. The limitation of these approaches is that they view 
development as primarily a national affair, one that can be achieved through 
following a certain national model or domestic institutional mechanism, and therefore 
the approaches under research the wider international context which enable some 
countries to develop and some not to. After critiquing the national model of 
development approaches, I will introduce the relational concept of ascent in the 
second section. This concept is based on the theoretical framework of the world-
system perspective which views national development as structured within the whole 
world-system. I agree with the main framework of the world-system approach as it 
provides a structural explanation for the trajectory of national ascent; that is, situating 
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national ascent and development in the context of the world-system. The main 
theoretical arguments of the world-system perspective, including the definition of 
capitalism, the hierarchical structure of capital accumulation, the interstate system, 
and anti-systemic movements will also be discussed. However, the world-system 
perspective does not bring the aspects of national social formation sufficiently into the 
analysis of national ascent trajectory. They provide the “big picture” of structural 
changes within the world-system, but place insufficient emphasis on the dynamics of 
national social formation. Accordingly, the third section will critique the world-
system approach and add a new framework to the study of national ascent, namely the 
analysis of the political dynamics of state-capital-labour relations.   
In general, the chapter argues that a country’s structural position and methods of 
incorporation into the capitalist world-system condition and constrain a country’s 
ascent. Analysing the domestic level of state-capital-labour relations can demonstrate 
the specific trajectory (including the achievement and obstacles) of ascent, and how 
that country uses the opportunities to ascend. Ascent trajectory is both informed by 
national social formation and structured in the capitalist world-system. The 
combination of these aspects (the structure of capital accumulation, the interstate 
system, and the state-capital-labour nexus) is the nature of national developmental 
trajectory   
 
2-1 A Critique of the National Model Approach 
 
I will review three main approaches (modernisation theory, varieties of capitalism 
school, and the East Asian developmental model) which place national development 
at the centre of their research by analysing domestic factors, such as economic 
systems, institutional arrangements, the role of the state, industrialisation policy and 
so on. These three main approaches have been used to study the developmental 
experiences of developed and developing countries (e.g. Britain, Japan, German, and 
East Asian NIEs) and have played an influential role in the study of national capitalist 
development.  
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2-1-1 Rostow’s modernisation theory 
 
Modernisation theory was the first influential theory on national economic 
development after World War Two. Its main approach was to view national 
development process as a series of successive linear stages through which all 
countries must pass (Todaro 2006, p.78). The approach views the modernisation 
process as a global, phased and lengthy process which originated in fifteenth century 
Europe, and has now become a worldwide pattern (Huntington 1971). The leading 
scholar, Walt W. Rostow, in The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (1960), introduced the analytical framework of modernisation. Based on 
Britain’s developmental experience, he argues that all countries must pass through 
five linear stages of development, from low-productive agriculture to high-productive 
industrialisation, and from a national economy to integration into the international 
economy. The first stage is ‘the traditional society’, which has limited productivity 
due to a lack of access to modern science. Thus it results in an agricultural economy 
in accordance with a hierarchical social structure. Examples are the Chinese empires 
and medieval Europe. The second stage is ‘the preconditions for take-off’, which is 
the transition process between a traditional society and ‘take-off’. Agricultural and 
industrial productions are introduced and modern science and modern manufacturing 
enterprises thus appear. Overall, society is still characterized by low-productivity 
methods. This stage can be observed in late seventeenth century and eighteenth 
century Western Europe.  
The third stage is ‘take-off’. With new techniques in agriculture and industry, 
society expands production and develops its economy by expanding new industries 
and increasing effective investment and high capital imports.  Britain, France, and the 
US in the early nineteenth century; Germany and Japan during the late nineteenth 
century; Russia and Canada in the early twentieth century; and India and China in the 
1950s are all examples. The fourth stage is ‘the drive to maturity’. During this stage, 
society expands into the international economy with a mature ability to produce goods 
that were formally imported. Industry has transformed into a more technological and 
refined process and society has the capability to produce select products. Most of the 
Western European countries and the US were at this stage by the end of the nineteenth 
century. The final stage is ‘high mass-consumption’. The increase of real income per 
head brings about a large number of people who can transcend consumption for basic 
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needs. Therefore the structure of labour also shifts to increase workers in offices or in 
skilled jobs, and the ratio of urban workers to total population also increases. This 
stage can be seen in the advanced countries.    
      There are several problems with modernisation theory. Firstly, Rostow adopted 
the British experience of development and assumed that other developing countries 
can develop under the same conditions. Modernisation studies view national states as 
an independent unit and presume that a state begins on a path of development that will 
finally arrive at the same stage of development as advanced countries (Hopkins 1982, 
p.10). As some scholars argue (e.g. Deviney and Crowley 1978; Todaro 2006; Cypher 
and Dietz 2004; Wallerstein 1979), the assumption is limited, as it ignores the actual 
conditions of other developing countries, and it attempts to generalise a universal path 
from the British experience. A country’s developmental capability cannot be taken for 
granted or be viewed as a pre-given. Not all countries have the same capability as an 
advanced economy like Britain. Secondly, modernisation theory is ahistorical and 
incorrectly assumes that the dynamics of economic development, at least during the 
first three stages, is limited by national boundaries (Wallerstein 1979). The so-called 
“modernisation” process is actually a historical evolution of capitalism. The point is 
that the dynamics of capitalism never limits itself to national or state boundaries. Nor 
does capitalism develop as a linear trajectory from national economies to the world 
economy. Thirdly, modernisation theory narrows the concept of development to 
economic growth, and technological and industrial change.  Cumings (1993) criticises 
modernisation theory as ‘technological determinism’ (p.25) as the theory views 
technological evolution is the only driver of capitalist development and social change, 
one which ignores other factors.  
 
2-1-2 Varieties of capitalism 
 
The British model was appraised by Rostow in the 1960s, however, from the 1980s 
onwards, numerous comparative studies began to pay attention to other modes of 
national development in advanced countries, including Zysman (1983), Albert’s 
(1993) ‘capitalism vs. capitalism’, Hart’s (1992) ‘rival capitalists’, Hutton’s (1996) 
‘world capitalisms’, Whitley’s (1999) ‘divergent capitalisms’, Crouch and Streeck’s 
(1996) ‘capitalism diversity’, and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997). These works 
explored the diversity of capitalism and compared different models of capitalist states 
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in the developed world. As such, these studies are different from Rostow, who 
assumed a universal model, yet they all try to identify a model to serve as a lesson for 
other countries. I will mainly concentrate on Zysman, Hart, Albert, Hutton, Crouch 
and Streeck in the following. 
    John Zysman (1983) distinguishes between three models of national capitalism by 
analysing the national financial structures and the industrial adjustment process. He 
focused on the capacities of various governments in advanced countries to intervene 
selectively in industrial performance. In particular, different structures in the financial 
sector reflect the different capacities of states to intervene in the economy. He 
identifies three models, namely the ‘state-led’ model, represented by Japan and 
France, the ‘market-led’ model, represented by the US, and the ‘negotiated’ model, 
represented by Germany (p.90-91). In the Japanese model, the financial system 
allocates resources through the state to facilitate industrial policy. State power is 
mainly controlled by the state bureaucracy in cooperation with major firms and banks. 
State-led policies, in combination with a credit-based, price-administered financial 
system, drive economic development. In contrast, the US model is a regime of market 
competition and price-driven adjustment with a limited regulatory function. This 
model, in Zysman’s view, is less efficient than the state-led and credit-based model. 
The negotiated model operates economic policy through political bargaining between 
the government, businesses and labour groups rather than through the market 
mechanism. This model faces problems as the environment of the international 
economy changes.  
Hart (1992) provides more structural analysis than Zysman in discussing the 
different arrangements of industrial countries as he argues that only studying the role 
of the government limits the understanding of the different degrees of competitiveness 
between national states. He suggests instead that the focus should be on the how the 
government, the business sector, and labour are organised within these countries in 
pursuing international competitiveness. This is termed ‘state-societal arrangements’ in 
which the state (governmental bureaucracies) and society (business and organised 
labour) are institutionally linked (Hart 1992, p.1). In the Japanese model, the state has 
a strong role in leading industrial development, alongside business groups, that is, 
industrial groups plus major banks and informal business groups. Labour is organised 
at the enterprise level and has established a negotiating relationship on some issues, 
although the overall labour organisation is weak. In the US model, the state acts more 
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to serve business’ interests. Governmental units (e.g. the US Chamber of Commerce, 
the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Office of the US Trade 
Representative) are required to hold discussions with business groups before 
finalising policies. In Hart’s view, US capitalism is led by business groups, while 
Japanese capitalism is directed by the state or a state-business coalition led by the 
state. In Hart’s view, Japan and Germany are better performers than the US and the 
UK.  
For Albert (1993), there are two models of capitalism. The ‘Rhineland’ model of 
capitalism (based on industrial banking, a comprehensive welfare state, small equity 
markets, dynamic and research-intensive manufacturing, comprehensive training and 
education, strict company laws and also a tightly regulated financial sector) is 
superior to the ‘Anglo-American’ model, which is based on the principle of a liberal 
economy as the only market mechanism in terms of economic organisation, financial 
structures, and social control. Hutton (1996) compares different models of capitalism 
in the US, Japan, the European states, and Britain, in terms of the basic principles of 
market, financial system, labour market, firms, welfare system, and government 
policies.  He argues that British capitalism is in crisis and should shift to a model of 
‘longtermism, commitment and co-operation without losing the stimulus of 
competition’, as is the case with Japanese and German models of capitalism (p.285). 
Crouch and Streeck (1996) argue that capitalism operates via a national system, and 
that there is more than one system. Accordingly, what determines capitalist diversity 
is national, and some national systems were found to be more ‘institutional’ than 
others (Crouch and Streeck 1996, p.2-2).  
The above comparative studies are only part of the wider research agenda into the 
varieties of capitalism. According to Hall and Soskice (2001), the approach of 
comparative capitalism in advanced countries has gone through three stages, 
beginning with Andrew Shonfield’s (1969) Modern Capitalism as the first analytical 
framework to compare institutional structures of Western European capitalist states. 
He argued that the key to economic success is ‘political will and skill’ in terms of the 
capability of political institutions (p.63). The second framework of comparison is 
based on the concept of neo-corporatism in the 1970s, which focuses upon state-
labour relations. Neo-corporatism views national policies as requested by and 
negotiated with major interest groups, especially those of the greatest economic 
importance: the trade unions and employers' associations. The third stage is a 
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comparison of the social systems of production in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. 
Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). This approach focuses on the internal structures of 
firms, the structures of the financial markets, education systems, industrial relations 
systems, and the nature of state intervention. They conclude that there are two types 
of social systems of production, one the social system of mass standardised 
production, as represented by the US model; and the other the social systems of 
flexible production, as represented by the German and Japanese models. Moreover, 
Hall and Soskice (2001) proposed a new analytical framework of comparative 
capitalism that tries to go beyond the above three frameworks by bringing the 
organization of the private sector (firms) into the centre of the analysis in order to 
‘understand the institutional similarities and differences among the developed 
economies’ (Hall and Soskice 2001, p.1). Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish 
between two types of national economies. The first type is ‘liberal market economies’ 
in which firms organise their activities mainly through hierarchies and a competitive 
market mechanism; the other type is ‘coordinated market economies’, in which firms 
rely heavily on non-market factors (e.g. networking, contracting) to promote their 
core competencies (p.8). The example of the former is the US and the latter is 
Germany and Japan. The new framework is referred to as the ‘varieties of capitalism 
approach (VoC)’; yet Hall and Soskice (2001) recognise that the new framework is 
much influenced by Albert (1993), Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), Whitley (1999), 
and Crouch and Streeck (1996). As such, I group this literature above as belonging to 
the school of varieties of capitalism, although the context of comparisons is different 
from each other.  
Huang (2002) suggests broadening the school of VoC to include other 
comparative approaches: (1) ‘production regime’ analysis, (e.g. Soskice 1999) which 
concerns the institutional framework of the production regime of the economy, 
including the financial system, industrial relations, the education and training systems, 
and the companies networks; (2) the ‘social structure of accumulation’ approach, 
which studies the set of social institutions that facilitate the accumulation of capital, 
including political and ideological structures and economic institutions; (3) ‘business 
system’ analysis (e.g. Whitley 1992), which argues that the way resources are 
organised by structured hierarchies and markets will distinguish one business system 
from another; (4) the ‘national system of innovation’ approach that studies 
organisations, institutions, and links in a country, and assumes that differences in 
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national competitiveness depend on the technological capabilities of firms (e.g. 
Bengt-Åke Lundvall); (5) the ‘regulation school’, which intends to identify different 
regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation in capitalist countries (e.g. Bob 
Jessop).    
      Overall, the VoC school advances Rostow’s economic growth theory in the way 
that recognises different national trajectories of development, whereas Rostow had 
only suggested a single trajectory. The VoC approach also provides detailed 
discussion on national differences, in particular in the comparison of institutional 
arrangements and state-societal relations. However, just as with Rostow’s perspective, 
the VoC approach only focuses on the developing experience of advanced countries 
and tries to identify a superior model which can serve as a lesson to both the declining 
model and any rising capitalist state (albeit not all VoC analysts, but those that do 
include Albert, Zysman, Dore, Hutton, Crouch, Streeck, and Hart). The weakness of 
this approach lies in the fact that it views development as mainly a national affair, and 
assumes that a country can improve its development once it is more competitive and 
improves its institutional arrangements compared to other models. As Crouch and 
Streeck (1996) contend, ‘what generates capitalist diversity was “national”…Some 
national economies were found to be more institutional than others (p.2-3).’ Yet, we 
need to ask why a certain kind of model or institutional arrangement (e.g. Fordism, 
mass production, the liberal market) was once competitive in the past but is not now? 
Is one model per se superior to another? Are there any other factors that determine the 
competitive nature of a model? If there is one developmental model superior to others 
by its nature, in that sense there will be no need for further research into the diversity 
of capitalism as the best model has already been found. This thesis argues to the 
contrary, that the competitive nature of a certain national model also needs to be 
viewed historically and put into the wider context of international political economy 
that goes beyond national affairs. Some literature of the VoC school (e.g. Hall and 
Soskice 2001) recognise that national systems experience external influence from a 
world economy and thus national systems can adjust themselves based on institutional 
differences. However, they only focus on how different national systems respond to 
external influences but under research the connection between these different systems. 
VoC analysis can be seen as an attempt to explain the patterns of Germany and Japan 
as emerging economic competitors to the US and the UK in the world economy 
during the 1960s and the 1970s. The emerging competitors (German and Japan) and 
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the declining models (the US and the UK) are arguably not completely two isolated 
patterns. For example, Japan’s post-war rapid industrialisation and economic growth 
benefited from direct and indirect US assistance (see Cumings 1987).  
Strange (1997) argued that most comparativists and state-centric theorists only 
pay attention to the differences between states, but ignore the similarities. As such she 
suggested common factors of global change, namely the theory of structural power 
(i.e. the structure of security, production, finance, and knowledge). However, merely 
focusing on similarities is also a partial approach; in reality, both similarities and 
differences co-exist, as long as the global framework of capitalism is recognised. 
These comparisons are problematic, according to Radice (2004), for two reasons: 
firstly, when they focus on the variety of institutional arrangements, which are linked 
to the conceptualization of ‘embeddedness’, the result is a difficulty in deploying a 
theoretical framework of institutional change, unless it is viewed as just an 
‘exogenous’ force to a certain ‘national’ model (p.188-189). The second problem is 
that using the taxonomy of ‘nationality’ as the central analysing structure reproduces 
the concept of Western ‘sovereign statehood’, which ‘underpins an implicit definition 
of capitalism as a system divided into distinct national capitalisms’ (p.184). 
In sum, I agree with the VoC approach’s assumption that national developmental 
trajectories are diverse; yet this diversity cannot be viewed as independent national 
models that merely compete with each other. A “universal” model might be good only 
for a time. The mobility of ascent is possible through the structure of capitalism and 
within a particular domestic context; however, ascent cannot be viewed as a universal 
model. Varieties of national developmental trajectories should be seen as a relational 
concept, where one model’s descent is related to another model’s ascent. Thus, the 
trajectory of national development is not limited by national institutional 
arrangements or any other domestic system but is also embedded in a wider historical 
and international context.  
 
2-1-3 The approaches of the East Asian NIEs developmental model 
 
While other advanced countries may have intended to learn the “Japanese lesson” in 
the 1970s, the “East Asian Tiger’s lesson” for other developing countries began from 
the 1980s. As the VoC approach attempted to explain the pattern of the rising 
competitors of Japan and Germany in the camp of advanced economies, several 
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perspectives also started to pay attention to the rise of some East Asian developing 
economies, the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs). Fruitful discussion on the 
successful model of East Asian development since the late 1980s, as the section will 
discuss, has two implications. One is that the discussion is an extension of the 
Japanese experience as a developmental model into the East Asian model; the other is 
that the discussion builds on the experiences of advanced economies into developing 
countries. In this respect, the discussion of the East Asian development model is not 
only an attempt to explain the rising East Asian economies but also a continuation of 
a long-term debate on national developmental trajectory.  
The empirical data show that the East Asian region has had remarkable growth 
since the 1980s. Considering economic growth in terms of an average annual growth 
rate in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), countries in East Asia and the Pacific 
maintained a growth rate of 6.8% between 1980 and 2007, a figure notably higher 
than the average growth rate of the world’s GDP (1.44 %), than the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (1.97 %), and other low-
and-middle income countries (2.43 %).11 Moreover, East Asia’s share of world Gross 
National Product (GNP) increased from 13% in 1960 to 25.9% in 1999, which was in 
distinct contrast to other regions (Arrighi, Hui et al. 2003, p.3). How can East Asian 
countries grow while other economies remain comparatively sluggish? 
Two major approaches explain the particularity of the dynamics of East Asian 
development. The first approach is neoclassical economics, which suggests that free 
market principles are major factors that drive the dynamics of industrial structure 
(World Bank 1993). The free market principles include (1) a virtuous circle of high 
investment, high economic growth, and high savings rates; (2) the increase of 
production efficiency via the imports of foreign capital and technology; (3) rising 
labour participation rates and good quality of labour (World Bank 1993). The engine 
of development is a ‘competitive market’ (especially domestic markets integrated 
within the international market) that acts as institutional arrangement to generate 
efficient resources (Wade 2004[1990], p.10). Therefore the key developmental policy 
is an outward oriented regime, one that encourages exports and has few impediments 
to imports. This approach, in Wade’s view (2004[1990]), is a shift in developmental 
policy from the prescriptions of the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. those of modernization 
theory) towards a neoclassical view of markets and governments of the second half of 
                                                 
11
 Data from the World Bank (2009). 
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the 1970s (p.10). Todaro (2000) divides the neo-classical economics school into three 
areas of analysis: (1) free-market analysis, which argues that the market is efficient 
and perfect, and thus the analysis views government intervention as a negative impact 
on the self-sustaining market; (2) public-choice approach, a public policy approach 
that uses some of methodologies of neoclassical economics, and which argues that 
politicians, bureaucrats, citizens, and states all pursue their own interests and suggests, 
therefore, that governmental intervention should be as minimal as possible; (3) the 
market-friendly approach, which recognises that the market is not perfect and that 
government can intervene in the event of market failure. This analysis is mainly with 
the work of the World Bank economists. Wade categorises this approach as ‘the 
simulated free market theory’ (2004[1990], p.23). 
Free-market analysis and a market-friendly approach are often applied to East 
Asian development, especially to the newly industrialising economies (NIEs) – South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These analyses view the successful 
development of East Asian NIEs as due to either the free market principle or to the 
export oriented strategy. Balassa (1988) argues that export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) was the main engine for growth in East Asian NIEs at first, and the growth of 
exports contributed to East Asian NIEs’ GDP growth; secondly, exports helped the 
NIEs to overcome the limitations of their domestic markets. EOI refers to an economy 
with industrial exports serving as the leading or main sector; import-substitution 
indusrialisation (ISI) refers to an economy that attempts to substitute products which 
the economy imports so that it can reduce its dependence on imports. Balassa (1989; 
1991) also contends that East Asian NIEs’ shift to free market discipline in terms of 
EOI in the 1960s and 1970s was a better strategy than Latin American NIEs’ strategy 
of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). The successful development of EOI was 
driven by four factors: stability of the export incentive system; limited government 
intervention; well-functioning labour and capital markets; and reliance on private 
capital (Balassa 1988, p.286-288). The World Bank (1993) terms the developing 
Asian countries mentioned in the previous paragraph together with Japan as ‘high-
performing Asian economies’ (HPAEs) which not only implemented a stable 
macroeconomic policy but, more importantly, also adopted an export-push strategy. 
The export-push strategy means that these countries ‘moved rapidly towards 
international best practice, despite highly imperfect world markets for technology’ 
(World Bank 1993, p.358). Bhagwati (1988) argues that the government of an under-
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developed country needs to maintain an export promotion strategy in order to promote 
economic growth, something governments in East Asian countries have done well. In 
a case study, Porter (1990) views South Korea as fostering a national consensus on 
pursuing international competitiveness by which the government has largely limited 
its intervention.   
The second approach employed to explain East Asian NIEs’ successful 
development, the state-centred perspective, argues that the dynamics of East Asian 
growth depend more on the state’s vital role in guiding the economy rather than the 
free market mechanism. The approach has rich studies concerning the role of the state 
in terms of ‘state autonomy’, ‘state capacity’, or ‘state intervention’ in the process of 
East Asian economic development. According to Huang (2002), state autonomy 
means that the state has autonomy from other social forces (e.g. capital and labour) 
and hence its bureaucracy is able to design and implement long-term developmental 
policy; state capacity is the state’s exercise of power over society;  state intervention 
refers to the guiding and interventionist roles of the state in the national economy. 
These state-centred perspectives include Johnson’s (1982) concept of ‘the 
developmental state’ which takes Japan as a case study, Wade’s (2004[1990]) 
‘governing the market’ which uses Taiwan as an example, Amsden (1989)’s ‘getting 
the price wrong’, Evan’s (1995) embedded autonomy, Weiss and Hobson’s (1995) 
‘governed interdependence’, and Dean’s (1996) ‘capitalist developmental state in East 
Asia’. Several case studies concerning the role of the state in industrialisation were 
conducted in the 1980s and the 1990s, including South Korea (Haggard and Moon 
1983; Koo 1984; Whang 1987), Singapore (Lim 1983; Rodan 1989), and Taiwan 
(Amsden 1989; Gold 1986; Wade 2004[1990]).  
      Johnson (1982) follows the concept of ‘economic nationalism12’ by the German 
historical school to study the Japanese “miracle” of the 1960s. He disagrees with the 
distinction between ‘market rationality’ and ‘plan rationality’, represented as liberal 
economies versus Communist economies (p.18). On the contrary, he argues that the 
Soviet-type economies are ‘plan-ideological’, and the real ‘plan rationality’ model is 
Japan (p.18). According to Johnson, the model has three main features.  Firstly, it is 
the state, rather than the regulatory regime or market (e.g. the US economy) which 
takes on the developmental function that leads industrialisation. Secondly, the plan-
                                                 
12
 The concept refers to a strong domestic control of economy, labour, and capital formation which 
includes protectionist measure and the ISI.  
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rational model addresses industrial policy in terms of promoting industrialisation 
through selected strategic industries. By contrast, the market-rational model does not 
have an industrial policy and relies on rules and the market mechanism. Thirdly, 
within the plan-rational model, the planning and execution are undertaken by a small 
elite group of high-level, well-educated, and talented economic bureaucrats, whereas 
within the market-rational model, the government officials are mainly composed of 
elected members of other professions (e.g. lawyers), and economic decision-making 
often occurs in the legislative chamber.  Such a developmental oriented, plan-rational 
model is called ‘a developmental state’. Johnson (1982) argues that if one country 
attempts to learn from the Japanese achievement, the prerequisite for that country is to 
firstly be a developmental state, and then to become a regulatory state (i.e. the market-
rational model) or a welfare state (p.306). Although Johnson recognises that Japan’s 
special historical (e.g. pre-war development, the Second World War) and social 
context (e.g. nationalism) are key factors in the emergence of the developmental state, 
he believes that other countries might be able to work out a social arrangement which 
is comparable to Japan’s, and then countries can adopt the abstract model of the 
development state. Such an abstract model (the developmental state) would have four 
key elements: (1) the existence of a small but elite technocracy within the system; (2) 
a bureaucracy which has enough autonomy to operate effectively and implement 
policies; (3) compliance with ‘market-conforming’ principles and state intervention in 
the economy; (4) a pilot organisation similar to the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) (p.315-320).  
     Wade (2004[1990]) develops a governed market theory (GM) in distinction to the 
neoclassical school’s free market theory in order to further address the role of the 
developmental state and the nature of the development. GM theory contends that 
capital accumulation is the primary force for development, and the theory explains 
that East Asia’s superior growth is the result of high levels of productive investment 
from interventionist economic policies, especially in selected strategic industrial 
policies, to pursue international competition. Wade distinguishes between two kinds 
of integration for a national economy: ‘internal integration’ and ‘external integration’ 
(p.xlviii). Internal integration refers to a domestic economy that has a heavy set of 
links between sectors, a well-filled input-output matrix, a structure of domestic 
demand, and strong social articulation; external integration focuses on the principle of 
comparative advantages and an outward-oriented trade regime. East Asian NIEs have 
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successfully integrated with the world market via an EOI policy, yet, from the view of 
GM theory, ‘the development of a national economy is more about internal 
integration than about external integration’ (Wade 2004[1990], p.xlviii). The most 
important factor to such integration is the government’s interventionist and guiding 
role. Wade mainly places emphasis on internal integration without making a sufficient 
link to larger systemic factors of change (referred to as external integration). Wade’s 
research on Taiwan of the 1950s and the 1960s, as Chapter Four will discuss, was in 
particular the period that the world-system and US hegemony provided an opportunity 
for Taiwan to ascend. 
     Amsden’s (1989) study of South Korea’s ‘late industrialisation’ argues that the key 
factor to South Korea’s economic achievement is that South Korea is intentionally 
‘getting the price wrong’ (p.139). In her view, it is the state, rather than the market, 
that leads capital into selected industrial sectors and manages resource allocation. 
Furthermore, as a late-industrialising economy, it is essential for the government to 
promote technological adoption as a means of “catching-up” with advanced countries. 
Accordingly, any late-industrialising country should catch-up with the 
industrialisation process through “learning”, which is better promoted through a high 
degree of state intervention. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) contend that 
states can be viewed as organisations that promote significant goals through official 
collective actions. Deans (1996) identifies five core features of a ‘capitalist 
developmental state in East Asia’, namely the fusing of the public and private, state 
ideology, developmental legitimacy, plan rationality, and a relatively autonomous 
economic technocracy. Chang (1999) reviews the long-established argument of 
previous development economists13 that the state can create and regulate the national 
economy for the purpose of accelerating industrialisation.  
The two approaches are debates on East Asian developmental trajectory and about 
the kind of model which can be identified as a lesson for the developing world. They 
seem to contrast with each other - while the neoclassical school addresses market-
driven forces, the state-centred approach emphasises the significance of state 
intervention. The now widely cited 1993 World Bank report recognises that state 
intervention does somehow ‘matter’ in certain selective industries, although it is only 
in the northeast Asian countries that this intervention has been truly successful, while 
                                                 
13Including Friedrich List (national capitalism), Alexander Gerschenkron (late development), Gunnar 
Myrdal (a hard state) and Simon Kuznets. 
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overall, according to the World Bank, the industrial policy of East Asian states does 
not work well (World Bank 1993). In response, Amsden (2001) argues that not only 
did some Asian countries, but many other developing countries14 successfully adopt 
certain institutional arrangements through an extended role of the government to 
catch-up during the 1950s to 1980s (e.g. development banking, local-content 
management, selective seclusion, and national firm formation) (p.125). It is 
noteworthy that the World Bank seemed to modify their free market dominated 
interpretation because of the East Asian crisis of 1997, the absence of any empirical 
study of China in the 1993 report, and effective criticism from state-centrist 
development theorists. The World Bank addressed the following opinions in their 
report of 2001, ‘Rethinking the East Asia Miracle’: 
 
The rich evidence from the 1990s also casts new light on the relative 
contribution of export-led policies and of import liberalisation to growth, and 
it helps to clarify key issues influencing the choices of exchange rate policies. 
We now realize that an understanding of East Asian development requires 
that we come to grips with the political economy of change, with governance, 
and with the roles of key institutions.  
(Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001, preface by Nicholas Stern and Vinod Thomas, 
emphasis added by the author) 
 
Thus the factors of ‘governance’ and ‘institutions’ are recognized in their new vision. 
What kind of governance and institutions mark East Asian development? In the 2001 
World Bank report, Shahid Yusuf summarises four main strands. The first is the 
dedication to appropriate macroeconomic management; the second is the ability of a 
bureaucracy to implement the goal of a ‘strong state’ in order to pursue a long term 
development strategy; the third is to speed up industrialisation and the export-led 
strategy; the fourth is that such a developmental approach needs to be pragmatic, 
flexibly applied, and to consider practical results (Yusuf 2001, p.6-7).  
These four strands are similar to the core features of the developmental state. Thus, 
the market-friendly approach and the state-centred approach are not completely 
                                                 
14Including Asian countries – China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Latin American countries – Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico, as well as Middle Eastern countries- 
Turkey. 
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opposed to one another; rather, they have two characteristics in common: they agree 
upon the necessity of some form of state/government intervention and market-
orientation. Their disagreement lays in how and to what extent the state intervenes in 
the market. For example, in Haggard’s (1990) case studies on East Asian NIEs, he 
argues that these economies combine market forces with strong state guidance to 
implement development policy when they shifted from an ISI strategy to an EOI 
strategy. Secondly, they both regard the East Asian experience as a successful model 
or lesson in national development that can be adopted by other developing countries.15 
The core concern regarding development, in their view, is the matter of finding the 
correct fundamentals of policy and of government-business relations in order to 
successfully integrate into the world economy, something East Asian states do quite 
well.  
The strength of the two approaches is that they advance the intellectual discussion 
on national capitalist development. Unlike modernisation theory and the varieties of 
capitalism school that mainly focus on developed countries, the two approaches look 
at the experiences of developing countries. In particular, the state-centred school is 
aware of the special conditions of a “late–comer” to advanced countries, and therefore 
they view the guiding and interventionist role of the state as a necessity.  However, 
criticisms of the two approaches have been made. Jessop (2005, p.24-25), for example, 
contends that both approaches naturalise the institutional division between the state 
and the market. Neither can see that such a separation is socially constructed and 
problematic. Both approaches only focus on economic growth rather than the specific 
pattern of accumulation regimes which are embedded in broader economic, political, 
and societal context. The developmental state approach in particular ignores the 
political, economic, and social conditions that allowed the state to implement 
developmental policies. Stubbs (2005) criticises the neoclassical analysis as 
ahistorical because it views the efficient resources of a successful economy (e.g. 
capital, educated labour, technology) as pre-given. The neoclassical analysis is not 
interested in explaining why these successful economies have these resources, and it 
also underestimates the interventionist role of the state. Stubbs (2005) also points out 
that the state-centred approach does not provide a systematic or theoretical analysis of 
                                                 
15See Amsden (2001), Amsden and Singh (1994), Harrold, et al. (1996), Leipziger and Thomas (1994), 
Stiglitz (1996). 
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the origins of the interventionist role of the state, which the case study of this thesis 
attempts to do so.  
Moreover, the two approaches are ahistorical and under research the international 
context. Other literature has examined historical and international factors, such as 
geopolitics or the international division of labour, that enable East Asian NIEs to 
implement state intervention and EOI, and these studies do not view East Asian 
economic growth as “miracles”  (Arrighi et al.1993; Bello and Rosenfeld 1990; 
Cumings 1987; Frobel et al. 1980; Gills 1993; 2000). Bello and Rosenfeld argue that 
three conditions enabled East Asain NIEs to be “successful” exporters, namely the 
political economic intervention of the U.S., dependence on Japanese firms, and the 
model of command capitalism rather than free market capitalism (Bello and 
Rosenfeld, 1990). Frobel et al. (1980) view the industrialisation of underdeveloped 
countries in Asia as only one part of the process of the new international division of 
labour. The other part of the process is that these countries are exploited by foreign 
capital through cheap labour in special trade zones. This has led to these countries 
serving the interest of the core economies so that the whole tendency is towards 
uneven development. Arrighi et al. (1993) argue that the rise of the East Asian NIEs is 
actually a single economic miracle which is due to the expansion of the Japanese 
multilayered subcontracting system. Cumings (1987) uses theories of product cycle, 
hegemony, and the world system to examine the origins and development of 
Northeast Asian states (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). He argues that a country-
by-country approach is invalid; instead, a regional analysis (such as viewing the three 
states in the context of a hierarchical interacting unit) is needed.   
     Furthermore, although East Asian developmental model approach advances the 
debate of national capitalist development by adding models based on developing 
countries, they still view development as mainly a national affair. Although 
recognising the reality of the diversity of developmental routes among the advanced 
countries and East Asian NIEs, the approach nevertheless agrees that a country is able 
to develop once it finds a correct or fundamental policy (or mechanism). These 
“national model approaches” or “region-wide models” have been criticized by 
scholars who disagree that a model of development can be generalised and imitated in 
the East Asian region (Abbott 2003; Bernard 1999; Bernard and Ravenhill 1995). 
This thesis argues that a model cannot be generalised, not only in the East Asian 
region but also elsewhere, because development is never limited to national matters.  
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In this section, I have discussed modernisation theory, the varieties of capitalism 
school, and two approaches of East Asian developmental models. In general, they 
mainly view development as a national matter of either arranging domestic 
institutional frameworks (e.g. the role of the state or production system), or choosing 
an industrialisation policy (e.g. EOI), or adopting linear-stages of development (e.g. 
modernisation process). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982) observe that such a 
perspective of national model of development, which they term ‘developmentalist’, 
views the world as consisting of a number of related but essentially ‘autonomous’ 
states, each on an upward trend, with a fundamentally similar route of development 
(p.42). The developmentalist not only pays insufficient attention to historical and 
international contexts, but also misunderstands the nature of capitalism. As Chase-
Dunn (1989) points out, the problem with defining a national economy as a juridical 
unit is that in reality economic integration does not follow national boundaries (p.208). 
The developmentalist’s assumption is that the world economy is an ‘aggregation or 
interrelation of national capitalisms’ (Radice 2004, p.191). The question is, do we 
really have varieties of “national capitalisms” that compose an “unknown” world 
economy?  
The term “national development” mentioned in this section, as well as in the case 
studies that the national model of development school adopts, only relates to 
“development” in terms of a rising “new” economy within the world economy.  As 
mentioned previously, national ascent should be viewed as a relational concept 
because ascent or descent of a national economy is not an isolated national affair but 
relates to other states and the whole system. Ascent and descent also refer to the 
changes of resources and power that national states can control politically and 
economically in the world-system. I disagree with the national model of development 
school as their analysis is ahistorical, under researches the international context, and 
views the diversity of national ascent trajectories as separate patterns or models and 
that one rising, superior model substitutes existing models.  Alternatively, this thesis 
argues that national ascent trajectory should be located in an international and 
historical context, to be precise, in the context of the capitalist world-system and 
domestic context. Domestic context does influence the trajectory of ascent; yet what I 
argue is that the domestic context is part of, but not exclusively, the key determining 
factor. In my view, the theoretical framework of the capitalism of the world-system 
perspective is very useful in providing an alternative approach that differs from the 
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analysis offered by the national model of development. I shall introduce the world-
system perspective and how they view capitalism and national ascent.   
 
2-2 Situate Ascent in the World-System Context: the World-System Perspective 
 
The world-system approach emerged from within sociology in the US during the 
1970s, although world-system analysts themselves consider their approach to be 
interdisciplinary or a ‘unidisciplinary’ approach, one that includes politics, economics, 
sociology, history, and anthropology (Wallerstein 1974, p.11). The approach has its 
own institutional support, e.g. the Fernand Braudel Centre at Binghamton University 
in the US., the Political-Economy of the World-System Section within the American 
Sociological Association, the journals Review and Journal of World-system Research. 
Its core concepts were informed by four major social science debates in the period 
between 1945 and 1970 (Wallerstein 2004). The first was the debate on the route of 
national development between modernisation theory and the core-periphery 
conception (including the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
scholars and the dependency school). The second was the debate among communist 
scholars  as to whether Marx’s concept of the ‘Asiatic mode of production16’ is valid 
or not. The third debate discussed whether the historical transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in Western Europe was either internally or externally driven. The fourth 
debate concerned the spatial-temporal viewpoint of history, and the Annales School in 
particular was influential to world-system perspectives.   
The world-system perspective emerged in the 1970s when its leading scholar, 
Immanuel Wallerstein, published his first volume, The Modern World-System, in 
1974. In the book, Wallerstein proposes the world-system as a theoretical framework. 
He argues that a world-system is a historical system17 (termed ‘historical capitalism’) 
which is self-contained as an ‘economic material entity’ based on extensive division 
of labour (1974, p.348). The term ‘world-system’ does not mean that it covers the 
                                                 
16
 Marx and Engels argued that Asiatic society had a different development route to Western capitalism 
as the former had several distinct features: lack of private property, land still owned by the state, self-
sufficiency of villages, unity of handicrafts and agriculture, and simplicity of production methods.  
17
 Wallerstein (1984) uses the term historical system to demonstrate that it is a system of historical 
cyclical development (i.e. the process of destruction, disintegration, transformation and close) (p.27). 
The term also means that all social systems or societies are ‘systemic’ and ‘historical’ (Wallerstein 
2004, p.94). 
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whole globe but that the system is larger than any judicially-defined political unit 
(Wallerstein 1974, p.15). Arrighi’s (1996) definition of a world-system is more clear, 
‘a spatio-temporal whole, whose spatial scope is coextensive with a division of labour 
among its constituent parts and whose temporal scope extends as long as the division 
of labour continually reproduces the “world” as a social whole’ (p.2). There have only 
existed two varieties of world-system in history, a world-empire led by a single 
political system, and a world-economy without such a single political system. A 
world-economy is not ‘bounded by a unitary political structure’ but is a large zone 
within which there is a division of labour, internal exchange of basic goods, and 
transfers of capital and labour (Wallerstein 2004, p.23). World-economies existed 
prior to the modern era, but were converted into empires or disintegrated (Wallerstein 
1975, p.348). The modern world-economy, the only surviving one, is a capitalist 
world-economy (or a capitalist world-system) which originated as a European world-
economy in parts of Europe and the Americas between the late fifteenth and the early 
sixteenth century. Wallerstein (1974) argues that the establishment of a capitalist 
world-system needed three essential elements: (1) geographical expansion of the 
world, (2) the development of various methods of labour control for different products 
and for different zones, and (3) the creation of relatively strong state machineries in 
the core zones (p.38). For the first element, in the sixteenth century, capital expanded 
from Europe into the Americas. Secondly, the flow of surplus was generated via an 
axial division of labour between three economic zones: core, semi-periphery, and 
periphery. The European division of labour and the various kinds of labour controlled 
between 1450 and 1640 was represented as wage labour and self-employment in the 
core zone (Western Europe and the Mediterranean Christian world), slavery in the 
peripheral zone (Eastern Europe and Hispanic America), and as sharecroppers and 
tenants in the semi-peripheral zones (Northwest and Southern Europe). Thirdly, while 
economic activities were oriented towards the global scale, political activities were 
primarily within the state. The role of the state is a consequence of their different roles 
in the world-economy, and the core states are the most powerful ones. By 1640, the 
core states in the European world-economy were England, the Netherlands, northern 
France, and a declining Spain. Following a historical study of the European 
economies from the sixteenth to nineteenth century, Wallerstein further formulates a 
theoretical framework of the modern world-system (i.e. capitalism) in his various 
publications, and I shall move forward to discuss these theoretical concepts.  
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Before moving to further discussion, I should point out that different arguments over 
Wallerstein’s analysis of the historical and spatial origins of capitalism exist within 
the field18, most notably Frank and Gills (1993), and Arrighi (1994; 1996). Frank and 
Gills (1993) view the contemporary world system as having gone through at least five 
thousand years, as the logic of the ceaseless accumulation of capital existed in Asia 
from that point. Conversely, Amin (1993) argues that the history of the world-system 
did not go back that far as it was brought about by the politics and ideology of the 
tributary (or world-empire, in Wallerstein’s term) in command, not the economic law 
of value. Arrighi (1996) argues that capitalist production began in Italy in the 
thirteenth century, rather than Western Europe in the sixteenth century. His argument 
is based on Braudel’s definition of capitalism as the top layer of world trade where 
large profits are made (the intermediate layer is the market economy, and the bottom 
layer is the elementary and self-sufficient economies). This thesis adopts 
Wallerstein’s assumption of the spatial and temporal origins of the capitalist world-
system, as I agree with his definition of capitalism and the three defining elements of 
the capitalist world-system.  
In this respect, the world-system approach is not a homogenous one. Although 
world-system analysts are in agreement on the fundamental theoretical framework, 
there exist disagreements on definitions and arguments within each framework. The 
focus of research also varies, including cyclical processes in world-systems, 
decolonisation, cycles of war, cycles of revolution, hegemonic cycles, inequity and 
democracy, interactions of class and trade, the roles of women, household, and gender, 
race and ethnicity, commodity chains, socialism, cities, the role of culture, the 
environment, peasants and so forth (Hall 2000).19 I will summarise the basic 
theoretical frameworks in the following discussion and point out the disagreements 
between each framework.  
        
2-2-1The modern world-system: Capitalism 
 
For Wallerstein (1974), the ‘secret strength’ that has allowed the modern world 
economy to survive for five hundred years is the nature of the capitalist world 
economy itself (p.348). The world-system perspective defines capitalism as a modern 
                                                 
18
 See Denemark, et al. (2006), Gills and Thompson (2006), Frank and Gills (1993). 
19
 See Hall (2000, p.9) and various issues of Reivew for the full references. 
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world-system which pursues the endless accumulation of capital. Influenced by 
Marx’s concept, Wallerstein (1996) distinguishes capital from accumulated wealth. 
Capital is used with the primary aim of self-expansion (p.14). However, the world-
system perspectives have developed a different analytical framework of capitalism 
from the Marxist perspective. Marxists view capitalism as primarily a national system 
that then expands to the global scale; the world-system perspective however regards 
capitalism originally as a world-system that then expanded to become the world-
system.  
Marxists claim that capitalism is a mode of production operated by a certain type 
of relations of production (capitalists and wage labour), that took place first in a 
national state (Britain) in the late eighteenth century, and then spread out across the 
globe during the twentieth century. Not until such relations of production become 
dominant in a nation-state can a nation-state be a capitalist state. Capitalism will 
extend such relations of production from capitalist states to “pre-capitalist” states so 
that finally capitalism on the one hand will overcome all other pre-capitalist relations 
of production, and, on the other hand, the intrinsic contradiction of the class structure 
as well as the contradiction between excess production and limited consumption will 
bring about a crisis of capitalism. The Marxist argument can be illustrated as follows: 
 
[…] class structures, once established, will in fact determine the course of 
economic development or underdevelopment over an entire epoch (Brenner 
1977, p.27) […] Economic development was a qualitative process, which 
did not merely involve an accumulation of wealth in general, but was 
centrally focused on the development of the productivity of labour of the 
direct producers of the means of production and means of subsistence. (p.67) 
 
Capitalism had emerged first in one country. After that, it could never 
emerge again in the same way. Every extension of its laws of motion 
changed the conditions of development thereafter, and every local context 
shaped the process of change. But having once begun in a single nation-state, 
and having been followed by other nationally organised processes of 
economic development […] (Wood 2002, p.24) 
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For world-system analysts, Marx’s original concept of capitalism is problematic. 
Chase-Dunn (1989) argues that Marx’s abstract model in the first volume of the 
Capital is based on a closed national society without an international context. In 
particular, this model is mainly deduced from the conditions of nineteenth century 
England. Wallerstein (1991) contends that only focussing on a specific production 
relation, industrial wage-labour, is insufficient to analyse capitalism. He argues that 
Marx himself did not claim that surplus-value can only be extracted from wage labour, 
and neither slavery nor other non-wage relations of production are marginal to 
capitalism (Wallerstein 1991, p. 154-155). In addition, Wallerstein points out that 
Marx was not aware of the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ as Marx merely viewed 
underdevelopment as at a pre-capitalist stage. In contrast, the world-system 
perspective insists that underdevelopment is the ‘creation of the capitalist mode of 
production’ (p.161).  
Both Chase-Dunn and Wallerstein’s criticisms of Marx are not new. In my view, 
one of the earliest critics who shared agreement with the world-system perspective on 
the limits of Marx’s framework was Rosa Luxemburg, although she was categorised 
as a Marxist. Luxemburg (1951[1913]) contends that the objective of capitalist 
production is the ‘ceaseless expansion of reproduction’, and therefore ‘expansion 
becomes in truth a coercive law… becomes a condition of existence…a constantly 
flowing process of alternate appropriation and capitalisation of surplus value’ (p.40-
43). In sum, the aim of capital accumulation is neither the pursuit of a pure surplus-
value nor of consumption; rather, pursuing an expanding surplus-value (capital). 
Furthermore, she found that the argument of capitalism was of a certain type of 
production relation (capital versus wage labour) and that was mainly drawn from 
Marx’s seminal work, the Capital (volume one), which only analysed individual 
capital accumulation. Yet in reality, although an individual capital does exist, but 
individual capital accumulation does not; it is the accumulation of an aggregate of 
social capitals that exist in reality. Luxemburg (1951[1913]) addressed the necessity 
of distinguishing the two levels of analysis, and she was aware of Marx’s attempt to 
formulate theoretical abstraction by making preconditions based on his analysis.20 
                                                 
20
 Luxemburg was aware that Marx “consistently and deliberately assumes the universal and exclusive 
domination of the capitalist mode of production as a theoretical premise of his analysis in all three 
volumes of Capital” (p.348, emphasis added by the author). When Marx discussed the chapter on “the 
conversion of surplus-value into capital” in Volume I, he noted that, “in order to examine the object of 
our investigation in its integrity….we must treat the whole world as one nation, and assume that 
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Therefore Marx’s analysis should be viewed as a good starting point for analysis 
rather than a ‘finished’ solution (Luxemburg 1951[1913]).     
Finally, she found Marx’s scheme of enlarged reproduction in the second volume 
of the Capital self-contradictory, because the scheme not only presents the 
accumulation process as being merely for the sake of production rather than for extra 
surplus-value, but also as one that becomes fully self-realised of surplus-value in 
order to solve the problem of the realisation of surplus-value of the two departments.21 
Marx’s scheme contradicts the assumption of the fundamental conflict between the 
capacity for consumption and production outlined in the third volume of Capital.  
Nevertheless, Luxemburg argued that the weakness of the scheme can be corrected 
through an excess of production of Department II, i.e. II> I (v+s)+II (v+s), or through 
an excess of production of Department I, i.e. I> (Ic+IIc). The crucial matter is, who 
will realise the surplus-value from either department? There has to be demand from 
outside the two departments; accordingly, the adding of a “third party” who is 
“outside” capitalist production is necessary.  In light of this, she argued that 
capitalism from the beginning needs a “non-capitalist surrounding” and a non-
capitalist method of production, and therefore capitalism cannot be limited to 
capitalist production (e.g. wage labour). Although Marxists recognise that capitalism 
needs to expand to the global scale, what Luxemburg (and the world-system analysts) 
contend is that capitalism from its birth was already a result of the interaction between 
the capitalist state (e.g. Britain or the core states in Western Europe) and the world.  
In sum, I agree with Luxemburg, Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn’s critique of Marx and 
Marxists mentioned above. It can be concluded that: firstly, capitalism is a process of 
ceaseless accumulation of capital through expanded reproduction on a globe scale. 
Relations of production are embedded in such a process, rather than relations of 
production alone constituting capitalism. Secondly, Luxemburg’s revision of Marx’s 
                                                                                                                                            
capitalist production is everywhere established and has possessed itself of every branch of industry.” 
(quoted in Luxemburg, 1951[1913], p. 331). 
21
 The scheme of reproduction has two departments, one supplies the means of production, the other 
supplies the whole consuming goods; both departments are composed by a certain amount of ‘constant 
capital (c)’-land, raw material, and machinery, ‘variable capital(v)’-labour power and ‘surplus(s)’. It 
can be summarized as follows (Marx 1974, ch.xx, xxi; Luxemburg 1951 [1913], ch.iv, vi)  
Ic+Iv+Is=Department I (I) 
IIc+IIv+IIs=Department II (II) 
In simple production, I (v+s)=IIc, Ic+IIc=I, and I (v+s)+II (v+s)=II. In enlarged reproduction, the 
formula is: I (v+s)<IIc, Ic+IIc<I, I (v+s) + II(v+s) >II, I (c+v+s)+II (c+v+s)=I+II.   
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analysis shows that it is necessary to bear in mind Marx’s specific methodology of 
theoretical abstraction, i.e. temporarily excluding some factors or giving specific pre-
conditions, rather than directly taking his original text as a “true” scheme of actual 
existing historical capitalism.22 Thirdly, since using non-wage labour is a necessary 
element of capitalism itself, the relationship between “capitalist society” and “non-
capitalist society” is neither a relationship of temporal sequence nor a relationship of 
spatial spread, but rather a geographical division through exchange/trade and the 
division of labour as a whole at any given moment. From the world-system 
perspective, the so-called non-capitalist society has formed a hierarchical relation 
with the so-called capitalist society, which is defined as a ‘core-semi-periphery-
periphery’ structure in the perspective.  
 
2-2-2 Structure of accumulation: the core-semi-periphery-periphery hierarchy 
 
Since the world-system perspective regards the dynamics of capitalism as the world-
system, the accumulation of capital takes place at a global scale rather than within a 
national economy. This section will discuss some basic concepts and mechanisms of 
accumulation, as well as its cyclical movement. 
The accumulation process is undertaken by a hierarchy of three economic zones, 
namely the core, periphery, and semi-periphery. As argued previously, the idea of 
capitalism’s reproduction through a hierarchy of states was not an insight from the 
world-system perspective but was one noticed by Luxemburg. Furthermore, the 
specific analytical framework for the hierarchy was used by Raul Prebisch and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the 1950s. They used the 
concept of centre-peripheral relations to explain the uneven economic relations 
between the US and Latin America. In their analysis, the ‘centre’ was an 
industrialised country exporting manufacturing goods, with the ‘periphery’ exporting 
agricultural goods and raw materials. Such a relationship operates through a particular 
mechanism, the deterioration of trade. Their analysis, however, is limited as it only 
focuses on a specific period (i.e. post-war) and on a specific mechanism (i.e. trade), 
and does not link to the long term and the structural development of capitalism 
(Wallerstein and Hopkins 1982). It was the dependency theorists of the 1960s that 
                                                 
22Before writing the book, Luxemburg (2000[1903]) had already criticized some Marxists’ misreading 
of Capital by only paying attention to the first volume and viewing it alone. 
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placed the concept of centre-periphery (or metropolis-satellite) relations into the 
historical development of capitalism (Wallerstein and Hopkins 1982). Andre Gunder 
Frank argued that capitalist development is both based on the development of the 
metropolis countries, and the ‘underdevelopment’ of satellite countries. They are two 
sides of the same coin, namely development and underdevelopment, and the two 
cannot be analysed as separate processes (Frank 1967). Amin (1976) distinguishes 
between the uneven developmental routes of the core capitalist state and the 
peripheral capitalist state as two different national social formations. 
Wallerstein adopts the concept of core-periphery23 relations and adds another 
analytical unit, the semi-periphery. This is a significant difference to the dependency 
school as the world-system perspective views the hierarchy of accumulation as a 
dynamic process in which ascent and descent are possible and takes place through the 
role of the semi-periphery. The semi-periphery has long been in existence within 
core-periphery relations in order to stabilise the conflict between the core and the 
periphery, rather than as part of a modernisation and industrialisation process. 
Although the hierarchical structure is part of the capitalist world-system, the 
composition of each zone is not fixed. Some states ascend and some descend. Arrighi 
and Drangel (1986) examine this mobility in terms of gross national product (GNP) 
per capita for 93 countries during 1938-1983. They found that five percent of the 
states moved either upward or downward between 1938-1950 and 1975-1983, while 
the other 95 percent remained unchanged between the two periods. 
The core-periphery conception is a relational pair and the distinction between 
these zones/areas is in their economic activities. The world-system perspective argues 
that the core-periphery difference is not between industrial production and agricultural 
production but between different levels of economic activity. Yet the definition of 
different levels of economic activity varies within the school. Chase-Dunn (1989) 
defines core activities as those which receive a high capital return, or are relatively 
capital intensive commodities which employ relatively skilled and highly paid labour; 
and the peripheral activities are the contrast. The criterion of ‘capital intensive 
commodities’ however is questioned by Arrighi and Drangel (1986), who disagree 
that capital intensive production and industrialisation are equal to core activities. 
Firstly, they point out that ‘non-productive’ activities (e.g. finance) are more 
                                                 
23
 The term ‘core’ is used instead of ‘centre’ as the former refers to an area or a zone rather than a point 
(Chase-Dunn 1989). 
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profitable than industrial production. Secondly, capital intensive production does not 
always bring the highest return. Thirdly, industrialisation has been increasingly 
located in non-core zones. As such, Arrighi and Drangel (1986) define core activity as 
one that receives a relatively large share of the total surplus no matter what the nature 
of the activity is. The nature of core-like and periphery-like activities is historically 
bounded and relates to current technology and product cycle. Similarly, Wallerstein’s 
(2004) latest definition mentions a key distinction between core-like and periphery-
like activities as ‘the degree to which they are monopolised and therefore profitable’ 
(p.93). I agree with the definitions of Arrighi and Drangel (1986) and Wallerstein 
(2004). 
      The definition of semi-periphery also varies. Gereffi (1990) argues that the 
characteristics of the semi-periphery are unclear and semi-peripheral ascent is one of 
the least clearly developed topics in the world-system perspective. Wallerstein (2004) 
contends that there is no semi-peripheral product but the semi-peripheral zone 
combines core-like products and periphery-like products because the semi-peripheral 
zone has a particular role within the world-system. Chase-Dunn (1989), however, 
argues that another type of semi-periphery exists, namely that which contains a level 
of intermediate activity between core and periphery activities (p.211-212). He further 
views the semi-periphery as able to play a ‘revolutionary’ role in changing the 
dynamic of capitalism via anti-systemic movement and upward mobility (Chase-Dunn 
1989, p.213). Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) conclude that five definitions of semi-
periphery, based on their historical studies of various world-systems: 
1. A mix of both core and peripheral activities and forms of organisation 
2. Spatially located between core and peripheral regions 
3. Spatially located between two or more competing core regions 
4. Mediating activities linking core and peripheral areas 
5. Institutional features are in intermediate form, between those forms found in 
advanced core and peripheral areas 
By adding Wallerstein’s discussion of semi-periphery, we can add a sixth, namely that 
the semi-periphery plays an intermediate role in the international division of labour. 
Finally, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1977) argue that a semi-peripheral country also has a 
GNP per capita which is intermediate between countries, but a semi-peripheral 
country with ascent mobility should have a higher economic growth rate.  
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I have discussed the hierarchical structure of accumulation; but what are the 
mechanisms to transfer surplus value between zones? Unequal exchange is often 
viewed by the dependency school and world-system analysts (e.g. Amin 1980; 
Wallerstein 1984; 2004) as the main mechanism to transfer surplus-value from the 
periphery to the core and thus to reproduce the hierarchical structure, and to 
incorporate the external area into the capitalist world-economy. The concept of 
unequal exchange was introduced by Arghiri Emmanuel in the 1950s. He contended 
that there exists unequal exchange between products from the periphery (i.e. low 
labour costs) and core-produced products (i.e. high labour costs) based on wage 
differences. However, two world-system scholars have different accounts of the role 
of unequal exchange. Chase-Dunn (1989) reviews different studies on both the 
problem of national development and the mechanism to reproduce core-periphery 
relations, including wage differentials, class-formation, trade composition, 
disarticulation of peripheral economies, transnational corporations, foreign equity 
investments, state power, power-block formation, class struggle, imperialism, and 
foreign aid and loans. He finds that low-wage exports cannot be viewed as a direct 
factor in slowing down national development, and he argues that foreign equity 
investment and foreign debt are more significant than other factors (p.255).  Arrighi 
(1990) contended that unequal exchange is only one of the main mechanisms that 
constitute, reproduce, and deepen the hierarchical structure of capitalism. The others 
are unilateral transfers of labour and capital (p.12-13). Unilateral transfers of labour 
and capital can be involuntary through violence and threats (e.g. slavery, colonial 
economy) or voluntary (e.g. labour migration, capital export). Unequal exchange 
however has a contradictory effect on the hierarchical structure. In reality, a 
peripheral state can use its low-wage commodities to gain wealth. As Arrighi (1990) 
has argued, some East Asian states (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have relied on 
exporting low-wage commodities to ascend since the Second World War. As such, 
unequal exchange can work both towards polarisation and depolarisation, as do 
unilateral transfers of labour and capital. The functions of the three mechanisms might 
not coincide with core-periphery relations, ‘depending on the particular circumstances 
of time and place under investigation (Arrighi 1990, p.14).’  He further contends that 
core-periphery relations are determined by the struggle over the benefits within world 
division of labour (p.15).  
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The final framework of capitalism’s hierarchical accumulation is a cyclical rhythm. 
Since the accumulation of capital takes place on the global scale, the stages of 
development of capitalism are the cycles of accumulation of the whole world-system. 
The growth, stagnation, and crises of capitalism are not limited by national boundaries. 
Most world-system analysts adopt the concept of the Kondratief wave (K-wave, or 
long wave for short) as a cyclical rhythm of capitalism, although the timing and 
moving forces of the K-wave are still widely debated.  The K-wave was named after 
the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff in 1926, and is a basic template of the 
cycles of price inflation/deflation and of production growth/stagnation. Kondratieff 
viewed the long wave as dating from the late eighteenth century. However, some 
economic historians (e.g. Braudel) and world-system analysts use the K-wave to 
analyse earlier periods (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982). The concept of the long wave 
is not only used in the world-system perspective but also in other analyses, e.g. the 
social structures of the accumulation school and the regulation school (Kleinknecht 
1992; Li, Xiao, and Zhu 2007). 
According to Wallerstein (2004), the driving force of the K-wave is the evolution 
of leading industries. The cyclical rhythm consists of an A-phase (expansion) and a B-
phase (stagnation) and lasts 45-60 years, depending on the political measures taken by 
the states to get out of B-phase and return to a new A-phase (p.31). Furthermore, there 
are two important features of the cyclical movement of capitalism. Firstly, the cyclical 
rhythm of the capitalist world-system does not mean that history merely repeats itself. 
Wallerstein (2004) argues that the end of a Kondratieff cycle does not imply a return 
to the same condition as at the start of the cycle (p.31). He contends the reason for this 
is because the limits of the world-system are changed when something has been 
enacted in the B-phase to leave the B-phase and return to an A-phase. Although the 
change solves short-term stagnation, it also starts to create problems for the structure 
of capitalism. Wallerstein (2004) terms the situation as ‘a secular trend’ (p.31). 
Secondly, Wallerstein (1992) points out that there is no reason to assume that state-
level long wave patterns parallel the long wave world-level patterns (p.340). As we 
shall see in following chapters, periods of national change are not exactly the same as 
change in the capitalist world-system, although they generally follow a similar trend.  
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2-2-3 Political system: interstate system and hegemonic transition 
 
The difference between a world-economy and a world-empire is that the former has 
no single political system but multiple states, and the political system in the capitalist 
world-system is an interstate system. In Wallerstein’s (1996) account, the term 
interstate system is preferred to international system/relations because nations and 
nationalism did not effectively emerge until the late seventeenth century, but the 
interstate system had already come into being even before the rise of the capitalist 
world-system (e.g. city-states). Furthermore, the term interstate system implies that 
these states interact as a system, rather than only being a relationship. The national 
states of the sixteenth century and the ideology of absolutism are different from 
nations and nationalism, with the latter not emerging until the late seventeenth 
century24 (Wallerstein 1974, p.145-146). The interstate system and the pursuit of the 
accumulation of wealth via international trade of the sixteenth century provided the 
historical prerequisites for the rise of nationalism, which led eventually to the modern 
sovereign state. Chase-Dunn (1989) argues that the world polity is composed of a 
system of ‘competing states’, which serve as structural support for capitalism (p.137). 
He clearly defines an interstate system as ‘a system of unequally powerful and 
competing states in which no single state is capable of imposing control on all others’ 
(p.142). Every state, even the states in the core zone, is limited by the interstate 
system.  
Wallerstein (1996) claims that some mechanisms (e.g. the international division of 
labour and unequal exchange) have transferred surplus to the core, and that more 
capital has accumulated in the core than elsewhere. As the core has more capital than 
other zones, further mechanisms have been created to facilitate a strong state in the 
core in order to maintain a monopoly; while the reverse is the case in the periphery. 
Centrality in the axial economic network and centrality in the political network thus 
tend to coincide (Hopkins 1982, p.13). So the capitalist world-economy has a strong 
state mechanism at the core and a weak state mechanism in the periphery, while the 
states in the semi-periphery serve to stabilise the imbalance of power relations as a 
whole.  
According to Wallerstein (1984), hegemony is where one power can enforce its 
rules on others through three analogous means: economy, ideology, and politics 
                                                 
24 For the discussion of the rise of the modern state since the eighteenth century, see Mann (1993). 
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(including military and diplomatic). The rise of a hegemon occurs through a sequence 
of a core’s production, commence, and finance spheres; a hegemonic position is also 
lost in reverse order with finance being preserved last and longest (Wallerstein 1984; 
2004). Arrighi (1994) defines hegemony as ‘the power of a state to exercise functions 
of leadership and governance over a system of sovereign states’ (p.27). Hegemony, in 
the world-system perspective, operates between states in the interstate system. The 
concept of hegemony is not used within a national framework, and hegemony within 
the interstate system is one of the dimensions that constitute the capitalist world-
system. The terminology differs from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: hegemony for 
Gramsci is the means by which the ruling class in a national society maintains control 
through the use of violence, political and economic coercion, and culture (Hoare and 
Smith eds. 1971). These means are similar to Wallerstein’s argument; yet Gramsci 
applies the concept to within the state.   
The hegemonic power has a material base, namely its economic power vis-a-vis 
the ability of its enterprises in the world-system. The rise of a new hegemon is driven 
by its superior economic power which represents a dominant production relation that 
incorporates other types of production models from different zones. The three means 
(economy, ideology, and politics) are also similar to the mechanisms suggested in 
other accounts regarding hegemonic power. For example, the neo-realist Gilpin 
argues that the hegemonic state has ‘military, economic and technological 
capabilities’ (Gilpin 1981, p.13). Both the world-system perspective and neo-realism 
argue the necessary existence of a powerful hegemon in the world-system or the 
international system. In contrast, Keohane (1984) argues that hegemony is not 
necessary when it can only facilitate cooperation in the international system, as a 
successful hegemon depends upon asymmetrical cooperation and consensus from 
other states (p.46). However, from the world-system perspective, hegemony matters 
not only in terms of political dominance, but also in the dominance of economic 
power within the capitalist world-system via the production, commerce and financial 
spheres. Furthermore, hegemonic power can enforce its rules on other states via the 
exercise functions of leadership and governance rather than the direct control of other 
states, as a hegemon is not an empire.  
Although the world-system perspective shares some similarity in its concept of 
hegemony with the neo-realism, the major difference between the world-system 
perspective and the neo-realist view of hegemony is in the “dynamics” of hegemonic 
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transition. In the neo-realist’s view, hegemonic power exists to maintain the 
“stability” of the international system. The concept of hegemonic stability was raised 
by American economic historian, Kindleberger (1973). This concept is further used 
by neo-realists, such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin (Krasner and Webb 1989; 
Gilpin 1987). The hegemonic stability theory argues that the dominance of a single 
country is necessary for the stability of the international system as the single dominant 
state can enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the 
system. However, to the world-system theorists, hegemonic power is not static and 
unchallengeable. As Wallerstein (1984) notes, ‘hegemonic power is not a state of 
being but rather one end of a fluid continuum which describes the rivalry relations of 
great powers to each other’ (p.39). The hegemon might decline once it loses its ability 
to develop leading industries ahead of other competitors. When other states begin to 
improve their economic power in the sequence of agro-industrial production, 
commerce, and finance, the remaining hegemony is inevitably challenged 
(Wallerstein 1984; 2004). Furthermore, the hegemon does not decline absolutely but 
relatively, and will not fall into the periphery (Chase-Dunn 1989, p.175).The cycle of 
hegemonic transition is a necessity of the dynamics of historical capitalism, as the 
following argument proposes:   
  
As a hegemonic power declines, there are always others who attempt to 
replace it. But such replacement takes a long time, and ultimately another 
‘thirty years’ war.’ The capitalist world-economy needs the states, needs the 
interstate system, and needs the periodic appearance of hegemonic powers. 
(Wallerstein 2004, p.59) 
 
Historically, according to Wallerstein, there were three instances of hegemony: the 
United Provinces of Holland in the mid-seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in 
the mid-nineteenth century, and the United States in the mid-twentieth century 
(Wallerstein 1984). The hegemonic cycle is different to the cycle of accumulation (i.e. 
K-wave) mentioned previously. The former is about twice as long as K-waves. Most 
world-system analysts argue however that there is correlation between the Kondratieff 
cycle and hegemonic cycle (Shannon 1996; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982). When a 
hegemonic power rises, the timing corresponds with a K-wave upswing (A-phase). 
Some other non-world-system analysts have also made a similar argument. Thompson 
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(2000) studied the political processes of a ‘leadership long cycle’ and argues that it 
has a tight connection with the economic process of K-waves. He defines ‘leadership’ 
as something similar to the term hegemony, although his analysis covers a longer 
period, 930-1973.  
 
Table 2-1: the period of K-wave and hegemonic cycle 
Kondratieff cycle Hegemonic cycle 
A: 1575-95 The Dutch: ascending (1575-1590) 
B: 1595-1621                    victory balance (1590-1620) 
A: 1621-50                    maturing (1620-1650) 
---                    declining (1650-1700) 
A: 1780/1790 – 1810/17 UK: ascending (1798-1815) 
B: 1810/17 – 1844/51         victory balance (1815-1850) 
A: 1844/51 – 1870/75         maturing (1850-1873) 
B: 1870/75 – 1890/96         declining (1873-1897)  
A: 1890/86 – 1914/20 US: ascending (1897-1913/20) 
B: 1914/20 –  1945/49        victory balance (1913/20-1945) 
A: 1945/49 – 1967/73         maturing (1945-1967/1973) 
B: 1967/73 –         declining (1967/1973) 
Source: Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982) 
 
2-2-4 Anti-systemic movements 
 
The world-system perspective is not the first one to conceptualise capitalism as 
constituting a form of social relations, and there is a resistance force in society to 
counter the logic of capitalism. Marx and Engels (1848) argued that the working class 
sells labour power for wages but do not own the means of production, and therefore it 
is the mission of the working class to replace capitalism with socialism. In Polanyi’s 
analysis of capitalism in England in the nineteenth century, he argued that the 
necessity of capitalism is to transform all elements of industry in a society into 
commodities including land, labour, and money. These commodities are fictitious as 
they were not produced at all and were not for sale initially (p.10). A society based on 
these fictitious commodities is the one that ‘subordinates the substance of society to 
the laws of the market (p.71).’ Polanyi argued that the explosion of market capitalism 
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will be disruptive socially. The concept of ‘countermovement’, then, is a movement 
against market forces using ‘the principle of social protection aiming at the 
conservation of man and nature [...] using protective legislation, restrictive 
associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods (p. 132).’ 
Although the world-system perspective has a different definition from Marx and 
Polanyi, the perspective also views that capitalism cannot be separated from society 
as capital is a form of social relations; and there is a counter force against the logic of 
capitalism in order to protect society and change the current system into a different 
system. Such a counter force is an ‘anti-systemic movement’. The term ‘anti-systemic 
movement’ was coined by Wallerstein in 1984, and refers to two counter-movements 
that emerged during the nineteenth century and that represent models of resistance to 
the capitalist world-system, namely social movements and national movements. 
Historically, the main issue of a social movement was class conflict, while national 
movement refers to ethno-national struggles.  He argues that the two types of 
movement actually share some similar features between 1850 and 1970 (Wallerstein 
2002).  The two types of movement both regarded themselves as revolutionary, they 
were politically weak, and they both went through debates over attitudes towards the 
state, whether to adopt a state-oriented strategy or to view the state as an enemy. 
Eventually the state-oriented strategy won out in both of the two movements. Social 
movements sometimes included a nationalist strategy, while nationalist movements 
sometimes pursued a social component. The two movements both engaged in popular 
mobilisation. They both struggled with the debate between ‘revolution’ and ‘reform’ 
as a mode of transformation. Finally, both movements experienced the same problem 
that, once they had come to state power, they found that state power was more 
restrictive than they thought. In sum, Wallerstein argues, both types of movement 
might have had different views towards the world, but their strategies and 
evolutionary processes look alike, namely a state-oriented strategy. Arrighi, Hopkins, 
and Wallerstein (1989) argue that although the organised social and national 
movements have set some limits on capital accumulation from the mid-nineteenth 
century, their overall influence remained confined to within the national state. The 
‘old’ social movement (in particular the labour movement), was successful in 
strengthening the power of the state yet at the same time failed to reduce the conflict 
of interstate competition. 
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The period 1967 to 1973 was not only a turning point in the cycle of capitalism but 
also in anti-systemic movements. The world revolution of 1968 marked the beginning 
of a different kind of anti-systemic movement which shared two basic arguments: 
they opposed both US hegemony and the Soviet Union as a superpower, and they 
criticised the old anti-systemic movements that mainly focused on state power. 
According to Wallerstein (2002), the new anti-systemic movements went through four 
attempts and some are still ongoing at present. The first are multiple Maoisms25 in 
some developing countries, which have very little significance today. The second are 
the ‘new’ social movements that combine environmentalists, feminists, workers, and 
racial or ethnic minorities. This type of movement is stronger in Western Europe than 
elsewhere. These are suspicious of the state-oriented strategy suggested by the old 
anti-systemic movement and the new social movements reject state power as the most 
important object. They take a new form of an anti-systemic movement to challenge 
the logic of capitalism, namely a different ethnic and gender composition, a different 
way of organising, and an increase in the capability to cross national boundaries 
(Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1989).  
     The third type is the human rights organisations located in the core zone. They try 
to implement their campaigns in other zones. The final one is the anti-globalisation 
movements, which were termed as such during the protests at the Seattle WTO 
ministerial meeting in 1999. Following Seattle, this type of social movement 
maintained their campaigns and networks through protests against intergovernmental 
meetings and via the establishment of the World Social Forum in 2001. For 
Wallerstein (2002), this final type of anti-systemic movement seeks to bring together 
all other types of anti-systemic movements at all levels of activist (local, national, and 
international). More importantly, the movement seeks to bring together social 
movement activists from different zones within a common framework and belief that 
another world is possible. In sum, the anti-systemic movement has shifted from a 
national movement and a (national) social movement to new forms during the B-
phase. In particular, the most effective and powerful one to resist the capitalist world-
system is the one that brings together different resistances from different zones and 
sectors. In this respect, while I will discuss the role of organised labour in Taiwan, I 
                                                 
25
 Inspired by the political revolution and cultural revolutions implemented by Mao Zedong in the 
1960s and the 1970s. Today in Nepal and India there are numerous active and also armed maoist 
movements.  
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will see if Taiwan’s organised labour’s resistance has connected with other sectors 
and other states.  
 
In conclusion, most world-system analysts agree that the fundamental feature of 
world-system analysis, namely capitalism, is a world-system rather than a national 
model; that the accumulation structure of capitalism is a hierarchy of a core, semi-
periphery and periphery; that the political system of capitalism is an interstate system 
rather than a nation-state; that there is a hegemonic power within the interstate system; 
that there is a cyclical rhythm of accumulation and hegemonic transition; and that 
there is the possibility of anti-systemic movements to counter the logic of capital 
accmulation. However, there have been some disagreements within each analytical 
framework, e.g. the types of world-system; the origins and location of the capitalist 
world-system; the definition of semi-periphery; the role of unequal exchange; and the 
measurement of cyclical rhythms. This is one of the reasons that the approach is more 
often called a perspective or an analysis rather than a theory (Hall 2000). Moreover, 
one reason why the perspective is rarely described as a ‘theory’ is that some world-
system analysts (e.g. Wallerstein) claim that the approach is ‘not a theory about the 
social world, or about part of it.’ The approach is instead ‘a protest against the way in 
which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the 
middle of the nineteenth century’ (Wallerstein, 1991, p.237). Generally, the approach 
should not be viewed as a homogenous theory but as loosely connected perspectives 
that share the same primary theoretical and analytical framework about capitalism.  
 
2-2-5 Criticism of world-system perspective 
 
Apart from the criticism of Marxists mentioned in section 2-2-1, other critiques, 
including the state-centred theorists such as Skocpol (1977) and Evans (1995), also 
challenge the perspective. Evans (1995) questions the world-system perspective’s 
assumption that national development is only determined by its position in the 
international division of labour and therefore has no room for agency. Instead, Evans 
(1995) argues that ‘state involvement needs to be taken as one of the socio-political 
determinants of what niche a country ends up occupying in the international division 
of labour’ (p.11). Skocpol (1977) also criticises Wallerstein’s theoretical framework 
as based on a two-step reduction: ‘first, a reduction of socio-economic structure to 
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determination by world market opportunities and technological production 
possibilities; and second, a reduction of state structures and policies to determination 
by dominant class interests’ (p.1079). Skopcpol’s argument of the first reduction is 
similar to Evans’; both are unsatisfied with the overestimation of the determination of 
the world-system over the state and the socio-economic structure by world-system 
analysts. I will discuss the issue below. As for the second reduction, Skocpol argues 
that Wallerstein only relies on economic and class factors to explain the degrees of 
state strength and state economic policies, and ignores other factors. In response, 
Arrighi (1996) contends that Skocpol misunderstands Wallerstein’s analysis for three 
reasons: firstly, Wallerstein does not reject the importance of nation-states in shaping 
the world-systemic process but de-emphasises national states as a ‘unit of analysis’ 
(p.3); secondly, Skocpol’s argument is based on the state-centric approach that 
ignores ‘systemic sources’ of state strength (e.g. geopolitics, world money); thirdly, 
Skocpol actually recognises that Wallerstein’s analysis of an interstate system is 
compatible with the importance of politico-military competition among emerging 
European states in facilitating the emergence of the capitalist world-system (p.3). 
However, despite agreeing with the world-system approach’s primarily theoretical 
framework, I agree with some of the criticism, in particular that the world-system 
perspective ignores domestic factors such as the role of the state or socio-economic 
structure, and I will propose a new position in the next section.  
There is another problem with the world-system perspective, namely the role of 
the semi-periphery. The complex and interrelated relationships between the structure 
of accumulation and the interstate system is only addressed clearly in the framework 
of hegemonic power. The relatively strong power of the core zone and the weak 
power of the peripheral zone are also discussed, but the role of semi-peripheral zone 
in both the interstate system and the structure of accumulation of capital are not well 
elaborated. The features of the semi-periphery are still unclear and ambiguous, for 
example, different definitions of core-like and periphery-like activities can lead to 
different definitions of the semi-periphery, as the latter is the mix of the former. The 
role of semi-peripheral zone is situated in the structure of accumulation but it plays a 
political role, so whether to locate countries based on a global division of labour or on 
their positions in the interstate system is another problem. As Martin (1995) notes, 
‘whether and to what extent interstate system may specify a semi-peripheral status or 
be utilized to move between zones of the world-econ
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contestable issue’(p.6). The semi-peripheral process (either descent from the core or 
ascent from the periphery) is at tensional crossroads between interstate state struggle 
and global accumulation. For example, semi-peripheral states may find forward 
movement blocked by the very forces that generated their membership in the zone 
(Martin 1995, p.8). It is also dangerous to generalise a universal pattern of the semi-
periphery, for example, Chase-Dunn (1989) argues the possibility of a counter-system 
revolutionary role for a semi-peripheralstate. Yet, a revolutionary semi-peripheral 
state is not possible without a revolutionary social formation. In my view, the best 
way to develop a clear analytical framework of semi-peripheral development lays in 
the research on various semi-peripheral states, and this thesis will contribute a case 
study. 
Above all, there have not been many studies based on the world-system 
perspective that examine semi-peripheral development26. As Martin argues, it is 
important to understand how and why the semi-periphery has functioned as a ‘primary 
locus for social, labour, nationalist, and anti-systemic movements?’ (Martin 1995, 
p.5). Therefore he claims that the reason to study individual states is to explore the 
semi-periphery by analysing the interstate struggle to maintain and ascend beyond 
semi-peripheral status and not decline within the capitalist world-system. This is what 
the case study will contribute towards. 
 
2-3 Bringing in Domestic State-Capital-Labour Relations 
 
2-3-1 Ascent as national social formation 
 
Wallerstein (1974) argues that three elements are essential to establish the capitalist 
world-system, namely geographical expansion of capital at the global scale, various 
methods of labour control for different zones, and the creation of relatively strong 
states in the core zone. These three elements demonstrate the significant roles of 
capital, labour, and the state. However, apart from the lack of semi-peripheral studies 
as criticised in section 2-2-5, another weakness of the world-system perspective lays 
in the lack of sufficient analysis of social formation, in particular the domestic social 
                                                 
26
 There are two collections of semi-peripheral studies: Martin, W. (1990) eds. Semi-peripheral States 
in the World-Economy, London: Greenwood;  Owen Worth and Phoebe Moore (eds), Globalization 
and the 'New' Semi-Peripheries, Palgrave Macmillan 2009 
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relations of capital accumulation, although Chase-Dunn (1989) notes that one of the 
world-system perspective’s research agendas is, in fact, to study the effect of changes 
in the world-system on national development. Yet most world-system studies pay 
more attention to the “big picture” of the world-system. The accumulation structure 
and the interstate system influence national development, but these are not all of the 
determining factors. Does capitalism as a world-system itself fully explain the ascent 
trajectory of an individual state (e.g. from periphery to semi-periphery and from semi-
periphery to core)? What kind of factors, opportunities, and obstacles cause a country 
to (or not to) ascend? When and how does a country ascend? Although by analysing 
the macro-level of capitalism an understanding of the whole picture of the current 
dynamics of world-system can be gained, such an analysis cannot demonstrate the 
ascent trajectory of each state and how domestic social relations impact upon this 
development path.  
Both the national model of development approach and the world-system 
perspective place insufficient emphasis on the analysis of domestic social relations. 
The former approach, although it gives attention to the role of the state and the 
institutional framework, views the state as a pre-given and a neutral institution rather 
than as a consequence of a power struggle between social forces, and between 
national and interstate power; the latter approach, although recognising the significant 
role of the state in the semi-peripheral zone and argues that an anti-systemic 
movement or nationalist movement can act as a social force in the capitalist world-
system, it does not provide sufficient discussion on the origins of anti-systemic 
movements and how they affect semi-peripheral ascent. The world-system perspective 
has done well to place national ascent in the context of the capitalist world-system; 
yet, the approach lacks viewing ascent as a national social formation and thus embeds 
the forces of anti-systemic movements. Accordingly, this section will discuss the 
concept of ascent in terms of national social formation.  
      I shall clarify what I mean by the terms “social formation”, “social relations” and 
“social forces.” The term “social formation” was introduced by the French Marxist, 
Louis Althusser, who used the term as a substitute for the term ‘society’ (Althusser 
and Balibar, 1968). He argued that social formation is a dynamic and complex process 
which is based on a determinate model of production that integrates economic, 
political and ideological relations at a certain stage of development (Althusser and 
Balibar, 1968, p.313). By contrast, Amin’s (1976) analysis on peripheral economies 
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uses the term social formation to refer not only to a structure that is dominated by a 
determinate mode of production, but also for a structure connected with other 
economies. As such, there are different social formations between national states 
depending on their positions in core-periphery relations. Amin (1976) argues that the 
core zone’s social formation is similar to Marx’s abstract model of a capitalist state, 
but that the peripheral zone’s social formation is more complicated and diverse. For 
example, he points to four features of the social formation of the peripheral zone: (1) 
agricultural capitalism has a dominate role; (2) a large share of local commercial 
capitalist class which has strong links with the core’s capital; (3) a developing special 
form of bureaucratic system; (4) non-complete proletarianisation.27 These features can 
be observed in Taiwan in the pre-1987 period, as Chapter Four will illustrate. I agree 
with Amin’s usage, as he argues that the economic system and social formation of the 
peripheral zone cannot be realised only by itself but needs to be understood as a part 
of the wider global social structure, an assumption which is compatible with the 
world-system perspective.  
     To analyse social formation, as Amin (1976) suggests, it is necessary to examine 
the method of producing surplus value, the transfer of surplus value, and the 
distribution of surplus value among social classes (the defined nature of class is a 
relational concept which is based on its position in the production and ownership of 
the means of production, e.g. slave, peasant, industrial worker, capitalist, and 
landowner). The term “social relation” is the relationship between these social classes 
depending on the context of social formation. For example, the dominant social 
relation of a peripheral society, whose main production method is agriculture, is the 
landowner versus peasants or slaves.  For a society which relies more on industrial 
production than agricultural production, its main social relation is capital versus 
industrial labour. The social relation of a national state is not a static, ahistorical, 
abstract structure, but a dynamic process depending both on the links of the state with 
the capitalist world-system and on changing social formation. Moreover, the concept 
of ‘class’ in Marx’s analysis is not only a structural position in the societal division of 
labour but is also a force or actor for social change through class struggle. As 
Ougaavd (2004) argues, a group or individuals might not constitute a social force 
even if they are in the same position of production. Only if the group shares a 
                                                 
27
 Proletarianisation refers to the social process whereby people move from being either an employer, 
or self-employed, or peasant to being employed as wage labour by an employer. 
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collective interest and has the capacity for collective action can it be called a social 
force (p.153).  I will use the case of Taiwan to examine this point in Chapter Seven. 
Let me summarise the three terms. A national social formation is constituted by a 
specific social relation of capital accumulation. The context of social formation and 
its associated changes are determined by its position within the world-system and by 
its social relations of capital accumulation. The power relation of social forces plays a 
significant role in shaping the pattern of the social relations, and therefore influencing 
national social formation. 
But why is it important to research social relations in regard to the dynamics of 
capitalism? Capitalism is defined (by Wallerstein and the thesis adopts the definition) 
as a historical system of the ceaseless accumulation of capital. How can capital be 
accumulated ceaselessly? Capital must produce something larger than itself: in 
Marx’s (1956[1983]) argument, it is the labour power among all the production 
factors (the land, the machinery, and raw materials) that produces surplus-value for 
capital, as labour always produces more than it needs to live. As such, capital 
accumulation is not merely a material action or one of existence (e.g. investment, 
production, finance), it is also a configuration of social relations, in particular the 
relations between capital and labour. Wallerstein (2004) agrees with Marx’s idea that 
the nature of capital is a social relation of production, but he views social relations as 
not being limited to the relationship between capital and industrial wage labour. For 
Wallerstein, there are different models of relations of production (understood as 
models of ‘labour control’ to appropriate surplus-value) that co-exist in different 
zones of the capitalist world-system (e.g. slaves for sugar plantation, serfdom for 
grain cultivation and wood harvest, tenant farmers for cash-crop operation, wage 
labourers for some agricultural production, yeoman farmers and intermediate 
personnel in others) (Wallerstein 1974, p.86). For example, Wallerstein illustrates the 
division of labour between forced labour (slavery), serfdom, and coerced cash-crop 
labour in Hispanic America and Eastern Europe; yeoman farmers in northwest Europe; 
and skilled labour and wage labour in sixteenth century Western Europe. Since 
capitalism is a world-system, the variety of forms of production in this world-system 
are all forms of capitalist production, and he argues that ‘not all these capitalist forms 
were based on ‘free’ labour, only those in the core of the economy… Free labour is 
indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free labour throughout the productive 
enterprises’ (Wallerstein 1974, p.126-127). As I will discuss in Chapter Seven, even 
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in a semi-peripheral state such as Taiwan since 1987, Taiwan’s labour force is not all 
‘free’: there are some low-skilled, un-free migrant labour existing in Taiwan. As such, 
the method of labour control, presented as a type of relations of production, varies 
depending upon their links within the capitalist world system. In this sense, non-
waged-labour relations of production in the form of agricultural labour, house workers, 
irregular labour, and so forth, are also part of the overall relations of production in the 
capitalist world-system. 
I have explored how capital-labour relations constitute capital accumulation, but 
what is the role of the state? From the context of the capitalist world-system, a 
competitive interstate system is a necessity to prevent the world-economy from 
becoming a world-empire. As stated before, states within the interstate system are not 
equally powerful, but the hegemon and the core zone tend to be relatively stronger 
than others. This is the context where a state is related to other states; however, what 
is the role of the state within the domestic context? In Wallerstein’s (2004) 
description, ‘a state is a bounded territory claiming sovereignty and domain over its 
subjects, now called citizens…A state claims the legal monopoly over the use of 
weapons within its territory, subject to the laws of the state’ (Wallerstein 2004, p.97). 
I agree that the state acts as a ‘legal monopoly’, and ‘national-legal, administrative 
agency of coercion’ (Wallerstein 2004, p.97; Woo 1991, p.6); however, I do not view 
these functions of a state as pre-given and static, as the ability of the state is both 
constrained by its position within the interstate system and its relations with other 
social forces (i.e. capital and organised labour). The “state” in this thesis is a concept 
related to two aspects: the interstate system and domestic social relations. In this 
respect, my perspective is different from the state-centred approach discussed in 
Section 2-1-3, which views the state as having pre-given autonomy over society and 
the economy. 
The world-system perspective develops analysis for the interstate system, the 
structure of capital accumulation, households, modes of labour control, and anti-
systemic movements. Nevertheless, the world-system perspective has not yet 
elaborated a complete analytical framework on the social relations of capital 
accumulation and on national social formation. The perspective explains well the 
hierarchical structure of capitalism. However, to understand why some states ascend 
and others decline needs historical studies on national developmental trajectory. 
While researching national ascent, the world-system perspective’s lack of sufficient 
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analysis on national social formation inevitably leads to the impression that the 
perspective only addresses the effects of the capitalist world-system.  
          
2-3-2 Determining aspects of national ascent trajectory 
 
In this sense, national ascent is not only a changing position within the capitalist 
world-system and accumulation of capital and wealth, but also a changing national 
social formation. Ascent is affected by the logic of capital accumulation and the 
politics of the interstate system, as well as by the power struggle of domestic social 
forces. In other words, to understand national ascent or descent, it is necessary to 
study its structural position within capital accumulation; restrictions or opportunities 
offered by the interstate system; and domestic state-capital-labour relations.    
     These aspects are interrelated and intersect with each other. The structure of capital 
accumulation and the interstate system are “external” factors to national economies, 
while domestic social relations are “internal” factors. However, these divisions are not 
isolated. Domestic social relations are influenced by the power struggle among social 
forces, but are not a completely separate national affair. As we shall see in the case of 
Taiwan, the capability or autonomy of the state over domestic social forces in post-
war industrialisation has much to do with the support from the interstate system. 
Similarly, capital and labour cannot be limited to national affairs. The movement of 
capital and labour has occurred across national boundaries since the birth of 
capitalism. The power of capital and labour within social relations is therefore also 
influenced by the structure of capital accumulation within the world-system. In other 
words, what we see as domestic social relations is actually a configuration of the 
power struggle between social forces and the structural effect of the capitalist world-
system. The totality of these aspects (interstate system, structure of capital 
accumulation, and domestic social relations) is the nature of the national development 
trajectory.   
     The structure of capital accumulation and the interstate system were discussed in 
Section 2-2. I shall discuss the domestic state-capital-labour nexus. The role of the 
state in a society with respect to capital and labour has no universal pattern but needs 
to be examined through its position in the capitalist world-system and its relations 
with social forces. However, the case study in this thesis is a semi-peripheral state. 
World-system analysts argue that semi-peripheral states strongly put forward 
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protectionist and interventionist policies (Wallerstein 2004). The interventionist role 
of the state is thus a key factor in encouraging ascent and preventing descent. 
However, the strong role of a semi-peripheral state does not mean that it also has a 
strong role in the interstate system. State autonomy that is effective domestically does 
not necessarily mean that the state increases as equally autonomous within the 
interstate system. It is important to include the constraints or opportunities provided 
by the interstate system (in particular the hegemonic power) as a key factor in 
influencing the role of the state domestically. The case study on Taiwan will illustrate 
the argument.  
Secondly, I define capital as both material action and a social relation. The 
dynamics of capital takes various forms depending on various functions in the process 
of accumulation, and different kinds of social relations exist in various forms. Capital 
is agricultural or industrial capital when it produces agricultural or industrial goods; 
capital is financial capital when it functions to earn interest. Thus, the social relation 
of agricultural capital is that between landlords and peasants or slavery; the social 
relation of industrial capital is the industrial capitalist and industrial workers; the 
social relation of financial capital is between the finance capitalist and financial 
service workers. While I discuss social relations as capital-labour, the term ‘capital’ is 
often used to mean “capitalists”, as the owners of capital are capitalists. 
My research did not study all forms of capital; rather, I focussed on the dynamics 
of industrial capital and financial capital as they represent the dominant forms of 
capital in Taiwan during the post-1987 period. To be precise, the two types of capital 
are the defining features of semi-peripheral social formation; agricultural capital 
dominates peripheral social formation, as discussed in Amin (1976). Niggle (1988) 
points out that several economists (including Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Rudolph 
Hilferding, and John Maynard Keynes) have identified the difference between the two 
types of capital. Following the insights of these economists, Niggle defines financial 
capital as the part of total capital that finances the position in financial assets for the 
purpose of earning interest or capital gain; industrial capital as the part of total capital 
that uses real assets (e.g. material, land, goods) to purchase labour power in order to 
produce for sale. This is a clear distinction; yet he ignores the discussion, mainly in 
Marx and Hilferding, of the link between the two types of capital.  
My distinction between the two forms of capital is drawn from Marx and 
Hilferding’s analysis of loan (or interest-bearing) capital and functioning capital, as 
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well as from world-system perspective’s discussion of hegemonic cycles. The original 
function of financial capital is discussed in Marx’s Capital Volume Three. He did not 
develop a theoretical framework of financial capital, yet he distinguished ‘loan 
capital’ (or ‘interest-bearing capital’) from ‘functioning capital’ (Marx 1956[1894]). 
The former is part of money-dealing capital and the latter includes industrial capital 
(the function of production) and commercial capital (the function of circulation). The 
loan capitalists obtain ownership of the loan capital but transfer the use of loan capital 
to the functioning capital to earn interest. As such, the ownership and use of loan 
capital is separated. Yet, Marx had not seen the great development of financial capital 
that leads to a break in such a separation. Hilferding (1981[1910]) advanced Marx’s 
idea by developing the concept of ‘finance capital.’ He argued that the expansion of 
financial capital and credit, together with the concentration of industrial capital in 
capitalist development,28leads to a breakdown in the separation between industrial 
capital and financial capital. Therefore, a combination of the two types of capital 
emerged, namely ‘finance capital’, as a dominant force in the capital accumulation 
process.  
 The world-system perspective does not develop a framework of these various 
forms of capital, nor does it provide a clear framework for the analysis of financial 
capital. However, it views industrial capital which controls industrial production as 
the primary force for hegemonic ascent.  The role of financial capital and the degree 
of its expansion are significant both to national capitalist development and to a semi-
peripheral state’s ascent trajectory. The core zone is defined as the countries which 
control the most profitable and highest capital-return activities. Financial services 
have been one of the most profitable activities during the B-phase. As the next chapter 
will explore, the core zone has turned to de-industrialisation and increased financial 
activities in order to slowdown the declining profit rates in the industrial sector. In 
this respect, development of the financial sector is a key for semi-peripheral ascent.  
Moreover, the cycle of hegemony and the challenges from new economic powers to 
                                                 
28
 The following quotation describes the distinction between financial and industrial capital, as well as 
the formation of finance capital: “An ever-increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to 
the industrialists who use it. They are able to dispose over capital only through the banks, which 
represent the owners. On the other side, the banks have to invest an ever-increasing part of their capital 
in industry, and in this way they become to a greater and greater extent industrial capitalists. I call bank 
capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually transformed in this way into industrial capital, 
finance capital” see Hilferding (1981[1910]). 
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the existing hegemon is through the sequence of agro-industrial production, 
commence, and finance (Wallerstein 1984; 2004). This means that the core zone and 
the hegemony must have financial superiority to dominate the capitalist world-system.  
Furthermore, in Arrghi’s (1994) account, the role of financial expansion is not 
only necessary to ascend to the core, but also implies a crisis for the existing 
hegemon-led order. Based on a different account of the cyclic movement of the 
capitalist world-system from Wallerstein, Arrghi developed a framework of ‘systemic 
cycles of accumulatuon’ which is composed of four cycles (Genoese cycle, Dutch 
cycle, British cycle, and the US cycle) since late-medieval Europe to the present day 
US-led cycle. These periods are characterised by an expansion of production and 
trade, which then lead to over-accumulation that causes high competition and 
financial expansion. The expansion of finance, however, will break down the existing 
structure of capital accumulation. Arrghi (1997) borrowed an argument from Braudel: 
‘these periods of intensifying competition, financial expansion and structural 
instability are nothing but the “autumn” of a major capitalist development’. In this 
respect, the process of financial expansion during the K-wave is not only a new way 
to accumulate profits, but also a symptom of crisis in the capitalist world-system and 
implies the relative decline of the current hegemon. 
 Thirdly, the role of labour in the state-capital-labour nexus has a double meaning: 
one as the producer of value and the other as a social force. To examine its dual role 
one can realise on the one hand how labour contributes to national ascent and on the 
other hand how organised labour can resist the logic of capital accumulation as part of 
an anti-systemic movement. Labour is first to be understood as the producer of value 
(including surplus-value) but neither as ‘using’ nor ‘owning’ surplus-value.29 The 
appropriation of surplus-value from labour is only possible when labour is 
collectively subordinated to capitalists in a firm, in a society, and in the world-system 
as a whole. Such subordination is the core feature of the social relations in capitalism. 
If labour attempts to change its subordinate role, its needs to be organised into a 
collective form as the capital accumulation process engages with a collective labour 
force in a firm, a sector, a country, and the world-system. Here emerges the second 
concept of labour, one where organised labour is a social force.  
                                                 
29
 Although the self-employed, yeoman, and some tenant peasants, own their own means of production; 
however, their labour value (i.e. products) need to be realised in the market, and their surplus-value is 
extracted by capitalists through the market mechanism in society as whole.  
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Empirically, O’Brien (2006) suggests that a labour group can influence the global 
order through four methods: (1) by influencing state policies; (2) by acting upon the 
rules of international governmental institutions; (3) by affecting the structure of the 
market; (4) by linking up with other social movements that can challenge global 
governance rules (p.222). From studying the case of the US labour movement, Herod 
(1997) argues that organised labour, as an agent, can be actively involved in the 
economic globalisation process by challenging the global scale of transnational 
corporations.  I agree with their analysis; yet my view of organised labour is slightly 
different from theirs. Firstly, not all labour in relations of production can be, or wants 
to be, transformed into organised labour. In other words, labour can be, but is not 
necessarily, a social force. Only when labour has ‘class consciousness’ (i.e. an 
understanding of its subordinate status) is this transformation possible. Radical 
intellectuals and labour movement leaders thus play important roles. Secondly, 
organised labour can take the form of trade unions, civic associations, and community 
organisations. Organised labour has the potential power to challenge capitalists and 
the state, and to challenge labour’s subordinate status. It should not be limited to a 
national framework because the dynamics of capitalism acts as a world-system. Not 
only are the links between different kinds of industrial labour necessary, the 
interaction between agricultural labour and industrial labour can also be part of a 
broad “anti-systemic” movement. However, thirdly, not all organised labour has class 
consciousness and the ability to act as an agent in the national and global political 
economy, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven in Taiwan’s case.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The general question of this thesis is: how can we study national capitalist 
development? Is there an alternative approach that breaks the dichotomy between an 
approach which mainly considers the domestic context (i.e. the approach of national 
model of development) and an approach which focuses most of its attention on the 
international context (i.e. the world-system perspective)? To answer this question, the 
chapter has developed a specific analytical framework that combines the basic 
principles of the world-system perspective with analysis of the domestic state-capital-
labour nexus. National development and ascent need to be viewed both as a relational 
concept (i.e. change of structural position within the world-system) and as a change of 
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national social formation (i.e. change in social relations). In this respect, the literature 
that assumes national development to be mainly a national affair, based on finding a 
particular model, misleads the analytical method of development. Although the world-
system perspective rightly provides an alternative approach in examining the role of 
national states within capitalism, it is unsatisfactory with regard to the political 
dynamics of social relations in the process of capital accumulation. In sum, this 
chapter suggests that the structure of capital accumulation, the interstate system, and 
the domestic state-capital-labour nexus, are the keys to understanding the nature of 
national ascent trajectory. I will use this framework to study the case of Taiwan in the 
following chapters.  Accordingly, the specific framework to rethink national capitalist 
development in this thesis will contribute to the literature which concerns national 
capitalist development and the literature of the world-system perspective. In addition, 
the case study is a semi-peripheral state; the examination of Taiwan’s ascent 
trajectory will also contribute to the world-system perspective with regard to the role 
of semi-periphery.  
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Chapter Three:  
The Transition Age: Global Changes of the Capitalist World-System 
(1967/1973-2007) 
 
Introduction 
 
After developing the analytical framework of the case study, Chapter Three will 
concentrate on the structural changes to the capitalist world-system in a particular 
period (1967/1973-2007), which will be referred to as the Kondratieff wave B-phase. 
As national ascent trajectory needs to be first situated in the context of structural 
changes to capitalism, we need to understand the content of the structural change and 
then analyse how these changes condition, constrain, and facilitate national change in 
the case study of Taiwan, in the following chapters. How does the world-system 
perspective analyse capitalism during this period? 
    The analysis of structural change of capitalism is mainly focused on the shift in the 
structure of capital accumulation and changes to the interstate system, as the two 
cycles are the primary dynamics of capitalism. In the period 1967/1973-2007, 
capitalism experienced a downturn phase in terms of the decline of profit rate in the 
industrial sector and sluggish economic growth in the core zone. In order to prevent 
the decline of profit rates in the industrial sector, the centre of capital accumulation 
expanded from the core to the semi-periphery and periphery (in particular to the East 
Asian region) via global industrial restructuring30, and from industrial sector to 
financial sector via the process of financialisation. Through the two processes, the US 
is able to transform into a global financial entrepot (Silver and Arrghi 2005).The 
relative decline of US hegemonic power in economic and financial areas is in 
accordance with the B-phase, and has indirectly facilitated the rise of East Asian 
economic power. The East Asian region is now a new centre of capital accumulation 
(in addition to the EU and North America), but it is not yet a world political-military 
centre. Furthermore, the complex political and economic relationships between the 
East Asian region and the US also impose uncertainty to the future hegemonic order. 
These changes will be discussed in this chapter in the following manner: firstly, I will 
                                                 
30
 Industry restructuring refers to activities that re-organise and re-structure firms and industries, such 
as investment in new plant and equipment overseas, mergers and acquisitions, cessation or downsizing 
of operations and the forging or termination of commercial alliances with other firms (OECD 2002). 
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review the basic assumption of the cycle of capital accumulation and hegemonic order. 
Secondly, I will discuss the trend of decline in profit rates of the industrial sector in 
the core zone and how the core zone responded to the trend via industrial relocation 
and financialisation. Thirdly, I will analyse another consequence of the decline in the 
profit rate of the industrial sector in the core zone, namely the relative decline of US 
hegemony, in particular in the economic area. Accompanying, this decline is the rise 
of the East Asian region as a rising centre of capital accumulation.   
 
3-1 ‘The transition age’- Kondratieff wave B-phase  
 
‘We are located in age of transition, transition not merely of a few backward 
countries who need to catch up with the spirit of globalisation, but a 
transition in which the entire capitalist world-system will be transformed 
into something else.’ (Wallerstein 2007, p.401) 
 
Wallerstein contends that the K wave B-phase since 1967/1973 is a transition age, a 
transition that is not one of developing countries “catching up” in terms of economic 
growth, but a transition of the whole capitalist system. To understand what the 
“transition” means and what has led to the transition, it is necessary to summarise the 
concept of cyclical change in the capitalist world-system and of hegemonic transition. 
The movement of capitalism is cyclical change of the world-system, and each cycle of 
the capitalist movement goes through stages of growth and expansion, stagnation and 
crisis. Although the beginning of the cyclical movement is still a matter of debate31, 
the regularity of the intervals of the cyclical movement is agreed upon by world-
system analysts, other political economists and Marxists (e.g. Schumpeter 1939; 
Mandel; Gordon 1980). The mechanism of cyclical change is also debatable, although 
some attribute it to technological factors (e.g. Schumpeter 1939, Tylecote 1992). 
Kleinknecht (1992) argues that although Schumpeterians and the theorists of the 
social structure of accumulation suggest two different mechanisms, these mechanisms 
are actually linked to the role of profit rate as the determining factor (p.6). Mandel 
(1992) contended that it is the increase of profit rate, rather than technological 
                                                 
31
 Schumpeter (1939) suggested that the long cycles started in Europe during the late seventeenth 
century. Kondratieff argued that the first long cycle began at the end of the 1780s. The difficulty of 
arguing for a historical existence of long wave before the seventeenth /eighteenth century lies in the 
lack of historical empirical data on the world economy, see Wallerstein (1992).     
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progress, which triggers the expansion of the long wave. He described the sequence as 
the increase of profit rates that triggers a growth of capital accumulation, and which 
then stimulates the finance for technological change (Mandel 1992, p.325). By 
contrast, Wallerstein (2004) considers the development of a new leading industry as 
the main mechanism that leads to the expansion of capitalism. In my view, 
technological progress, the rise of profit rates, and a new leading industry are all 
related to the expansion of capitalism and it is hard to argue that each factor can 
function alone. With capital accumulation to pursue the increase in profit rate as its 
principle purpose, technological progress gives rise to a new leading industry which 
brings higher profits and capital return.  
The cyclical rhythm does not mean that history merely repeats itself. Wallerstein 
(2004) argues that the end of a Kondratieff cycle does not mean a return to the same 
condition as at the start of the cycle (p.31). He contends the reason is because the limit 
of the world-system was changed as a result of actions taken in the B-phase to leave 
the B-phase and return to an A-phase. These changes, although solving short-term 
stagnation, also start to create problems for the structure of capitalism. Wallerstein 
terms the situation as ‘secular trends’ (p.31). Furthermore, the cyclical movement is 
not limited by national or political boundaries. National change might reflect changes 
in the world-system, but we cannot assume that national change and the changes to 
capitalism are completely the same pattern. As such, Wallerstein argues, ‘there is no 
systematic comparison of the differential effect of long waves on core and periphery. 
There is no reason to assume that state-level patterns would all be parallel with world-
level patterns’ (Wallerstein 1992, p.340). 
      Each cycle of the K-wave has an A-phase as the upturn stage and a B-phase as the 
downturn stage. The most recent cycle, which started in 1945, had its A-phase from 
1945 to 1967/1973, and the B-phase has continued since then. The year 1945 is taken 
to mark the start of an A-phase as it was the end of the two world wars and the 
beginning of post-war reconstruction. In particular, the world economy entered a 
sharp upward boost after the 1950s. From table 3-1 below, it can be seen that the 
world economy grew most rapidly during the period of the 1950s to the early 1970s. 
However, the post-war economic boom only lasted for two to three decades. In the 
early 1970s, the world economy entered a downturn stage. Global GDP per capital 
growth was more than three percent in the 1960s, yet the growth rate has decreased to 
less than two percent since the early 1970s. Among the high-income countries, there 
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was also a decrease of GDP growth per capita growth since the 1970s (from more 
than four percent to less than three percent). The growth rates of fixed capital stock in 
the industrial countries decreased from 5% in the 1960s to 3.3% in the 1990s. During 
2000-2004, the Triad had a growth rate of less than 3% (Glyn 2006, table 4.2). 
Furthermore, the annual growth rate in world trade reached its highest level during 
1960-1973 (8%); the figure in 1973-1979 was only 4.5% and in 1980-88 was 4% 
(Satoshi Ikeda 1996, p.71). Between 1990 and 1997, as well as 2000 and 2007, the 
annual growth rate of the world’s merchandise exports and imports was 3% and 5.5% 
respectively (WTO 2008). In other words, the annual growth rate of world trade 
declined in the B-phase. Patomaki (2006) found that the decline of world economic 
growth and the increase in global inequalities are two main features of global changes 
since the 1970s. He argues that these features can be explained using the long wave 
cycles analysis, meaning that the world economy has entered a downturn stage since 
the 1970s.  
 
Table 3-1: Past average annual economic growth rates for world and world regions  
 1500-1820 1820 -
1870 
1870 -
1913 
1913 -
1950 
1950 -
1973 
1973 -
1998 
1999- 
2007 
West 
Europe 
0.4  1.6 2.1  1.2 4.8  2.1 - 
USA 0.9 4.2  3.9 2.8 3.9  3.0 - 
Japan 0.3 0.4  2.4 2.2 9.3  3.0 - 
World 0.3 0.9  2.1 1.8 4.9  3.0 3.0 
Source: Maddison (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: 
OECD, P. 262; WTO (2008, table A1b)  
In parallel with the cycle of capital accumulation is the cycle of hegemonic transition. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the hegemonic cycle is different to, but correlates with, 
the cycle of capital accumulation (i.e., the K-wave). The former is about twice as long 
as a K-wave. Most world-system analysts argue that there is correlation between the 
Kondratieff cycle and hegemonic cycle (Shannon 1996; Hopkins and Wallerstein 
1982). The rise of a hegemonic power coincides with a K-wave upswing (A-phase). 
Some other non world-system analysts also have made a similar argument. For 
example, Thompson (2000) studies the political processes of the ‘leadership long 
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cycle’ and argues that it has a tight connection with the economic process of K-waves. 
What he means by ‘leadership’ is similar to the term ‘hegemony’ although his 
analysis covers a longer period, 930-1973. Historically, there were three instances of 
hegemony: the United Provinces of Holland in the mid-seventeenth century, the 
United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, and the United States in the mid-
twentieth century (Wallerstein 1984). The rise and maturing of US hegemony 
corresponds with a K-wave A-phase.  
The heyday of US hegemony in terms of political, economic, financial, military, 
and cultural power coincided with the post-war A-phase (1945-1967/1973). In the 
interstate system, the US is one of the world’s superpowers and has the most 
advanced military equipment. During the Cold-War period, the US had military 
presence in allied states. The US’s industrial capability, exports, outflow FDI, and 
transnational corporations dominated the global economy and facilitated the economic 
expansion of the A-phase. Its ideology of capitalism and anti-communist campaign 
led all its bilateral and multilateral allies. Finally, the Bretton Woods system (BWS) 
gave the US and US dollar unique roles in the world financial system. The BWS was 
an international monetary arrangement in terms of the arrangement of foreign 
exchange rates and balance of payments adjustment in order to prevent instability in 
the world’s financial system (Llewellyn and Presley 1995). Within the system, par 
value of the exchange rates of all currencies were to be fixed against gold, with 
pressure on balance of payments adjustment, and the provision of international 
liquidity through the IMF if necessary. Exchange rates were fixed to the US dollar but 
were adjustable in the event of disequilibrium. In other words, the BWS was a system 
that tried to find a balance between the rigidity of the gold standard and the instability 
of a floating exchange rate. Forty-four nations agreed to fix their currencies to the US 
dollar, and linked the dollar to gold, with the dollar pegged to gold at a rate of 35 
dollars per ounce. They also agreed to use the US dollar as a transaction currency to 
adjust exchange rates. As such, from the end of the 1950s, the dollar replaced sterling 
as the dominant reserve currency. As the dominant international currency and the 
major unit of account for trading, the US dollar dominated the Eurocurrency markets 
and served as the major international store of value so far.  
      However, US hegemony declined in relative terms during the B-phase, as the rest 
of the chapter will discuss. The hegemonic transition matters to the study of 
capitalism because it reflects the power relations of the hierarchy of capital 
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accumulation. The hierarchy of capitalism is also about the distribution of political 
forces/resources. In particular, the relative decline of US hegemony has not occurred 
in all areas. The US is still the centre of political-military strength, although its 
economic and financial power has declined. For example, according to SIPRI (2006; 
2008), the top largest supplier of arms transfer between 1976 and 2005 was the US, 
accounting for US$ 307,469 million. After the collapse of the USSR, the military 
capability of the US was far more than those of the European Countries and China. 
The share of military expenditure to GDP in the US increased between 3% and 5.7% 
between 1989 and 2005 while the share in China was between 1.7% and 2.8% (ibid). 
In 2007, 45 of the top 100 arm producing companies were from the US, while another 
42 were from the EU.  
In Arrghi’s (1994) view, the particularity of relatively declining US hegemony, 
namely the decline of economic power while retaining political-military power, places 
some uncertainty to the future. Furthermore, the interstate system and the structure of 
capital accumulation do not completely match with each other, in particular in the 
case of the East Asian region. Although Japan is a core state, its political-military 
strength is weaker than China’s, which is still struggling to ascend from the periphery. 
In sum, the world-system has entered the downturn B-phase since 1967/1973. The 
phase has gone through more than sixty years and has experienced a global crisis 
during 2007-2009. It is not clear whether the global economy will recover from the 
depression and enter another A-phase in the next few years, or remain in the current 
downturn phase. Yet at the time of writing, a gradual trend towards economic 
recovery has been seen in the East Asian region (Wassener 01/08/2009; Tosutzai 
07/10/2009; IMF 29/10/2009). 
 
3-2 The Main Changes of the Capitalist World-system during the B-phase 
 
As analysed previously, there has been a downturn phase since the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s. As Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996) argue, the years 1967/73 were 
chosen as the starting point of the B-phase for several historical incidents that implied 
a downturn trend of capitalism: In 1968, The US announced that they would no longer 
directly intervene in Asian affairs following the failure of the Vietnam War (see 
Nixon’s article in Foreign Affairs in 1967). Meanwhile the US began to normalise its 
diplomatic and economic relations with China. In 1973, the US announced that the 
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US dollar would no longer be linked to the value of gold, which marked the end of the 
Bretton Woods System. Finally, the oil crisis increased the production costs of the 
industrial sector and caused a sharp growth in the international financial flow from 
oil-exporting countries.     
     The main argument of this thesis is that the trajectory of national ascent is 
determined by the structure of the capitalist world-system and by the domestic state-
capital-labour nexus. This chapter’s concern is with what has happened during the B-
phase. The topic of global changes during the last three decades is very broad, and a 
great number of studies from different disciplines have covered this. Here I shall limit 
the discussion to the world-system school’s viewpoint and elaborate how they view 
global changes during the B-phase. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996) conclude their 
analysis with three main political economic changes that have occurred (1) in the fall 
of the profit rate in the production sector, (2) the relative decline of US hegemonic 
power, and (3) the attack on state power. In my view, the third feature is a 
consequence of the first feature. In sum, the main change of the B-phase in terms of 
the capital accumulation process is the decline of the rate of profit and the sluggish 
economic growth in the core zone. The main change in the interstate system is the 
relative decline of US hegemony. These two changes are not separate but are related 
to each other. The US was the dominant economic power in the A-phase. US 
hegemony facilitated the upturn of the A-phase, and it was the main core state that has 
experienced the fall in profit rates in the production sector. The starting of the B-
phase is associated with the relative decline of US hegemony. In other words, the 
current cycle of K-wave (since 1945-to the present) is related to the fluctuations of US 
hegemony.  
 
3-2-1 The decline of the rate of profit in the production sector 
 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996) argue that since the 1970s, growth in global 
production has slowed, and with a sharp rise in oil price led to a decrease in the profit 
rate of the production sector. Three studies support the trend of a declining profit rate 
(Glyn 2006; Dumenil and Levy 2005; Lee and Sutch 1985). Firstly, an earlier 
empirical study by OECD scholars demonstrate that the gross rates of return, gross 
profit share, and total factor productivity annual growth rates for 11 OECD countries 
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showed a more remarkable decline during the period 1973-1982 than the period 1960-
197232, as the table below shows (Lee and Sutch 1985).  
 
Table 3-2: Some economic indicators in the manufacturing sector of 11 OECD 
countries (Unit: percentage) 
Eleven OECD countries 1960-1972 1973-1981 
Gross rates of return 17.55- 16.19  
(The decline rate: 7.7%) 
16.19- 11.45  
(The decline rate: 29.3%) 
Profit share 36.44- 32.73 
 (the decline rate: 10.2% ) 
32.73- 27.72  
(The decline rate: 15.3%) 
Total factor productivity 
annual growth rate 
4.76 1.78 
Source: Lee and Sutch (1985) 
 
Secondly, drawing on data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Japanese 
Annual Report on National Accounts, and Several National Statistics of European 
countries, Glyn (2006) finds that the profit rate of the non-financial sector in the US, 
Japan, and some European countries (the UK, West Germany and Italy) decreased 
after the late 1960s (except in the UK, which experienced growth after the 1980s). 
Finally, according to data from Dumenil and Levy (2005), in the US, the profit rate 
after the payment of real interest33 of nonfinancial corporations reached its peak in 
1965 (near 7.5%) but has declined since then. In 2003, the figure was less than 4.5%. 
In France, the profit rate also reached its peak in the late 1960s (nearly 12%) but 
gradually decreased to less than 3% in 2001. 
The empirical data above demonstrates the declining rate of profits in the industrial 
sector during the B-phase. As a result of this, several strategies were adopted by the 
core zone to tackle the crisis. Two of the most important ones are: (1) the 
restructuring of the industrial sector from the core zone to overseas in order to reduce 
                                                 
32
 The profit rate is measured by operating surplus unadjusted for depreciation divided by a measure of 
gross capital stock at current costs. Gross profit share is the share of gross operating surplus in gross 
value added. Total factor productivity is all of the factors that influence the inputs, including labour and 
capital productivity (the ratio of gross value added to gross capital stock). The 11 OECD countries 
include the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden.  
33
 Profit is defined as net product minus the cost of labour, business and profit taxes, and the payment 
of real interest.   
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production costs; (2) the increasing crucial position of finance as a means to 
circumvent the economic crisis and to ‘create’ more profit (Hopkins and Wallerstein 
1996; Foster and Magdoff 2009). The two features bring about the restructuring of 
industrial capital, the increasing dominance of financial capital, and the growing 
power of transnational capital. Consequently, there is an attack on state power in 
order to reduce the barriers to international trade, investment, and financial flow. 
Most importantly, the restructuring transforms the US into a global financial entrepot 
(Silver and Arrghi 2005, p.174). In a comparative study of the British and US 
hegemony, Silver and Arrghi (2005) find that Britain played the role of global 
financial entrepot at the peak of its industrial domination, but the US during its period 
of hegemony did not. Only since the late 1960s when US corporations were 
challenged by other competitors had they heightened liquidity preference. Meanwhile 
the US government adopted fiscal and monetary policy to attract mobile capital from 
the world, and with the rise of economic liberalism, the US is able to transform itself 
into a global financial entrepot.   
  
(1) Industrial relocation and the transnationalisation of capital34 
 
Several studies on post-war industrialisation point out that there a shift has occurred 
since the 1960s, namely the old international division of labour (OIDL) has been 
replaced by a new international division of labour (NIDL) (Hoogvelt 2001; Jenkins 
1992; Gereffi 1995; Dicken 2004). The old international division of labour during the 
pre-war period was one where manufacturing was dominated by the core while other 
zones mainly undertook raw material and agricultural production (Hoogvelt 2001; 
Jenkins 1992). The order of OIDL was imposed via colonialism. For example, data 
from League of Nations shows that during 1926-29, nine advanced countries (the US, 
the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan) manufactured 
about 80.6% of world industrial production (Hoogvelt 2001). In 1966, the advanced 
countries still accounted for 71.2% of world industrial production (Jenkins 1992). The 
pattern has changed since the first few export processing zones (EPZs) were set up in 
India in 1965 and in Taiwan in 1966. The function of EPZs in developing countries 
was to provide a friendly investment environment for transnational corporations 
(TNCs) (e.g. tax-free, a geographical cluster, cheap labour, transportation access, and 
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 The subtitle is borrowed from Hoogvelt (2001, p.73). 
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simplified administrative procedures), and to direct a developing country’s industrial 
policy towards export-led industrialisation. According to the ILO database, there were 
79 EPZs in 25 countries in 1975, and the number increased to 3,500 EPZs located in 
130 countries, employing 66 million workers, by 2006 (Boyenge 2007). The number 
employed in EPZs in 2006 was equal to 82% of the TNCs employment in 2007. The 
development of EPZs facilitates the growth of TNC activities.       
As such, world manufacturing production is increasingly directed towards the 
developing countries. By the end of the 1970s, the value of manufacturing products 
exported from the developing countries surpassed that of their food and raw materials 
exports (Dicken 2003). Between 1953 and the late 1990s, the developing economies’ 
share of world manufacturing output increased from 5% to 23% (p.37). The 
manufactured exports from developing countries grew from 6% in 1963, to 10.8% in 
1980, and were nearly 27% in 2007. Industrial relocation thus has an effect on the 
international trade. As Held et al. (1995) argue, the structural change of international 
trade is due not only to the decrease of trade barriers and transportation costs, but also 
to the ‘changing structure of global production’ (p.175). For example, manufacturing 
only accounted for 20 % of total exports in 1960 but increased to nearly 70% in 2007 
(WTO 2008). 
There are two other important features about the NIDL. The first is the uneven 
development within the developing countries. Such unevenness is not only based 
between the semi-periphery and periphery, but between different regions. East Asian 
NIEs and China are the only few countries that have engaged with the NIDL 
successfully. As I will discuss later, in the last two to three decades, the East Asian 
region had the highest annual growth rate of GDP in the world. The East Asian NIEs 
and China have benefited from the NIDL since the mid-1960s and the 1990s 
respectively. For example, in 1981, four East Asian NIEs’ share of all developing 
countries’ manufacturing exports was nearly 48% (Hoogevlt 2001, table 4.1). Since 
China has engaged in EOI, its share of manufactured exports of world merchandise 
exports grew from 2.5% in 1993 to 11.9 % in 2007, surpassing the US (9.6%) and 
Japan(6.7%) (WTO 2007, table I.6). In 2006, 60 % of EPZs employment was located 
in China (Boyenge 2007). However, it would be partial to argue that the industrial 
relocation from the core since the mid-1960s is either beneficial or exploitative to all 
developing countries. Both East Asian NIEs and China have a very different 
developmental outcome compared to the rest of the developing world. As Held et al. 
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(1995) argue, ‘the new international division of labour embodies a polarisation of 
economic fortunes in the global economy and [a] new pattern of stratification 
(p.173).’   
The second feature that should be added to the discussion of the NIDL is that the 
semi-peripheral zone in East Asia has also relocated industries to the peripheral zone, 
especially to China, since the 1990s. From 1988, investment by NIEs in China has 
exceeded that of both Japan and America (Clark and Kim 1995, p.254). The share of 
NIE-based foreign direct investment (FDI) in China among China’s inflow of FDI 
was as high as 54.7% in 2008 (Japan only accounted for 3.95%, while the US 
accounted for 3.19%, and major European countries accounted for 5.41%) 
(MOFCOM 2009). The increasing importance of East Asian NIEs’ outflow of FDI is 
related to the restrictions on exports of East Asian NIEs to the North American and 
European markets (Clark and Kim 1995). Investment in Southeast Asian and China 
has thus become an alternative route for trade expansion (Clark and Kim 1995, p.254). 
The new wave of NIDL is much more complicated than ever, and it is not only 
between the core and the semi-peripheral zone, but also between the semi-peripheral 
zone and the peripheral zone. In this respect, the economic integration of the capitalist 
world-system since the 1990s is deeper than that in the previous period. Again, not all 
peripheral states can ascend from the new wave of restructuring, although China is an 
exception. Several data demonstrate that China’s economic performance is now in the 
top four countries in terms of GDP, the top third trading country, the top sixth FDI 
inflow country, and China has the highest foreign exchange reserves (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China 2008). In 1990, China’s GNI per capita was nearly the same as 
low income countries; in 2007 the figure (US$ 2360) was between the level of low- 
and-middle income countries (US$2337) and of middle-income countries (US$ 2872) 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2008). China has ascended from the periphery 
to somewhere in between the periphery and the semi-periphery. 
I have discussed the general features of industrial relocation since the B-phase, 
and I will analyse the movement of TNCs and FDI to demonstrate the dynamics of 
industrial relocation. According to Dicken (2004), a TNC is a corporation that 
coordinates and controls its operations in more than one country. FDI is only one of 
the TNC’s activities. The TNCs have played ‘a significant and dominant role in the 
relocation of industrial activity from the old industrial centres to the new’ (Hoogvelt 
2001, p.73). TNCs are the ‘primary shaper of the contemporary global economy’ 
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(Dicken 2005, p.198), are the ‘chief economic organising agent of the global 
capitalism’ (Gereffi 1995, p.13), and are the dominant force restructuring new 
relations of production with labour and new power relations with states.  
Empirical data demonstrate the significance of the role of TNCs and FDI in the 
current period of capitalist accumulation, world production, and the process of 
economic integration. Firstly, according to Fortune’s list of Global 500 TNCs, the 
revenue of the Global 500 TNCs in 2009 is equal to 41.4% (US$ 25175.47 billion) of 
the world’s GDP by 2008 (US$60689.81 billion). The figure was only 28% in 1998 
and 15% in 1982 (Kentor 2005). Secondly, by taking FDI stock as a share of the 
world’s GDP, the share was 27.9% by inward FDI and 28.9% by outward FDI in 2007 
(UNCTAD 2008). Furthermore, in value-added activity (gross product) by the foreign 
affiliates, TNCs accounted for 11% of the world’s GDP in 2007. Sales amounted to 
$31 trillion, about 20% of which represented exports, and the number of employees 
reached nearly 82 million (UNCTAD 2008). Thirdly, in terms of geographical spread 
and trans-nationalisation of operation, the largest 100 TNCs have affiliates in 41 
foreign countries (UNCTAD 2008). UNCTAD has developed a ‘Transnationality 
Index’ (TNI) which is composed of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign 
sales to total sales, and foreign employment to total employment. The TNI value of 
the world’s top 100 TNCs was nearly 62% in 2006. UNCTAD also found that more 
than 70% of affiliates of the world’s top 100 TNCs are located abroad. Finally, Intra-
firm trade accounts for between 25% and 33% of total trade (Held et al 1999). The 
importance of TNCs has been addressed; we will now look at the movement of the 
TNCs in order to understand the dynamics of industrial relocation.  
Firstly, it was not during the A-phase, but during the B-phase, that TNCs and FDI 
have increased sharply. The A-phase of capitalism in the first two to three decades 
after the end of the Second World War did not see as much TNC and FDI activity as 
in the pre-war period. According to Jones (2005), the post-war TNCs came to fruition 
only after the 1980s due to several ‘shocks’, namely the end of the European colonial 
empires, the spread of Communism, and growing state intervention in economies. 
From the table below, it is clear that TNCs have experienced remarkable growth 
during the B-phase.  
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As noted previously, the growth rate of GDP and of the profit rate in the B-phase is 
less than it was in the A-phase. Accordingly, the increase of TNCs and FDI do not 
bring about an absolute expansion of capitalism (in terms of global GDP growth rate 
and the rise of the profit rate), but rather brings about the concentration of capital 
power to the core (i.e. stronger growing TNCs) and the redistribution of world 
production geographical locations (i.e. thus some developing countries’ GDP growth 
rate, due to manufacturing exports, is higher than some core countries’). As such, the 
increase of TNC and global economic activity cannot reduce global inequality 
between the core and other zones, but only increase the gap. In 1960, GNP per capita 
for all developing countries as percentage of the core’s GNP per capita was only 5%, 
and the share was exactly the same in 1999 (Wade 2005).  
Secondly, I argue that the increase of TNCs and FDI are reflections of the increase 
in concentration of the core zone’s capital power. This is because the majority of 
TNCs are from the core zone and the trend has not changed significantly. In 2004, 
85% of the top 100 TNCs had their headquarters in the ‘Triad’ (the European Union, 
Japan and the United States). However, there is a change in the leading TNCs during 
the B-phase, which is related to the distribution of economic power within the core. In 
the 1950s and the 1960s, US Corporations were the only leading actor in the 
expansion of international business. Until the 1980s, the US was the top FDI outflow 
country (around 45.7%-65.9% of total outflow FDI) in the world (Dicken 2004). 
Since the 1980s, Western European FDI has surpassed the US’s, and is now the top 
FDI outflow region.35 In 2007, the share of outflow FDI from the advanced countries 
accounted for 84%, of which the European Union, the US, and Japan accounted for 
57.2%, 15.7%, and 3.6% respectively (UNCTAD 2008, Annex table B.1). The table 
below also shows the change in the leading TNCs from different home countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 It is noteworthy that Japan surpassed the US to be the country with largest outflow of FDI between 
1988 and 1990 
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 Table 3-3: Nationality breakdown of the world top 500 industrial corporations 
 1975 1985 1990 2009 
USA 241 212 164 140  
EU 168 168 168 163 
Germany 38 33 30 39 
Japan 54 82 111 68 
Asia NIEs 0 10 12 23 
China 0 0 0 38 
Total 500 500 500 500 
Source: Fortune, 2009; Ikeda 1996 
 
The change in the leading TNCs has another two implications. The first is a reflection 
in the shift of the leading method of industrial organisation and management, for 
example, from a US-led Fordism to a Japanese-led post-Fordism.36 The different 
performances of TNCs from the US, Western Europe, and Japan have led to a number 
of debates about the diverse performances of capitalist states and varieties of 
capitalism, which I discussed in Chapter Two. The second implication relates to the 
relative decline of US hegemony, which will be discussed in the next section.  
     Thirdly, East Asian NIEs and China not only play important roles as 
manufacturing exporters, but also become important for outward FDI since the 1990s. 
Between 1985 and 1989, less than 4% of outflow FDI was from the developing 
countries; however, during 2004-2006, nearly 9% was from the developing countries 
(UNCTAD 2008). It is Asian FDI that has dominated this increase. In 2007, among 
outflow FDI from developing countries, four Asian NIEs accounted for 36.4% and 
China accounted for 8.8% (UNCTAD 2008, Annex table B.1.) In 2004, Asian TNCs 
accounted for 38 of the top 50 TNCs from developing countries. Of the top 100 TNCs 
that are from developing countries, 76 are from East Asia. From the table below, it 
can be observed that in East Asia, outward FDI stocks as a share of GDP showed a 
remarkable growth between 1990 and 2007, and the growth rate surpassed the growth 
rate of inward FDI. East Asia’s pattern is different to other developing counties but is 
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 For example, see the discussion on Japanese flexible manufacturing in Bernard, M. (2000) Post-
Fordism and Global Restructuring, in Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G. eds. Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order,  
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similar to advanced countries. It demonstrates the increasing importance of East Asian 
outward FDI to domestic and international economies.  
 
Table 3-4: FDI stock as a share of GDP, 1990, 2007, by region and economy (%) 
 1990  2007  
Region inward outward Inward  outward 
World 9.1 8.5 27.9 28.9 
Advanced countries 8.5 9.5 27.2 33.9 
Developing countries 13.6 4 29.8 16.5 
  -East Asian 25.9 5.4 35 28.4 
Note: FDI stock is the value of the share of capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable 
to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise. Inward stock is 
the value of the capital and reserves in the economy attributable to a parent enterprise resident in a 
different economy. Outward stock refers to the value of capital and reserves in another economy 
attributable to a parent enterprise resident in the economy 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, Annex table B.3 
 
Fourthly, within manufacturing, several industries are particularly favoured by the 
TNCs, including electronics, oil and petroleum, motor vehicles, chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals. These are the top industries in which the top 100 non-financial 
TNCs had the most foreign assets in 1992 and in 2007 (UNCTAD 1994; 2008). In 
2007, the above industries, together with telecommunications and utilities, accounted 
for 55% of the activities of the largest TNCs. Furthermore, UNCTAD (2008) argues 
that TNCs from developing countries have increased their foreign employment due to 
their ‘externalisation of productive activities in labour-intensive industries’ 
(UNCTAD). Electrical and electronic equipment manufacturing in particular is the 
top industry for the 50 TNCs from developing countries.  
To take the industries above as examples, they show the complexity of 
international division of labour and the dynamics of TNCs in the world’s industrial 
production. I shall discuss the concepts of ‘production chain’, ‘value-added chain’ 
and ‘production network’ as they are key concepts to understand the dynamics of 
industry, and I will use these concepts to analyse Taiwan’s industrialisation in 
Chapters Four and Five. According to Dicken (2004), a ‘production chain’ is the 
production process of any goods or service that has a ‘linked sequence of functions in 
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which each stage adds a value (p.14).’ The production is linear and demonstrates the 
sequence of operations to produce and distribute the good and service. Within the 
chain, a backward integration occurs in the upstream sector (e.g. raw materials), and a 
forward integration occurs in the downstream sector (e.g. finished goods). Another 
term has the same definition, according to Pass, Byran, and Davies (2000): a ‘value-
added chain’ is a chain of vertically linked activities that each adds value in 
production and distribution, for example, in the petrochemical industry, where the 
upstream sector is a raw material (oil), the intermediate sector is ethylene and PVC, 
and a finished product may be plastic kitchenware. In this thesis, I shall use the term 
‘production chain.’ Several production chains are structured in a wider production 
network of inter-firm relationships, and ‘each production network has spatiality’ 
which means the network has geographical division (Dicken 2004, p.19).  
In the automobile industry, the production chain can be divided into engines and 
transmissions, components, bodies, and final assembly. In 2001, the majority of car 
production was dominated by the Triad, accounting for 80% of the world’s 
automobile output (Dicken 2004). In 2000, the top motor vehicle producing countries 
were the US (21.9%), Japan (17.4%), and Germany (9.5%) (OICA 2000).There has 
been a significant shift in the industry since 2000: China in particular rises to be a 
major car producer base. In 2008, the top three countries are Japan (16.4%), China 
(13.3%), and the US (12.3%) (OICA 2008). Germany only accounted for 8.6% of the 
world’s car production. It is noteworthy that by including other East Asian countries 
(South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Malaysia), East Asia’s production accounted for 
38% of global motor vehicle production in 2008, surpassing North America (15.2%) 
and Western Europe37 (21.2%). Furthermore, for the first time, China rose to be the 
top market for the automobile in December 2008 (Hogg 10/02/2009). Although China 
has become the main producer, the top manufacturing companies are still dominated 
by the Triad. The top ten automobile manufacturers accounted for nearly 68% of the 
world’s automobile production: in 2008, four were Japanese firms, three were 
Western European, two were American firms, and one was South Korean (OICA 
2008). The top Chinese car company (FAW) only ranked at thirteenth on the same list 
(OICA 2008).The pattern in the electronics industry is much more complicated. The 
industry can be generally dived into semiconductors, electronic components 
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 North American region includes the US and Canada, the Western European region includes Germany, 
the UK, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, and Austria. 
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(connectors, PCBs, etc.), consumer electronics, and electronic equipment (computer 
equipment, communication equipment and consumer electronics (TVs, radios, etc.). 
The last three subsectors can be referred to as electronics systems manufacturing 
(Luthje 2006). Similar to the automobile industry, the US, the EU, and Japan 
dominated global electronics production in the B-phase but East Asian NIEs and 
China have gradually increased their production in the industry. The EU, the US, and 
Japan accounted for 23.1%, 28.3%, and 25.7% respectively of the world’s electronic 
production in 1992.38 By 2005, their share had been reduced to 15.9%, 20%, and 
13.6%, respectively. On the other hand, East Asian NIEs and China increased their 
share of production to 14.1% and 18.4% in 2005, respectively. In the semiconductor 
industry, in 1978, TNCs from the US, the EU and Japan were the top ten producers 
and the top ten semiconductor manufacturers dominating 52% of the world’s 
semiconductor production (Dicken 2004). This figure however decreased to 35% in 
2008.39 On the other hand, South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies 
have risen as new competitors since the 1990s, and two South Korean and one 
Taiwanese company accounted for 15% of the world’s semiconductor production in 
2008. In other areas of the electronics industry, TNCs from the US and Japan have 
dominated the industry since the 1960s. East Asian NIEs, however, have gradually 
emerged to become important players in the industry. For example, of the world’s top 
twenty electronics firms ranked by revenue, the US (8), Japan (7), and EU (3) 
accounted 18 of them, while the other two were from South Korea and Taiwan 
(Beutler 2007).  
Although the US, Japan, and the EU still lead the global electronics industry in 
terms of production, sales and revenues, some East Asian NIEs and China have now 
emerged as new players. It is noteworthy that within these East Asian countries, 
different paths were taken to join the global competition. As I will discuss in Chapter 
Five, Taiwanese electronic firms (both in semiconductor and electronics systems 
manufacturing) tend to serve as contract manufacturers in the supply chain for top 
brands. It is also the route that Chinese electronics firms follow. On the other hand, 
South Korean firms tend to develop vertically integrated manufacturers of 
semiconductor and world brands (e.g. Samsung, LG). In the following chapters on 
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 The following data is drawn from Yearbook of world Electronics Data in 2006. 
39
 The 2008 semiconductor sales was US$248.6 billion (HIS 2009), the amount of sales of the top ten 
semiconductors is from Electronic Research Network (2009). 
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Taiwan, it will be seen clearly that the internationalisation of the electronics industry 
has played an important role in Taiwan’s industrial development. The industry was 
the top source of inward FDI in Taiwan before the 1980s, and has become Taiwan’s 
top outward FDI since the late 1980s. The industry has become exclusively dominated, 
both in Taiwan’s domestic economy and in its outward investment during the last two 
decades. This shows how Taiwan’s industrial development and capital accumulation 
have been influenced by the overall dynamics of global restructuring and TNCs/FDI.  
In general, the discussion above demonstrates that during the B-phase, in order to 
accumulate more capital and to reduce the decline in the rate of profit, a new 
international division of labour has occurred since the late 1960s and a second wave 
of the NIDL has also occurred since the 1990s. First, the core zone, and then the semi-
peripheral zone, has increased their relocation of manufacturing to other zones. 
However, such relocation has been concentrated in the East Asian region, and the 
region has thus become an important manufacturing production base and traders for 
these core countries. Although there is a change within the core zone in terms of the 
leading TNCs, overall the core zone still dominates the major activity of the TNCs 
and FDIs.  
 
(2) Financialisation - the dominance of financial capital 
 
Another significant attempt to reduce the decline of the profit rate in the core zone is 
to find a new sector that has a higher profit rate then the older traditional sectors. As 
Foster and McChesney (2009) argue, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
stagnation and financialisation. The financial sector serves as the most profitable 
sector during a downturn B-phase. Compared with the decline of the profit rate in the 
industrial sector, there has been a sharp increase in the rate of profit in the financial 
sector. In the US, aggregate profits of financial corporations rose from 20%, 
comparable to non-financial profits in the 1970s and the 1980s, to 50% since 2000 
(Glyn 2006, p.52). According to Dumenil and Levy (2005), the profit rate of financial 
corporations in the US has experienced remarkable growth since the early 1970s, 
from less than 1% to 7% in 2002. In France, the figure has also grown since 1975, 
from minus 7.5% to more than 10% in 2001. The increase in the profit rate of the 
financial sector, the emergence of the Eurocurrency market, the end of the Bretton 
Woods system and the oil crisis in the 1970s, have led to dramatic growth in 
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international financial flows. For example, the daily volume of foreign exchange 
transactions was only US$15 billion in 1973, and this has increased by more than six 
times between 1989 and 2007, from US$570 billion in 1989 to US$3.2 trillion in 
April 2007 (Epstein 2005; BIS 2008). 
The emergence of the financial sector as a profitable sector leads to the rising 
dominance of financial capital. There are no statistics on financial capital but we can 
observe the growth from other data. The following data demonstrate that the profits of 
the financial players, as a share of GNP, are now higher than the share of the non-
financial sector to GNP. Epstein and Jayadev (2005) define a ‘rentier’ as an active 
agent in the financialisation process, to obtain profits from the financial sector such as 
banks, stockbrokers, and insurance companies. They find that the rentier income as a 
share of GNP was higher in the 1980s and the 1990s than in the 1960s and the 1970s 
in 15 OECD countries.40 In the 1960s, the share of the non-financial sector’s profit to 
GNP was higher than the rentier share, yet the situation has been the reverse since the 
1970s. In the 1990s, the average rentier share of the 15 OECD countries was 20%, 
higher than the share of the non-financial sector’s profit (10%). Furthermore, rentier 
income does not include capital gains on financial assets, as a cross-country sample 
on the latter is very hard to obtain. We can estimate that the financial capital’s profit 
is much larger than the rentier income.  
    The pattern of pursuing more profits from the financial sector and the increase in 
financial activities can be called ‘financialisation.’ Broadly, this refers to ‘the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein 
2005). Foster and Magdoff (2009) argue that the emergence of financialisation is 
related to the decline of US economy. Financialisation serves as a ‘solution’ to the 
crisis of long-term stagnation in the US. They argue that speculative finance has 
become ‘the secondary engine for growth given the weakness in the primary engine, 
productive investment’ (p 18). The system is now ‘more and more dependent on a 
series of financial bubbles to keep it going, each one bigger than the last (p 18)’.  
     In general, financialisation covers three main trends: the concentration and 
consolidation through merger and acquisition; the trans-nationalisation of operations; 
and diversification into new product markets (Dicken 2004). I would argue that the 
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 The data Epstein and Jayadev collect includes from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, and USA between 1960 and 2000.  
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third trend should be termed as the development of “non-productive finance” due to it 
being unlinked with real production and having grown to such a stage where it is 
beyond the control of any single national government. With respect to the first trend, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the financial industry has been a global 
phenomenon since the 1990s, and around 20% of all M&A has occurred in the 
financial sector globally, especially in the advanced countries (Amel et al. 2004). 
There were 15,502 cases of financial M&A (8,144 were between banks) between 
1990 and 2001 (Amel et al. 2004).    
Secondly, following the increase of TNCs in manufacturing, the expansion of 
transnational banking has also occurred since the 1960s (Dicken 2004). According to 
Dicken (2004), initially the transnational operation of US banks was to finance US 
TNCs in the 1950s and the 1960s. After the establishment and growth of the 
Eurodollar market, US banks increased their operations to include Europe. In the 
1970s, the financial flow from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the deregulation of exchange controls on capital movements gave 
transnational banks more “resources” with which to develop transnational operations. 
The foreign affiliates of banks increased from 202 in 1960 to 1,928 in 1985, and the 
number was 13,173 in 2008 (accounting for nearly 65% of the total affiliates of the 
top fifty financial corporations) (Dicken 2004, p.454; UNCTAD 2008).  
Thirdly, the increase of non-productive finance is through so-called financial 
innovation activities that de-link finance from industrial production. Strange (1998) 
argued that financial innovation is different from industrial innovation. The former 
needs the authority of government, but the latter does not (p. 26-27). It may be argued 
that the major difference is that financial innovation only creates “liquidity of capital” 
in terms of credit availability, rather than real value. This is why financial innovation 
has become one of the causes of ‘the casino economy’ (Strange 1998), as well as 
indicating that the financial innovation boom is a ‘bubble’ (Xie 06/08/2007). Sweezy 
did predict ‘the triumph of financial capital’ in the way that the development of 
financial capital is no longer a reflection of the expansion of real economy, but to feed 
a stagnant economy (cited from Foster and McChesney 2009). There are two types of 
innovative, non-productive, financial products: financial derivatives and asset 
securitisation (financial assets and real property). The derivative market has sharply 
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grown globally since the late 1990s. The notional amounts41 in the global derivatives 
markets outstanding increased from US$72 trillion in June 1998, to US$516 trillion in 
June 2007 (BIS 2008). The latter is approximately seven times the amount of world 
GDP (US$65.8 trillion) in 2006. 
      The process of financialisation is dominated by the US and the EU in terms of the 
composition of the top financial corporations, the leading role in the innovation of 
non-productive finance, and the dominance of the world’s financial centre. In 2008, 
43 of the top 50 financial corporations were from the EU and the US. By ranking the 
competitiveness42of financial centres, based on assessments 26,269 financial centres, 
eight were located in Europe and the US, one in Singapore and one in Hong Kong.  
     Financialisation is also the other side to the pattern of deindustrialisation of the 
core zone. In other words, although the core zone relocates manufacturing to other 
zones, they can obtain their profits mainly from the process of financialisation and the 
dominance of TNCs/FDI in world production and trade. The two attempts to prolong 
the decline of the profit rate in the core zone discussed above have inevitably 
influenced national development trajectories, both in the core zone and other zones. 
Such an influence is however not wholly negative to all developing countries - it 
depends on the country’s position in the capitalist world-system. Industrial relocation 
is also a means, although unintentionally by the core states, of shifting capital 
accumulation from the core to the semi-periphery, from Western Europe and North 
America to East Asia. The East Asian region is the only region that benefits from such 
a global restructuring. Taiwan is one of these cases. In the following chapters, I will 
discuss how Taiwan’s industrialisation has been affected (and to some extent 
benefitted) by the relocation of industrial manufacturing from the core zone, and by 
Taiwan’s own industrial sector as a capital-exporter to other peripheral countries. 
Taiwan’s domestic economy has also experienced financialisation in terms of the 
increasing importance of the role of financial capital, growth of non-productive 
finance, and the concentration of financial capital.  
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 The nominal amount is used to calculate payments made on swaps and other risk management 
products. This amount generally does not change hands, and is thus referred to as notional. See 
http://www.investordictionary.com/definition/notional+amount.aspx 
42
 People, business environment, market access, infrastructure, and general competitiveness.  
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(3) Neo-liberalism and economic globalisation: the attack on state powers 
 
While TNCs have increased their influence and power in the capitalist world-system 
(i.e. production, trade, and finance), the situation inevitably challenges the power of 
national states in the way that the state acts as the primary regulator in a national 
economy. Some scholars argue that TNCs are acting as a ‘transnational hegemony’, a 
‘transitional capitalist class’, or a ‘transnational managerial class’ (Robinson 2004, 
p.54; Cox 1981). However, the increasing power of TNCs is not from the activities of 
TNCs alone; the policy and institutional support from the core states cannot be 
ignored.  
The policy and institutional support is referred to as ‘neo-liberalism.’ A great 
number of studies (e.g. Robison and Hewison 2005; Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg 
2005; Harvey 2005) have researched the cause and the framework of neo-liberalism, 
as the following discussion will show. Neo-liberalism is viewed as having two 
dimensions. One is the neo-classical economic belief in market fundamentalism, 
namely that economic efficiency is delivered by self-regulating markets, where prices 
can respond to the laws of equilibrium and ensure the efficient allocation of resources 
(Robison and Hewison 2005, p.186). Such economic thinking is promoted by 
economists, such as Hayek, Friedman, and the Chicago school. The other dimension 
is the implementation of the thought into practice, which challenges the previous 
Western state-centred Keynesian demand policies and development practice in 
developing countries. For example, Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg (2005) argue that 
neo-liberalism is ‘the assertion that the market is the core institution of modern 
capitalist societies and that both domestic and international politics and policy-making 
is (and should be) primarily concerned with making markets work well (p.12).’ As 
such, the aim of neo-liberalism is to establish institutions and practices which are 
‘market-based’, ‘market-led’, ‘individualistic’, ‘market-orientated’, and ‘market-
friendly’ (p.12). Under this assumption, barriers to international trade and capital 
flows need to be removed. Furthermore, others view neo-liberalism as a political 
project or agenda associated with the policies implemented by Ronald Regan and 
Margaret Thatcher, and policies imposed by the IMF as the regulator of the debt crisis 
(Kiely 2005, p.95). Many associate neo-liberalism with the concept of the 
‘Washington Consensus’ (e.g. Robison and Hewison 2005; Harvey 2005). The term 
was coined in 1989 by John Williamson to summarise a common framework and 
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common policies suggested by Washington-based institutions (e.g. the IMF, World 
Bank, and US Treasury Department) to developing countries, including (1) fiscal 
discipline and a balanced budget; (2) a redirection of public expenditure priorities 
towards areas offering both high economic returns and improved income distribution; 
(3) tax reform, to a tax system with a broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates; 
(4) interest rate liberalisation; (5) a competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalisation; 
(7) liberalisation of FDI inflows; (8) privatisation; (9) deregulation; (10) secure 
property rights. 
      In my view, neo-liberalism does not bring about the market-led system; capitalism 
does. Neo-liberalism as an economic thought is not significantly distinct from the 
economic liberalism in the eighteenth century, such as Adam Smith’s idea of ‘the 
invisible hand’ and Ricardo’s trade theory. The logic of capitalism is market-led and 
crosses political boundaries from where it originates. Free international trade and less 
state intervention in the domestic economy are not new, but can be observed during 
British hegemony in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. What the core zone 
imposed on other zones before the Second War was more aggressive than at present, 
as the other zones did not have state sovereignty but served as colonies. In sum, neo-
liberalism or economic liberalism is not something completely new to the capitalist 
world-system, but is re-introduced. 
     The re-introduction of neo-liberalism is related to the overall decline in the profit 
rate of the industrial sector in the core and the increasing power of transnational 
capital. Without removing barriers to trade, investment, capital flow, finance, and 
domestic regulation, the relocation strategy and the process of financialisation could 
not be fulfilled. The re-introduction is also a response to the previous developmental 
paths where the power of states reached their peak when the system of states was born. 
According to Wallerstein (1996), the power of states vis-a-vis their relations with 
social forces and the structure of the interstate system existed before the creation of 
capitalism, and arrived at an ‘exceptional’ peak in the post-war A-phase. It can be 
observed in the Keynesian economic system43 of advanced countries; in the use of 
state machinery to promote development in developing countries; and in the 
                                                 
43
 An economic system that was based on John Keynes’ ideas, namely that the government and public 
sector should take an active role in the national economy via the monetary policy, fiscal policy, and 
macroeconomic policy.  
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authoritarian regimes of East Asia. The state not only ran several key enterprises but 
was also committed to provide basic services to its citizens.  
     With the previous developmental paths in the core zone were in decline, neo-
liberalism was seen to be a solution. As Harvey (2005) argues, neo-liberalism is a 
‘political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation’ (p.19). The 
practices of neo-liberalism are mostly covered by the Washington Consensus 
mentioned above, in sum, to reduce state intervention in the domestic economy and to 
reform institutional frameworks for transnational capital. It is ironic to see that since 
the global financial and economic crisis occurred during 2007-2009, the assumption 
and practice of neo-liberalism is held back and the practice of state intervention has 
again been re-introduced to solve the crisis.  
     Neo-liberalism is the policy of institutional support for transnational capital in the 
process of global industrial restructuring and financialisation. Furthermore, the 
consequence of the process is “economic globalisation”, in terms of the lifting of 
barriers to trade, investment, and finance, facilitating the increase of economic 
interaction globally. Globalisation is a contested concept, and has political, economic, 
social, and cultural definitions. Here I only refer it to as an economic term. Economic 
globalisation and regionalisation mean that there is an increase of economic activities 
in interaction, integration, connection, and interdependence between national states 
globally and regionally. From a national perspective, the national states need to adopt 
a policy of liberalisation (including deregulation and privatisation) to engage in 
economic globalisation, and therefore challenging state power.  
A number of studies have assumed the inevitable trend of globalisation (e.g. 
Ohmae 1990, Robertson 1992; Reich 1991; Friedman 1999). However, several 
scholars have questioned the existence of economic globalisation and argue that (1) 
inter-nationalisation is a more accurate description than globalisation (Hirst and 
Thompson 1999; Wade 1996); and (2) regionalisation in the so-called ‘triadisation’ 
areas is more integrated than global integration (Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and 
Thompson 2003; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). Some scholars, although recognising 
the trend of globalisation, argue that the nation state still does, and should, matter 
significantly to globalisation (Berger and Dore 1996; Gilpin 2003a; Mann 2003; 
Weiss 1997; Wood 2002b).  
   Another viewpoint about economic globalisation, with which my thesis agrees, 
regards current globalisation as one of a number of historical processes - probably the 
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most intensive one. From a world-system perspective, economic globalisation is 
neither a completely new “stage” of capitalism nor a new phenomenon since the 
1970s. The dynamics of capitalism have been working towards the economic 
integration of the world for about five hundred years, since the beginning of 
capitalism. The difference between the B-phase and previous periods is that the 
current integration has been the most intensive, in terms of production, investment, 
finance, trade, labour migration. It is important to analyse the current economic 
globalisation in the context of the B-phase, that is, the increasing integration is for the 
purpose of solving the downturn and economic crisis in the core zones. In this respect, 
it is not surprising to find that the core zone (the governments, the corporations and 
international institutions which are mainly dominated by the core states such as the 
IMF and the World Bank) are the main promoters of the process of economic 
globalisation, as they encourage the financialisation and transnationalisation of capital, 
and neo-liberalism can serve as a useful body of thought and practice to impose 
economic policies and practices on developing countries.  
 
3-2-2 The relative decline of US hegemony 
 
Coinciding with the decline of the profit rate in the industrial sector and the stagnation 
of economic growth in the core, US hegemonic power has also experienced relative 
decline. In Chapter two (section 2-2-3), I have discussed the concept of hegemony 
and why I chose the world-system perspective to view hegemonic transition. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the cycle of hegemonic transition correlates to the cycle of 
capital accumulation as the hegemon of each cycle is the strongest core of capital 
accumulation. The rise and the maturity of a hegemon correspond with an A-phase of 
capital accumulation and the decline of the hegemon corresponds with a B-phase: the 
correlation is shown in Chapter Two. As such, the relative decline of US hegemony is 
not a unique case historically. The current cycle of hegemony is US-led hegemony, 
and it has entered a period of relative decline during the B-phase of capitalism. A 
great deal of literature from different perspectives has discussed the relative decline of 
US hegemony since the failure of the Vietnam War;44 here I will only focus on the 
body of literature from the world-system perspective. 
                                                 
44 For example, see Arrighi (1994), p.27; Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996); Gilpin (1981); Keohane 
(1984); Du Boff (2003). However, some literature disagrees with the declinist literature but argues that 
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The US rose to be one of the candidates for hegemon status in the 1870s when the 
British hegemon entered a B-phase. The US’s other competitor, Germany,45failed 
during the two World Wars, and thus the US became the only country, whose 
industrial power benefited from the two World Wars. By 1948, US national income 
was more than twice the total national income of France, German, Italy, and the UK; 
and more than six times of that of the USSR (Silver and Arrighi 2005, p.168). As the 
first section noted, the US was the dominate source of outflow FDI and TNCs in the 
post-war A-phase. It was also the creditor country to Western Europe and Japan. It 
dominated world production, and its specific organisation of enterprises became a 
model of mass production, namely Fordism. The US’s industrial production was 
deemed to be the most capable and efficient one in the capitalist world-system during 
the A-phase. In other words, the US was the main contributor to economic expansion 
of the A-phase.  
The US soon transformed such an economic advantage into political, military, and 
cultural advantages. One of the main causes of the transformation was the Cold War. 
Wallerstein (1996) argues that the USSR-US Cold War was not only about the 
competition between two superpowers, but was a special condition that enabled the 
two powers to exercise a strong control in their own spheres of influence. He contends 
that neither the US nor the USSR were willing to engage in full-scale warfare with the 
other, as can be observed by three incidents: the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the Korean 
War in the 1951-1953, and the Cuban crisis of 1962 (Wallerstein 2004, p.26). In other 
words, neither side was really ready to be the world’s only hegemon. Wallerstein 
(2004) describes the Cold War as being ‘cold indeed in terms of direct conflict 
between the two superpowers’ (p.26). For the US, political-military alliance with 
Western Europe, Japan, and East Asia are examples of these. Not only through 
political-military alliance, but the US also provided economic assistance or 
advantages via the program of massive reconstruction to its allies, first in Western 
Europe and then in East Asia, as Communist China was seen as a threat to US 
strategy. As such, the US, not only through its own political, military, and economic 
                                                                                                                                            
the Post-Cord War order retained unipolarity, and the US dominated the order as single power: see the 
discussion in Krauthammar (2002).  
45
 According to Wallerstein (2004), Germany rose after it achieved unification and defeated France in 
war. Before 1873-1914, Germany and the US outdistanced the UK in the share of production of the 
world, and the two countries had the leading sectors: steel, automobiles for the US, and petrochemicals 
for Germany.  
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strength, but also through the Cold War, matured to become a hegemon in the 
capitalist world-system (except in the Communist states).  
In this respect, the USSR might have challenged the US’s intention to be a true 
world hegemon, but it actually facilitated the strength of US power within its own 
alliance. Furthermore, the USSR was not an alternative hegemon candidate to the US 
as it only had political and military strength, but lacked the most important strength, 
economic power. Such power is the determining force for a semi-periphery rising to 
the core, and for a country in the core wishing to rise to be the hegemon. What 
challenged US power or caused US hegemony to decline was not the USSR and the 
Cold War, but the emergence of other economic competitors.   
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996) argue that two major factors, both economic, 
caused US hegemonic power to decline relatively from 1967/1973. The first was the 
challenge from other core economies, namely Japan and West Germany, in terms of 
productivity efficiency and economic growth.46 US manufacturers saw a decrease of 
more than 40% in the rate of capital return between 1965 and 1973; however the US 
adjusted to the crisis by the devaluation of the US dollar against the Japanese Yen and 
the German Mark during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Silver and Arrighi 2005, 
p.170). According to So and Chiu (1995, p.219), in the 1970s, the US’s growth rate in 
GNP per capita (2.42%) and labour productivity in manufacturing (1.14%) was much 
lower than that of Japan (5.05% in GNP per capita and 2.75% in labour productivity) 
and of West Germany (2.98% in labour productivity). By 1977-1980, the US’s ratio 
of net exports to total manufacturing trade began to be negative since 1940 (Bernstein 
and Adler 1994 p.20). All these data demonstrate that the US has lost its strength and 
dominance in the industrial sector.  
The second factor is the change of world financial structure. The US’s hegemonic 
position had been supported by the dollar being used as a reserve and transaction-
currency, and therefore the dollar’s status provided the US with the rights of 
‘seigniorage’ (IKenbery 2007, p.47). The emergence of Eurodollars meant that the US 
dollar was only physically located in Europe but was actually not under US 
government’s control.47 Furthermore, the sharp increase in the outflow of US gold 
                                                 
46
 For a detailed discussion of the US’s decline in economic power since the 1970s up to present, see 
Du Boff (2003); Bernstein and Adler (1994). 
47
 Eurodollars are deposits denominated in US dollars at banks outside the US (including Europe, Asia, 
and elsewhere outside the US), and therefore are not under the control of the Federal Reserve. 
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stock (due to the trade imbalance48), US Marshall Aid, and heavy capital outflow due 
to Vietnam War-related expenditure led to a shortage and loss of gold from the US. 
To prevent the outflow of gold from the US, in 1973, the US announced that the 
dollar was no longer to be freely convertible into gold. The system of global fixed 
exchange rates of gold to the dollar was ended. The US not only decreased the value 
of its own currency but also lost its direct control over the world monetary system. 
Liewellyn and Presley (1995) conclude that the consequences of the collapse of the 
BWS was that, firstly, the US’s hegemonic role became less acceptable than before to 
other countries, in other words, in Wallerstein’s (2004) terms, the ‘moral legitimacy 
of its dominance’ was questioned by other countries. Secondly, the dollar itself 
became vulnerable and its role in acting as the hegemonic currency was also doubted. 
Other consequences included the decision-making process of the world financial 
structure that was no longer decided by the US unilaterally but by the core zone: an 
example was the first annual meetings of Finance Ministers of the Group of Seven (as 
it then was) in 1977 (Wallerstein 1996). Finally, the US shifted from being the main 
source of world liquidity and outward FDI in the 1950s and 1960s, to be the main 
debtor nation and the largest recipient of foreign capital from the 1980s (Silver and 
Arrighi 2005, p.173). 
Above all, the most important consequence of the relative decline of US 
hegemony was the rise of East Asian economies in the capitalist world-system. This 
might be an “unintentional” consequence but the US did contribute to the rise of East 
Asian economies during the B-phase, as will be discussed later. In the historical 
process, a declining hegemony is inclined to ‘tie their fates to the next hegemonic 
power as junior partners - the United Provinces to Great Britain; Great Britain to the 
Untied States’ (Wallerstein 2004, p.24). Will it be the same route for the US 
hegemony?   
 
A rising economic power centre: the East Asian economies 
 
While the capitalist world-system has entered the downturn B-phase and the core zone 
has suffered a decline in the rate of profit of the industrial sector, the East Asian 
region has experienced rapid economic growth and is increasingly important globally 
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 Since 1971, the US has had a trade deficit that has increased year by year, and in 2007 the trade 
deficit was as high as US$ 700 billion (US Census Bureau 2008). 
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in terms of manufacturing, trade, and outflow FDI. The trend implies that a new 
economic power has recently ascended while the rest of the world and the core zones 
have descended. In my view, the rising economic power will play an important role to 
facilitate another upturn phase of capitalism - if another upturn is possible.  
     With respect to economic growth in terms of the annual growth rate in GDP, most 
developing countries in East Asia have remained at between five percent and eleven 
percent during the last two decades, a figure higher than the average growth rate of 
world GDP (1.81% to 2.88%) and of OECD countries (1.12% to 2.22%) (World Bank 
2005). By percentage distribution of global GDP at PPP in 2007, the Asian and 
Pacific region is the top region (32.7%), surpassing the EU (29.3%). Exports from 
East Asia have also had remarkable growth. The share of East Asian exports in world 
trade increased from 15.3% in 1980 to nearly 28% in 2007 (Urata, 2004; WTO 2008). 
In particular, manufacturing exports have dominated Asia’s trade, for example, nearly 
82% of Asia’s trade was manufacturing exports in 2007 (WTO 2008). The share of 
East Asia’s49 manufacturing exports of total global manufacturing exports was 
17.7%in 1980, and this figure grew to 30.8% in 2007 (WTO 2008). Furthermore, by 
2007, China was the leading exporter of manufactured goods, and its share of the 
world’s manufacturing exports was nearly 12%, surpassing the US (9.6%), Japan 
(6.7%), and any single country in the EU. Only seven years ago, the US was the top 
leading exporter of manufactured goods, with a share that was nearly 14%, compared 
to China’s 4.7% (WTO 2008). 
     Chapter Two reviewed some of the development literature with regard to the factor 
that facilitated the East Asian region’s ascent. Most national model approaches 
believe that the role of the state, or its institutional framework, or its internal 
integration (see the discussion in Chapter One) is the key factor. However, I have 
criticised their lack of attention to the international context, which I will discuss here. 
The relative decline of US hegemony and global industrial restructuring mentioned 
above are the key factors that have contributed to the rise of East Asia. During the 
heyday of US hegemony, Japan and some Asian NIEs’ industrialisation benefited 
from US support in terms of economic aid, outward FDI, and the establishment of an 
economic planning mechanism. With the official end of economic aid, the US 
suggested a policy of export-led industrialisation (EOI) as a means to reduce the costs 
of retaining hegemonic power in East Asia (Gills 1993). The US opened its domestic 
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 Japan, China, East Asian NIEs, Malaysia, and Thailand 
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market for its East Asian trading partners. Such a shift of regional economic policy by 
the US thus encouraged some East Asian states’ export-led industrialisation, such as 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  
     The fast growing exports from East Asian states to the US caused serious trade 
deficits between the US and its main East Asian partners, and domestic US products 
could not compete with cheap imports from these countries. For example, between 
1978 and 1987, Taiwan’s trade surplus with the US increased from US$0.2 billion to 
US$16 billion (CEPD 2008, Table 11-9a). US-Taiwan trade relations will be further 
discussed in Chapter Five. Under pressure from US industries, the US requested that 
its East Asian trading partners reduce their exports to the US, and most importantly, to 
appreciate their national currencies. Since the mid-1980s, East Asia’s second post-war 
wave of industrial restructuring has occurred, after the Japanese currency was put 
under pressure by the US to appreciate its currency, in the Plaza Accord of 1985 (the 
first wave occurred when TNCs began to establish the EPZs in Asia in the 1960s). 
The Japanese Yen appreciated by 31.19% between 1984 and 1988. Consequently, 
Japanese outflow of FDI increased sharply, from US$6.4 billion in 1985, to US$44.2 
billion in 1989 (UNCTAD 1991). Japanese FDI in Asian NIEs increased from 
US$718 million to US$4.9 billion from 1985 to 1989 (MOF Japan 2005). Thereafter, 
the US raised a variety of trade issues with East Asian NIEs, such as opening their 
services market, the protection of intellectual property rights, trade-distorting 
investment laws, specific industrial targeting, and most importantly, the appreciation 
of Asian currencies (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995; Haggard and Cheng 1989). The 
South Korean Won appreciated by 20.54% from 1987 to 1989, and the New Taiwan 
Dollar appreciated 30.19% between 1986 and 1989.50 Both South Korea and Taiwan 
also became capital-exporting countries during this period.  
     Meanwhile, the US had changed its relations with Communist China and shifted its 
regional strategy in East Asia to less intervention, as US President Richard Nixon put 
it in Foreign Affairs in 1967, ‘in a design for Asia’s future, there is no room for 
heavy-handed American pressure; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind 
of Asian initiatives that help bring the design to reality’ (Nixon 1967). There are 
many factors that caused the US to decide on rapprochement with China in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, such as the failure of the Vietnam War, the burden of 
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 The data for Japan and South Korea is from the IMF’s International financial statistics database. 
Taiwan’s data is from CEPD (2008). 
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economic assistance to the US’s anti-communist allies in East Asia, and the 
opportunity to create conflict between the USSR and China. Whatever the case, the 
US’s change of East Asian regional strategy has had a strong influence on East Asian 
states, in particular on China and Taiwan. China was the first Communist state to be 
offered an opportunity to integrate into the capitalist world-system, although 
integration has only gathered pace since the early 1990s. The beginning of China’s 
integration into the capitalist world-system also benefited the whole East Asian region 
as China provides a huge cheap labour force and land for investment and production.  
As such, the US initially attempted to increase the production costs of these East 
Asian countries in order to reduce its trade deficits; however, the pressure 
unintentionally became the major “push” factor, first for Japan, and then for East 
Asian NIEs, to export capital and relocate their production overseas. On the other 
hand, the start of China’s integration into the world-system has played a “pull” factor 
in attracting East Asian outflow FDI. A division of labour of manufacturing among 
East Asian states has thus formed to serve as the production base for the world.  
However, according to Arrighi (1994), the decline of US hegemony does not 
mean that there will be another new hegemon to replace the US soon; instead, there 
will be some uncertainty about the next cycle as the current cycle has a specific 
feature that has not occurred in the previous historical cycles. The US still acts as the 
centre of political-military strength in the capitalist world-system, although there is a 
rising centre of capital accumulation in East Asia. Such a separation places 
uncertainty to the next cycle (Arrighi 1994). I would add two other factors that 
contribute to such uncertainty.  
Firstly, the East Asian region still relies on the US market. The empirical data 
demonstrates that the share of intra-regional trade in East Asian trade grew from 
34.97% in 1980 to 55.56% in 2006 (ARIC various years; Fouquin et al. 2006, p.1). 
Several studies51 reveal that the growth of intra-industry trade, in terms of trading 
                                                 
51A study by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment (METI) reveals that the trade 
value of intermediate goods (e.g. parts and materials) increased faster than the value of finished goods 
between 1990 and 1998 in Asia, see METI (2001). The Asian Development Bank’s (2008b) report also 
shows that the percentage of parts and components trade in the total manufacturing trade grew from 
24.3% to 29.4% between 1996 and 2006. The IMF’s Asia-Pacific Regional Outlook in 2005 also 
makes a similar argument.  
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intermediate goods and vertical specialisation52, has driven East Asia’s intra-regional 
trade. If the intermediate goods’ final destination is taken into account, the Asian 
Development Bank- ADB (2008b) estimates, in 2006, that eventually 67.5% of Asian 
exports, direct and indirect, are to outside the regional market and 32.5% within the 
regional market, although Asia’s intra-regional export was 51.8% (p.72). What the 
data above tell us is that the increase in intra-regional trade of the East Asian region is 
due to the increase of intra-industry trade. The East Asian region still relies on an 
external market, especially the US market. Although from historical perspective, the 
core zone or the hegemon may have relied on an external market (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Britain), this was due to their own natural territorial limits. In the case of East Asia, in 
particular of China, the reliance on an external market is due to the low capacity of 
domestic mass consumption. In my view, China’s ascendance to the core (not as a 
hegemon) is only possible when it controls the key sectors in industry and finance, 
and serves as the world’s market (not only the world’s factory) to solve the crisis of 
over-production in capitalism. Palley (2006) argues that China needs to shift from 
export-led growth to a domestic-demand developmental strategy in order to solve the 
contradiction of China’s reliance on the US market (for example, recession in the US 
market will eventually impact on China’s growth).   
     The other factor in the uncertainty is the complex relationship between East Asia 
and the US in the financial sector. East Asia’s financial capital has limited capability 
to dominate the global financial sector, although the East Asian region has obtained a 
huge trade surplus, foreign reserves and made net savings. East Asian countries 
generate net savings (domestic saving exceeds domestic investment) but do not 
manage it on their own; rather, financial investors/institutions from the EU and North 
America serve as financial intermediaries for Asia (Crowen et al. 2006). Some 
evidence of this weak capability is as follows:   
    
 Although Asia’s cross-border portfolio investment increased sharply during 
2001-2004, only a small share of this was intra-regional. Asia’s foreign 
portfolio liabilities and assets are mainly from the US and the EU-15 regions 
(in other words, this is capital inflow from outside Asia) (Crowen et al. 2006, 
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 Vertical specialisation is the industrial restructuring of production chains, such that different stages 
of the production chain are controlled by different firms, rather than being vertically integrated within a 
single firm (Hummels, Rapport, and Yi 1998). 
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p.9). 
 Asian holdings of US assets and US holdings of Asian assets continue to rise 
recently; the US has also been the main source of foreign portfolio investment 
in East Asia (36% to 37% during 2001-2006) (ADB 2008b, p.124-126). 
 Asian countries rely on bank borrowing and lending more from US and EU-15 
banks than from regionally based Asian banks. The claims of US and EU-15 
banks on Asia were larger and increased faster than Asian banks claims on 
Asia (Crowen et al. 2006, p.10).  
 Among the top 50 financial TNCs in 2008, only four were from Asia (two 
from Japan, one from Hong Kong, and one from Singapore). The others were 
mainly from North America and Western Europe (UNCTAD 2008). 
 
Apart from the lack of capability of financial capital, Asian economies have remained 
interdependent with the US economy through links between their currencies and the 
US dollar. The US dollar has long stood as the world’s major reserve currency, even 
though its share of global allocated foreign exchange reserves decreased from 80% in 
the mid-1970s to 63.9% at the end of 2007 (IMF 2008; The Economist 04/12/2004). 
Many East Asian countries have long maintained direct or indirect pegs of their 
currency to the US dollar, thus enabling the US to adjust their trade imbalance by 
pressurising these countries, including Japan, the NIEs, and China, to appreciate their 
national currencies. Because the US market serves as the largest destination for East 
Asia’s final products, East Asia on the one hand has a huge trade surplus with the US; 
and on the other hand, this trade surplus is presented as East Asia’s official foreign 
reserves, nearly 88% of global foreign reserve holdings.53 Most of East Asia’s foreign 
reserves are in the form of US dollars. The situation has several implications.  
Firstly, East Asian countries need to purchase the US dollar when their national 
currencies appreciate, in order to prevent Asian export-oriented industries being 
greatly damaged, something which also works to stabilise the price of the US dollar. 
Second, most of the East Asian foreign reserves are invested in US governmental 
                                                 
53 In 2006, the amount of East Asia’s foreign reserve was US$2,944, 397 million, the world’s foreign 
reserve was US$3,348,120 million (The share of the holding to East Asia’s holdings, top three holders: 
the PRC accounted for 36.2%, Japan 29.8%, Taiwan 9%). See Dent (2008), p.160; IMF (2008). 
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securities and the financial market,54 with the result that the inward foreign capital 
flow balances the capital account of the US. This is why the US has huge trade 
deficits and fiscal deficits while also having a capital account surplus. Third, cheap 
and abundant imported goods from East Asia has enabled the US to consume more 
than they produce (i.e. GDP) and maintain a low growth rate in the consumer price 
index (CPI),55 which, together with their capital account surplus, allows US interest 
rates to remain lower than elsewhere.56 As such, on the one hand the US has 
facilitated East Asia’s export-oriented industrialisation. On the other hand, the 
domination of the US dollar and cheap imports from East Asia have alleviated the 
weakening productivity of the US. Such a relationship ties Asian countries to the US 
dollar and US economy. This also becomes a dilemma for East Asian countries, for 
example, whether or not to diversify their main currencies making up their foreign 
reserves, although this idea would be strongly opposed by the US.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The capitalist world-system has experienced a significant change in the post-war B-
phase, a change that is neither one of capitalism expanding from a national economy 
to economic globalisation, nor from state-led development to neo-liberalism. It is a 
transition of the industrial centre shifting from the core zone to the semi-peripheral 
zone and to a few countries in the peripheral zone (most notably China). It is a 
transition resulting from the relative decline of US hegemony and rising capital 
accumulation centre in East Asia. The core zone instead now pursues profit and 
capital accumulation through financialisation. In Arrghi’s view, the future is uncertain 
as the centre of political-military centre is different from the rising economic centre. 
The rising economic centre also has a complicated political economic relationship 
with the current hegemony.  
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 In summer 2005, foreigners held a quarter of the bonds issued by the US and more than 50% of the 
US Treasury bond market. East Asia has been a significant region in investing in the US bond market, 
see Warnock (2006). 
55 The US CPI of all items has been lower than EU 15 and Japan since the 1980s, See OECD, Main 
Economic Indicators, various years. 
56
 (1) Between 1980 and 2004, the US received net foreign capital and financial inflows. (2) If the CPI 
remains low, the pressure of inflation is low. For this reason, the Federal Reserve can keep interest 
rates low and even reduce them.  
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     Taiwan’s change in the past two to three decades has been significantly influenced 
by these changes. As the next chapter will show, Taiwan’s post-war peripheral ascent 
was supported by US hegemony, the US’s regional strategy and the new international 
division of labour in the 1960s. As these two factors have changed, Taiwan’s 
capitalist development inevitably changed. Taiwan is affected by the shift of the 
industrial centre from the core to the semi-periphery and from the semi-periphery to 
the periphery; the rising of a new economic centre; the process of financial expansion; 
the emerging policy and practice of neo-liberalism and the attack on state power; and 
the relative decline of US hegemony. In sum, Taiwan’s ascent trajectory in the B-
phase has benefited from and been constrained by the noted changes above.   
In the following chapters, I will discuss in detail how Taiwan’s domestic state-
capital-labour nexus has interacted with these influences to shape Taiwan’s particular 
ascent trajectory. Before entering into the discussion, however, it is important to 
examine Taiwan’s peripheral ascent trajectory: how did Taiwan ascend to become a 
semi-peripheral state, and what did Taiwan achieve before the B-phase? 
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Chapter Four: Peripheral Ascent: Historical Study of Taiwan’s 
Capitalist Development before 1987 
 
Introduction 
 
In the early seventeenth century, Taiwan was inhabited only by several ethnic groups 
of Malay-Polynesian origin, and they were engaged in a primary economy to sustain 
living. Thereafter, Dutch hegemony, the Chinese Qing Empire, British hegemony, and 
Japanese imperialists subsequently paid attention to the small island. By the end of the 
Second World War in 1945, Taiwan had a serious monetary crisis (inflation) and its 
GNP per capita in 1952 was only US$186. Even in 1970, its GNP per capita (US$390) 
was still less than other developing countries, such as Brazil (US$420) and Mexico 
(US$670) (Hsu 2002). However, Taiwan’s current economic performance (per capita 
GNP, world trading status, and economic structure) has become, in the World Bank’s 
classification, a high-income developing country. This chapter argues that Taiwan 
ascended from the periphery to the semi-periphery in the 1970s, as Taiwan has 
developed both export-led industrialisation and domestic production chains in main 
industries. After the late 1980s, Taiwan advanced its semi-peripheral status (but not 
yet part of the core) by exporting capital, and relocating industries to peripheral 
countries. The question in this chapter is: how did Taiwan ascend from the periphery 
to the semi-periphery? The chapter will focus on Taiwan’s capitalist development 
from the seventeenth century to the pre-1987 period, and Chapters Five to Seven will 
mainly discuss Taiwan’s upward trajectory since 1987.  
      As discussed in Chapter Two, various development studies, in particular with East 
Asian political economy concerns, have  examined in detail the factors of economic 
success of East Asian NIEs. The neo-classical school and World Bank scholars 
contend that the correct strategy, export-led industrialisation, is a key to such a 
success. The state-centric school however argues that the function of state-guiding in 
the domestic economy is a significant factor. The study of Taiwan’s capitalist 
development was engaged in the core of the debate. This chapter will however, adopt 
a different perspective to re-examine Taiwan’s ascent trajectory, namely to study 
Taiwan’s capitalist development from the context of the capitalist world-system (the 
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structure of capital accumulation and the interstate system), and from the domestic 
state-capital-labour nexus.   
     In the first section of the chapter, I will discuss the timing of Taiwan’s peripheral 
ascent based on the definition of semi-periphery as discussed in Chapter Two. Then 
the historical study will be presented in the sequence of (world and regional) 
hegemonic order which once dominated Taiwan’s political economy, as Table 4-1 
shows, from the Dutch occupation of Taiwan in the seventeenth century, the Qing 
Empire’s rule from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the British influence in the 
nineteenth century, Japanese colonialism from 1895 to 1945, and US influence in the 
post-war period. I will discuss how the hegemonic order and the capitalist world-
system shaped Taiwan’s capitalist development. Taiwan is an interesting case, 
because a small island like Taiwan experienced the maturing and decline of 
hegemonic transition in the capitalist world-system as Table 4-1 shows. Taiwan’s 
capitalist development reflects regional and global changes. Finally, the chapter will 
analyse the special feature of Taiwan’s peripheral ascent (from a periphery to a semi-
peripheral) by adopting the analytical framework as discussed in Chapter Two.   
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Table 4-1: The periods of Taiwan’s changing structural position within the capitalist world-system 
Hegemonic order Period State 
Authority 
Methods of inclusion into the world-system Industry Main production 
relations 
The maturing of 
Dutch hegemony 
(1620-1650) 
1624-1662 Dutch colony  • Maritime Transfer base for international trade 
• Natural resources 
• Trade: exporting buckskin, venison, dried fish, 
sugar to Japan, China and Persia; importing 
silver from Japan 
The primary 
sector 
Primitive 
economy, 
landlord-tenant 
The decline of 
Dutch hegemony 
(1650-1700) 
1662-1683 Zheng’s 
Family 
• Trade: exporting rice, sugar, buckskin, silk, 
herbal medicine to Japan; importing cooper, 
lead, weapons and other military materials 
from Japan and Southeast Asia 
Agriculture Landlord-tenant 
1684-1857 Qing 
Empire’s 
affiliate 
• Trade: exporting sugar, rice, jute, rattan, 
camphor wood to the Mainland; importing 
industrial products (cotton fabric and cloth, 
silk, paper, porcelain) from the Mainland 
Agriculture 
(sugar, rice) 
Large landlord- 
small landlord- 
tenant 
The maturing of 
British hegemony 
(1850-1873), the 
decline of British 
hegemony (1873-
1897) 
1858-1894 Politically 
belongs to the 
Qing Empire; 
Economically 
influenced by 
European 
Powers 
• Trade: exporting sugar, tea, camphor to 
Europe, Mainland, the US, and Japan; 
importing opium from Europe, raw materials 
from Mainland 
• Finance: British financial capital 
Agriculture 
(sugar, rice, 
tea, camphor) 
Large landlord- 
small landlord- 
tenant 
Japanese regional 
imperialism 
1895-1945 Japanese 
colony 
• Exporting sugar and rice to Japan;  
• Importing manufacturing goods from Japan 
Agriculture, 
light 
• Agriculture: 
landlord-tenant 
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• Japanese inward FDI 
• Japanese financial capital 
industries, 
heavy 
chemical 
industries 
(from the 
1930s) 
• Industry: 
handicraft, 
wage labour 
 
The maturing of 
US hegemony 
(1945-1967/73) 
1945-1949 The KMT Exporting sugar to Mainland Agriculture, 
light 
manufacturing 
Agricultural: 
landlord-tenant  
1950-1965 The KMT • Trade: exporting sugar, rice and processed 
food to Japan; importing raw materials from 
the US 
• Inward FDI: Overseas Chinese and US FDI 
• US aid 
• Agriculture 
• light 
manufacturi
ng (food 
processing, 
textiles) 
Agriculture: 
smallholders 
Industrial: Wage 
labour 
The decline of US 
hegemony 
(1967/73-) 
1966-1986 The KMT • Trade: exporting textile, plastics and 
electronics products to the US; importing 
capital goods from Japan 
• Inward FDI: Japanese and US electronics FDI 
Light 
manufacturing, 
heavy-
chemical 
industries, 
electronics 
assembly 
industries 
Wage labour, 
home-based 
labour 
Source: Conducted by the author 
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4-1 From the Periphery to the Semi-periphery 
 
When did Taiwan ascend to the semi-periphery? Greenhalgh (1988) argues that 
Taiwan ascended to the semi-periphery in the early 1970s, due to Taiwan’s exports 
shifting from low-waged, low-skilled and labour intensive products to high-waged, 
high-skilled and capital intensive products, and due to Taiwan building up its 
periphery in Southeast Asia. However, Taiwan’s official statistics show that, before 
1987, there were only a few cases of outward Taiwanese investment (less than 50 
cases) and most of them invested in the US. In the 1960s and the 1970s, food 
processing and textile products were still the main products and exports. Not until 
1988 did the electronics and electronic equipment sector become the top exporting 
sector (Liu 1995[1992).  As such, Greenhalgh’s argument cannot be used to support 
assertion that Taiwan ascended to be semi-periphery in the early 1970s. A similar 
concept to semi-periphery is the term Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), which 
was created in 1979 by the OECD. The OECD defines NICs in three aspects: (1) Fast 
growth in both the absolute level of industrial employment and the share of industrial 
employment in world total employment; (2) A rising share of exports of 
manufacturing; (3) Fast growth in real per capital GDP such as the country was 
successful in narrowing the gap with advanced countries (Chowdhuy and Islam 1993). 
Under this definition, four Asian economies (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore), Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Brazil were on the 
NICs list. Industrialisation is the key to the status of the NICs. Yet what kind of 
industrialization trajectory is it? The definition above is too narrow and it only 
focuses on export-led industrialisation.  
One of the definition of semi-periphery as discussed in Chapter Two was in terms 
of a mixture of both core and peripheral activities. In the 1970s, Taiwan not only 
developed labour-intensive export-led industrialisation, but also developed an 
integrated domestic production chain by developing its heavy-chemical industries, 
such as petro-chemical, iron, and steel sectors. In terms of the international division of 
labour and the link between the core and the periphery, Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
status is more profound since the late 1980s, when Taiwan exported capital, and the 
main exports shifted from textile products to consumable electronic products. In sum, 
Taiwan’s capitalist development ascended to the semi-periphery after the 1970s 
through a mixture of core and peripheral activities; since the 1980s, Taiwan has 
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advanced its status (although not yet to the core) through the export of capital to 
peripheral countries. Taiwan’s ascent from periphery to semi-periphery occurred in 
the heyday of US hegemony during the A-phase.  
    
4-2 Dutch Hegemony 
4-2-1 The maturing of Dutch hegemony: Taiwan transformed into a trade 
oriented economy (1624-1662) 
 
Before the Han Chinese migrated to Taiwan in the seventeenth century during the 
Ming Dynasty, the aboriginal inhabitants consisted of several ethnic groups of Malay-
Polynesian origin (also referred to as Austronesian) (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002, P.167). 
Their main productive activity was to cultivate grain crops (especially rice and foxtail 
millet planted in dry fields) and hunting; immigrant Chinese were mainly engaged in 
trading (Shepherd 1993). This division was because Taiwan’s aboriginal people’s 
production was only for subsistence rather than the investment of labour for increased 
production (Shepherd 1993). The isolation changed with the 1624 Dutch occupation.  
During the seventeenth century, European states competitively searched for 
lucrative overseas colonies, especially in seeking to control or gain access to their 
natural resources and raw materials. Dutch hegemony arose in the sixteenth century 
and Holland became one of the major seafaring and economic powers in the 
seventeenth century. Dutch traders dominated international trade, and the Dutch were 
briefly the most important trading and financial centre in the seventeenth century in 
European capitalist world-system (Shannon 1989). In 1602, the Dutch East India 
Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie ) was founded, which had the right to 
sign foreign treaties with trade zones (octrooigebied)57, enlist its own army and navy, 
and wage a defensive war to prevent other European nations from entering its area. Its 
trade zones included Coromandel coast of India, Pulicat, Bengal, Ceylon, Japan 
(Deshima), Taiwan (where it established a trading post), China, Persia, and Arabia 
(Vries and Woude 1995[1997]). 
It was at the peak of its hegemony (1620-1650) when the Dutch occupied Taiwan. 
In 1622, The Dutch East India Company first occupied Penghu, (also called the 
Pescadores, a small group of islands near Southeast China, now affiliated to Taiwan) 
                                                 
57
 The information about the trade zones is from 
http://www.tanap.net/content/voc/tradezone/tradezone.htm 
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to use it as a maritime transfer base for international trade within the Far Eastern 
region (i.e. entrepot trade with Japan and China). After negotiating with the Chinese 
Ming Empire, the Dutch gave up Penghu and instead invaded Formosa (Taiwan) in 
1624. The Dutch controlled both northern and southern Taiwan after they defeated the 
Spanish in the north of Taiwan in 1626. The Dutch occupation marked Taiwan’s first 
direct link with the emerging European capitalist world-system. The Dutch imposed 
trade duties and monopolised Taiwan’s trading channels. They deposed all landlords 
and placed the land into the (Dutch) King’s ownership, encouraged Chinese emigrants 
from the mainland, and rented land to these Chinese as tenants, the so-called ‘wang-
tian’ system. Through the wang-tian system, the Dutch could make use of the 
landlord-tenant system to extract and increase agricultural products. By 1649, Taiwan 
was the second largest Dutch trading post in terms of trading volume(the largest was 
Japan) of its Asian trading zones (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002). Taiwan’s trading network 
involved trade in luxury goods and in bulk goods. Taiwan exported buckskin, venison, 
dried fish, sugar, tea, camphor and copper to Japan, China, and Persia; it imported 
silver, raw silk, silk and satin, herbal medicine, porcelain and gold from Japan and 
China (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002). For Wallerstein (1996), the distinction between 
trading in luxury goods and in bulk goods is that the former is trade within a world-
system but the latter between world-systems. In this respect, Taiwan’s trading 
network was both within and between the world-systems. In sum, the Dutch 
occupation transformed Taiwan from a self-subsistence primitive economy to an 
outward-trading oriented economy, from an isolated economy to one interacting with 
regional and world economies.  
4-2-2 The decline of Dutch hegemony and the rise of Chinese influence on 
Taiwan (1662-1857) 
 
The Dutch entered a period of decline in 1650, as the British overtook them as a 
trading and financial centre (Shannon 1989).  At the same time, the Dutch lost its 
control over Taiwan. In 1660, the Chinese Ming loyalist Zheng Cheng-gueng fled to 
Taiwan after losing control of the mainland to the Manchu Qing dynasty. In 1662, the 
Dutch were defeated by Zheng. The Zheng regime adopted the previous Dutch 
economic system, except changing ownership of the land from the Dutch king to the 
Zheng regime, and forbidding Taiwan’s trade with China and the Dutch (Hsiao and 
Hsiao 2002). By excluding China and the Dutch, the British replaced the Dutch as 
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Taiwan’s major European trading partner; they signed three commercial treaties 
(Taiwan was called the Kingdom of Formosa) with the Zheng family and established 
a trading house in Taiwan (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002). Japan became Taiwan’s main 
trading partner. As will be shown later, Britain and Japan showed more interest in 
Taiwan in the following decades. The Zheng family governed southern Taiwan until 
1683 when the Qing army attacked and conquered the island. In general, the 
achievement of the Zheng’s regime was to improve agricultural production and 
deepen Taiwan’s trading-oriented primary economy, although it replaced China and 
the Dutch with Britain and Japan as its main trading partners. Taiwan exported rice, 
sugar, buckskin, silk, and herbal medicine to Japan, and imported copper, lead, 
weapons and other military materials from Japan and Southeast Asia.  
      From 1684, Taiwan remained affiliated to the Manchuria Qing Empire for the 
next 211 years (1684-1895), first as part of  Fujian province (1684-1986) and then as 
the province of Taiwan (1887-1895). During this period, the Qing Empire 
discouraged migration to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland for the sake of national 
security. Many mainlanders nevertheless emigrated, particularly from south eastern 
China to Taiwan, thus increasing the growth of Taiwan’s agricultural cultivation. In 
1725, the Qing ended the ban on rice imports from Taiwan and, as a result, Taiwan’s 
rice production and exports grew (Duan 1999). According to Duan, sugar and rice 
were the two main products and exports until the re-opening of Taiwan’s harbours to 
the West in 1858. Rice was mainly exported to the Mainland, and sugar to both Japan 
and the Mainland (Duan 1999). These exports were mainly produced by the landlord-
tenant system which had been introduced with the immigrant Han Chinese in the 
seventeenth century. In particular, landlords were divided into large and small 
landlords, the former obtaining land from the Qing authority and renting it to the latter, 
who in turn rented their land to tenants. However, Taiwan’s rice exports declined 
sharply after the 1850s, because of the forced opening of China’s ports that introduced 
competition in rice imports from other Asian countries (Duan 1999). In other words, 
Taiwan’s rice lost the Mainland market after China was forced to open its markets. 
With regard to Taiwan imports, the import of consumer products was mainly from 
mainland China (e.g. cotton, ironware, groceries, and handicraft industrial goods), yet 
this source also changed to Britain and Japan after the opening of Taiwan’s ports 
(Duan 1999).   
  116
 
In sum, under the Qing Empire’s rule, Chinese immigration facilitated the growth of 
agricultural products in Taiwan and the Mainland was the main trading partner. 
During this period, Taiwan did not have direct links with the European-led world-
system but was within the Sino-centric economic system. Taiwan mainly exported 
sugar, rice, jute, rattan, and camphor wood to the Mainland and Japan, and imported 
industrial products (cotton fabric and cloth, silk, paper, porcelain) from the Mainland 
(Duan 1999).  With its inclusion into the Qing Empire, Taiwan’s further development 
was significantly changed by the Qing Empire’s later evolution.  
4-3 British Hegemony: Opening to the British-led World-system (1858-1894) 
 
After the decline of Dutch hegemony, Britain rose to be the hegemon in the late 
seventeenth century, reaching its peak between 1850 and 1873. Britain expanded its 
role as a central commercial and financial entrepot of the world via its overseas 
colonies and commercial networks. The key to the British hegemonic role in the 
world-economy was ‘unilateral free trade’ promoted by Britain (Silver and Arrighi 
2005, p.164). In Asia, the British and French defeated the Qing Empire in the second 
Opium War in 1858 that forced the Qing Empire to sign the unequal treaty of Tientsin 
with the British and the French. Accordingly the southern ports of Taiwan were 
required to be opened for trading. Two years later, the Qing Empire signed another 
unequal treaty, the Treaty of Beijing, which forced the opening of the northern ports 
of Taiwan to European traders. The two treaties had a significant influence on 
Taiwan’s economy in terms of towards to be a more export-led economy. As the data 
shows, after the opening of Taiwan’s ports, Taiwan’s exports grew tenfold between 
1865 and 1893, and the export balance increased from a trade deficit of 480,000 Qing 
Kuping taels, to a surplus 4,613,000 Qing Kuping taels58 (Liu 1992[1975], Table one).  
The British influence was different from Dutch dominance as the latter occupied 
Taiwan as a colony while the former influenced Taiwan via “free trade” and British 
financial capital. Between 1868 and 1894, Taiwan’s major exports were sugar, tea, 
and camphor, with tea and sugar on average accounting for more than 85% of total 
exports during this period.59 The export-led production of tea and sugar was initiated 
and financed under the influence of British capital, through loans and control of 
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 According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, one Kuping tael weight about 37.3 grams of gold.  
59
 The author’s calculation from Ho (1978).  
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trading channels (Yanaihara 1985[1934], p.34). After 1860, local export associations 
could not compete with British trading companies, so local trading companies were 
established (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002). These Han Chinese trading companies gradually 
evolved into money lending businesses and thus came to play the role of loan capital. 
In the financial sector, there were no formal financial institutions (i.e. banks) set 
up in Taiwan during the late nineteenth century. Taiwanese tenants obtained funds 
mainly from two areas: one was their landlord and the other was from merchants. The 
key funding source behind Taiwan’s domestic merchants was European banks, 
through intermediaries such as ‘ma zhen guan’ (merchants), and ‘yang hang’ (foreign 
trading companies) (Liu 1992[1975], p.16-17). The biggest financial institution 
behind the yang hang for loans was the British owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 
(HSBC). However, the HSBC did not establish branches in Taiwan, but required the 
yang hang to serve as the representatives to distribute loans to local 
Taiwanese/Chinese merchants, and then from the merchants to local trading 
companies, and finally to farmers (Lai 1997; Liu 1992[1975]). The circulation of tea 
and sugar commodities moved in a reverse direction, i.e. from farmers to yang hang.  
Around 80% of sugar production was for export, with Japan and north China the 
destinations; tea was ‘developed as a direct consequence of the opening of trade with 
the West’, and went to Europe, America and Southeast Asia (Ho 1978, p.16-20). 
Taiwan was also the largest camphor producer in the world (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002). 
Meanwhile, opium accounted for nearly 60% of Taiwan’s imports by 1880 (Sumiya et 
al. 1995[1992]). The division of labour in the production of tea and sugar was as 
follows: Han Chinese tenants produced tea and sugar,60 Han Chinese merchants 
dominated domestic trade, and Western capitalists (in particular the British, Germans, 
and the Americans) dominated external trade and the financial arena through trading 
companies and providing loans. The state (the Qing Empire) played little role. 
     In sum, this was the second period of Taiwan’s direct link to the European-centred 
capitalist world-economy. This time, however, the link went further. British capitalists 
had no interest in changing the mode of production in Taiwan (e.g. they did not 
introduce wage labour). Instead, they made use of the indigenous production relations 
of the landlord-tenant system (which I described previously as larger and small 
landlords versus tenants). British capitalists dominated the external circulation and 
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 It was a plantation export economy of ‘sub-tropical’ type (i.e. tenant labour), similar to a Caribbean 
economy but without slave labour.   
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financial arenas to obtain surplus value. Finally, Taiwan’s agricultural production was 
heavily export-oriented and mainly concentrated on sugar and tea.  
4-4 Japanese Colonialism (1895-1945) 
 
After the Qing Empire was defeated by Japan in the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-
95, China agreed to cede Taiwan and the Penghu islands to Japan. Taiwan was 
therefore placed under direct Japanese colonial rule from 1895 until 1945, when Japan 
was defeated in the Pacific War. Taiwan’s economy under Japanese colonialism was 
fully integrated into a Japanese-led regional sub-system, in an international division of 
labour between Japanese manufacturing and Taiwanese agriculture through trade, 
investment and finance. Taiwan was further developed towards an export-oriented 
agricultural economy. For example, the share of exports to GDP ranged from 35% to 
53.9%, between 1905 and 1939, a level which was not regained until the 1970s (Scott 
1979; Sumiya et al. 1995[1992], Table 0-4). The majority of Taiwan’s exports and 
imports were in trade with Japan61. Sugar and rice were the two main exports, and 
their share of total exports increased from 51% in the 1900s to 72.7% in the 1930s 
(Ho 1978). Japanese colonialism differed from the Dutch and the British in the 
following ways: firstly, Japan attempted to use Taiwan to pursue its semi-peripheral 
ascent strategy; in contrast, the Dutch and the British mainly sought profits. Secondly, 
Japan introduced the production relations of capital and wage labour in some 
industrial sectors while the other hegemons did not. Thirdly, Japan established a 
complete framework of bureaucracy, as well as industrial and financial systems that 
were taken over by the KMT later. The other two hegemons did not do so. These 
differences inevitably led to a distinctive influence on Taiwan’s capitalist 
development. The following section will discuss these points in detail.  
      Before discussing the influence of Japanese colonialism, it is important to put 
Japanese colonialism in a wider context. Japan-Taiwan colonial relations were not a 
unique case. As Moulder argues (1977), Japan’s wider colonization of Taiwan, South 
Korea, Southern Sakhalin, the Ryukyus, and some parts of North-eastern China, 
facilitated Japan’s industrialisation in several ways: (1) it provided a market for 
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 Eighty-four percent of Taiwan’s exports went to Japan (mainly sugar and rice) during the period 
1897-1939; while 77% of Taiwan’s imports were from Japan (mainly manufactured goods, chemicals, 
and processed foods). The data is drawn from Ho (1978). However the data does not cover each year 
between 1897 and 1940. Rather, it shows only selected years during this period.  
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Japan’s growing industries; (2) it provided raw materials; (3) it contributed to Japan’s 
shipping industry; (4) it brought indemnities and colonial taxes, in particular Chinese 
indemnities, making up around one-third of Japan’s GNP (Moulder 1977 p.184-188). 
However, this Japanese-led regional sub-system was still subject overall to the West. 
Japan was not fully independent from the West’s influence in Asia and did not 
recover its full tariff autonomy until 1911 (Winckler 1990; Halliday 1975). During the 
period of “unequal treaties” with the West (1858-1910), Japan needed to import 
manufacturing goods from the West and to export raw silk, tea, coal, and other semi-
finished goods. In other words, Japan occupied at the semi-periphery status in the 
capitalist world-system and acted to integrate the regional division of labour in the 
rest of East Asia.  
      During the first ten years (1895-1904) of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan,62 
Japan’s aim was to build and ‘modernize’ the basic infrastructure:63 including the use 
of land surveys and land reform, the reform of the monetary and financial system, the 
control of customs and fiscal authority, and the establishment of modern 
transportation facilities. In the second period (1905-1934), Japan further developed 
Taiwan’s sugar and rice export-led agriculture. In the sugar sector, Japanese capitalists 
first invested in Taiwan by establishing factories and introducing new machinery in 
1900, with the support and protection of the Japanese colonial administration in 
Taiwan. Before 1924, Taiwanese were not allowed to establish factories, unless the 
factory was a joint-venture with Japanese (Ho 1978, p.38). As such, Japanese 
capitalists dominated the sugar sector and increased its productivity.64  
However, this was only for sugar-processing. As for direct sugar-production, the 
major supply of primary sugar to the new sugar factories still came from tenants 
                                                 
62
 Here I draw on Liu (1995[1992])’s division of Japanese colonisation into three sub-periods.  
63Those who argue that Japan’s colonialism promoted Taiwan’s modernisation and development often 
address Japan’s effort to build such infrastructure (e.g. Wade 1990; Ho 1978; Amsden 1985). There is 
no doubt that Japanese colonialism transformed Taiwan’s economy; however, the historical legacy 
before Japanese colonialism cannot be ignored. For example, although Taiwan’s productivity pre-1895 
was less than during Japanese colonialism, its economy was already export-led because of the prior 
domination of the Dutch and the British. The Qing Empire tried to build upon certain areas of the 
infrastructure after the French signalled their intention to seize Taiwan in 1887. Some measures were 
successful; some were not, but were nevertheless carried further by the Japanese, e.g. the land reform 
abolishing large landlords.  
64 There were many joint-venture companies owned by Japanese and Taiwanese, although such 
companies were dominated by Japanese. For example, Japanese ownership accounted for 90.7 % of all 
joint stock manufacturing companies in 1929, see Ho (1978). 
  120
 
(Sumiya et al. 1995[1992]). Similarly, in the rice sector, Taiwanese tenants produced 
rice, while Taiwanese capitalists dominated the process of rice processing and 
domestic circulation, and Japanese capitalists dominated external circulation through 
trading companies (ibid). For example, in the late 1930s, 90% of Taiwan’s rice export 
to Japan was controlled by four Japanese trading companies; Japanese sugar 
companies also exported 88% of Taiwan’s sugar production to Japan (Hsiao and 
Hsiao 2002). In sum, the above discussion shows how Japanese colonialism moved 
Taiwan’s economy further towards an export-led production of sugar and rice by 
making use of the indigenous methods of production (i.e. landlord-tenant relations). 
There was no ‘indigenous capitalist class’, but rather a class of colonised commercial 
capitalists and Japanese capitalists, who dominated the industrial production sector 
and trading sectors. Under such social relations of capital accumulation, Taiwan 
contributed both to the supply of large amounts of sugar and rice to Japan65 and to the 
consumption of Japan’s manufacturing goods (i.e. served as a market for expanding 
Japanese industrial production).  
     During the third period of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan (1935-1945), Japan 
attempted to ascend to the core via expanding their regional leadership ambitions to 
Southeast Asia to achieve its goal of a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ 
(Halliday 1975, p.116-140; Gordon 2000). This was a colonialist proposal, made in 
the name of Pan-Asianism. Taiwan’s geo-strategic position and financial support 
became significant to Japan’s invasion plans of Asia. Accordingly, Japan began to 
develop Taiwan’s (and Korea’s) heavy chemical industries in the mid-1930s. A new 
set of industries besides food processing were now invested in e.g. cement, chemicals, 
pulp and paper, fertilizer, petroleum refining, and metallurgy. Taiwan imported many 
older-generation machines from Japan, and this diversified industrialisation was 
Taiwan’s first experience with import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). I shall 
summarise the ISI again here. ISI attempts to produce substitute products which the 
economy imports so that it can reduce its dependence on imports. Structurally, 
Taiwan’s ISI was driven by the second phase of Japan’s own product-cycle, that is, 
one based on steel, chemicals, armaments, and automobiles (Cumings 1987, p.45). 
However, the real motivation was not an economic one, but rather a geo-political one. 
Taiwan’s ISI served the military needs of the Japanese Imperial Army’s invasion 
                                                 
65
 For example, in the sugar sector, Taiwanese sugar held a major share of the Japanese domestic sugar 
market, i.e. 81% in 1911 and 75% in the 1930s Ho (1978), Sumiya, et al. (1995[1992]). 
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strategy of the Asian region. In sum, under Japan’s regional imperialist strategy, 
Taiwan’s status ascended from periphery to semi-periphery in the Japanese-led 
regional sub-system, in the way that Taiwan advanced industrialisation and engaged 
in a regional division of labour with Japan and Southeast Asia.  
     In this context, what was the domestic state-capital-labour nexus? Even as Taiwan 
increased industrialisation, the manufacturing sectors were still dominated directly by 
Japanese capitalists, in particular by the four great zaibatsu - Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Yasuda, and Sumitomo66 (Ho 1978, p.87). For example, Liu showed that in 1941, the 
Japanese share of capital was 91.1 % of stock companies in Taiwan (whose assets 
were more than 0.2 million Japanese Yen) (Liu, 1995[1992], p.25). The expansion of 
Japanese monopoly capital to Taiwan first began with the domination of the sugar 
sector, and then increased through investment in other sectors from the 1930s onward.         
Japanese monopoly capital not only dominated the production and trading sector, 
it also controlled major finance channels. The financial control of the British 
imperialists was replaced by the Japanese colonial government. After Japan formally 
colonised Taiwan from 1895 onward, the Japanese colonial government established 
official monetary and financial institutions. The monetary system linked Taiwan’s 
currency to Japan’s (and delinked from the Chinese Qing Empire). The formal 
financial institutions enabled the transfer of Taiwan’s savings into industrial and 
commercial loans. The division of labour among financial capital was: the colonial 
authority set up the Bank of Taiwan to serve a similar function as a central bank; 
Japanese capitalists established twelve commercial banks (or branches); Taiwanese 
commercial capitalists and landlords organised local credit associations (Lai 1997). 
One noteworthy point, however, is that during the Japanese colonial period, the level 
of internationalisation of Taiwan’s banks was very high. For example, in 1943, the 
number of overseas branches of Taiwan’s banks was sixty-one (there were eighty in 
1995), of which twenty-seven were located in Mainland China (there were seven in 
2007) (Lai 1997, p.13).  
In the employment sector, by the skill division of labour between Japanese and 
Taiwanese male labour, more than 80% of the technicians, trade and professional 
employees were Japanese males in 1943; the majority of Taiwanese working males 
                                                 
66According to Sumiya (1989), the ‘zaibatsu’ were family owned holding companies, in the financial 
form of monopoly capital, and had their own related general trading companies. In 1945, the “big four” 
zaibatsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda) owned around one quarter of the Japanese private 
sector’s total paid-up capital (p.111-112).    
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(nearly 70% during the period 1905-1930) remained in the agricultural sector (Ho 
1978). Social relations during the Japanese colonialism were not harmonious, as there 
was organised resistance among Taiwanese peasants, workers, indigenous people, and 
the Taiwan Communist Party, who all attempted to resist Japanese rule; they were 
heavily oppressed by the colonial government (Chan 2001; Wong 1992). 
      In conclusion, the division of labour between Japanese capitalists, Taiwanese 
commercial capitalists and landlords, and Taiwanese tenants under the Japanese 
colonial order, created Taiwan’s capital accumulation and export surplus, which 
accounted for 26% to 30% of total exports from 1905 to 1944 (Ho 1078; Sumiya et al. 
1995[1992]). Taiwan’s agriculture was already export-oriented from the 1860s (rather 
than just during the Japanese colonial period), when Taiwan was being integrated into 
the European-centred capitalist world-system. Yet, specifically in the Japanese 
colonial period was that the capital/wage-labour mode of production was introduced 
directly in the sugar-processing sector. The development of other manufacturing 
sectors was accommodated by the pace of Japan’s industrialisation and Japan’s 
imperial expansion within East Asia. This specific historical evolution forms the 
setting of Taiwan’s contemporary post-war capitalist development.  
4-5 Post-war Peripheral Development and the US Hegemony 
 
Taiwan’s capitalist development entered another phase in the post-war period. Japan 
was defeated by the Allied powers in the Second World War and in 1945 Taiwan was 
re-affiliated to mainland China. The ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), took over 
Japanese properties and reorganised them into state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Taiwan briefly re-connected with the mainland economy in 1945, but disconnected 
again following the KMT administration move to Taiwan in 1949. After that, 
Taiwan’s economy was again delinked from mainland China and re-connected 
eventually with Japan.67 Overall, the US and Japan both played significant roles in 
Taiwan’s post-war capitalist development. Taiwan’s economy was integrated into the 
US-led hegemonic order through trade (exporting agricultural goods to Japan, and 
importing raw materials and aid commodities from the US), inward foreign direct 
                                                 
67
 As Liu (1992[1975]) notes, the export destination of sugar shifted from Shanghai to Japan in 1949, 
when the ROC signed a trade accord with Japan in September 1950. Muraoka (2002) points out that 
Taiwan’s rice and sugar exports to Japan were a means of obtaining foreign exchange before the arrival 
of US aid. 
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investment (mainly from the US), and direct US aid.68 Japan’s role had two 
dimensions. The first was the Japanese legacy from the colonial period which served 
as the foundation of Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises and state financial capital, 
while the second dimension was inward FDI from Japan and capital goods imported 
from Japan that facilitated Taiwan’s export-led industrialisation, as will be discussed 
later.  
 
4-5-1 The Japanese legacy: the foundation of Taiwan’s SOEs and financial 
capital (1945-1949) 
 
The Japanese-owned enterprises that dominated processed food and other 
manufacturing sectors in the colonial period were taken over by the KMT and were 
organised into state-owned enterprises69 and KMT-owned enterprises.70 The KMT 
administration also incorporated many Japanese small- and medium-sized enterprises 
into two state-owned enterprises. The significance of this “takeover” was that the 
KMT and the new Taiwanese state inherited the legacy of capital accumulation during 
the Japanese colonial period, and incorporated them into new state-owned enterprises. 
The take-over served as the main mean of transferring surplus to mainland China 
during the civil war period (1945-1949), and the main means of facilitating Taiwan’s 
economic development after the 1950s.   
Accordingly, between the 1950s and the 1970s, the share of public enterprises in 
total output and investment in Taiwan was one of the largest outside the communist 
world and Sub-Saharan Africa.71 The function of the SOEs was very significant to 
Taiwan’s economy, and it should be viewed as part of the vital role of the state in 
Taiwan’s capitalist development. The SOEs provided basic infrastructure (e.g. water, 
                                                 
68
 US$5.7 billion in aid arrived in Taiwan between 1950 and 1968; it comprised of military aid, 
economic aid, a development loan fund, and surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480 
(CEPD 2008, p.252). 
69
 This included financial institutions and the petrol, aluminium, power, sugar, fertiliser, camphor, 
shipping, machinery, cement, pulp and paper enterprises. 
70
 The KMT administration took over Japanese public property (1.1 billion old Taiwanese dollars), 
Japanese private enterprises (of 860 companies, 775 were controlled by Japanese and 85 were by 
Taiwanese) and personal property (1.1 billion old Taiwanese dollars), and Japanese private lands 
(257,608 hectares) (Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council n.d.)  
71
 The amount of public enterprise output in GDP at Factor Cost and in Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
from the1950s to 1970s was 13% and 32% respectively, see Wade (2004[1990]). 
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electricity, gas, public transportation), stablised consumer prices, and offered a means 
of financial control (e.g. the banking sector), managed exporting in the 1950s (e.g. 
sugar), and undertook the function of import-substitution industrialisation in the 
1970s (e.g. petroleum, iron, and steel). As Wade (2004[1990]) also points out, many 
SOEs formed a vertically integrated system that offered a foundation for Taiwan’s 
defence industry.  
      In the financial sector, a similar characteristic to the industrial sector can be 
observed, namely, the foundation of Taiwan’s post-war financial capital was mainly 
inherited from the Japanese legacy and emigrant mainland financial capital. Lai (1997) 
proposes that Taiwan’s financial pattern (before the 1990s) originated from three 
sources: the first source was the financial institutions left from the Japanese colonial 
period; the second was domestic banks established in Mainland China but which later 
moved to Taiwan with the KMT in 1949; the third was the financial institutions which 
were newly-established in Taiwan after 1950. Financial institutions inherited from the 
colonial government were reorganised into state-owned commercial banks, state-
owned medium and small business banks, and community banking institutions (i.e. 
credit cooperatives, and farmer/fishers’ associations). Financial institutions that 
moved from the Mainland to Taiwan served as specialist banks or as development 
banks. The financial institutions established after 1950 were mainly commercial 
banks and regional medium-and-small business banks, and branches of foreign banks.  
In sum, the architecture of Taiwan’s financial and industrial sectors was based on 
the two inheritances of Japanese legacy and immigrant capital. These two inheritances 
also enabled the KMT party-state to dominate the industrial and financial sectors and 
to act as industrial and financial capitalist. 
 
4-5-2 US hegemonic influence: US aid and inward FDI (1950-1965) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, US hegemony began to mature from the end of the 
Second World War. At first, in East Asia, the US’s regional strategy was not that clear. 
For example, the US tended not to intervene in the issue of the divide between the 
PRC and the ROC. However, the Korean War in June 1950 caused the US to shift its 
position and to incorporate Taiwan into its anti-communist alliance in East Asia (Lin 
1992). Not only Taiwan, but also Japan and South Korea received US aid, for 
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example, Japan’s payment for imports from Taiwan came out of its US aid.72 When 
the US decided to intervene in Taiwan following the outbreak of the Korean War, 
Taiwan’s capitalist development was incorporated into the maturing US-centred 
world-system via US aid, trade, inward FDI, and political and military assistance. 
Taiwan’s peripheral development needs to be viewed in the context of the peak of US 
hegemony and its regional strategy in East Asia. Subsequently, US$5.7 billion in aid 
arrived in Taiwan between 1950 and 1968; it comprised of military aid, economic aid, 
a development loan fund, and surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480 
(CEPD 2008, p.252).73         
US aid was a means to solve the problem of surplus agricultural products from 
the US. About 29% of US aid commodities were US surplus agricultural commodities 
(CEPD 2008). The significance of US aid to Taiwan is a key point often taken up in 
the literature in the study of Taiwan, including the fact that US aid helped the KMT 
administration to control inflation; filled the foreign exchange gap (it contributed 
more than 90% of the deficit in Taiwan’s international balance of payments, see Li 
1988); financed domestic revenues, and contributed to domestic investment (it 
provided one-third of capital investments, see Li 1988); supplied necessary food and 
raw materials; financed land reform; provided a channel for the transferral of 
technology; facilitated the guiding function within the state; and strengthened the 
private sector (Cumings 1987; Ho 1978; Jacoby 1966; Li 1988; Liu 1992[1975]; 
Wade 2004[1990]). Apart from these contributions, from the viewpoint of Taiwan’s 
capitalist development, US aid (and other US economic measures) was significant as 
(1) it developed Taiwan’s economic planning mechanism, which was viewed by the 
national model approach as a vital role in guiding Taiwan’s capitalist development; (2) 
encouraged export-led agriculture so Taiwan was able to export agricultural products 
and earn foreign exchange, and thus promoted industrialisation; (3) incorporated 
Taiwan into the US-economic dominated world-system via trade and FDI. These 
points will be discussed as follows. 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 Japan and the US signed the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas and Economic Rehabilitation 
in Occupied Areas between 1945 and 1952 (Muraoka 2002, p.233).  
73US aid was officially phased out in June 1965, yet the ROC requested an extension of two more years. 
See Li and Liu (2005).  
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(1) US aid developed Taiwan’s economy planning methodology 
Taiwan’s post-war economic planning mechanism originated from the body 
controlling the use of US aid.74 US aid was first launched in mainland China in 1949 
when the ROC established the Council for U.S. Aid (CUSA), soon after signing the 
Sino-American Aid Agreement in Nanking. CUSA moved to Taiwan and became the 
major unit to implement policy planned by the new Economic Stabilisation Board 
(ESB) until 1958.75 When the US signalled its intention to cease its aid program in 
1963, CUSA was reorganised into the Council for International Economic 
Cooperation and Development (CIECD). In the 1970s, CIECD was in turn 
reorganised into the Economic Planning Council (EPC), and was later merged with 
other units to create the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD). 
Economic policy and planning was undertaken through the Four-Year Economic 
Development Plans, which were planned by the above units. The first three Four-Year 
Plans (1953-1956, 1957-1960, and 1961-1964) were to apply for US aid (CEPD 
2005/02/17). The function of economic planning was indeed created by US aid. Li 
Kwo-ting, the governmental officer strongly involved in the aid programme, clearly 
pointed out the major function of US aid:  
 
‘I feel strongly that the most significant contribution of the aid programme 
was not the material aid per se but rather the programme’s spin-offs. In co-
ordination with the programme we developed the basics of economic planning 
and programming methodology. Directional planning and objective budgeting, 
among others, were introduced into the country and were firmly established. 
The most striking evidence of this was that, two years before our emergence 
from the aid programme the Chinese agency handling aid funds was 
                                                 
74
 Liu (1992[1975]) argued that the US formulated three mechanisms to guide Taiwan’s development: 
the Blue Print System; the Uses of Local Currency AID Fund; and the Special Matching Fund. 
According to the Economic Aid Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of China (03/07/1948), the ROC needed to promptly deposit an 
amount of Chinese currency equivalent to the US aid imported into the special account. In 1965, the 
Special Fund was reorganised as the Sino-American fund for Economic and Social Development, and 
the amount of the fund was NT$ 32.96 billion (US$ 824.08 million).  
75According to Li (2005), ESB was responsible for planning and coordinating the US aid program, 
CUSA took charge of implementation. However, ESB was abolished in 1958 and its role was 
transferred to the CUSA.  
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reorganised and integrated into our economic planning and implementing 
machinery.’ (Li 1988, p.219, emphasis added) 
 
(2) US aid facilitated export-led agriculture 
During the period of US aid, agricultural products and processed agricultural products 
were the two main exports.76 Agricultural production grew annually at a rate in excess 
of 5%, and remained at around 30% of GDP throughout the 1950s (CEPD 2008; Ho 
1978). The importance of agricultural products was, as Liu analysed, that they (1) 
supported military finances through government’s levy of large amounts of rice;77 (2) 
facilitated industrialisation by exporting agricultural products and earning foreign 
exchange. The annual amount of sugar and rice for export was around US$100 
million, as much as the annual US economic aid; and (3) stabilised the domestic 
consumer price and the food-supply (1995[1992], p.80). 
    Several factors contributed to this increase in agricultural productivity. Firstly, it 
was based on the historical legacy of export-led agricultural production and 
agricultural processing industries. Secondly, the land reform implemented by the 
KMT administration between 1951 and 195378 increased agricultural productivity. 
Land reform and other agricultural policies were guided by the ROC-American Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), an institution established under the 
Economic Aid Agreement between the US and the ROC in 1948. Thirdly, according 
to Thorbecke (1979), US aid was initially largely directed towards agriculture and 
provided related resources (p.172). The assistance and guidance from the US to 
implement land reform, as well as to finance the military sector, was not unique to 
Taiwan, as South Korea also had a very similar experience (Cumings 1987).   
 
 
 
                                                 
76
 Before 1960, the main exports were rice and sugar, which accounted for around 74 % of total exports 
in 1952 and 66 % in 1956. Between 1961 and 1966, the main exports were sugar, textile products and 
canned food. See Hsueh, et al. (2001). 
77
 The share of rice levied and bought by the government was around 30% of total rice production 
between 1951 and 1965. 
78For an introduction to land reform, see Ho (1978), Thorbecke (1979). The most important was a 
‘land-to-the-tillers’ programme, where the landlord-tenant system was abolished as this program 
allowed each landlord to own a mere three chia (2.907ha) of medium grade paddy field, the excess part 
of their lands being purchased by the Taiwanese government and resold to the tenants.  
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(3) Incorporation of Taiwan into the US-Japan economic relationship 
With the increase in agricultural productivity, agricultural exports balanced Taiwan’s 
current account and facilitated labour-intensive industrialisation. Taiwan’s trade 
relations from the 1950s to the mid-1960s were mainly characterised by the export of 
agricultural products to Japan (accounting for 49-65% of Taiwan’s exports) and the 
import of raw materials from the US (accounting for 70-80% of Taiwan’s imports) via 
aid79 (CEPD 2008). Taiwan’s strong economic ties with Japan and the US from the 
1950s to the 1980s, as Gills argues, presented a ‘triangular pattern of industrial 
restructuring’ (Gills 1994, p.213).  The US not only financed Taiwan via US aid, but 
also via its outward FDI. Taiwan’s post-war inward FDI began with the relaxation of 
US-based FDI. The Investment Guarantees Agreement was signed by the ROC and 
the US in 1952.80 From 1955, US private capital was invested in Taiwan. US and 
Japanese FDI accounted for around 85% and 11% of total inward FDI (excluding 
overseas Chinese investment), respectively (Investment Commission 2001).81 The 
largest investment by sector was in electronic and electric appliances, which 
accounted for around 27% of total FDI.  
4-5-3  Domestic state-capital-labour nexus: the domination of bureaucratic-
corporate capital  
 
Apart from the influence of US hegemony and the Japanese legacy, the special role of 
the KMT regime also significantly shaped Taiwan’s capitalist development. The 
dominating role of the state in Taiwan has been termed as a ‘developmental state’, or 
‘bureaucratic capitalism’ (Amsden 1985, p.362), ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian industrial 
regime’ (Cumings 1987, p.71), and the Taiwanese liberal economists’ ‘party-state 
capitalism.’82 However, another term, ‘bureaucratic-corporate capital’ is more precise 
                                                 
79
 The pattern of trade relations, however, changed dramatically in the mid-1960s, namely, Taiwan 
exported light manufacturing products to the US and importing capital goods from Japan (i.e. forming a 
structural trade deficit with Japan and a trend to a surplus with the US).  
80
 It was extended to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals in 1954 and to the Statute for 
Investment by Overseas Chinese in 1955. 
81
 FDI by foreign nationals accounted for 69% of total FDI between 1952 and 1967, while the rest was 
overseas Chinese investment. Between 1952 and 2007, overseas Chinese investment only accounted 
for 4.3% of total inward FDI.    
82
 Six liberal economics professors from Cheng-She, a liberal society, published a book entitled “The 
Capitalism of the Party-State” in 1991, in which they criticise the monopoly of public enterprises 
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as it points to a special pattern of state-capital relations. The term was coined by Liu 
Jin-qing, a Taiwanese economist who obtained his PhD, and taught, in Japan, in his 
thesis of 1971 (published in 1975). Liu argued that Taiwan’s public enterprises, 
owned by the KMT-state (the traditional and semi-feudal regime in Liu’s view), were 
neither competitors, nor the opposite of the private enterprises owned directly by 
business (the private capitalist regime). Rather, Taiwan’s KMT-state bureaucrats and 
private capitalists were combined together as ‘bureaucratic-corporate capital’ (guan 
shang z ben)83 that dominated the industrial and financial sectors (Liu 1992[1975], 
p.279-280). Taiwan’s capital-accumulation structure between 1945 and 1965, 
presented as bureaucratic-corporate capital, externally depended on the US and 
Japanese economy, and internally exploited small agricultural landholders and low-
wage workers.   
     The dominance of bureaucratic-corporate capital was not only due to inherited 
Japanese owned enterprises, as noted previously, but also due to the security concerns 
of the KMT regime. The share of SOEs capital in Taiwan’s total capital formation 
was 50.3% and 58.7% in 1954 and 1966, respectively (Liu 1992[1975], p.111). The 
SOEs were exclusively controlled by the state under the KMT authoritarian regime. 
Compared with SOEs, Taiwan’s private capital was relatively weaker. Although the 
US intended to encourage the development of Taiwan’s private enterprises rather than 
SOEs, the KMT was cautious and wished to prevent ‘indigenous Taiwanese industrial 
capitalists’84 from dominating the economy (Ellison and Gereffi 1990, p.387), so as to 
keep political control over the ‘native Taiwanese’ and a monopoly of emigrant KMT 
cadres. Similarly, one of the main purposes of highly controlled financial institutions 
was to prevent the rise of indigenous private financial capitalists and industrial 
capitalists (Chen 2004), given that such a class could be viewed as a potential threat 
or rival to KMT political power in Taiwan.   
                                                                                                                                            
controlled by the KMT and intervention in the free market, thereby highlighting the necessity of 
liberalisation and privatisation.  
83
 ‘Guan shang z ben’ had been translated into several different terms:  bureaucratic-corporate capital, 
bureaucratic-business capital, and the bureaucratic-merchant capital. Here I use the first translation, 
drawing from Hsu (2002).  
84
 The Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan during the Qing period are called ‘native Taiwanese’ (ben 
sheng ren) although there were real “indigenous people” living in Taiwan before these Chinese arrived 
who are now called ‘aborigines’. The Chinese who moved to Taiwan with the KMT in 1949/1950 are 
referred to as Mainlanders (uai sheng ren).  
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The state profoundly intervened in the private industrial sector and financial 
sectors. The major private industrial sectors were food-processing and textile products. 
The former, based on pre-war development, was the main source of exports (together 
with direct agricultural products) in the 1950s and the 1960s. The latter, the textile 
sector, was “protected to develop” by the government via ISI. The protectionist 
measures85 of the textile sector predated the First Four-Year Plan because this 
industry came over from mainland China with the KMT in 1949. This industry was 
mainly “mainlander capital”. The state’s fostering of the textile industry enabled this 
industry to become the major exporter in the 1960s and the 1970s, eventually 
superseding exports of rice and sugar.86     
In the financial sector, the domestic full-service banks were mainly state-owned 
(twelve of sixteen). The other four87 were non state-owned, as three of them were 
established by overseas Chinese capital. The consequence of the nationalisation of the 
banks was that the state could use the banking sector to mobilise national savings and 
allocate banking loans to the industrial sector on a “selective” or strategic basis. The 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates were also directly determined by the 
government until 1989. In other words, the state acted as “financial capitalist”, 
specifically to guide industrial capitalists (either state-owned enterprises, or private 
enterprise managed ‘special permission’ businesses). Apart from the monetary 
institutions (banks, local branches of foreign banks, and local financial institutions), 
other financial institutions were also established: (1) the postal savings system (PSS)88 
                                                 
85The ISI policy included regulating the entry of new factories, adopting multiple foreign exchange 
rates (1951-1957), implementing high tariff-protection and import controls.  
86
 Textile products were the dominant export in the 1960s and the 1970s, while electrical machinery 
and apparatus was the second largest export commodity in the 1970s (Taniura 2003[1988], Appendix 
2-8) 
87
 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was renamed from the Bank of China, and it 
was privatised in 1971, due to ROC’s withdrawal from the United Nations. When the PRC replaced the 
seat of the ROC in the United Nations in 1971, all overseas property with the same title as PRC’s 
overseas property would be taken over by the PRC government. So the ROC government changed the 
name of ‘Bank of China’ to ICBC and privatised it in 1971. 
88
 The PSS accepts saving deposits and arranges life insurance business through their branches (post 
offices), but the PSS was prohibited from lending. All their deposits are re-deposited with the Central 
Bank of China (CBC). As such, the CBC can use the PSS deposits to implement selective credit 
accommodation. After 1982, the re-deposit policy was changed so that four specialised banks plus the 
CBC could accept the re-deposits of the PSS (Shea, 1994). The share of the deposits of the PSS of all 
financial institutions was around 13% in 1981 (Lai, 1997). 
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and (2) investment and trust companies (ITC).89 The community banking institutions 
were privately owned by co-operative members and farmer/fishing associations. Their 
leaderships were either close to the KMT or members of the KMT. It is clear that the 
KMT party-state had the power to channel financial capital to specific industrial 
capitalist projects.  
4-5-4 The end of US aid and US-China rapprochement 
 
Although the US had a strong influence on the Taiwanese state, their interests were 
not the same. For example, during the US aid period, US officials continued to put 
pressure on Taiwan to develop private enterprises and to implement economic 
liberalisation (Li and Liu 2005). Yet the Taiwanese state responded by maintaining a 
large share of SOEs while choosing some Taiwanese capitalists to manage “special 
permission businesses”. For example, the Formosa Plastics Corporation, Taiwan’s 
largest plastics corporation to date, was founded in 1954 and was supported and 
funded by the government through US aid.90 Another example was that the KMT 
administration planned to “recover mainland China,” in the 1950s, so a large defence 
expenditure was allocated.91 The US, however, tried to change the KMT’s plans in 
favour of developing Taiwan rather than returning to China (Hsueh et al. 2001, p.21). 
     The situation of competing concerns and interests between the US and Taiwan 
became more obvious in the 1960s. In 1959, the Director of the International 
Cooperation Administration of Mutual Security Mission to China, Wesley Haraldson, 
                                                 
89
 These act as trustees to manage trust funds and trust property, mainly utilised for loans, and 
securities investment. The Taiwanese government did not allow newly established private banks, but 
they allowed the establishment of private investment and trust companies (Lai, 1997). In the early 
1970s, seven ITCs and one state-owned ITC were set up, and then the licensing of new ITCs was soon 
suspended due to the fierce competition. The share of loans provided by ITCs, as a proportion of all 
financial institutions, in 1981 was 4.17% (see Lai, 1997). Nowadays, only two ITCs exist, as the other 
ITCs were either transferred to or merged with commercial banks, or withdrew.  
90The Industrial committee of Economic Stabilisation Board initially proposed a production plan of 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) undertaken by state-owned enterprise; however, the facilitator of the 
committee, Yin Chung-long, argued that such an industry should be produced by private enterprise. 
Accordingly, they negotiated with Wang Yung-ch’ing (who later founded the Formosa Plastics 
Corporation) to execute the plan and applied for a loan from US aid for him. See Gold (1986), Li and 
Liu (2005).  
91According to Ho, the share of defence expenditure of general government expenditure was 65.8% in 
1955 and 65% in 1960 (1978, Table7.1). 
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proposed eight reform points92 to the Vice President of the ROC (Li and Liu 2005). 
Later the ‘Nineteen-Point Program for Economic and Financial Reform’ was drafted 
by Taiwan. This plan was approved in January, 1960. It was a response to the US’s 
proposal and ‘accepted the main points put forward by the USAID director in 
essence’ (Hsueh et al. 2001, p.22). The real issue of the 19 Point Reform, however in 
Hsueh et al’s account, was to pursue self-sufficiency, namely to search for alternative 
resources instead of relying on US aid (2001, p.24-25). As such, the multiple foreign 
exchange rates system was completely adjusted to a single rate system in 1960, and 
the Central Bank was re-established in 1961. The Statute for Encouragement of 
Investment legislation drafted from the 19 points, was promulgated in September 
1960, and aimed to increase investment, domestic savings, and encourage export 
through tax relief.93  Taiwan was not a unique case in shifting to encouraging exports 
under US pressure. As Gills (1994) argues that in both Taiwan and South Korea, the 
timing of the shift to EOI, under political pressure from the US, was synchronised 
(Gills 1994). Taiwan’s economic policy change needs to be seen as part of the overall 
shift of US East Asia strategy from aid to EOI promotion.  
Thereafter, the US not only changed their regional strategy from aid to EOI 
promotion, but also changed its geopolitical strategy in the late 1960s. Amongst other 
things, the US decided upon rapprochement with Communist China, which thus 
impacted on Taiwan. I should briefly review the complicated US-China-Taiwan nexus 
here. After Japan was defeated by the Allied Alliance in 1945, Taiwan was 
temporarily under the governance of the Republic of China led by the Kuomintang 
(ROC-KMT). With US support, the ROC was also one of the founding members of 
the United Nations (UN) and obtained a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 
1945. However, domestic political conflict within China was severe in the late 1940s. 
The ROC-KMT was defeated by the Communist Party of China (CPC), and thus 
moved to Taiwan in 1949. The ROC also left the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1950. The legitimacy of the ROC-KMT’s governance of Taiwan 
                                                 
92(1) to transfer new GDP to productive investment instead of military expenditure; (2) to control 
inflation; (3) to reform the tax system for enterprise development; (4) to unify the foreign exchange 
rate system; (5) to prevent the use of the foreign exchange rate system to control imports; (6) to set up a 
committee examining the price of public enterprise services; (7) to set up a stock market; (8) to 
privatize public enterprises; see Li and Liu (2005), Appendix Four 
93The package included income tax holidays, business income tax, tax exemption for undistributed 
profits, tax deduction of exports, exemption of stamp tax, and tax reduction of foreign currency debt. 
See Kuo, et al. (1981)  
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remained unresolved, as Japan officially repudiated Taiwan in the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty94 on 8 September 1951, without mentioning which authority would 
succeed the right to govern Taiwan. This controversy was due to two authorities 
announcing that they represented China and assuming Taiwan to be part of China: one 
was the PRC-CPC; and the other the ROC-KMT. The US intervened by pressuring 
Japan to sign another peace treaty with the ROC-KMT (the Treaty of Peace between 
the ROC and Japan) 95 on 28 April 1952, rather than with the PRC-CPC.96 The ROC-
KMT was soon incorporated into the US’s anti-communist regional alliance in Asia, 
receiving political, military, and economic aid from the US between 1950 and the 
mid-1960s.   
However, the US shifted its Asian strategy in the late 1960s, and began to 
contact the communist PRC. This rapprochement produced three communiqués97 in 
1972, 1978, and 1982 respectively, in which the PRC announced the ‘one China 
policy’ (namely, that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China) and the US 
recognised this policy. In this context, the PRC replaced the ROC’s seat in the UN in 
1971, causing the ROC to withdraw from the UN in 1971. In 1979, the ROC’s 
strongest supporter, the US, broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC and 
approved the Taiwan Relations Act.98 This Act mentions that ‘the absence of 
diplomatic relations of recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the 
US with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.’ Yet, under the Act, all US policy 
and official exchanges will no longer take place through official departments but are 
to be carried out through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a non-profit 
corporation. Although US-Taiwan political and economic exchanges could be 
operated through special ‘non-official’ relations after diplomatic relations were 
                                                 
94
 For the full original text see (http://www.uni-
erfurt.de/ostasiatische_geschichte/texte/japan/dokumente/19/19510908_treaty.htm) 
95
 For the original text see (http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm) 
96
 Several studies analyse how the US intervened into this controversy see Richard Bush, At Cross 
Purposes: US-Taiwan Relations since 1942, (London: M.E.Sharpe, 2004); Matake Kamiya, 'Japanese 
Politics and Asian Policy', in Ezra F. Vogel, et al. (ed.), The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan 
Triangle 1972-1989, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 52-75; Man-
houng Lin, 'E-news No.40: Future Possibilities for the Relations between Taiwan and the UN', 
01/11/2007, (http://newsletter.sinica.edu.tw/en/file/file/4/434.pdf, 20/09/2008). 
97
 The Shanghai Communique in 1972, the Normalization Communique in 1978, and the Arms Sales 
Communique in 1982 
98
 The following discussion about the Taiwan Relations Act is drawn from the original text, 
(http://www.ait.org.tw/en/about_ait/tra/). 
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broken off, other countries did not act the same way as the US. The ROC’s diplomatic 
allies reduced from 59 in 1971 to just 23 in 2008.99   
In sum, the US played a significant role in deciding Taiwan’s international status 
and cross-strait relations. The controversy over Taiwan’s legal status in the 1940s and 
the 1950s was “solved” by the US; yet when the US and China reached agreement on 
the Taiwan question in the 1970s, Taiwan was only “informed” by the US. In other 
words, it was the US and the PRC who negotiated the status of Taiwan. Such 
characteristics remain a core principle in the US-Taiwan-PRC nexus to date. 
Moreover, Taiwan’s dependence on the US did not decline when US aid officially 
ended in 1965, or when the ROC-US diplomatic relations ended in 1979. On the 
contrary, in the Taiwanese government’s view, the US is a necessary third party for 
cross-strait relations. For example, former President Lee Teng-huei argues that if 
Taiwan planned to sign a peace accord with the PRC, the accord would not be 
legitimate unless the US signed jointly (Ho 30/04/2008) 
4-6 Ascended to the Semi-periphery:  (1966-86) 
From 1966 to 1986, Taiwan ascended from the periphery to the semi-periphery. The 
features of the ascent can be observed in three points. Firstly, Taiwan shifted from an 
export-led agrarian economy, to an export-led industrialising economy in a mere 20 
years from 1945. In particular, inward FDI from the US and Japan played key roles. 
The share of agricultural goods (23.6%) of GDP was exceeded by industrial products 
(30.2%) in 1965 (Sumiya et al. 1995[1992], p.350).100 The export of light 
manufacturing products (e.g. textile, electronics) increased from 8.1% of total exports 
in 1952 to 62.7% in 1966 (CEPD 2008). In the export-led sectors, it was the FDI and 
Taiwan’s small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) undertaking much of the 
activity. Secondly, the outcome of EOI was not only the development of 
industrialisation, but also a growth of capital surplus. In 1977, Taiwan’s current 
account recorded a surplus (CEPD 2008). Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserves was 
less than US$700 million in 1972, a figure that increased to US$11,859 million by 
1983 (Department of Investment Services 2007). Within just a decade, the foreign 
                                                 
99
 MOFA, Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 1st Session (Taipei: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan), 05/03/2008). 
100However, the agricultural labour force was not overtaken by the industrial labour force until 1973, 
which implies a surplus agricultural labour force. I will discuss this in the following chapter. 
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exchange reserves grew by nearly 17 times. Thirdly, Taiwan not only developed 
export-led industrialisation, but also attempted to establish domestic production 
chains by developing upstream heavy chemical industries in the 1970s. The 
bureaucratic-corporate capital, which includes state-owned enterprises and certain 
large private enterprises, undertook the job to develop domestic production chains.  
     As such, Taiwan ascended to the semi-periphery through the special dual industrial 
trajectories, EOI and ISI. The two trajectories were not completely separated, but 
were related to each other via division of labour among SOEs, large private 
enterprises, and SMEs. The upstream and intermediate stream of Taiwan’s production 
chains (e.g. petro-chemical, steel and iron, transportation equipment) were mainly 
SOEs and large private enterprises, and they focused on ISI and produced for the 
domestic market. The downstream (e.g. textile, clothing, plastics products) sector was 
mainly SMEs, and they focused on the EOI. The only exception was in the electronics 
industry, the second largest exporting sector in this period, as it was an FDI-
dominated industry (mainly US and Japanese FDI) from the beginning of its 
development in Taiwan. The industry, however, turned into the primary engine for 
Taiwan’s semi-peripheral upward mobility from the late 1980s. 
The neo-classical school argues that the EOI was the main engine in promoting 
Taiwan’s development; however, the reality is that Taiwan’s peripheral ascent was 
facilitated by both the EOI and ISI. In a comparative study of East Asian and Latin 
American NIEs, Gereffi and Wyman (1990) contend that it is an over-simplification 
to regard ISI and EOI as being strictly separate. These two industrialisation paths have 
indeed been ‘complementary and interactive’ in Taiwan’s capitalist development 
(p.18). Taiwan’s EOI during 1966 and 1986 was light manufacturing, that is, end-use 
products; accordingly, the EOI of end-use products was not in conflict with the 
formation of domestic production chains. Taiwan retained features of EOI-led 
industrialisation after 1987; however, the EOI is the exporting of intermediate goods, 
for the purpose of joining a global production chain in the electronics industry.  
The state-centric school’s argument is partial by viewing the guiding role of the 
state as the main actor in Taiwan’s economic success. The role of the state and 
bureaucratic-corporate capital was crucial in the integration of Taiwan’s domestic 
production chains. However, EOI cannot be ignored and it was mainly developed by 
SMEs and FDI which received little support and guidance from the state. The success 
of Taiwan’s EOI needs to be placed in the wider international context, namely 
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Taiwan’s links with the capitalist world-system and the influence of US hegemony. In 
general, Taiwan’s peripheral ascent needs to be analysed through an understanding of 
the two industrial trajectories, the domestic and international context. The following 
sections will discuss the factors that drove Taiwan’s peripheral ascent, through the 
analysis of Taiwan’s links with the capitalist world-system, domestic production 
chains, and state-capital-labour nexus.  
 
4-6-1 The Success of the EOI: the context of the capitalist world-system 
 
Why was EOI successful? As noted previously, the EOI strategy was not a sudden 
shift in policy. Since British hegemony opened Taiwan’s trade in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Taiwan has been an export-led economy, and Taiwan simply shifted from an 
export-led agricultural economy to an export-led industrialising economy in the post-
war period. The EOI policy emerged due to the changes in US aid policy in the early 
1960s. Most importantly, Taiwan’s EOI was constituted for a triangular international 
division of labour with the US and Japan, through trade and FDI. The process can be 
viewed as a ‘development of invitation’, namely the opportunity of development is 
offered by the capitalist world-system and the core zone (Wallerstein 1979, p.80). As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the core zone has entered a downturn phase since 
1967/1973, and one of the strategies to prevent the decline in the rates of profit in the 
industrial sector is to relocate industries abroad, which brought about the process of 
industrialisation in some chosen developing countries; Taiwan was one of these 
chosen countries.  Not only did the US and Japan relocate their light industries to 
Taiwan, but the US also opened its market for Taiwan’s light manufacturing exports. 
Without the opening of the US market to Taiwan, the import of Japanese capital 
goods, the inward US and Japanese FDI, and the US’s push on Taiwan’s policy shift, 
there was no possibility of Taiwan’s EOI being successful. In other words, Taiwan’s 
EOI was guided and influenced by the US and Japanese economies. The detailed 
relationship among the triangular nexus via trade and FDI is as follows.  
     Firstly, the triangular pattern was that Taiwan exported textile products, electronics, 
and consumer manufactures to the US.101 Taiwan imported machines, electrical 
                                                 
101These three exports accounted for 62.7% of Taiwan’s total exports to the US in 1966, and increased 
to 78.8% in 1975, see Baldwin, et al. (1995).  
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machinery, apparatus, and transportation equipment (i.e. capital goods) from Japan 
(Baldwin et al. 1995). More than 50% of Taiwanese total exports and imports were 
traded with the US and Japan, which was consistent with the previous period. 
However, the US became the main export destination in 1967, and Japan became the 
largest source of imports in 1964 (CEPD 2008). In 1977, Taiwan’s current account 
recorded a surplus, and this continued to increase sharply from then on. Specifically, 
Taiwan’s exports to the US reached a surplus in 1968, and remained as high as 40-
50% of Taiwan’s total exports until 1988. The reduction of the trade surplus during 
the 1980s was due to the US’s bilateral political pressure on Taiwan to improve the 
trade balance - this will be discussed further in Chapter Five. On the other hand, 
Taiwan’s imports from Japan did not show a significant change, and have remained as 
high as 26%, up to the present. This phenomenon needs to be discussed with the 
composition of exporting commodities.  
     Secondly, textile products were the dominant export during the 1960s and the 
1970s, while electrical machinery and apparatus was the second largest export 
commodity in the 1970s (Taniura 2003[1988], Appendix 2-8). The increase in textile 
exports from Taiwan to the US was as a result of the protectionist measures imposed 
by the US on Japanese cotton textiles in the 1950s (Baldwin et al. 1995), and 
Taiwan’s inclusion into the US’s Generalised System of Preference (GSP) between 
1976-1989. In other words, Taiwan’s textile exports were strongly influenced by the 
shift in the US’s international economic policy. As for the electronics sector, it was 
FDI-led and export-led. For example, a share of 81.9% of Taiwan’s electronics 
exports was from Taiwan’s inward FDI in 1975 (Chu and Amsden 2003, Table 2-19). 
In sum, FDI played a crucial role in the export-led electronics industry, together with 
the export-led textiles industry, and drove Taiwan’s EOI development in the 1960s 
and the 1970s. 
     Thirdly, the key contributor to the EOI via inward FDI was mainly from the US 
and Japan. Although the ratio of FDI to Taiwan’s gross domestic capital formation 
figure was only between 3% and 10% in the 1970s (Wade 2004[1990], p.149),102 it 
would be misleading to argue that FDI was not important. The state-centric approach 
argues that inward FDI played little role in Taiwan’s peripheral ascent (e.g. Wade). 
The specific role of inward FDI in Taiwan needs to be analysed in the context of 
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 According to author’s calculation from CEPD (2008) and Investment Commission (2008), the share 
of all inward FDI to gross domestic capital was only 5.3% and 6% in 1986 and in 1987.  
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sector and investing countries. First of all, Japanese (29.9%) and US FDI (38.4%) 
accounted for 68.3% of total FDI by amount (excluding overseas Chinese investment) 
between 1968 and 1986 (Investment Commission 2008). Secondly, during the same 
period, the electrical equipment sector accounted for 36.5% of total investment, 
followed by chemical materials (17.8%), and the machinery and equipment sector 
(12.7%). Thirdly, FDI was export oriented, for example, about 20-25% of Taiwan’s 
total industrial exports were from FDI in the 1970s, and the share was as high as 39% 
in 1987 (Kuo 1991; Wade 2004[1990]).  
Moreover, the FDI-led, export-led electronics industry established the foundation 
for its successor, the export-led Taiwanese hi-tech electronics industry in the 1980s 
and the 1990s. The model of promoting EOI was also inherited by the latter, namely 
from the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to the new form of science-based industrial 
parks. An EPZ is a special production zone to promote export-led industrialisation, 
and it provides a geographical cluster, transportation access, simplified administrative 
procedures, and tax-free environment. In 1966, the first EPZ was established near 
Kaoshiung harbour, which was 70% funded by US aid. Two further EPZs were 
subsequently established in 1970. In the 1970s, around 80% of investment in EPZs 
came from foreign-owned companies (60%) and from joint venture companies (20%) 
(Hsueh et al. 2001, Table 2-8). The main investors were Japanese and American. For 
example, Japanese FDI and US FDI accounted for about 38% and 16% respectively of 
total investment in 1972. The electronics and electrical machinery industries 
accounted for 76% of the EPZs investment during the period 1966-2001 (EPZA 2001, 
p.40). The EPZs present a miniature pattern of FDI in Taiwan. Although exports from 
EPZs, as a share of Taiwan’s total exports, were only 7% to 8% in the 1970s and the 
1980s,103 they were responsible for 19.44% of Taiwan’s total trade surplus during 
1966-2001 (EPZA 2001). Moreover, the development of EPZs brought about the 
growth of small-and-medium sized enterprises (SMEs). According to EPZA, more 
than twenty thousand satellite plants were either outsourced by EPZs or established by 
ex-employees from EPZs. Specifically, in 1972, the Taiwanese government mobilised 
a mainly female, home-working labour force to be used by EPZ enterprises, through 
the policy of “the living room is a factory.” The influence of EPZs on Taiwan’s 
economy and employment was far more than EPZs per se.  
                                                 
103Author’s calculation from Li and Chen (1987, Table 5-5), CEPD (2005, Table 11-4).   
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Another key factor in the success of the EOI, apart from FDI, was the Taiwanese 
SMEs.104 Before the late 1980s, the SMEs were export-led, but importantly, they 
began to be oriented towards the domestic market after 1988.105 The point shows that 
the SMEs were export-led only for a time. To take some export-led industries in the 
1960s and the 1970s as examples: the share of SMEs by numbers was 97% in the 
plastic products industry; 58% of those enterprises had fewer than ten employees 
(Chou and Lin 1999, p.62). In the textiles industry, 85% were SMEs in 1976 (p.65). 
However, SMEs had industrial links with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), large 
private enterprises, and TNCs through subcontracting and outsourcing. For example, 
the statistical data compiled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1988 showed that 
around 11.6% of the gross profit of the manufacturing industry was created by 
subcontracting arrangements (Hsiung 1996, p.54). As such, Shieh (1992) argues that 
the flexibility of the subcontracting system made the effective response to rapid and 
wide fluctuations of exports possible, and this flexibility was a major contributor to 
the success of Taiwan’s export-led industrialisation (p.161). 
     Compared with large private enterprises, SMEs have received less support from 
the state, especially in their financing methods. Although the state dominated the 
financial sector, they channelled most of their capital to state-owned enterprises and 
to the large private enterprises.106 Within private enterprises, the data for 1983 
provided by Shea and Yang show that only enterprises with more than 10 employees 
had more than 50% of their domestic borrowings from financial institutions (Shea and 
Yang 1994, p.213). In other words, SMEs needed to seek other funding apart from the 
formal financial institutions. Here, then, enters the informal financial market, which 
refers to the financial borrowings and loans which are not from official financial 
institutions and the capital market but from informal methods, including credit 
rotation clubs, trade credit, deposits with enterprises, moneylenders, pawnbrokers, 
leasing companies, instalment credit companies, investment companies, and credit 
unions (Wang 2001). 
                                                 
104
 The role of SMEs in Taiwan has been significant from the early stages of industrialisation to the 
present. In 1971, SMEs (with less than 30 employees) made up of 86.7% of the total number of 
factories (Hsiung 1996). By 2001, this portion had increased to around 90% (DGBAS various years-a). 
105
 More than 50% of SMEs’ products have been oriented towards the domestic market since 1988, 
whereas the figure was only 24.1% in 1982, see Chou and Lin (1999). In 2005, the share of domestic 
sales of total SMEs’ sales was 78 %, see SMEA (2006).  
106
 For example, around 95% of SOEs relied on loans from financial institutions, while only 60% of all 
private enterprises received loans from financial institutions (Shieh 1992). 
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Between 1964 and 1987, 25.3% of business financing was from the informal financial 
market (Shea and Yang 1994, p.203). Of private enterprises 35.2% made use of the 
curb market, especially SMEs with fewer than ten employees. Some scholars have 
termed the pattern of co-existence between the informal financial market serving 
SMEs and the official financial institutions serving SOEs and large private enterprises 
as ‘financial dualism’ (Chou 1995; Yu and Wang 2005). The term, however, is 
misleading, as the two systems are not in fact truly separate. For example, in Tang’s 
study (1995), trade credit between enterprises either took the form of ‘supplier’s 
credit’ or the form of ‘upstream firms provide loans to downstream contractors’ 
(p.849). Many cases also show that the upstream and intermediate stream enterprises 
obtained loans from the banks and then extended credit/loan further downstream to 
small firms at higher interest rates (ibid.) As such, the informal financial market was 
neither replaced by the formal financial market, nor a true competitor. Rather, they 
played a complementary role vis-a-vis each other. The relationship between official 
financial institutions and informal financial market is a reflection of the 
complementary relationship between SOEs, private large enterprises, and SMEs. This 
is due to Taiwan’s dual industrial trajectories. I have discussed the EOI which was 
undertaken by TNCs and SMEs, and I will now introduce another trajectory. 
4-6-2 Domestic production chains via the development of heavy-chemical 
industries and industrial financing 
 
While Taiwan pursued EOI, it also promoted another trajectory, namely to build up 
domestic production chains via the development of heavy-chemical industries (HCI). 
While light manufacturing (e.g. textile, plastics) was developed from the mid-1960s, 
there was an insufficient supply of intermediates (e.g. Polyvinylchloride-PVC) from 
domestic firms, although four PVC firms were established in the 1950s and 1960s. As 
such, the Taiwanese state fostered import-substitution industrialisation in “basic 
heavy industries”, such as chemical wood pulp, petrochemical intermediates, and 
large-scale integrated steel production (Ministry of Economic Affairs 1961, cited 
from Wade 1990, p.87). Not only for the purpose of reducing import intermediates, 
the state viewed that industrial development in the long-term needed to be centred on 
export products based on the development of both ‘forward and backward industries’ 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs 1961, cited from Wade 1990, p.87). As discussed in 
Chapter Three, to form a production chain, the forward sectors (e.g. finished goods) 
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and the backward sectors (e.g. raw material) need to be integrated. As such, the state 
attempted to build domestic production chains by developing the upstream and 
intermediate stream sectors. In particular, the two oil crises of the 1970s (1974, 1978) 
and the downstream demand for plastics and manmade fibre textiles led the 
Taiwanese state to develop backward industries and infrastructure. The security factor 
also counted, because Taiwan lost its UN seat in 1971, the US reduced its arms sales 
to Taiwan, and in 1972 began withdrawing its military personnel (Gold 1986, p.99; 
Hsueh et al. 2001, p.37). The ‘Ten Major Development Projects’ were launched in 
1973. These projects included: implementing import-substitution in heavy industries, 
such as petrochemicals, steel, and shipbuilding via state-owned enterprises, for 
example China Petroleum Corporation, China Steel Corporation and China 
Shipbuilding Corporation. As such, major industries in this period (1966-1986) were 
not only food processing, textiles, electronics, but also chemical and plastic products 
(Sumiya et al. 1995[1992], Table 2-11). 
     The domestic production chains in the upstream petro-chemicals, intermediate 
stream chemical material and products, and downstream plastics products and 
synthetic fibre textiles were vertically integrated. Another example of a production 
chain was the upstream iron and steel industry (SOEs), intermediate stream 
transportation equipment manufacturing (ships and automobiles), and downstream 
machine processing industry. The major partners who assisted such integrated 
projects were American petroleum and chemical giants (Gold 1986).107 However, this 
hierarchical structure was also built through state intervention: the upstream was 
monopolised by state-owned enterprises until 1986, while the intermediate stream was 
dominated exclusively by four private plastics enterprises (Formosa Plastics 
Corporation, Cathay Plastics Corporation, China General Plastics Co., and Ocean 
Plastics), and the downstream was occupied by numerous SMEs which pursued 
export (Hsueh et al. 2001; Taniura 2003[1988]).  
 
Industrial financing support 
The state helped to form domestic production chains via several strategies, e.g. trade 
protection, the establishment of SOEs, tax incentives, technology imports, entry 
restrictions, and infrastructure establishment. The most important strategy was 
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 Therefore chemical products became one of the few areas in which the US surpassed Japan to 
become the biggest importer (Baldwin et al. 1995). 
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industrial financing support via interest rates policy, foreign exchange rates policy, 
selective credit accommodation, export and import financing, and development 
banking. It is noteworthy that this industrial financing support was aimed at both the 
EOI and the ISI sectors. 
     (1) Interest rate policy and foreign exchange rate policy. The government 
determined the interest rates by setting a high interest rate on saving deposits to 
encourage high domestic savings,108 and by providing a ‘concessional’ rate on loans 
financing targeted industries or sectors.109 Taiwan’s national savings rate was as high 
as 24.34% between 1971 and 1988, most of which were household savings (Shea and 
Yang 1994). Interest rate policy thus served as a tool to channel household savings 
into the industrial sector. As for the foreign exchange rate, in the 1950s and the 1960s 
the government implemented a multiple exchange rate system to encourage both the 
export sector and the import-substitution sector (Wen 1996). From 1970, the system 
changed to a fixed exchange rate system by pegging the NT at 40 dollars to one US 
dollar. The consequence of a fixed exchange rate was to keep the NT dollar devalued 
so as to allow Taiwan’s export-led industries to remain at an international competitive 
price.  
    (2) Selective credit accommodation by the CBC. The special loans policy had 
provided agricultural and strategic industrial sectors with capital for export activity 
and investment. The special loan rediscounts (i.e. the interest rate charged by the CBC 
for rediscounting special loans offered by domestic banks) as a share of total claims of 
the CBC on monetary institutions was around 52% between 1962 and 1988 (Shea and 
Yang 1994). Several types of selective credit accommodation were provided by the 
CBC to banks (CBC 1996, p.172-174): export accommodation110, the special fund for 
medium-and long-term credit111, and loan accommodation.112 
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 The nominal interest rate on one-year deposits averaged 10.28% between 1961 and 1988; and 
interest on savings held for two-years was tax-free (Shea and Yang 1994, p.205).  
109
 The interest rate for lending money to the export sectors was 11.88%-13.32% between 1956 and 
1967, while the interest rate to other industries was 19.8%-13.32% (Chang, Chiu, and Tu 2005). 
110
 From 1971, the Central Bank accommodated export loans to domestic and foreign banks. The 
accommodation interest rate (6.75%-11.25% between 1979 and 1984) was lower than the temporary 
accommodations rate (10%-17%) and the rediscount rate charged by the CBC to the banks (7%-
13.25%) (Wang 1996). This policy was abolished in 1991. 
111
 In 1966, some of the postal savings re-deposits were used to set up the Special Fund to 
accommodate banks’ medium-and long-term loans, e.g. basic infrastructural projects. 
112
 From 1973, the banks could apply to the CBC for accommodation for loans for the imports of 
machinery, to technology-intensive industries, and short-term loans to SMEs.  
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   (3) Export and import financing. In the 1960s, the state offered a preferential 
interest rate to the export sector and to the industries which imported machinery. The 
interest rate for export firms was much lower than the minimum rate for secured 
loans.113However, Chou argues that the interest rate subsidy to export loans was not 
actually much when compared with the contribution of exports to the GNP. In other 
periods the share of export loans to the total of short-term secured loans was mostly 
less than 10% (Chou 1995, p.99). This was because most export-led SMEs could not 
obtain loans from the banks, as was discussed previously. 
    (4) Development banking. The majority of commercial banks normally do not 
attempt to provide loans for long term investment. The function of development 
banking is to provide long-term credit to industries. In Taiwan, the government 
directed different specialist banks to provide special credit loans for various sectors 
(Amsden 2001). Accordingly, after the amendment of the Banking Act in 1975, six 
state-owned banks were either established or appointed to finance particular 
sectors.114  
 
In conclusion, under the two industrial trajectories, SMEs and TNCs dominated the 
external exports market, while SOEs and large private enterprises dominated the 
domestic market (Baldwin et al. 1995, p.10). As Baldwin et al argue, ‘the former 
enterprises (SMEs plus TNCs) were highly competitive and market driven, while the 
latter (SOEs plus LEs) were oligopolistic and state directed’ (1995, p.11). High tariffs 
and import control measures coexisted with export promotion measures in the 1960s. 
The export incentives remained in place while the government adopted import-
substitution in the 1970s (ibid). The Taiwanese state was able to implement industrial 
policy not only because the US supported Taiwan’s policy shift, but also as the KMT 
party-state controlled both the political and economic system (e.g. politically it was an 
authoritarian regime; economically the KMT developed the SOEs and controlled the 
financial institutions). However, private industrial capital gradually increased in 
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 During 1974-1989, the difference between secured loans and export loans had ranged from 2.3% to 
6.3% (Wen 1996). The policy of low-interest rate export loans was abolished in 1989, when the 
liberalisation of interest rates was completed. 
114
 The Farmers Bank of China (agriculture), The Land Bank (real estate), Medium-and Small Business 
Banks (medium and small business loans), The Export-Import Bank of ROC (export-import 
enterprises), as well as the Industrial Bank of China, and the Chiao Tung Bank (medium and long term 
loans to industry). 
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number. Private enterprises grew dramatically between the mid-1960s and the 1970s. 
According to Liu (1995[1992]), only 56.2% of manufacturing GDP was produced by 
private enterprises in 1965, but the figure had grown to 85.8 % by 1975 (ibid, 
Appendix 1-7). This share did not exceed 90% until 1996 (CEPD 2005, Table 5-4). It 
is evident that this period was very significant in the growth of private manufacturing 
enterprises, especially the growth of the SMEs and large enterprises in mid-stream 
sectors.  
4-6-3 How did labour contribute to Taiwan’s peripheral ascent? 
 
The specific role of state-capital relations, in terms of bureaucratic-corporate capital 
in the industrial and financial sectors in promoting the two industrialised trajectories, 
was not the full story of Taiwan’s peripheral ascent. As the thesis argues, labour was a 
necessary part of social relations for capital accumulation. So how did labour 
contribute to Taiwan’s ascent, and did organised labour as a social force resist 
Taiwan’s ascent? This section will discuss a specific labour pattern that contributed to 
Taiwan’s peripheral ascent trajectory, in particular in the export-led sectors, namely, a 
flexible and unprotected labour market, and the “feminization” of labour. As Chapter 
Seven will show, in Taiwan’s overseas employment since the 1990s, we find that 
Taiwan’s specific labour pattern in the pre-1987 period is similar to Taiwan’s 
overseas employment since the 1990s, and this demonstrates that a peripheral ascent 
needs a particular labour pattern. Furthermore, as we saw in the previous discussion 
of peripheral social formation, Amin (1976) argues that one of the features is ‘non-
complete proletarianisation,115 a feature that can be observed in Taiwan’s specific 
labour pattern during the pre-1987 period.  
The division of labour between different types of industrial capital (SOEs, private 
enterprises, and SMEs) reflects the pattern of labour and labour’s working conditions.  
The following discussion will show that more female labour than male labour worked 
in the export-led sectors; by contrast, male labour dominated the upstream and 
intermediated stream sectors (e.g. petrochemical, steel, transportation manufacturing 
sectors). Thus, a gender division in labour occurred in accordance with the division of 
labour between different types of industrial capital. Working conditions in the 
                                                 
115
 Proletarianisation refers to the social process whereby people move from being either an employer, 
or self-employed, or peasants to being employed as wage labour by an employer. 
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upstream and intermediate sectors were also better than that in downstream export-led 
sectors as the former required skilled labour and paid higher wages than other sectors 
(as the following table shows), and these enterprises were under labour protected by 
Taiwan’s labour law. Taiwan’s labour regulation (e.g. Trade Union Law) was only 
aimed at those enterprises employing more than 30 workers. However, nearly 60% of 
employees worked in export-led SMEs during the 1960s and the 1980s (Chou and Lin 
1999). A complete framework of labour regulation for all industrial workers (i.e. 
Labour Standards Law) was not promulgated until 1984. In other words, the main 
characteristic of labour’s working conditions during Taiwan’s peripheral ascent 
period was a lack of labour protection and regulation. In the following section, I will 
mainly discuss the labour pattern in the export-led sectors as they were the majority in 
employment and represented the specific labour pattern of peripheral ascent.  
 
Table 4-2 : Some indicators of key industries during 1973-1987 
key industries 
number of 
male 
workers 
number of 
female 
workers 
male 
workers' 
wage (NT$) 
female 
workers' wage 
(NT$) 
the total manufacturing 
sector 
1,033,189  972,592  9,651  6,596  
textile industry 82,401  149,334  9,862  7,003  
electronics component 
industry 
44,180  90,162  14,352  8,701  
Petroleum refining industry 10,024  1,101  14,334  12,427  
chemical industry 25,735  12,247  11,925  8,401  
Source: DGBAS (various ears-b), Time Series of Earning and Productivity Statistics 
Tables 
 
The flexible and unprotected labour market 
I have shown how the state promoted industrialisation (both EOI and ISI) and helped 
to integrate domestic production chains through its domination of the industrial sector 
(the bureaucratic-corporate capital) and of the financial sector (state financial capital). 
Nevertheless, those firms that received least protection and promotion by the state, i.e. 
the SMEs, had a profound development role in export-led sectors. I have discussed 
the situation whereby the SMEs were at the bottom of the domestic industrial linkage 
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and relied on the informal financial market for financing. In such a tough environment, 
how could they maintain export competitiveness? A significant factor behind their 
success was their special pattern of labour. This section will first discuss the two 
characteristics of the labour pattern in the SMEs, namely a flexible and unprotected 
labour market, and the feminization of labour.  
The labour patterns that are categorised by Harrord (2006) as ‘least protected’ are 
peasant, casual labour, enterprise labour (mainly referring to non-unionised and small 
enterprises labour), self-employed labour, and household labour (p.42). All of these 
unprotected labour patterns could be observed in Taiwan, and were in fact the major 
labour pattern. 
In addition to the high numbers employed by SMEs, there was a high share of 
self-employed labour in Taiwan, accounting for more than 20% before 1985.116 Two 
types of labour contribute to this pattern: the small subcontracting workshop, and 
home-workers. Shieh’s (1991; 1992) study of Taiwan’s subcontracting network 
explores four types of labour: (1) unpaid family members; (2) hired wage-labour; (3) 
mixed family members and wage-labour; (4) neither wage-labour nor family labour. 
The first and fourth are counted as self-employed labour. They primarily use family 
members as the labour force because the latter can provide ‘elasticity, flexibility, and 
low-labour cost’ (1992, p.138-139). There were two types of wage system in 
subcontracting: one was the piece-rate system, which is the same system as for home-
workers; the other was the time-wage system, in which the employers pay a basic 
wage117 plus some allowances and bonuses (p.133-135). Moreover, enterprises which 
employed less than five employees were not required to offer labour insurance.118 
This feature of export-led SMEs, the flexibility of the subcontracting system and the 
low-labour costs created opportunities for new entry to small enterprises. Thus, many 
manufacturing workers might shift to being the subcontractors of a new enterprise. 
The pattern of “black-hands” (i.e. manufacturing workers) becoming “boss” was a 
significant feature before the late 1980s (Chou and Lin 1999; Shieh 1991; 1992). A 
sample survey revealed that around 35% of the labour force had set up their own 
                                                 
116 See Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C (2003) 
Yearbook of Human Resource Statistics 
117
 Before the enforcement of the Labour Standards Law in 1984, the basic wage regulated by the 
government was around 40 to 50 percent of the average wage of the manufacturing workers.  
118
 Before the enforcement of Health Insurance in 1994, it was Labour Insurance that covered all 
functions of social insurance.  
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businesses between 1979 and 1987 (cited from Shieh 1992, p.177). It was a high level 
of SME entrepreneurship which added a difficulty to organised labour’s resistance, as 
labour might shift to being “the boss” of an SME.  
 In terms of state regulation, before the promulgation of the Labour Standards Law in 
1984, factory working conditions were regulated by the Factory Law and by the 
Labour Insurance Act. The former only covered labourers who worked in factories 
and excluded home-workers and self-employed labour. The Labour Insurance Act 
merely covered enterprises which hired more than five employees. The legal working 
hours were forty-eight hours per week; however, overtime could extend working 
hours by up to four hours as long as the total overtime working hours did not exceed 
46 hours per month. In general, the legal working hours plus overtime hours were 
between 194 and 238 hours per month (48-59 hours per week). There were no 
regulations for severance pay or retirement funds for labourers. Factories were also 
allowed to employ workers as apprentices, who were more than thirteen years old,119 
thereby including child labour of school age. 
 
Femalisation of labour in the export-led sectors 
In Taiwan, several studies noted that the participation of female workers sharply 
increased during the 1960s and the early 1970s (Cheng and Hsiung 1992; Greenhalgh 
1985, p.273). In particular, between 1965 and 1973, female participation in the labour 
force grew from 33.1% to 41.5%120 (Cheng and Hsiung 1992, p.324). It is notable that 
until 1973 the share of the labour force in the manufacturing sector did not exceed the 
primary sector, agricultural and mining (Taniura 2003[1988], p.246).121 Combining 
these data, the major factor in the change in the labour force between the two sectors 
is the participation of female labour. In other words, Taiwan’s transformation from an 
export-led agricultural economy to an export-led industrial economy was 
accompanied by an increase in the female labour force. Kung’s 1973 data, drawn 
from the Taiwanese government, shows that female labour was concentrated in key 
                                                 
119 The Factory Law defined workers aged between 14 and 16 years old as “child labour”, and they 
were not allowed to work overtime or at night.  
120
 Meanwhile, the male labour force participation rate reduced from 82.6% to 77.1%. In the 1970s, the 
female labour participation rate was slightly reduced due to the development of heavy-chemical 
industries, the rate then increased to 42.1 percent in 1983. 
121
 The share of the labour force in the primary sector decreased from 46.6% in 1965 to 30.5% in 1973 ; 
whereas, the share of the labour force in the secondary sector grew from 22.3% in 1965 to 33.7% in 
1973.  
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sectors: it made up 85% of the labour force in the apparel industry; 79% of workers in 
the textile industry; 65% of the labour force in electrical equipment and supplies; and 
59% of the workers in the food processing industries (Kung 1984, p.109).  
The feminization of labour occurred both in the SMEs and their subcontracting 
system, and in the EPZs and transnational corporations’ employment patterns. Young, 
unmarried women were particular preferred by TNCs in EPZs. By looking at the 
female labour force participation rate at different ages in 1966 and in 1974 
respectively, we see that the female labour force participation rate aged between 15-
19 years old was greater than 50%, both in 1966 and 1974; and the rate at ages 20-24 
years old was 46.6% in 1966, and 54.3% in 1974 (Cheng and Hsiung 1992, p.326).  
     These were all major export processing sectors. According to Ge (1978), more 
than 80% of EPZ employees were female between 1967 and 1976. Around 57% of 
EPZ employees were young (mainly unmarried) women (Ge 1978, p.61). Some 
empirical studies concerning female workers in the large garment or electronics 
factories correspond with the above argument (Arrigo 1984; Diamond 1979; Kung 
1976; 1984).122  Many women from rural areas began to work in assembly factories 
after graduating from primary school or junior high school. The recruiting managers 
had contacts in the junior high schools of rural areas and were able to recruit either 
full-time employees or apprentices. 
     Why did factory employers prefer young and unmarried females? One major 
reason is that these female workers’ wage rates were far lower than that of the male 
workers. Female workers had a lower wage rate because, firstly, they were unmarried 
females and society regarded men as the major bread winners; secondly, female 
labour was concentrated in downstream export-led and labour-intensive sectors, 
sectors that are less capital-intensive and technology-intensive than up- and 
intermediate-stream sectors, where labour was paid a higher wage; thirdly, female 
workers from rural areas still partially depended on agricultural income.  The wage of 
EPZ female workers was lower than the average wages of male and female employees 
in the manufacturing sector as the following table shows. The following table also 
shows clearly that the EPZ workers’ wages were the lowest, and much lower than the 
                                                 
122  Most of the empirical studies in the 1970s and 1980s were by American sociologists and 
ethnologists, their primary concerns were more or less the debate about whether indusrialisation and 
modernisation brought about women’s emancipation or changes to the Chinese family structure, and 
took Taiwan (a “traditional” Chinese society) as a case study.    
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average manufacturing male workers wage: less than 70% of the average male 
workers’ wage (Table 4-3).  
 
 
Table 4-3 : Average wages of manufacturing workers in the 1970s (unit: NT$, %) 
 A: male workers B: female workers 
(B/A as a percentage) 
C: EPZ workers 
(C/A as a 
percentage) 
1973 2,468 1,879 (76%) 1,715 (69%) 
1974 3,301 2,497 (76%) 2,189 (66%) 
1975 3,881 2,927 (77%) 2,317 (61%) 
1976 4,507 3,545 (79%) 3,136 (69%) 
Source: DGBAS, Time Series of Earning and Productivity Statistics Tables 
(http://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas04/bc5/earning/ht456e.asp); Ge (1978), Table 5-13  
Note: 1. Data from DGBAS is the August data of each year. 2. NT$ 40 = one US dollar 
 
Invisible female labour in the satellite factory system 
Another feature of the SME subcontracting system in Taiwan, apart from an 
unprotected and flexible labour pattern, was that many married women served as 
home-based workers or workers in small factories in export-led industries. Hsiung’s 
ethnographical study of Taiwan’s satellite factories found that Taiwan’s married 
female workers mainly worked in small factories with less than thirty employees 
(Hsiung 1996, p.76). For example, the government’s data shows that between 1979 
and 1987, about 55% of married female labour worked in small factories with fewer 
than thirty employees, but about 66% of unmarried female labour worked in larger 
factories with more than thirty employees (ibid. p.76-77).   
     In 1972, the ‘living room is a factory’ programme (i.e. home-based contract work) 
was promoted by the government. The plan was in fact a means to encourage 
housewives to engage in processing work at home for export-led industries. These 
subcontracting workshops were located in former military bases, residential 
communities, and rural villages (Shieh 1991, p.155). According to an official survey 
in 1982, 46% of 1,526 randomly selected residents responded that this programme 
had been organised in their community (Hsiung 1996, p.52). Local government 
offered loans for families to do processing work at home and sometimes local 
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officials (e.g. village heads) served as a contractor acting between factories and 
families (Hsiung 1996, p.53-54). The payment was based only on the number of 
processed products, i.e. a piece-rate basis.     
 According to Huang’s survey of 1986, the home-workers’ average working hours 
were 7.2 hours per day (cited from Shieh 1991, p.164-165). Some 75.2% of home-
workers earned less than one US dollar per hour (ibid), while a manufacturing 
worker’s average hourly wage was US$1.8 (DGBAS various years-b). In other words, 
the hourly wage gap was nearly 50%. Furthermore, there were neither 
allowances/bonuses nor holiday if the product deadline was urgent (Shieh 1991). 
These home-workers were at ‘the bottom of the subcontracting system’ and served as 
an ‘invisible workshop’ (Shieh 1991, p.155-161). Huang’s survey also shows that 
nearly 90% were involved in exporting (cited from Shieh 1991, p.164-165). In sum, 
the programme offered the export-led sector very low-cost and flexible labour, which 
was also feminised labour.  
 
‘Silent’ and ‘disciplined’ labour  
I have discussed the particular features of the labour pattern that contributed to 
Taiwan’s peripheral ascent in the pre-1987 period. Did any form of organised labour 
or collective resistance exist in order to change labour’s working rights and status, and 
challenge the logic of capital accumulation? According to the official statistics 
between 1949 and 1965, there were only 520 cases of labour dispute (Chang 1991). 
Thereafter, the number of disputes remained below one thousand a year prior to 1980 
(Kleingartner and Peng 1991). The economic factors that caused the ‘silence’ of 
organised labour included: the typical managerial features of SMEs; a majority of 
young female labour in the export-led sector; manufacturing labour’s reliance on the 
agricultural economy (as many SMEs were located in the rural areas); and the 
relatively fair distribution of income equality (cited from Hsu 1989; Kleingartner and 
Peng 1991). A great deal of literature mentions political factors; such authors discuss 
how the state (i.e. the KMT administration) controlled the labour regime and 
organised labour (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003; Deyo 1989; Frenkel et al. 1993; Ho 
2006; Hsiao 1992a; Hsu 1987; Kleingartner and Peng 1991; Kong 2005; Minns and 
Tierney 2005; Rice 2006; Wang and Cooney 2002). In particular, a study by Deyo 
(1989) of East Asian labour movements (including Taiwan) argues that ‘East Asian 
development is associated with the continued vitality, and indeed the expansion, of 
  151
 
employment relations based on patriarchal, paternalistic, and patrimonial systems of 
labour control’ (p.8).  
Under Martial Law, other forms of labour and citizens organisations, apart from the 
officially recognized trade unions, were forbidden. Martial Law was declared in 1948 
after the “228 incident” 123 of 28 February, 1947. Taiwan’s citizens were forbidden 
from organising political parties; freedom of speech, assembly, association, and 
communication (including the media) were banned. Security agents (the Taiwan 
Garrison Command) could arrest citizens and put them on trial in military courts, and 
many emergency decrees were promulgated. Another instance of large scale arrests by 
the KMT government of citizens occurred during the “White Terror” of the 1950s. 
These arrests targeted those who were suspected of being communists, including 
many trade union activists. Taiwan’s labour movement before the end of Martial Law 
(1987) was therefore severely oppressed. It has been estimated that of 140,000 people 
who were involved, 29,000 cases of political persecution occurred during the 40 years 
of Martial Law (Huang 20/05/2005) 
      Another feature of the organised labour movement that has had a very significant 
impact was the absence of industrial unions in the trade union structure. The state (i.e. 
the KMT) rigorously controlled organised labour by setting up a weak trade union 
structure and controlling the leadership of trade unions. The official trade union 
organisation was an arm of the KMT. According to the Trade Union Law, the 
structure of trade unions was established on the basis of the dual industrial structure. 
Each state-owned-enterprise (SOE) had an enterprise-based union. Workers in private 
enterprises that employed more than thirty employees had a plant/factory-based union, 
so a large private enterprise that had fifteen plants may therefore have had fifteen 
separate trade unions. Enterprises that employed fewer than thirty employees were 
unable to organize plant-based unions. In other words, the Trade Union Law excluded 
85-90% of the total labour force from organising a trade union at all. However, there 
                                                 
123
 When the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, they did not interact well with Taiwanese; on the 
contrary, their ‘corrupt bureaucracy, economic hardship, and a deteriorating sense of public security’ 
dissatisfied Taiwanese. On 27 February 1947, an old lady who sold illegal cigarettes was hit on her 
head by a policeman, and the incident escalated to a conflict between people who witnessed the 
incident and policemen. The next day, those angry crowds presented a petition to Governor-General 
Chen Yi; yet they were shot at by military force. Thereafter unrest was widespread in other cities, and 
Chen Yi even requested that the KMT government (then in mainland China) to send more troops to 
control the unrest. The 2-28 Museum estimates that between 10,000 and 20,000 people were killed 
during the 2-28 Incident. See 2-28 Museum (n.d.), Kerr (1965). 
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was a third type of labour union, the craft/occupational unions, which were made up 
of workers without a fixed employer. This type was not a real trade union, but rather a 
labour association sponsored by the government to implement labour and health 
insurance for their membership. SMEs with fewer than thirty employees usually 
joined a craft union because the monthly fee paid to the social insurance was cheaper 
through the craft union than through joining the social insurance system as an 
individual. As such, the unique and fragile trade union structure of Taiwan was an 
enterprise-based union in the SOEs; a plant-based union in private enterprises with 
more than thirty employees; and a craft union where the workers were in small 
enterprises that had fewer than thirty employees.124 The trade union movement, after 
the late 1980s, was led by the SOEs’ enterprise-based unions and the private 
enterprises’ plant-based unions. However, as we will discuss in the following chapter, 
SOEs have declined since the late 1980s while the large private enterprises grew. 
Taiwan’s trade union structure has been unable to transform itself in parallel with 
industrial transformation, e.g. no single industrial union has been formed to date. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed how Taiwan ascended to the semi-periphery, from a long-
term historical perspective from the seventeenth century to 1986. I argue that 
Taiwan’s capitalist development is better understood in the context of the capitalist 
world-system and domestic social relations, rather than regarding Taiwan’s case as 
national stages of development from a pre-capitalist agricultural society to a capitalist 
industrial society. This chapter also demonstrates how Taiwan’s historical capitalist 
development through several hegemonic influences drove Taiwan’s post-war 
peripheral ascent.  
      Firstly, Taiwan developed export-led agriculture and had been linked with the 
European-centred world-system (first under Dutch hegemony, and then under British 
hegemony) and the Qing Empire, through both trade and finance. The Europeans were 
more interested in monopolised trading channels and financial loans rather than 
changing Taiwan’s indigenous production system. Secondly, during Japanese 
                                                 
124 For the detailed discussion of Taiwanese trade union’s structure, please see Chang C.L. (2002), The 
Politics of Regulation: Globalisation, Democratiation, and The Taiwanese Labour Movement. The 
Developing Economies, 305-26  
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colonialism, Taiwan further developed its export-led agriculture, started its 
industrialisation, established a central-planning economic framework, and was 
integrated into Japan’s semi-peripheral strategy. Japan also dominated the trade and 
finance sectors. Unlike the Europeans, Japan introduced industrialisation and a 
capital/wage labour production mode. Japanese capitalists controlled not only 
commercial and financial capital but also industrial capital. Thirdly, after the KMT 
migrated to Taiwan, they took over the Japanese legacy of capital accumulation and 
tied Taiwan’s economy into the US-led capitalist world-system through trade, inward 
FDI, and US aid. The KMT-led bureaucratic-corporate capital (including industrial 
and financial capital) monopolised the domestic economy in order to deepen export-
led agriculture and develop industrialisation. Under the auspices of US hegemony and 
links to the US and Japanese economies, Taiwan shifted from being an export-led 
agrarian economy to export-led industrialisation.  
Finally, Taiwan was able to ascend from the periphery to the semi-periphery 
through two trajectories: export-led industrialisation, which benefited from the 
support of the US (policy support; the opening of US market; inward FDI) and from 
the Japanese economy (technology and imports of capital goods; inward FDI); in 
other words, it is a development by invitation in the way that Taiwan was invited by 
the core zone into the new international division of labour since the 1960s. The 
success of EOI can also be attributed by a special state-capital-labour nexus in which 
SMEs and FDI capital took the leading role with a flexible, disciplined, unprotected, 
and ‘silent’ labour force. 
The other trajectory is the success of the integration of domestic production chains. 
The US played a key role in the technology transfer to the petrochemical industry, but 
most importantly, it was the KMT state and authoritarian bureaucratic-corporate 
capital that guided the direction of domestic industrial integration. In general, 
Taiwan’s peripheral ascent demonstrates Amin’s (1976) argument of the four features 
of peripheral social formation, that agricultural capitalism has a dominate role; a large 
share of the local commercial capitalist class has strong links with the core capital; the 
development of a special form of bureaucratic system; and an incomplete 
proletarianisation. Firstly, Taiwan’s agricultural capital was significant via production 
and exports until the 1960s when Taiwan shifted to be an export-led industrialising 
economy. Secondly, EOI enabled Taiwan’s capital links with capital from the US and 
Japan. Thirdly, the authoritarian bureaucratic-corporate capital and an unprotected, 
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flexible, feminized, and incomplete proletarianised labour force facilitated Taiwan’s 
peripheral ascent.  
In general, the historical study of Taiwan’s capitalist development and the factors 
contributing to Taiwan’s peripheral ascent demonstrate the central argument of the 
thesis: to understand national capitalist development, it is necessary to study both the 
context of the capitalist world-system and the domestic state-capital-labour nexus. 
Since Taiwan has ascended to the semi-periphery and the capitalist world-system has 
experienced several changes (as discussed in Chapter Two), what has been the impact 
on Taiwan?  
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Chapter Five: To Remain at the Semi-periphery or Move towards to 
the Core? The Transformation of Taiwan’s Industrialisation 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter will discuss the changes to Taiwan’s industrial sector since 1987/88.  In 
the previous chapter, I argued that Taiwan’s peripheral ascent represented the 
development of two industrialising trajectories. The two trajectories have now 
changed. Changes to the industrialising trajectories are also shifts in the ascent 
trajectory. Since the 1980s, Taiwan has moved upwards in its position in the structure 
of capital accumulation, and in the international division of labour. Taiwan’s links 
with the capitalist world-system has also changed, from being tied to the US and 
Japan to becoming closer to the East Asian economies (in particular China). It is 
Taiwan’s industrial capital which has advanced Taiwan’s position within the capitalist 
world-system (through capital exporting) and changed Taiwan’s links with the 
capitalist world-system. In other words, the change of the dynamics of the industrial 
sector reflects the shift of ascent trajectory. As such, this chapter will focus on the 
dynamics of the industrial sector and it will discuss how the changes to the capitalist 
world-system, as examined in Chapter Three, and the state-capital relationship 
influenced the dynamics of Taiwan’s industrial sector.  
     The chapter is as follows: the first part will examine the impact of the changing 
capitalist world-system on Taiwan’s industrial sector, namely neo-liberalism 
(liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation) and its attack on state power. The 
bureaucratic-corporate capital collapsed, and with the rise of private industrial capital, 
the industrial capital began to relocate production overseas. Secondly, I will discuss 
the rise of the electronics industrial capital being as the dominant industrial capital in 
Taiwan’s capitalist development after the collapse of bureaucratic-corporate capital. 
Taiwan’s two industrialising trajectories in the previous period have merged into one, 
export-led industrialisation. In particular the electronics industry is a microcosm of 
Taiwan’s ascent strategy. It means that Taiwan no longer promotes domestic 
production chains led by bureaucratic-corporate capital, but pursues integration into 
global production chains. Taiwan’s position in the global electronics industry has 
changed from one of peripheral production to one acting in semi-peripheral 
production. Furthermore, Taiwan’s further integration into the global production 
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chain in the electronics industry and Taiwan’s rise as a capital-export economy are 
two sides of the same coin as Taiwan’s industrial capital makes use of overseas 
relocation to ascend its position in the capitalist world-system. The electronics 
industry is Taiwan’s leading sector, exporting capital and relocating production to 
peripheral economies. In particular, China has become a primary trading partner and 
production base for Taiwan’s electronics industrial capital. The third section will 
therefore discuss the changes of Taiwan’s links to the capitalist world-system, from 
being tied to the US and Japanese economies to increased interaction with China. The 
trend coincides with the rise of East Asian economies as a centre of capital 
accumulation. However, the increase of cross-strait interdependence presents a new 
dilemma for Taiwan. The dilemma is represented as the state’s choice of priority 
between economic globalisation and economic regionalisation, but in fact the real 
dilemma is the conflict between cross-strait political tensions and cross-strait 
economic interaction. 
         
5-1 Neoliberalism, the Decline of US Hegemony, and the Collapse of Taiwan’s 
Bureaucratic-corporate Capital 
 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the main changes to the capitalist world-system during 
the B-phase, including the decline in the rate of profit of the industrial sector in the 
core zone, the rise of neo-liberalism and its attack on state power, the relative decline 
of US hegemony, and the rise of the East Asian economies as a new centre of capital 
accumulation. These changes have all influenced Taiwan’s capitalist development 
since the late 1980s. As I argued in Chapter Three, the re-introduction of neo-
liberalism is related to the overall decline in the profit rate of the industrial sector in 
the core zone and the increasing power of transnational capital. The current economic 
globalisation is to alleviate the downturn and economic crisis in the core economic 
zone. Thus, the core zone (the governments, the corporations and international 
institutions which are mainly dominated by the core states) is the main promoter of 
economic globalisation, and neo-liberalism can serve as a useful body of thought and 
practice with which to impose economic policies and practices on developing 
countries. As a newly semi-peripheral state, the development of Taiwan’ industrial 
sectors was limited through such pressures to adopt neo-liberal practice. The pressure 
was mainly from the US via bilateral and multilateral trade talks for more than two 
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decades. From the US’s side, such neo-liberal practice can both expand their market 
of industrial and financial capital and reduce the light manufacturing imports from 
Taiwan. The next section will examine in detail how US hegemony and the WTO are 
key actors in imposing neoliberal practice on Taiwan.  
5-1-1 The foundation of neo-liberalism: US-Taiwan bilateral trade talks in the 
1970s and the 1980s 
 
From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, the KMT administration began debating economic 
lliberalization125  and in 1984 the government proposed a clear new direction for 
economic reform. Premier Yu Kuo-hua stated three basic policy directions that 
needed to be followed, namely economic liberalisation, internationalisation, and 
institutionalization.126 However, Taiwan’s overall economic liberalisation should not 
be understood as a result of domestic policy choice, but rather as an inevitable 
consequence of the impact of neo-liberalism in terms of pressure of the bilateral 
Taiwan-US trade talks, and Taiwan’s accession to the GATT/WTO. The US has 
played a key role in Taiwan’s capitalist development, both in the process of Taiwan’s 
peripheral ascent and liberalisation. The US once supported Taiwan’s EOI 
industrialization yet they restricted Taiwan’s light manufacturing exports from the late 
1970s. The situation demonstrates that semi-peripheral development is not unlimited, 
as their development might be restricted by the core zone.  
     The US and Taiwan have held  long term dialogue aimed at negotiating economic 
affairs ever since the first US aid to Taiwan in 1950. As noted in Chapter Four, the 
US pushed Taiwan towards being a more economically liberal regime following the 
end of US aid in 1965. After Taiwan adopted EOI in 1965, the US became the top 
destination for Taiwan’s industrial exports, which contributed to Taiwan’s trade 
surplus.127Taiwan’s exports to the US began increasing remarkably from the 1960s 
                                                 
125
 Between 1978 and 1984, the government frequently held ‘Financial and Economic Symposia’ to 
discuss the economic reform policy. President Chiang Ching-kuo first addressed the issue of further 
liberal economic reform (e.g. reducing import barriers and reducing the trade surplus) in the 
symposium in 1983.  
126
 ‘Liberalisation’ means that the government should follow ‘the market’ and reduce its direct 
intervention; ‘internationalisation’ means reducing the barriers for capital, goods, services and cultural 
arenas; ‘institutionalisation’ means to establish transparent governance.  
127
 Taiwan began to have a trade surplus in 1977. The overall export value increased eleven-fold, from 
US$5.3 billion in 1975 to US$66.3 billion in 1989 (CEPD 2008). The significant growth in Taiwan’s 
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onwards, owing to the reduction of US tariffs agreed in the Kennedy Round of the 
GATT (1964-1967) (Baldwin et al. 1995). Taiwan’s inclusion in the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) of the US between 1976 and 1989 was another 
significant factor that contributed to the growth of exports to the US. For example, 
Taiwan was the largest single beneficiary of the US-GSP (in terms of tariff benefits) 
in 1979 (Sapir and Lundberg 1984). Compared to the level of Taiwan’s exports to the 
US in 1960 (US$18.9 million), the amount in 1980 (US$6.7 billion) had grown 357 
times (CEPD 2008).  
      Textile products were the dominant exports in the 1960s and the 1970s (Baldwin 
et al. 1955). Taiwan’s textile exports became a target for US-Taiwan bilateral trade 
talks in the 1ate 1970s. To understand this, we need to examine the history of 
international textile trading arrangements. In the 1950s when the US was confronting 
the Japanese challenge, under pressure from US cotton and textile industries,128 
Japanese cotton textile exports to the US market were first restricted through the 
voluntary export restraint (VER) imposed by the US government in 1955-1956 (Pai 
1988; Baldwin et al. 1955). A VER is a bilateral arrangement where an exporting 
country voluntarily restricts exports so that the importing country does not need to use 
quotas, tariffs or other import controls (WTO glossary). Accordingly, other Asian 
developing countries’ cotton exports to the US grew (Baldwin et al. 1995). When the 
increase of Asian NIEs’ textile exports became a problem for the US cotton industry, 
the Short Term Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA) 
and the Long Term Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles 
(LTA) were launched by the GATT Cotton Textile Committee in 1961-1962 as the 
‘global cartel arrangement’ to regulate cotton textile exports and reduce trade 
conflicts. During the period the LTA was implemented, textile exports shifted from 
cotton, to wool and synthetics.129Given this situation, a more general framework 
                                                                                                                                            
trade surplus was due to its increasing exports to the US in the 1970s and the 1980s. For example, 
between 1983 and 1987 over 40% of Taiwan’s exports were to the US. Between 1978 and 1987, 
Taiwan’s trade surplus with the US increased eighty fold from US$0.2 billion to US$ 16 billion (CEPD 
2008, Table 11-9a).  
128
 For example, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute organized a lobby group to pressure US 
government and US Congress; they also acted as government consultants to attend international 
negotiation meetings between the US and their trading countries (Pai 1988).   
129
 For instance, Taiwan’s production of manmade fibre increased sharply from the late 1960s, with the 
export of manmade fibre, synthetic fibre and their production, as a share of total textile and apparel 
exports growing from 15% in 1961 to 67% in 1970 (Hsueh et al. 2001). 
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including all textile products replaced the LTA in 1975, namely the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA).  
     In this context, US-Taiwan trade talks during the 1970s were mainly concerned 
with the restriction of Taiwan’s textile exports.130 Taiwan was not a unique case, as 
other Asian countries such as South Korea and Hong Kong were also being requested 
by the US to limit their cotton textile exports.131 However, because Taiwan left the 
GATT in 1950 and the United Nations in 1971, thus Taiwan was not included in the 
multilateral frameworks above. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s cotton, wool, and manmade 
fibre textile exports were restricted by the bilateral US-Taiwan textile agreements.132  
Moreover, bilateral US-Taiwan trade negotiations in the late 1970s also aimed at 
establishing a new official trade dialogue after formal US-ROC diplomatic relations 
were broken off in 1979. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Agreement on Trade 
Matters between the Government of the USA and the Government of the ROC was 
signed on 29 December, 1979. It stated that in its bilateral relations with the U.S., 
Taiwan would enjoy the rights, and would need to respect the responsibilities, as 
decided in the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-1979).133 Although Taiwan left GATT in 
1971, its bilateral relations with the US enabled Taiwan to adopt the outcome of 
GATT (e.g. tariff reduction by the US and the international textile trading 
arrangement), because the US-Taiwan bilateral trade negotiations was based on the 
liberalising framework of GATT.  
  In the 1980s, with the growth of Taiwan’s trade surplus, US-Taiwan bilateral trade 
talks became more intense, and included annual meetings to review the trade 
imbalance, and irregular meetings to negotiate specific trade topics. Around twenty-
two sets of trade talks were held between the two countries during the 1980s. The 
                                                 
130
 Besides the textile products, the US imposed some restrictions on Taiwan’s other exports, e.g. 
footwear, and colour television sets. Yet textile exports was the main concern of the US. 
131
 The author interviewed Eric Chiang on 27 March 2006, Eric Chiang was Director of the Second 
Bilateral Trade Division (the Americans, Europe and Asia), Ministry of Economic Affairs when the 
author conducted the interview. Also see Baldwin, et al. (1995), Ch.7. The following discussion about 
the global textile arrangement is drawn from the same source. 
132
 Several agreements between the US and Taiwan were signed, including the following: the cotton 
textiles arrangement (1973-1974), the wool and manmade fibre textiles arrangement (1971-1974), and 
the cotton, wool and manmade fibre textiles arrangement (1975-1980). 
133
 The original text can be seen in Yen (1987). One official document on 24 October 1979 also shows 
that ‘with regard to tariff measures referred to in this letter, both sides shall have the same rights a 
GATT Contracting Party would have with respect to articles bound in the GATT…’ See Gibert and 
Carpenter (1989). 
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agenda of the above trade negotiation meetings was largely set by the US. Taiwan 
was not unique in being requested by the US to engage in such bilateral trade 
dialogues. As discussed in Chapter Three, the US changed its regional economic 
strategy from encouraging EOI and offering access to the US market, to restrictions 
on East Asian exports and promoting liberalisation. In Gilpin’s (2000) view, the 
change of American’s economic strategy was from an open and multilateral trade 
policy to a ‘much more parochial and nationalistic foreign economic policy’ (p.227). 
He argues that such a shift was a result of several factors, including a growing 
concern about American industrial decline; the trade deficit with Japan; the increase 
of regionalisation in Western Europe; public support for trade liberalisation; and 
President Regan’s policy preference. In this context, as Haggard and Cheng (1989) 
point out, the US raised specific trade issues with several East Asian NIEs, such as 
opening trade in services; the protection of intellectual property rights; the reform of 
trade-distorting investment laws; curtailing specific industrial targeting; and 
modifying exchange rates. The ‘new bilateralism’134 imposed by the US led to East 
Asian NIEs’ further economic liberalisation.  
In the case of Taiwan, the US had several complaints about Taiwan’s economic and 
trade systems: (1) many restrictions on domestic market access; (2) a high tariff rate 
which restricted foreign imports; (3) an unreasonable tariff rate system; (4) 
inappropriate restrictions to FDI; (5) insufficient protection of intellectual property 
rights; (6) insufficient protection of workers’ rights; and (7) inappropriate intervention 
in the foreign exchange rate system (Taniura 2003[1988], p.314). For this reason, 
Taiwan was investigated in seven cases of unfair trade practices under Section 301 of 
the Trade Act (Smith 1997). The issues that concerned the US in its trade relations 
with Taiwan included tariff rates, market access, the foreign exchange rate system, the 
labour regime, intellectual property rights, public procurement, and non-tariff trade 
barriers, among the agricultural, industrial, and banking sectors, with the following 
aims (Baldwin et al. 1995; Yen 1987; Prybyla 1989): (1) to reduce Taiwan’s exports 
                                                 
134
 The term was used by Haggard and Cheng, refers to a change from multilateralism to a more 
aggressive bilateralism imposed by the US on its East Asia trading partners (Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) during the second Reagan administration. The term has also been used to refer to the George 
W. Bush administration’s trade diplomacy in recent years. 
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to the US135, (2) to increase US imports and US FDI to Taiwan136, (3) to implement 
protectionist measures on intellectual property rights.137  
 
After several rounds of negotiation, Taiwan agreed to most US requests, and several 
agreements were signed during the 1980s. In regard to reducing Taiwan’s exports to 
the US, firstly, the US required Taiwan to remove the imposition of an ‘export 
performance requirement138 on inward FDI in the automotive industry; and Taiwan 
agreed to do so.139 As such, Taiwan abolished the export performance requirement by 
amending its Automotive Industry Development Plan in September 1986. The US 
also requested that Taiwan implements a voluntary export restraint on machine tools 
and steel in 1987; thus an agreement on certain machine tools was signed between 
Taiwan and the US on 16 March, 1989 and on 30 June, 1992. Taiwan agreed to limit 
the amount of exports of machine tools to the US to less than 90% of that in 1985. 
Furthermore, in 1989, after the appreciation of the NT dollar forced by the US, 
Taiwan’s foreign exchange rate system was changed from one of ‘soft-pegs140’ to a 
‘managed floating’ exchange rate system. The exchange rate of the NT dollar against 
the US dollar increased from NT$37.8 in 1986 to NT$26.4 in 1989, an appreciation of 
                                                 
135
 (1) restrict Taiwan’s exports to the US (e.g. rice, textile products, machine tools, and steel); (2) 
appreciate the New Taiwan dollar against the US dollar (i.e. make Taiwan’s exports more expensive), 
and request Taiwan’s foreign exchange policy be oriented towards free market principles; (3) 
implement a labour protection law so that Taiwan’s exporting sector would not be able to make use of 
cheap labour for reducing costs. 
136
 (1) open Taiwan’s market access for US goods (e.g. agricultural goods, tobacco, alcohol, soda, 
midstream petrochemicals products, communication equipment) by removing non-tariff barriers (e.g. 
quotas, import licensing systems, sanitary regulations, prohibitions) and reducing Taiwan’s import 
tariffs; (2) open Taiwan’s market access for US-based FDI (e.g. automobile, banking and insurance, 
and retail); (3) increase public procurement from the US. 
137
 The US requested Taiwan to sign an agreement that the copyright of American publications 
(published after 1955) should be protected for 30 years.   
138
 Export performance requirement is a requirement to FDI on the proportion of export of the FDI’s 
production.  
139
 A Letter of Exchange on export performance requirement in the automotive sector was signed by 
the US and Taiwan on 9 October, 1986.  
140
 According to the IMF (27/11/2007), soft pegs includes a single currency or a composite of 
currencies, the conventional fixed pegs and crawling pegs; managed floating includes managed floating 
and independently floating.  
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27 percent.141 The government also relaxed the controls on foreign exchange and 
capital movement. Thus, Taiwan has become a capital exporting country since 
1988.142 Finally, Taiwan’s Labour Standard Law was announced in 1984, providing a 
legal framework related to working conditions (e.g. working hours, wages, 
employment contract, retirement system, and so on). 
     With regard to the issue of increased US imports and US-based FDI: Firstly, 
during the trade talks of 1978-1989, the US requested a total of 1,807 items for tariff 
reduction, and Taiwan granted 1,314 concessions (a success rate of 72.7%) (Chen and 
Liu 1985). Notably, Taiwan agreed to remove licensing controls on the import of US 
commodities (especially agricultural goods). Taiwan thus became the third largest 
buyer of US corn, barley, and soybeans (Prybyla 1989). Furthermore, under pressure 
from the US and its business lobby, Taiwan’s state-owned airline (China Airlines) 
decided to procure six Boeing 754-700 aircraft in 1987 (Chieh 2005). Secondly, in 
1988 Taiwan also changed its inward FDI policy from a “positive list” to a “negative 
list”, so that 207 sub-sectors were further opened to US FDI). Thirdly, the Taiwanese 
government also organised a “buy American mission” and made purchases of around 
US$11 billion during the trade talks of 1978-1987 (Prybyla 1989, p.66). 
     Consequently, Taiwan’s average nominal tariff rate was sharply reduced from 
31.1% in 1980 to 9.7% in 1989 (Figure 5-1) (Dept. of Customs Administration 
(DOCA) 2004). Meanwhile, custom revenues as a share of government revenues, 
declined from 33.4% to 17.3% (Figure 5-1). Non-tariff barriers143 were also reduced 
(e.g. permitted import items) as a share of total items, grew from 57.1% in 1970 to 
97% in the late 1980s. In particular, the percentage of items that were “free from 
import licenses” of total import items increased from 10.5% in August 1983 to 66.2% 
by the end of 1989 (Smith 1997). Local content requirements144 in machinery, 
                                                 
141It was a common situation that East Asian NIEs were pressurised by the US to appreciate their 
currency, the percentage change for the South Korean won and Singapore Dollar against the US Dollar 
between 1986 and 1990 was 19.71% and 16.77% respectively. See Hsing (1998). 
142There are two different sets of data regarding the timing of when Taiwan’s net outward investment 
exceeded net inward investment. According to the data from the Central Bank, it was 1988; the data 
from the Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, shows that it was 1991. See Lin, et al. 
(2003) about the comparison of the two sets of data.   
143
 According to glossary from the WTO, NTBs are non-tariff measures such as quotas, import 
licensing systems, sanitary regulations, prohibitions 
144
 Local content requirement is a requirement that the production chain needs to include some local 
produced raw material or components.  
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electrical equipment and transport equipment (perceived by the US as non-trade 
barriers) were abolished, except in the automobile industry (Smith 1997).  
 
 
Figure 5-1: The Change in Taiwan’s Tariff Rate145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DOCA (2004) 
 
Empirical studies above show that the US obtained a great deal from Taiwan through 
their bilateral trade talks. This is evident in the lack of growth in Taiwan’s bilateral 
trade surplus with the US since 1987. On Taiwan’s side, the government became 
concerned that some protectionist measures by the US might damage the advantages 
enjoyed by Taiwanese exporters. Taiwan also proposed the establishment of a dispute 
settlement mechanism to deal with trade disputes, but this proposal was refused by the 
US. There was no trade dispute mechanism in the bilateral negotiation. The US was 
both the negotiator and the arbitrator, which caused the bilateralism to be 
unilateralism in effect, imposed by the US. In general, the Taiwanese government was 
in a defensive position during negotiations. Taiwan’s formal chief negotiator Vincent 
Siew, has stated, ‘our main strategy was to strive for a longer period for implementing 
US’s requests…We did not have the leverage during the negotiations.’146 Taiwan’s 
powerless position during the negotiation process can be explained by the uncertainty 
and weakness of the legitimacy of Taiwan’s (the ROC) statehood after its withdrawal 
from the UN. It seems that the US was the only country that continued trade 
negotiations with Taiwan. The reality, however, was quite opposite. The US 
supported the statehood of the ROC on Taiwan, rebutting the PRC until its 
                                                 
145
 Nominal tariff rate is the rate of duty leveled on the gross value of a product.  
146
 The author interviewed Vincent Siew on 11 April, 2006. Vincent Siew was the chief negotiator of 
ROC-USA trade talks between 1972 and 1988, former Premier between 1997 and 2000. Since May 
2008 he has been Vice President of the ROC. 
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rapprochement with the PRC in the early 1970s. When the US changed its East Asian 
regional strategy, in particular by normalising relations with the PRC and imposing a 
new bilateralism with East Asian NIEs, Taiwan was inevitably influenced. As being a 
semi-peripheral economy (i.e. increased industrial capacity but facing challenges from 
the core zone) and a state in a weak position within the interstate system, Taiwan was 
powerless to resist US pressure for liberalisation. As such, Taiwan sought to join the 
multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO) in the 1990s, to improve the asymmetric 
relations with the US and to gain access to the dispute settlement mechanism.  
      In conclusion, Taiwan’s bilateral trade negotiations with the US in the 1970s and 
the 1980s demonstrated how Taiwan’s economic system was pressurised by the US to 
liberalise. The experience of bilateral trade talks not only contributed knowledge and 
experience to Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in the 1990s, but also indirectly links 
Taiwan’s liberalisation to the multilateral frameworks of liberalisation, such as the 
GATT. As the former chief Taiwan trade negotiator, Siew, claims: ‘Taiwan’s 
connection to the international regime and the rules of the game were established in 
the period of US-Taiwan trade negotiations…. without such experience, the 
Americans would not like to help Taiwan join GATT/WTO while under the pressure 
from the PRC.’147 Moreover, the liberalisation policies under US-Taiwan trade talks 
have had a significant influence on Taiwan’s capitalist development. Firstly, Taiwan 
shifted to a capital-export economy when the NT dollar was sharply appreciated. 
Secondly, those exports (textile, consuming electronics, light manufacturing) that 
were restricted by the US thus experienced decline, some industries began to relocate 
production to Southeast Asia (e.g. textiles), and some industries reduced inward FDI 
(e.g. consumer electronics).  
 
5-1-2 Accession to the GATT/WTO and TIFA 
 
Taiwan re-applied for GATT membership in January, 1990. However, due to pressure 
from China, Taiwan’s application was postponed until 29 September, 1992, when the 
GATT Council established a working party to examine its application (Chang and 
Goldstein 2007, p.6). Taiwan obtained observer status on this date. Following a 
lengthy negotiating process, the Working Party finalized Taiwan’s accession 
                                                 
147
 Author’s interview Vincent Siew, in Taipei, on 11 April, 2006. He mentioned that the US assisted 
Taiwan to join the APEC and GATT/WTO in the 1990s. 
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documents on 18 September, 2001. Following formal approval during the WTO Doha 
Ministerial Meeting during November 2001, Taiwan became the 144th member of the 
WTO on 1 January, 2002. After 12 years of talks, Taiwan successfully entered the 
WTO.   
    Taiwan submitted its first draft schedule in 1994 and conducted bilateral 
negotiations with 26 countries.148 By 1998, Taiwan nearly finalized the process by 
signing agreements with 24 countries, including an agreement with the US on 2 
February 1998 (Taiwan WTO Centre n.d.). Taiwan already fulfilled the requirements 
of accession in 1998.149 Additionally, Taiwan’s commitments were more liberal than 
other developing countries (e.g. South Korea).150 In terms of the negotiation 
procedures and the commitments of market access, there was no apparent reason to 
delay Taiwan’s entry to the WTO.  
     The major factor for the delay in Taiwan’s accession was political, namely 
Taiwan’s statehood status and cross-strait relations. The PRC decided to apply for (or 
“resume” membership to) GATT on 10 July 1982, formally applying on 10 July, 1986. 
Its GATT working party was established on 4 March 1987. While the Tiananmen 
Square massacre of 1989 caused its examination to cease temporarily (Liang 2002), in 
1992 China reached consensus with the US about its accession to GATT, on the 
condition that the PRC could not block Taiwan’s application.151 The PRC further 
requested to enter the WTO earlier than Taiwan, and GATT endorsed this request.152 
                                                 
148
 In practical terms, an accession case is negotiated in a working party by “consensus decision-
making”, so that accession agreements are negotiated between the applicant country and any incumbent 
member who is interested in the accession case Charnovitz (2006). These agreements are included in 
the “Protocol” and are enforceable under WTO dispute settlement (p. 406). Two kinds of issues are 
negotiated during accession negotiations: one is the applicant member needs to guarantee they will 
fully apply WTO rules, the other about market access commitments for incumbent members by 
applicant members, see Langhammer and Lucke (1999). 
149
 The author interviewed John Deng in Geneva on 6 and 8 June 2006. John Deng was the Deputy 
Permanent Representative of the Mission of TPKM to the WTO from 2002 to 2006; he has been the 
Trade Representative and Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs since 2008.   
150
 For South Korea’s status, see WTO (1996). For example, South Korea’s industrial tariff rate (6.7% 
in 2004) and agricultural tariff (52.2% in 2004) was higher than Taiwan (4.16% in industrial tariff and 
13.46% in agricultural tariff). See South Korea’s 2004 trade policy review report in WTO (18/08/2004). 
151Interview with John Deng in Geneva on 6 and 8 June 2006. Also see Liang (2002). 
152
 When the GATT Council meeting discussed the accession of Taiwan on 29 September 1992, the 
chairman stated: “All contracting parties had acknowledged the view that there was only one China, as 
expressed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 25 October 1971. Many 
contracting parties, therefore, had agreed with the view of the People's Republic of China (PRC) that 
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However, China was not very active in negotiating with other countries, and 
experienced difficulties in adjusting its non-market economic regime until Chinese 
Premier Zhu Ron-gji visited the US in April 1999.153 China eventually signed a 
negotiation agreement with the US in November 1999. Consequently, the incumbent 
members and Taiwan had undertaken the negotiation process slowly in order to wait 
for China’s progress. One of Taiwan’s negotiators for the financial services sector in 
the 1990s, Sean Chen, mentioned that Taiwanese negotiators intended to conduct the 
agreements slowly and sometimes repeated negotiation of the same issue.154 
     When the PRC’s accession was approved by the WTO on 10 November 2001, 
Taiwan’s accession was agreed one day later. The consequence of the waiting process 
indirectly gave Taiwan eight to twelve years, from when Taiwan first submitted a 
draft of the lists of commitments in 1994 to adjust its economic regime to fit the WTO 
rules and Taiwan’s commitments. In other words, Taiwan did not request a longer 
time period for implementing the WTO agreements and their list of commitments, but 
the waiting-time in the accession process, which was due to political factors, in 
practice provided Taiwan a much longer time period for implementation. Taiwan’s 
major commitments to the WTO accession are summarised in the following:155 (1) 
Reducing the average normal tariff rates in agricultural and manufactured products156; 
(2) Reducing non-trade barriers on agricultural and industrial products157; (3) Opening 
service-sector markets (committed to 123 out of 155 sub-sectors); (4) Acceding to the 
Agreement on Government Procurement. Taiwan would open government 
procurement contracts worth some US$6 to $8 billion a year to bidding; (5) 
                                                                                                                                            
Chinese Taipei, as a separate customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the PRC itself”, 
see GATT (27/10/1992). 
153
 About Zhu’s visit to the US, see Lai (2001). 
154
 Author’s interview with Sean Chen, in Taipei on 22 March, 2006. Sean Chen was Deputy Minister 
of Finance between 1998 and 2002.  
155The following summary is drawing from CEPD (2002). 
156
 The agricultural the tariff rate would reduce from 20.2% to 14.01% in 2003, and then to 12.86% in 
2011 (the reduction is 35.76%). The manufactured product tariff rates would reduce from 6.03% to 
5.78% in 2003, and then to 4.15% in 2011 (the reduction is 31.17%). 
157
 Including the removal of most of the import controls on agricultural products; replacing the area 
restrictions on the importation of small passenger cars and light commercial vehicles by a tariff rate 
quota system; eliminating the local content and sourcing requirements applied to the production of 
automobiles and motorcycles; permitting the importation of motorcycles larger than 150cc and small 
diesel passenger vehicles; adjusting downward the automobile commodity tax and eliminating the 3% 
commodity tax offset on locally designed automobile and motorcycle bodies, engines and chassis; 
permitting access to the tobacco and alcohol markets. 
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Implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). 
      In general, many of the above issues had been implemented before 2002. The US 
pressurised Taiwan to change its economic and trade systems in the 1980s, and 
pushed the liberalisation of Taiwan’s market in agricultural and industrial goods, as 
well as the issue of intellectual property rights. The WTO introduced the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services on (GATS) that had been agreed during the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations (1986-1994). As such, Taiwan’s application to the WTO 
led to the liberalisation of its service sector, as well as expansion of Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN)158 status towards all WTO incumbent members (only the US and some 
Western European countries obtained MFN from Taiwan in the 1980s). This 
illustrates that bilateralism imposed by the US on Taiwan in the 1970s, and the 1980s 
was a foundation that pushed Taiwan to adopt a neo-liberalism.  
     Although the multilateral trading framework enabled Taiwan to develop trade talks 
with other countries, it did not reduce the asymmetric power relations between the US 
and Taiwan. The US requested more aggressive commitments than other incumbent 
members, in particular by asking Taiwan to “pay the down-payment.”159 The US 
argued that since Taiwan would eventually gain access to the WTO, it should have no 
difficulty in implementing some commitments in advance.160 The Taiwanese 
government viewed the US-Taiwan accession negotiation as the final significant step 
towards its accession. Accordingly, Taiwan agreed to reduce tariffs on 33 agricultural 
products in 2000, two years earlier than its accession.  
     Similar to other weaker countries, Taiwan lacked negotiation capability, and the 
Taiwanese negotiators were government officials without professional negotiation 
skills.161 However, there is one distinct difference between Taiwan and other weak 
countries: pressure from China. The US had played an important role in cross-strait 
relations since 1950, protecting Taiwan from China, and so Taiwan relied heavily on 
the US during its WTO accession process.  
                                                 
158
 According to the glossary from the WTO, the MFN is the requirement that one country cannot 
discriminate different trading partners. 
159
 The following discussion about US-Taiwan accession negotiation is from United Daily: United 
Daily (10/02/1998, 12/02/1998, 13/02/1998, 16/02/1998, 22/02/1998, 06/05/1998).  
160
 Author’s interview with Sean Chen in Taipei on 22 March 2006.  
161
 Author’s interview with Sean Chen in Taipei on 22 March 2006; author’s interview with John Deng 
in Geneva on 6 and 8 June 2006.  
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Moreover, US bilateralism with Taiwan did not disappear when Taiwan entered the 
WTO. Such a situation needs to be examined in the broad context of the US’s 
economic bilateralism strategy of recent years. Several studies have elaborated upon 
the pattern of bilateralism in Asia-Pacific, in which some Asia-Pacific countries have 
promoted FTAs since the late 1990s (Ravehhill 2003; Desker 2004; Dent 2003). 
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by the end of 2007, of a total of 
134 FTAs, 44 had been concluded, 49 were under negotiation and 41 were proposed 
(ADB 2008). The US recognised its absence in the global trend of bilateral FTAs 
since the 1980s, and former US Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick called for 
action to ‘clear the way for American’s international trade leadership and economic 
interests’ during US President George W. Bush’s first administration (Phillips 2007, 
p.162). As such, the US actively signed FTAs and Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements (TIFAs) with East Asian countries.   
In this context, the first meeting of the TIFA between the US and Taiwan was held 
in September 1994, and two follow-up meetings were held in February 1997 and 
January 1998.162 During TIFA meetings, Taiwan tried to discuss a plan to sign an 
FTA with the US, but the latter made no attempt to reciprocate. Instead, the US made 
specific trade requests through TIFA, including issues relating to Taiwan’s protection 
of intellectual property rights; more imports of rice from the US;163 the protection of 
pharmaceutical patents in Taiwan; and further access to fixed-line 
telecommunications. In the latest meeting held in July 2007, some of the above issues 
were addressed,164 but the issue of signing a FTA was again disregarded by the US. It 
is noteworthy that the US began to make active use of the TIFA to deal with US-
Taiwan trade issues corresponding with the sluggish progress of the Doha Round of 
the WTO (the Doha Round is now not able to be concluded). However, the 
asymmetric power relations between the US and Taiwan has not changed significantly. 
Similar to the situation before the trade talks in the 1990s, the agenda for TIFA 
meetings was mainly decided by the US. Taiwan’s core concern (e.g. FTA) has not 
                                                 
162
 Between 1999 and 2003, the TIFA meetings were suspended by the US because the US was 
occupied in negotiations regarding China’s accession. In April 2004, the TIFA annual meetings 
resumed (Author’s interview with Eric Chiang in Taipei on 27 March 2006). 
163
 Taiwan agreed to open the rice import up to 144,720 tonnes, of which 75 percent is from the US. 
The US still pushes Taiwan to increase import amounts.  
164
 For example, pharmaceutical pricing and regulations, IPR protection, and imports and exports of 
agricultural products, see Huang (20/07/2007). 
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been included at the TIFA meetings. Moreover, when the latest TIFA meeting was 
held in Washington in July 2007, the Taiwanese trade representatives attended the 
meeting with a procurement proposal of around US$4 billion (Huang 20/07/2007). 
Such a strategy (i.e. a pre-negotiation offer) to reduce the US’s aggressive requests 
was commonly used during the pre-1990s US-Taiwan trade talks. In sum, the WTO 
and the TIFA have remained the main forces to push Taiwan’s liberalisation to date.  
 
5-1-3 Privatisation and democratisation 
 
While the US pressurised Taiwan to liberalise its economic and financial systems in 
the 1980s, they also pressurised Taiwan to liberalise its political system. In 1987, the 
KMT government lifted Martial Law and then lifted the ban on visits to mainland 
China by Taiwanese citizens. Several factors pushed the KMT government to lift 
Martial Law. Firstly, the growing opposition political movement165 (called ‘tangwai’, 
meaning that they were outside the KMT party) together with social movements had 
mobilised several massive, illegal gatherings from the late 1970s onward. In 
September 1986, the tangwai movement decided to form an illegal opposition party, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Tsang 1999); secondly, President Chiang 
Ching-kuo made a general move166 towards the relaxation of the domestic political 
economy in the 1980s.167 The proportion of Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing 
Committee increased from just 14% in 1973 to 52% in 1988 (Tien 1992). Finally, 
international pressure from the US Congress and the US media pushed for the end of 
Taiwan’s authoritarian regime (Chieh 2005; International Committee for Human 
Rights in Taiwan 1987).  
     In the background, with the abolition of martial law announced by the ruling KMT 
regime in 1987, the newly-established opposition DPP called upon the government to 
liberalise the state-owned-enterprises and open up the “special permission” industries. 
In other words, they requested the state to open the upstream and intermediate sectors 
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 Some scholars have viewed the emergence of the opposition movement as stemming from the 
supplementary elections of members of The National Assembly and Legislative Yuan in 1969 when 
some non-KMT candidates were elected, see Cheng and Haggard (1992). 
166
 For Chiang’s role in political democratization, see Tien (1992). 
167
 For example, Chiang began to talk about an economic liberalisation policy, he also marginalised the 
extreme right-wing faction (e.g. General Wang Sheng) within the KMT, and he appointed Taiwanese 
elites (i.e. non-mainlanders) into the government and party leadership, including the vice-president Lee 
Teng-hui. 
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of domestic production chains. As noted in Chapter Four, some Taiwanese liberal 
economists criticized the monopoly of SOEs controlled by the KMT as ‘party-state 
capitalism168’ and argued that SOEs should be deregulated and liberalised. This 
assumption has since become the economic foundation of DPP policies. Economic 
liberalisation and deregulation did not contradict the democratic ideology of the DPP. 
On the one hand, the DPP called for political democracy; on the other hand, they 
called for economic liberalisation. The domination of bureaucratic-corporate capital 
and state finance capital together with the KMT’s authoritarian regime became a joint 
target for the political opposition, social forces (peasants, labour, and environmental 
movements) and Taiwanese SMEs. Furthermore, privatisation has been narrowly 
viewed by the DPP as selling or transferring the shares of state-owned enterprise to 
private owners, the DPP was concerned with political favouritism in the way the 
KMT tried to transfer shares to their party-affiliated enterprises or specific private 
capitalists. Indeed, the DPP only criticized the process of privatisation, rather than 
privatisation itself. In fact, the DPP continued to implement liberalisation and 
privatisation policies when it came to power itself.  
     Accordingly, after the first official unit to promote privatisation was established on 
25 July 1989, 36 SOEs were privatized169 and 17 were closed at the end of 2007 
(CEPD 18/03/2008). Half of them were either privatised or closed during the DPP’s 
administration. The government prepared a further 13 enterprises to be privatised. As 
such, the percentage of SOEs in gross capital formation was down from 31.4% in 
1983 to 7.7% in 2007 (CEPD 2008, p.66). Furthermore, private enterprises in the 
intermediate stream sector are able to enter the upstream sector and become the 
dominant force for capital accumulation. For example, the largest intermediate stream 
private enterprise, Taiwan Formosa Plastics Co., was allowed to manufacture crude 
oil refining and petroleum products in 1986, and to establish a power plant in 1996. 
The Taiwan Formosa Plastics Co. business group formed a production chain from 
upstream to downstream sectors, and this industrial conglomerate has been called “the 
petro-chemical kingdom.”  In sum, the process of privatisation not only broke down 
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 Six liberal economics professors from Cheng-She, a liberal society, cooperated to publish ‘The 
Capitalism of the Party-Stat’” in 1991. They criticized the monopoly of public enterprises controlled 
by the KMT and intervention in the free market, thereby they highlighted the necessity of liberalisation 
and privatisation. 
169
 In which, there were 8 banking enterprises, 5 insurance and trust firms, 4 petrochemicals, 3 
transportation, 2 steel & machinery, 1 construction, and others. 
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bureaucratic-corporate capital, but also encouraged the development of private 
industrial capital.  
In conclusion, US hegemony has played a key role in pushing Taiwan’s adoption 
of neo-liberal practice, and the Taiwanese state has been powerless to resist such 
pressure. The case of Taiwan shows that although semi-peripheral development was 
supported by the core zone for a time, such support may turn out to be restriction.  
During the US-Taiwan trade talks and Taiwan’s accession to GATT/WTO, Taiwan’s 
export-led light manufacturing industries (i.e. labour-intensive, located in the 
downstream of domestic production chains) faced a crisis, for example, the reduction 
of state promotion, the sharp increase of the NT dollar’s foreign exchange rate against 
US dollar, the increase of labour costs, and the reduction of US market access quotas 
(i.e. the end of GSP). From the late 1980s, the declining industries either closed 
factories, or requested permission to import low-skilled migrant labour, or increase 
overseas investment to Southeast Asia and to China. In the up- and intermediate 
stream sectors, the upstream SOEs were privatised and their business was deregulated, 
thus providing an opportunity for private industrial capitalists to expand. The 
domestic production chains that were dominated by the bureaucratic-corporate capital 
had hence collapsed by the late 1980s.  
As such, in terms of industrial structure, the consequence of Taiwan’s adoption of 
neo-liberalism is that Taiwan’s two industrialising trajectories broke down. Taiwan’s 
private industrial capital replaced declining bureaucratic-corporate capital to be the 
main capital accumulator. Chapter Seven will discuss the impact on employment, and 
how the government promoted labour flexibility policies and imported migrant labour 
in order to help Taiwan’s industrial capitalists reduce labour cost.  
The impact of neo-liberalism is however one side of the story; on the other side, 
Taiwan developed another industrialising trajectory which also changed Taiwan’s 
links within the capitalist world-system, namely, the Taiwanese-led, export-led 
electronic industry. The industries affected by neo-liberalism (e.g. the labour intensive 
and export-led light manufacturing industries, SOEs) have been termed by the 
government as “traditional industries,” in contrast to the “hi-tech electronics industry”, 
which developed since the 1980s. While the traditional industries have declined, the 
Taiwanese-led, export-led, hi-tech electronics industry has grown.  
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5-2 Development of Taiwanese-led and Export-led Electronics Industry 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the industrial centre shifted from the core to some 
selective semi-peripheral states (e.g. NIEs) in the 1960s and the 1970s, and then to 
some selective peripheral states (e.g. China) since the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
The electronics industry is increasingly the case. In the 1960s and the 1970s, US and 
Japanese firms dominated electronics production, both relocated industrial production 
via outward investment to developing countries (Borrus 2000). Japanese producers 
gradually took the lead in consumer electronics and components technologies (e.g. 
displays, precision mechanical parts, and semiconductor memory), which challenged 
the competitiveness of US firms (Borrus 2000). However, US chip and semiconductor 
producers regained the leading role by 1994 (ibid). According to Borrus (1997), the 
success of the US semiconductor industry can be attributed to the growth of technical 
sophistication and Asian-based production networks which occurred during the 1980s. 
A number of studies have focused on how the Asian production network of the 
electronics industry contributed to Asian economic regionalisation and the 
development of the industry.170 In this context, the development of Taiwan’s hi-tech 
electronics industry is influenced by such a global shift. The section will briefly 
review how Taiwan’s electronics industry was started by inward FDI from the US and 
Japan. Then, I will discuss how the Taiwanese state is keen to promote the industry 
(although with limited resources, under the pressure of neo-liberal policies) to 
participate in global production chain.  
The dynamics of the electronics industry can demonstrate Taiwan’s semi-
peripheral development as it represents Taiwan’s industrialised trajectory during the 
period, and the industry dominates production, trade, overseas investment, and 
employment (both domestic and overseas). The electronics industry became a major 
producer and exporter during the 1980s. In 2006, a 55.7% share of Taiwan’s exports 
were integrated circuits (IC) and information technology (IT) electronic products; 
34.7% of domestic manufacturing production by value was in the sector (Hung 2007). 
Between 1993 and 2007, 41% share of Taiwanese outward FDI was in the electronics 
industry (Investment Commission 2007). Excluding overseas production, there were 
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 For example, see Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard (2000) eds., International Production Networks in Asia:  
Rivalry or Riches? London: Routledge; Dicken, P. (2004) Global Shift: Reshaping the Global  
Economic Map in the 21st Century, fourth edition, London: SAGE 
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Twenty-four Taiwanese products that held the top three world market share in 2006 
(CEPD 2007, Table 4-b), and the majority were IC and IT related products. How have 
the two main factors mentioned above (state promotion and the global production 
chain of the electronics industry) driven such development? What is the implication 
for Taiwan’s semi-peripheral development? Before discussing these points, it is 
necessary to review briefly the evolution of the electronics industry up to the late 
1980s.  
5-2-1 Historical condition: FDI-led, export-led electronics industry 
 
Before the 1960s, the share of electronic and electronic communications equipment in 
Taiwan’s manufacturing GDP was less than 2% (Tu 2001). The electronics industry 
became the largest recipient of FDI from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Around 
36% of FDI was concentrated in this industry between 1952 and 1986, in particular 
from the US and Japan (Investment Commission 2008). This industry was FDI-
oriented and export-oriented, and Taiwan served as a major assembler for TNCs. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, FDI played a crucial role in the export-led electronics 
industry, together with the export-led textiles industry, and drove Taiwan’s EOI 
development in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
     Between the 1960s and the early 1970s, the main electronic assembly products 
were black-and-white televisions, radios, transistors, and integrated circuits171 (Tu 
2001). Japanese and American electronics TNCs played important roles in this 
industry in terms of FDI and technology transfer. For example, one of the top 
Taiwanese enterprises specialising in consumer electronics, the Tatung Company, 
began importing electronic components from Japan in 1961. It formed a joint-venture 
company with Toshiba - a Japanese TNC - in 1964, to assemble transistor radios and 
televisions, and it became an OEM172 for Japanese companies.  IBM, an American 
TNC, set up a computer manufacturing factory in Taiwan in 1962, followed by 
General Instruments in 1964 and the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1967. 
The American TNCs mostly invested in the assembly of black-and-white televisions. 
Apart from household electronic appliances and computer products, the US TNCs 
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 It was undertaken by US companies, e.g. Texas Instruments (1958), General Electric (1964) and 
RCA, see Chu and Amsden (2001, p.49).   
172
 The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) mainly undertakes mass production for their 
customers; they outsource assembly to small-scale subcontractors. 
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introduced the integrated circuit (IC) industry to Taiwan in the 1960s. The industry 
can be divided into three stages: design, fabrication, and testing and packaging. 
Taiwan was merely at the downstream sector, the testing and assembly work for the 
US TNCs.  
      In the 1970s, cassette recorders, colour televisions, electronic calculators, and 
digital watches became the main products (Tu 2001). The last two were linked to the 
IC products. The share of FDI in electronics exports was as high as 81.9% in 1975 
(Chu and Amsden 2003). However, the share of FDI in electronics exports reduced 
dramatically to 35.7% by 1985, when the main electronic products shifted to 
integrated circuit packages, microcomputers, telephones, monitors, and computer 
terminals (Chu and Amsden 2003; Tu 2001). These new leading IC and IT products 
are manufactured by Taiwanese firms. How did this happen? 
 
5-2-2 State promotion: IC and IT industries as strategic industries  
 
The first factor to drive this development was state promotion. Industrial policy has 
had a long history in Taiwan’s post-war capitalist development, although the term 
‘strategic industries’ first appeared  in the 1976-1981 Six-year Economic 
Development Plan173(Hsueh et al. 2001). In Chapter Four, I demonstrated how the 
state favoured the textile industry through import-substitution measures (e.g. 
regulating the entry of new factories, adopting multiple foreign exchange rates (1951-
1957), implementing high tariff-protection and import controls) and by encouraging 
export policies in the 1950s and the 1960s, and then the state promoted heavy 
chemical industries through the establishment of SOEs in the 1970s. Most importantly, 
the state financed these specific industries through state-owned banks. However, most 
of these measures, which served as the government’s policy instrument to promote 
specific industries, have now been abolished or reduced due to the economic 
liberalisation as discussed in 5-1. The state’s major tools are now limited to fiscal 
methods through tax incentives, encouraging R&D, and indirect industrial financing. 
In this context, the idea of a ‘strategic industrial policy’ is neither a new policy nor a 
strengthening of state-intervention. The key point is that, since the 1980s, the state’s 
                                                 
173The Economic Development Plan by CEPD had lasted for four years per term between 1953 and 
1993. An exception was the seventh term (1976-1981), which lasted six years as part of the 
government’s response to the oil crisis in the late 1970s.  
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promotion has been exclusively focused on the electronics industry, hence the 
concentration of the government’s resources directed Taiwan’s industrialised 
trajectory towards EOI.   
      The first step of state promotion was to target specific industries. According to 
Luthje’s (2006) definition, the hi-tech industry includes the production of microchips 
(semiconductors and related devices) and electronics systems manufacturing 
(computer related electronic components, communications equipment, and consumer 
electronics). These industries are all selected by the state as strategic industries and 
have become the major products and exports (mainly IC fabrication and PC systems) 
from the 1990s up to the present174.  
Furthermore, the state helped to develop R&D technology by establishing state-
sponsored science-research institutes, financing private enterprises, and assisting the 
purchase of technology from US and Japanese TNCs. In 1973 and 1974, the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and the Electronics Research and Service 
Organisation (ERSO), under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), were 
established, respectively. In 1976, the ERSO purchased production technology of 
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) from RCA, a US electronics 
TNC.175 The United Microelectronics Corp (UMC), using the above technology 
transfer, was established in 1980. It was the first Taiwanese private integrated circuits 
company to produce CMOS, although it in fact was a “spin-off” of the ERSO. The 
government owned a 55% share of the UMC (Chen and Wang 1999). However, 
competition in semiconductors intensified due to major South Korean firms also 
entering the industry (Dicken 2004). Like Taiwan, South Korea established the Korea 
Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) in 1976, which acts in a similar way to 
Taiwan’s ITRI and ERSO. From the 1980s, South Korea also became a global major 
semiconductor producer.  
     As such, another “spin-off” from ERSO, was the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the first dedicated foundry company in the world, 
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 In the second National Economic Conference in December 1981, the information electronics 
industry and the machinery industry were chosen as ‘strategic industries’. In 1989, the information 
technology (IT) sector, consumer electronics sector, telecommunication sector, automation sector, and 
the materials sector were the five strategic industries. In the 1980s, the third term of the Statute for 
Encouraging Investment gave tax holidays to capital and technology-intensive industries.  
175According to Tu (2001), bringing in such technology cost NT$489 million (around US$ 12.9 
million).   
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founded in 1987. This company is mainly funded by the government through the 
National Development Fund (49% of the shares), and by Philips (the Dutch TNC) 
(27.5% of the shares). Since the TSMC was established, Taiwan’s foundry industry 
has moved towards specialising in the so-called “pure-play foundries” rather than the 
integrated device manufacturers (IDM) mode. In the model of pure-play foundries, 
the only devices manufactured are under contract by other companies, without 
designing them. On the other hand, the IDM model is a vertically integrated 
production of ICs which includes design, fabrication, and test/assembly processes. It 
was mainly adopted by the US, EU, Japan, and Korea, which dominated the IC 
industry in the 1980s (Dicken 2004). Thereafter, UMC shifted from the IDM mode to 
the pure-play foundry mode. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (pure-play foundries) 
thus adopted a different trajectory from South Korea (IDM). 
     In the IT industry, ITRI and ERSO co-operated with eight Taiwanese electronic 
firms to begin researching IBM-compatible PCs in 1982, when IBM PC computers 
were the major products in the world market (Chang 1992). ERSO transferred key 
technologies to Taiwanese PC enterprises, and some ex-ERSO engineers formed a 
new enterprise, ACER. ACER has since become a leading brand computer in Taiwan 
and in the world. In cooperating with ITRI, ACER developed 16-bit and 32-bit PC 
computers in 1984 and in 1986 (Chu and Amsden 2003, p.50). In sum, the 
significance of the state’s R&D support is mainly through the research agency in 
forming a division of labour with private firms, in which the research agencies act as a 
‘main provider of R&D in the industrial system’ as well as an ‘important channel for 
foreign technology’ (Breznitz 2005b, p.211). 
Besides R&D, the state also established a special industrial park for the electronic 
industry, the same as the EPZ for export-led industries in the 1960s. The proposal to 
establish a Science-based Industry Park was included in the Six-year Economic 
Development Plan in 1976. Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) was launched in December 
1980, located near to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport with two leading 
universities in science and engineering. According to Taniura (2003[1988]) and Tu 
(2001), HSP was an imitation of the US’s Silicon Valley. HSP was initially planned 
to target the semiconductor industry. Currently six industries are permitted in the HSP: 
integrated circuits, computers and peripherals, telecommunications, optoelectronics, 
precision machinery and materials, and bio-technology. The integrated circuits (IC) 
industry has been the largest in terms of both investment and sales. Despite being 
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eligible under the Statue for Encouraging Investment (1980-1989) and the Statue for 
the Upgrading of Industry (1990-to the present), the enterprises in HSP also enjoyed 
the following inducements:176 
 
 Duty-free imported machinery for self use, raw materials, fuel, material and 
semi-finished goods. Park enterprises that export products or labour services 
are not subject to enterprise tax. 
 Additional tax incentives e.g. no enterprise tax for five years. 
 Foreign investors enjoy national treatment. Foreign investors can hold 100% 
equity in park enterprises, and can seek the government of the Republic of 
China and local enterprises as joint investors. 
 Investors can apply for government participation in investments, with the 
maximum investment amount by the government capped at 49% of principal 
capital. 
 Scientific industry enterprises may apply for low interest loans from the 
Chiao-tung Bank for the purposes of acquiring machinery and equipment or 
building plant facilities. 
 
Strategic industries versus traditional industries 
The state also provides tax incentives to IC and IT industries. The state has offered 
these tax incentives to selective industries since the 1960s; yet, only since the 1990s 
has the state exclusively allocated these tax incentives to the IC and IT industries. 
Most of the regulations on tax incentives were addressed in the Statue for 
Encouraging Investment (SEI) which was promulgated in 1950. The Statute for 
Upgrading Industries (SUI) was launched in 1991 to replace the SEI. Between 1961 
and 1990, most of the new investment enterprises covered by the SEI enjoyed 
exemption from the business income tax, and some other incentives. However, in the 
SUI, only strategic industries can enjoy the five-year exemption from business income 
tax or investment tax credit. The “traditional enterprises” (non-strategic industries) 
can only enjoy tax incentives when they invest in R&D, personnel training, and new 
equipment or technology. Accordingly, based on the SUI, Taiwan’s industries are 
                                                 
176These incentives were from the version of the Statue for the Settlement and Management of Science-
based Industry Park of 1979. The current incentives can be seen at 
http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/en/opp/locations/science_parks.html  
  178
 
divided into two groups: traditional industries, which obtain functional incentives, and 
strategic industries, which obtain general incentives.  
     What strategic industries are covered by the SUI? As mentioned above, five 
industries were chosen to be strategic industries in the 1980s. From 1991 based on the 
SUI, ten industries were identified as ‘newly emerging important technologies 
industries.’177 After 2000, the ten industries were extended to eighteen ‘newly 
emerging, important and strategic industries’ (strategic industries for short).178 
According to data from the Ministry of Finance, the amount of tax reduction due to 
the implementation of the SUI, increased from NT$5.9 billion in 1993 to NT$83.2 
billion in 2005 (MOF 2006, Table 17). Nearly half of the amount of tax reduction was 
concentrated in the strategic industries. For example, in 2005, there were four to five 
hundred enterprises enjoying tax reductions of NT$42.3 billion; however, the other 
650,000 enterprises that do not belong to the strategic industries obtained just 
NT$40.9 billion (MOF 11/03/2005). The MOF criticized the huge uneven distribution 
between the traditional industries and the strategic industries. In 2000, the government 
debated whether the promotion of ‘newly emerging, important and strategic 
industries’ through the SUI should remain or not.179 The conclusion was that such 
promotion should remain until the review of SUI by the end of 2009, but the sub-
sectors of the strategic industries would be reviewed every two years.   
 
5-2-3 Global production chain of the electronics industry 
 
From the context of state promotion, the development of Taiwanese private 
enterprises in the IT and IC industry is viewed by Chu and Amsden as a success story 
of a government-led industrial-network, which is a main characteristic of a ‘neo-
                                                 
177The communications, information, consumer electronics, semiconductors, precision machinery and 
automation, aerospace, advanced materials, specialty chemicals and pharmaceuticals, medical and 
health care and pollution control and treatment  industries. 
178The information software, computer, communication, consumer electronics, semiconductors, 
precision machinery equipment and automation, aerospace, bio-medical, specialty chemicals, green 
technology, advanced plastic materials, electronic materials, advanced amalgamation materials, 
advanced fibre materials, special alloy materials, precision ceramics materials, medical and heath care 
and pharmaceutical industries.    
179Interview with Chen, Hua-yin, Assistant Director of Division of Industrial Policy, Industrial 
Development Bureau , Ministry of Economic Affairs, on 24 April 2006 
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developmental state’180 (Chu and Amsden 2003, p.199). The discussion above makes 
it very clear that the state has strongly fostered this industry. However, the context of 
the global production chain of the electronics industry cannot be ignored. Borrus 
(2000) argues that the development of the electronics industry in East Asia has strong 
links with the development and redevelopment of the US semiconductor industry 
from the 1980s. He further identifies three stages of how US electronics firms make 
use of such a ‘regional production network’ in East Asia: the first stage was to 
establish overseas branches in Asia through outward FDI in the 1960s and the 1970s; 
the second stage was that these Asian affiliates developed local relationships via 
technology transfer and the establishment of local supply-chain during the 1980s; the 
third stage was that these Asian affiliates extended production networks to more and 
more capable local Asian producers via sourcing and contract manufacturing since the 
1990s. As Borrus (2000) describes it, ‘by the early 1990s, the division of labour 
between the US and Asia, and within Asia between affiliates and local producers, 
deepened significantly, and US firms effectively exploited increased technical 
specialisation in Asia (p.73)’. It is within such an international context that Taiwan’s 
export-led and hi-tech electronics industry develops.  
     The IT industry’s contract manufacturing process can be summarised as shown in 
Table 5-1 below. According to Luthje (2002) and STPI (24/06/2005), the broad 
production chain of the electronics industry includes: branding, marketing, product 
design, product development, mass production, assembly, distribution, after-sales 
service, and product repair. Among these processes several types of contract 
manufacturing play important roles. Firstly, the original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) mainly undertakes mass production for their customers; they outsource 
assembly to small-scale subcontractors. Secondly, the original design manufacturer 
(ODM) provides design services with production and was mainly based in Taiwan 
after the 1990s. Thirdly, the electronics manufacturing service (EMS) and the contract 
manufacturer (CM) emerged in the 1990s, integrating the intermediate stream of the 
production chain, and representing a pattern of ‘network-based mass production’ 
(Luthje 2006, p.22). The definition of the CM varies. Some studies argue that ODM 
plus EMS are the CM (Sturgeon and Lee 2005); some define the CM as a new type 
in-between these contracting networks (Luthje 2002). Here I adopt Luthje’s definition, 
                                                 
180The literature of how the ‘neo-developmental state’ promotes the IT industry development can be 
seen in Breznitz (2005a), Breznitz (2005b), Mathews and Cho (2000), O'Riain (2000), O'Riain (2004).  
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which is that the CM excludes production design. Lüthje (2002) estimated that the 
CMs accounted for 15-20% of the value-added of the global electronics industry. The 
EMS is mainly located in North America and the majority of CMs are Taiwanese 
companies.  
 
Table 5-1: Different types of contract manufacturers in the global IT industry  
Contract manufacturing OEM EMS CM ODM 
Own brand     
Marketing 
Product design  
Product development    
Mass production 
Global assembly   
Logistics/ distribution 
After-sales service  
Product repair 
Sources: (Luthje 2002; STPI 24/06/2005) 
 
In the past, Taiwan’s traditional export-led industries (e.g. textile and plastic products) 
developed domestic production chains with SOEs and large private enterprises. 
However, the electronics industry has been developed within a global production 
chain since the early stages. During the 1960s and the 1970s, Taiwan served as either 
the assembly base for electronics FDI, or OEMs, or subcontractors to the factories of 
the above. After the 1980s, Taiwanese enterprises entered the IT and IC industries 
through the mode of pure-play foundries and being OEMs. The two industries both 
depend on foreign technology transfer and foreign buyers (Fuller 2005). After two 
decades, although Taiwan shifts from being OEMs to being ODMs and CMs, the 
modes of subcontracting and outsourcing still dominate in these two industries. 
Taiwan “upgrades” its position in the international division of labour of the 
electronics industry but remains reliant on the technology transfer and production 
chains of leading TNCs.181 
                                                 
181See Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) who discuss the cases of the electronics industry in Taiwan and in 
South Korea. Also see Fuller’s (2005) analysis of how Taiwan’s IC fabrication and PC systems have 
been heavily dependent both on ‘technology transfer’ from foreign firms and on ‘foreign customer 
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According to Sturgeon and Lee (2005), the majority of Taiwan’s IT hardware 
products are the ‘ODM-type’ and accounted for a large share of the world market 
(p.47).182 An estimation of the share of various kinds of contract manufacturing of 
Taiwan’s IT hardware production was as high as 91% in 2002, therefore the pattern 
was termed by Sturgeon and Lee (2005) as ‘supplier-oriented industrial 
upgrading’(p.50). Between 1998 and 2003, the top five buyers of Taiwan’s IT 
hardware products were HP/Compaq (34%), DELL (16%), Sony (9%), Apple (7%), 
and the IBM (6%), most of them were US brands (Sturgeon and Lee 2005). The 
situation is as I have discussed earlier, where US electronics TNCs have made use of 
an Asia-based production network to increase their competitiveness. In 2006, four of 
the top ten CMs in the world were Taiwanese enterprises (Hon Hai Precision, Asuster, 
Quanta, Inventec), and they accounted for 55% of the top ten’s 2006 revenue (EDN 
27/09/2007). On the one hand, the CMs act as a “one-stop shop” for transnational 
brand companies, OEMs, ODMs and EMS customers from the core and 
semiperipheral zones; on the other hand, they outsource downstream assembly to 
local small-scale subcontractors in peripheral countries. According to Lüthje (2006), 
‘the fastest growing players have been the CMs from Taiwan, which are said to be 
most efficient in exploiting the economies of low-cost manufacturing in China’ (p.25). 
China’s Guangdong province is estimated to be the largest concentration of 
Taiwanese corporations’ subcontractors (ibid).   
     The above discussion reveals that Taiwan’s IT hardware industry has developed 
through a global production chain and links with core and peripheral economies. A 
similar pattern can be observed in the IC industry. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is 
also a kind of contract manufacturing that produces pure-play foundry. In 2006, three 
of the world’s top 10 pure-play foundry companies were Taiwanese companies,183 
which accounted for 71% of world pure-play foundry production (Insights 
07/08/2006). Taiwan’s foundries industry is as Dicken (2004) describes, ‘the 
workshops of the electronic world’ (p.432). However, the mode of pure-play foundry 
                                                                                                                                            
base’ (p.141). Ernst (2000) examines how Japan’s change of regional division of labour after the late 
1980s has had significant consequence on its East Asian network in the electronics industry. South 
Korea and Taiwan become competitors for OEM contractors and act as suppliers of precision 
components (p.98). 
182
 In 2002, Taiwan producers accounted for 61% of global production of notebook PCs, 23% of 
desktop PCs, 61% of LCD monitors, 75% of motherboards, 51% of CRT monitors and 45% of optical 
disk drives. 
183
 The others weretwo Singaporean companies, a South Korean firm and three Chinese firms.  
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is less profitable than IDM semiconductor production. According to iSuppli’s 
estimation of world semiconductor revenue in 2007, Taiwan only accounted for 4.5%, 
far less than the US (46.2%), Japan (23.8%), South Korea (11.1%) (iSuppli 
27/11/2007). This figure is a huge contrast to Taiwan’s pure-play foundries’ market 
share in the world (71%). Fuller (2005) states that Taiwan’s fabrication firms are still 
small, for example, the total fabrication revenue of Taiwan’s 16 semiconductor 
companies was smaller than the revenue of Samsung (a South Korean firm) in 2000. 
He argues that this is due to Taiwan’s tight credit system (no option into high 
debit/fund investment) that led to a lack of patent capital and innovation in Taiwanese 
firms (Fuller et al. 2005). In sum, Taiwan’s IC and IT industries have seen a 
remarkable growth since the 1980s, from an FDI-led to Taiwanese-led development 
due to state promotion and a global production chain; however, the growth should not 
be overestimated as the position of Taiwan’s industrial capital in the global 
production chain is as contractor that supplies for the world top brands from the core, 
and outsources to subcontractors from peripheral companies.  
 
The electronics industry as top overseas investment sector 
By analysing the position of Taiwan’s electronics sector, it is not surprising that these 
electronics industries became Taiwan’s largest overseas investment and trading goods 
sectors. Before 1992, Taiwan’s outward electronics FDI, as a share of Taiwan’s 
outward manufacturing FDI, was 33%,184 but the figure increased to nearly 61% 
between 1993 and 2007 (Investment Commission 2007). Increasingly, Taiwanese 
electronic exports are produced abroad. For example, before 1997, 98% of Taiwanese 
electronic exports to the US were exports from Taiwan: this figure dropped to 67% in 
2002 (i.e. 33% of exports to the US were produced and shipped from third countries). 
The Taiwanese government has tried to reduce hi-tech industrial investment in China. 
However, it is the electronics and electrical appliance sectors that are the largest 
source of Taiwanese FDI in China and accounted for 34.79 % of Taiwan’s total 
investment in China between 1991 and 2005 (Taiwan Economic Research Institution 
2008). Furthermore, by dividing Taiwan’s electronic exports to China into finished 
goods, hi-tech intermediate goods, and ordinary intermediate goods, the share of 
export of hi-tech intermediate goods to China increased from 24.4% in 1990 to 67.5% 
in 2002 (Lin et al. 2003, Table 5-2) while the percentage of other goods decreased. 
                                                 
184The following data are drawn from Lin, et al. (2003). 
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This shows that in the electronics industry, there is a division of labour between 
Taiwan and China in the way that Taiwan exports intermediate goods to China for 
further processing. This also served as the foundation of Taiwan’s contract 
manufacturing’s expansion in the world market.   
 
In conclusion, state promotion only partially explains the development of Taiwan’s IT 
and IC industry after the 1980s. The state has tried to foster targeted/strategic 
industries since the early stages of industrialisation. Before the 1980s, the targeted 
industries were able to integrate a domestic production chain from upstream to 
downstream. However, after the 1980s, the new strategic industries were integrated 
globally with leading electronics TNCs and downstream subcontractors in peripheral 
countries (mainly in Southeast China). Taiwan, then, is in an intermediary position, 
although its contract manufacturing products (both in IT hardware and in pure-play 
foundries) are now the leading ones in the world market. Taiwan’s electronics 
industry shifted from a downstream position (i.e. assembly for FDI) in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, to an intermediate position after the 1980s. Taiwan has also successfully 
shifted from the EOI of light manufacturing to the EOI of the hi-tech electronics 
manufacturing. However, such a development does not mean that Taiwan has 
ascended to the core. Taiwanese electronics enterprises, on the one hand served as the 
contractors for leading branded TNCs. On the other hand, they established a 
production base in peripheral countries by exporting Taiwanese capital and re-
exporting production. The overall industrial upgrading strategy (an upgrade in the 
position in the global production chain and an upgrade from light manufacturing to hi-
tech manufacturing) is actually a process of deepening Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
position, rather than a process of becoming a core economy.   
      The previous two sections examined how changes to the capitalist world-system 
have influenced Taiwan’s industrialised trajectory. Under the pressure of neo-
liberalism, Taiwan’s bureaucratic-corporate capital and two industrialised trajectories 
collapsed. The labour-intensive industries started to relocate production overseas. On 
the other hand, Taiwan private industrial capital made use of the global production 
chain to upgrade its electronics industry. Thus the electronics industry becomes 
Taiwan’s dominant production, export, trade, and overseas investment. In sum, 
Taiwan has abandoned the strategy to form domestic production chains led by 
bureaucratic-corporate capital, and shifted to an export-led electronics industry led by 
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Taiwanese private industrial capital. Taiwan’s private capital has hence become the 
main capital accumulator, rather than the bureaucratic-corporate capital, since the late 
1980s. Such a change is not only a domestic shift, but it has also transformed 
Taiwan’s integration within the capitalist world-system. Between 1945 to the late 
1980s, Taiwan’s capitalist development was tied to the US and Japanese economies 
via aid, trade, inward FDI, and technology transfer. However, since the late 1980s, 
China has increased its influence on Taiwan’s capitalist development, and has become 
Taiwan’s leading trading partner and overseas production base. The next section will 
discuss the change.  
 
5-3 Increasing Economic Interaction with China 
 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the rise of the East Asian economies as a new centre of 
capital accumulation.  Taiwan’s industrial capital is a key contributor in the rise of 
East Asian economies. Taiwan benefited from industrial relocation by the US and 
Japan in the 1960s and the 1970s; since the 1980s, Taiwan further shifted to export 
capital and relocate production to other East Asian peripheral countries. For example, 
in 2006, the share of exports to East Asia reached nearly 62% of Taiwan’s total 
exports; while imports from East Asia accounted for 54% of total imports (CEPD 
2007). Behind Taiwan’s integration within the East Asian economies is Taiwan’s 
increased economic interaction with China via outward investment and trade.  
 
5-3-1 The rise of capital exporting185 
 
Taiwan’s outward FDI is the key factor in Taiwan’s increasing economic ties with 
China. This section will examine the dynamics of Taiwan’s outward FDI.186 Taiwan 
began to invest overseas in the late 1970s and the 1980s; however, the amount was 
not significant until 1988, as Figure 5-2 shows. The first reason as to why this period 
is significant relates to financial liberalisation. The full framework of financial 
liberalisation will be discussed in next chapter; here I will only address the point 
                                                 
185In this section, Taiwan’s outward FDI excludes investment in China. Data is from Investment 
Commission (2008).   
186In this chapter, FDI only refers to foreign investment that does not include overseas Chinese 
investment. The following data regarding inward FDI is from Investment Commission (2008). 
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related to foreign exchange rate policy. Before 1987, Taiwan’s major controls on 
financial accounts were mainly on outward capital flow, owing to the government’s 
intention to accumulate foreign exchange reserves.187 Taiwan’s foreign exchange 
reserves accordingly grew dramatically in the 1980s, from US$22.05 billion in 1980 
to US$76.7 billion in 1987, nearly three-and-a-half times, and was had the second 
largest foreign currency reserves in the world (Department of Investment Services 
2007). Meanwhile, Taiwan was under US pressure to appreciate the NT dollar, which 
was a result of the US’s economic bilateralism in the 1980s to push some leading 
export countries into appreciating their currencies. The exchange rate of the NT dollar 
against the US dollar increased from NT$37.8 in 1986 to NT$26.4 in 1989, an 
appreciation of 27 percent.188In order to adjust Taiwan’s international balance of 
payments and to reduce the impact of the appreciation of the NT dollar on Taiwan’s 
international export competitiveness, the only solution was to loosen the controls on 
outward capital flows.189 A similar pattern occurred in Japan in the mid-1980s and in 
South Korea in the late 1980s. As such, since 1987, the foreign exchange control of 
current account transactions were partially liberalised190 except where short-term 
capital movement exceeded the accumulated remittance amount annually191 which 
still needed prior approval from the Central Bank (CBC 2004). Taiwan thus became a 
capital exporting country from 1988.192  
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s inward FDI also experienced a significant change due to 
financial liberalisation. Although inward FDI increased during the late 1980s, due to 
Japan’s strategy of industrial relocation to Taiwan (in particular in the electronics 
                                                 
187
 The author’s interview with Maggie Lin (no. 14) on 21 March 2006. She is a senior specialist from 
the Dept. of Foreign Exchange, the Central Bank of China (Taiwan). 
188It was a common situation that East Asian NIEs were pressurised by the US to appreciate their 
currency, the percentage change for the South Korean won and Singapore Dollar against the US Dollar 
between 1986 and 1990 was 19.71% and 16.77% respectively. See Hsing (1998). 
189
 The author’s interview with George A-Ting Chou (no.12) on 21 March 2006. 
190
 There were four main deregulating measures: (1) Exporters and importers do not need to declare 
their foreign exchange earnings or payments; (2) exporters were free to hold or utilize any foreign 
exchange they obtained through their exports; (3) individuals and companies were free to purchase 
foreign exchange; (4) Unused foreign exchange previously purchased do no need to be remitted. See 
the detail in Shieh (1996). 
191
 US$5 million by a natural person or US$50 million by a juridical person.  
192There are two different sets of data regarding the timing of when Taiwan’s net outward investment 
exceeded net inward investment. According to the data from the Central Bank, it was 1988; the data 
from the Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, shows that it was 1991. See Lin, et al. 
(2003) on the comparison of the two sets of data.   
  186
 
industry), overall Taiwan’s inward manufacturing FDI has declined since the 1990s 
and inward services FDI (in particular finance and trade-related) has became the main 
field to attract foreign investment. Financial inward FDI, mainly from the US and the 
EU, grew sharply after 1998 and has become the top source of inward FDI since then. 
The phenomenon indicates that Taiwan no longer serves as a production base for FDI, 
and the pattern of FDI-led and export-led industrialisation is changed. On the other 
hand, Taiwan is now involved in the process of financialisation as Chapter Six will 
discuss.  
As such, considering the similarity in the timing of the increase of inward FDI to 
Taiwan in the late 1980s (see Figure 5-2), the pattern of industrial restructuring that 
occurred in Taiwan since the late 1980s can be seen, and Taiwan has thereby become 
one of the key actors contributing to the economic integration process in East Asia, as 
Taiwan’s main outward FDI goes to East Asia.  
 
Figure 5-2: Taiwan’s inward and outward FDI (1980-2005) (unit: US$1, 000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Investment Commission 2008) 
     
Apart from the factor of financial liberalisation discussed above, the second factor 
regards the US’s liberalisation requests on Taiwan’s labour-intensive and export-led 
industries. As mentioned in the first section, the US ended Taiwan’s inclusion of the 
GSP (General System of Preference) in 1989 and restricted Taiwan’s exports to the 
US market. In addition to the sharp appreciation of the NT dollar, Taiwan’s exports 
confronted a serious challenge. The increase of labour costs was also a factor that 
pushed Taiwan’s industrial capital to relocate their labour-intensive industries to other 
peripheral countries. As the Labour Standard Law was implemented in 1984, labour 
0 
2,000,000 
4,000,000 
6,000,000 
8,000,000 
10,000,000 
12,000,000 
14,000,000 
a
m
o
u
n
t
year
inward FDI
outward FDI
  187
 
costs and labour disputes have thus increased sharply since then. According to a 
DGBAS survey, the percentage of labour costs to Taiwan companies increased from 
12.75% in 1981 to 14.36% in 1986 (DGBAS various years-a). Therefore, pursuing a 
cheaper labour-supply, which includes overseas relocation and imports of migrant 
labour, becomes a strategy of industrial capital. In general, Taiwan’s shift to export 
industrial capital not only reflects industrial capital strengthening its power from 
domestic economy to international economy, but also reflects the change in Taiwan’s 
financial and labour sectors.     
With regard to the destination of outward capital flows, it is necessary to divide 
the period into two, from 1988 to 1992 and 1993 to 2007, as Taiwanese business 
began investment in mainland China only after 1992, due to the Taiwanese 
government lifting the ban on investments in China in 1992.193In the period from 
1988 to 1992, the major destination of Taiwanese outward FDI (measured by volume) 
was Southeast Asia194 (35%), the US (30%), and Bermuda and the British overseas 
territories of the Caribbean (19%). This outward FDI was overwhelmingly 
manufacturing-based, and accounted for nearly 89% of total outward FDI. It included 
the plastics products sector (26%), the textiles sector (25%), and the wood and 
bamboo sector (18%). These industries are the ones that were under US pressure to 
restrict their exports from Taiwan. Further, it is noteworthy that Taiwanese FDI in the 
British overseas territories of the Caribbean and Bermuda is quite different from the 
investment sectors in other areas.195 In Southeast Asia, 69% of Taiwanese FDI was in 
the manufacturing sector. The figure was 57% in the US. However, in the British 
overseas territories of the Caribbean and Bermuda, 77% of Taiwanese outward FDI 
was in the financial sector.  According to Tung (2003), the majority of Taiwanese FDI 
in the British overseas territories of the Caribbean (e.g. the British Virgin Islands and 
the Cayman Islands) was to make use of tax-havens, for re-investing in Mainland 
China. It is also the reason why this area is among the top three origins of inward FDI 
to Taiwan. Currently, we do not have statistics or an official survey regarding the re-
                                                 
193
 The PRC government announced the ‘Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan People’ 
on 7 July 1988, and established a Taiwanese Affairs Office under the State Council (MAC 2008). In 
1992, the Taiwanese government approved the ‘Statutes Governing Relations between Peoples of the 
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’. 
194
 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
195
 The following data in this paragraph is from 1952 to 2007, because official statistics do not combine 
area, year, and sector in one table.    
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investment destination of Taiwan’s FDI in that area.196 The PRC’s official data shows 
that the Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands accounted for 18% of China’s inward 
FDI in 2005. In sum, Southeast Asia was the top destination for Taiwan’s outward 
FDI from 1988 to 1992, in particular in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Increasing economic interaction with China  
As for outward FDI between 1993 and 2007, China was clearly the major destination 
for Taiwanese outward FDI, and accounted for nearly 52% of Taiwanese FDI, as 
Table 5-3 shows. Taiwanese FDI shifted remarkably to China from other Asian 
countries197 after 1993. Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia reduced from 35% to 
less than 13% between these two phases. In the distribution of investment by sector, 
the electronics industry was dominant, accounting for 41%; the other sectors were all 
less than 10% individually.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
196This is one of the reasons why statistics regarding Taiwan’s investment in Mainland China are 
sharply different between the Taiwanese government and the PRC government.   
197The ‘Asian area’ refers to the area of Northeast Asia plus Southeast Asia, including Japan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other 
Asian countries.  
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Table 5-3: The amount of Taiwanese FDI from 1993 to 2007 (unit: US$1,000; %) 
Year 
(1) Other 
Asia 
(2)Mainland 
China 
(3)Total 
(including 
China) 
Asia: 
(1)+(2)/(3) 
China 
(2)/(3) 
Other 
Asia 
(1)/(3) 
1993 663,514 3,168,411 4,829,346 79.3 65.6 13.7 
1994 559,471 962,209 2,578,973 59.0 37.3 21.7 
1995 467,743 1,092,713 2,449,591 63.7 44.6 19.1 
1996 661,717 1,229,241 3,394,645 55.7 36.2 19.5 
1997 818,743 4,334,313 7,228,139 71.3 60 11.3 
1998 580,819 2,034,621 5,330,923 49.1 38.2 10.9 
1999 836,378 1,252,780 4,521,793 46.2 27.7 18.5 
2000 851,065 2,607,142 7,684,204 45.0 33.9 11.1 
2001 814,981 2,784,147 7,175,801 50.2 38.8 11.4 
2002 530,055 6,723,058 10,093,104 71.9 66.6 5.3 
2003 1,063,915 7,698,784 11,667,372 75.1 66.0 9.1 
2004 1,275,089 6,940,663 10,322,685 79.6 67.2 12.4 
2005 430,673 6,006,953 8,454,402 76.1 71.1 5.1 
2006 1,390,621 7,642,335 11,957,761 75.5 63.9 11.6 
2007 2,366,606 9,970,545 16,440,522 75 60.6 14.4 
Total 10,944,784 54,477,370 114,129,261 64 51.8 13 
Source: (Investment Commission 2008) 
Note: 1. Hong Kong is included in (1) the Asian area.  
2. The investment amounts in China in 1993 and 1997 were unusually high because in many of the 
cases, outward investment did additionally supplement procedures during the two years. 
 
The above data shows clearly that mainland China has emerged as Taiwan’s top FDI 
destination since 1993. In the manufacturing sector and in the electronics industry in 
particular, the tendency is more intense than in other sectors. 74.5% of Taiwan’s 
outward manufacturing FDI and 74.1% of Taiwanese electronics outward FDI were 
located in mainland China during the period from 1988 to 2007 (Investment 
Commission 2008). The figures for other Asian countries were only 10% and 9%, 
respectively. The big contrast between Taiwanese FDI in China and other Asian 
locations shows that Taiwan’s economic interaction with the East Asian region in 
terms of its outward investment is mainly driven by investment in China. Accordingly, 
Taiwan’s electronics outward FDI contributes to the development of China’s 
electronics industry as the industry is both export-led and FDI-led in China (Jin 2006), 
as was the case with Taiwan in the 1960s and the 1970s. In 2005, the share of FDI of 
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China’s total in the sales, added value, profits, and exports by amount in the 
electronics industry accounted for 77%, 77%, 77%, and 87% respectively.  
     In sum, Taiwan’s interaction with the East Asian economies in terms of outward 
investment has had a remarkable development since 1988. The first stage between 
1988 and 1992 concentrated in Southeast Asia and the US.  Since 1993, however, 
when the Taiwanese government allowed Taiwanese businesses to invest in mainland 
China, China has received most of Taiwan’s FDI. Even though Taiwan’s official 
statistics have revealed Taiwan’s strong economic ties with China, the real situation is 
far more than the statistics show. Taking into account that Taiwan’s outward FDI in 
the financial sector in Bermuda and the British overseas territories of the Caribbean 
Sea, and Hong Kong, might be re-invested in China, the share of Taiwanese FDI to 
China will be far more than the apparent 52% (between 1993 and 2007).  
      China has not only been Taiwan’s leading outward FDI’s destination since 1992, 
it has also become Taiwan’s leading trading partner. Similar to the pattern in 
Taiwanese outward FDI, East Asia has become Taiwan’s top trading region since the 
late 1980s. In 1980, Taiwan’s exports to and imports from East Asia accounted for 
only 29%, and 37%, of total exports and imports, respectively. In 2006 however, the 
share of exports to East Asia reached nearly 62 % of Taiwan’s total exports, while 
imports from East Asia accounted for 54% of total imports (CEPD 2007). However, 
by analysing the destination of Taiwan’s trade with East Asia, it can be seen that 
Taiwan’s trade with Hong Kong also experienced a remarkable growth. The share of 
exports to Hong Kong of Taiwan’s total export increased from 7.7 % in 1987 to 19% 
in 1991, and the average share between 1993 and 2006 was 21% (CEPD 2007, Table 
11.9f). In other words, about one-fifth of Taiwan’s export has gone to Hong Kong 
since the 1990s. It is therefore evident that Taiwan’s trade with Hong Kong is a main 
contributor to Taiwan’s increasing of trade within East Asian region. 
     Transit trade with Mainland China, via Hong Kong198, was the main contributory 
factor for this increase. According to statistics from the Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Department, Taiwan’s re-exports to mainland China from Hong Kong, as a 
share of Taiwan’s exports to Hong Kong, increased from 19.1% in 1984 to 80.6% in 
                                                 
198According to the Regulations Governing Permission of Trade Between Taiwan Area and Mainland 
Area, Article Five states, ‘Trading activities between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area shall be 
executed in an direct manner, whereby the buyers or the sellers shall be the traders in the Mainland 
Area, but the goods/articles involved in such transactions shall be transshipped via third territories or 
the off-shore shipping center.’ Most of the transit trade is via Hong Kong.  
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2007 (Taiwan Economic Research Institution 2008). In terms of imports, the 
percentage grew slightly from 20.5% in 1984, to 43% in 2007. Due to the partial 
openness of trade with China, there are different results between Hong Kong 
Customs’, Taiwanese Customs’, and Chinese Customs’ statistics regarding cross-strait 
trade. In 2007, according to an estimate by the Mainland Affairs Council, the share of 
cross-strait trade of Taiwan’s total trade was 30.1% by export and 12.8% by import199 
(Taiwan Economic Research Institution 2008). China has become the largest single 
destination for Taiwan’s exports, greater than the US, since 2002 (Figure 5-4). 
Moreover, after 2004, the share of exports to China measured by volume was more 
than that to the US and Japan combined. 
 
Figure 5-3: The share of Taiwan’s export by destination (1984-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (CEPD 2007; Taiwan Economic Research Institution 2008) 
 
In fact, the number of imports from China could be higher if the Taiwanese 
government did not impose restrictions on Chinese imports. On 7 July, 1988, the 
KMT approved ‘the Mainland Policy at the Current Stage’, and the government began 
to allow 50 items of agricultural and labour-intensive imports from Mainland China 
from August 1988. In 1996, the government opened up to more imports by changing 
the criteria to a “negative list” basis.200 During that year, two thousand items were 
allowed to be imported from Mainland China. The proportion of Chinese imports to 
Taiwan’s total imports was 52.5% in 1996. Around half of all Chinese goods 
remained prohibited from even being imported indirectly to Taiwan. In 2002, when 
both Taiwan and China entered the WTO, Taiwan further opened its markets to more 
Chinese imports. The proportion of permitted indirect Chinese imports increased to 
                                                 
199
 The figure was only 3.7% and 16.5% in 1988 and 1993 by export; less than one percent and 1.43% 
in 1988 and 1993 by import. 
200The data related to restrictions on Chinese imports is from the Bureau of Foreign Trade (2006).  
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nearly 80% (8,718 items) in 2007. Since 2006, China has become the second largest 
source of imports to Taiwan (12.2%), greater than the US (11%) (CEPD 2007).  
     Following the discussion about Taiwanese FDI in Section 5-3-1, Taiwan’s 
increasing economic interaction within the East Asia region has been driven mainly 
by cross-strait economic interaction. China has become a new major trading partner to 
Taiwan in addition to the US and Japan. This high economic interdependence has, 
however, become a very controversial and challenging situation for Taiwan. In order 
to understand the controversy, I will outline cross-strait political relations in next 
section.  
 
5-3-2 Political context of cross-strait relations 
 
Taiwan’s increasing of economic interaction with China cannot be understood without 
analysing the political context of cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s democratisation 
process. I have discussed the significant role of US hegemony in cross-strait relations 
in Chapter Four, namely the US-Taiwan-PRC nexus. Here I will briefly examine the 
political evolution of cross-strait relations since it opened-up in the early 1990s. 
Before 1987, the KMT’s mainland policy was both the “three noes - no contact, no 
compromise, and no negotiation” and the “unification of China under Sun Yat-sen’s 
three principles of the people.”201 On 13 January 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the first 
non-mainlander President after the death of Chiang Chin-kuo. Lee is the key person in 
the evolution of Taiwan’s mainland policy as he had a different attitude towards 
China compared with in the KMT leadership. Lee’s power struggle within the KMT 
leadership thus influenced the KMT’s mainland policy.  
During the early Lee administration, he was involved in tense relations and a 
power struggle within the KMT for the leadership of the party. The KMT was spilt 
into two factions: the “mainstream faction” led by Lee, and the other the “non-
mainstream faction”, led by mainlanders. These two factions had different attitudes 
towards constitutional reform, the presidential electoral system, and relations with the 
DPP (Lu 2002). Firstly, due to opposition and student movement campaigns, 
members of National Assembly who had come with the KMT in 1949 were in 1991 
required to retire and new members were elected. Secondly, the new National 
                                                 
201
 These three principles indicate the importance of nationalism, democracy, and welfare.  
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Assembly held a Second Congress in 1992 and a proposal for a direct presidential 
election202 was approved. This proposal originated from the DPP, but soon became 
part of Lee’s reform agenda. This peaceful process of democratisation (i.e. without 
severe unrest) is viewed as part of Lee’s strategy to manoeuvre public opinion and the 
opposition political movement as part of the power struggle within the KMT.203 No 
matter what the motivation or strategies Lee may have used, in the 1990s the 
consequences of peaceful democratisation were that the KMT mainlander leadership 
became marginalised, Lee’s power was strengthened, and the DPP has had an 
ambiguous relationship with Lee since then. The above context is significant in 
understanding the change in the KMT’s mainland policy during the 1990s.   
In Lee’s early administration, while he still struggled over the leadership within 
the KMT, he gradually opened cross-strait political exchange. Firstly, in September 
1990, the government established the National Unification Council (NUC), which 
served as an advisory unit to the President. Secondly, in January 1991, the Mainland 
Affairs Council (MAC) was set up to tackle all mainland affairs. The Straits Exchange 
Foundation (SEF) was established under MAC in February 1991 as the negotiation 
body representing the Taiwanese government. On the other side, the PRC government 
established the Taiwanese Affairs Office under the State Council in 1988, and the 
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in 1991.204Thirdly, on 30 
April, 1991 the Lee administration removed ‘the period of mobilisation for the 
suppression of Communist rebellion’, from the ROC constitution, which meant that 
the CCP was no longer viewed by the Taiwanese government as a ‘rebellion’ rather as 
a ‘confrontational competitive regime’ (MAC 1994; Sheng 2003, p.8).  
    While President Lee started to approach the PRC, he also attempted to change 
assumptions about Taiwan’s sovereignty, from “being part of China” to “one of 
representative of China.” For example, the ROC’s constitutional amendments from 
1991 to 1992 divided China’s territory into the “free” area and “mainland” area 
(Article 11 of 1991 amendment),205 the members of the Legislative Yuan and the 
National Assembly are elected only from the Taiwan area (Article 1 and 3 of 1991 
amendment), and the President and Vice-President are directly elected by the people 
of the Taiwan area (Article 2 of 1992 amendments). Such changes indirectly asserted 
                                                 
202
 Previously the President of ROC was elected by the National Assembly. 
203
 See Lu (2002) for the detailed discussion of Lee’s strategies. 
204
 From 1992 to early 1995, there were 15 rounds of negotiations between the SEF and the ARATS. 
205
 Before the constitutional amendments, the ROC constitution covered mainland China. 
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that the government in Mainland China does not have legitimacy to govern the 
Taiwan area and the assumption became the foundation of Lee’s ‘two states’ theory in 
the late 1990s.  
The “friendly” atmosphere of cross-strait exchange suddenly changed, however, 
in May 1995 when President Lee Teng-hui was granted a US visa to visit his alma 
mater (Cornell University), and where he made a speech during his visit.206From July 
1995 to March 1996, the PRC held a military exercise and missile tests near 
Taiwan.207 The cross-straits negotiation meeting (SEF-ARATS talk) was terminated 
by the PRC. The increasing tensions over the Taiwan Strait influenced East Asia’s 
political order. It led to the US Clinton administration sending two aircraft carrier 
battle groups to the area on 11 March, 1996. Additionally, the Guidelines for Japan-
US Defence Cooperation were revised208 and the US-Japan bilateral political 
relationship was thus strengthened. After Lee won the first presidential election on 20 
March 1996, anxiety over cross-strait relations gradually eased for a few years. The 
chair of SEF, Koo Chen-fu, was invited to visit China, and Taiwan also planned to 
host the chairman of ARATS, Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan. However, Lee’s 
statement of his ‘two states’ theory in an interview conducted by a German radio 
station on 9 July 1999, eight months before the 2000 presidential election, froze cross-
straits relations again. In the interview, Lee says,  
 
‘The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-straits relations as a 
state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, 
                                                 
206
 This was a result of a successful lobby of the US Congress by the Cassidy Company hired by the 
Taiwanese government between 1994 and 1996 and with fees amounting to US$45 billion being paid 
to the company. The amount of money paid by the Taiwanese government to the Cassidy Company as 
reported by the United Daily (25/03/2007) and by one of my interviewees. My interviewee (interview 
list no. 22) also noted that Taiwan paid much more money (US$15 billion per year) than other 
countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia only paid US$6 billion a year.) 
207
 During the presidential election, Lee revealed that the missiles China had fired in the Taiwan Strait 
were dummies; Lee’s information was from a PRC general: see Tung (03/03/2006). 
208
 The new Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation on 23 September 1997 were the first 
revision since the original version of 1978. In the former, Japan’s Self Defence Force (SDF) and US 
military forces in Japan were limited to issues of Japan’s territorial defence. In the 1997 revision, 
however, the scope was extended to “areas surrounding Japan”, which is “situational” rather than 
“geographical” (Department of Defence 1998, p.21). In particular, the new guidelines cover not only an 
actual security threat but also an “expected” threat (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, p.113). The new 
guidelines have given Japan more autonomy to engage in regional security. 
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rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a 
renegade group, or between a central government and a local government. 
Thus, the Beijing authorities’ characterization of Taiwan as a “renegade 
province” is historically and legally untrue.’ (Deutche Welle 09/07/1999).  
 
Before Lee’s statement, the cross-strait negotiation meeting was based on ‘the 
governments on the two sides of the Strait were both political entities with de facto 
authority’ (MAC 1994). Sheng (2003) argues that Lee’s ambitious announcement was 
a strategy to establish a framework of cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s legal status 
for Lee’s successor. After his statement, which the PRC strongly opposed, other 
major countries re-affirmed their support for the one-China policy, and the US 
pressurised President Lee to give up such policies (p.35). The SEF-ARATS talks were 
terminated once again in October 1998 (but re-started in June 2008). Lee responded 
that the media had misinterpreted his argument, that he did not mention the ‘two 
states’ theory and that his mainland policy had not changed. However, Lee did make 
it clear in an article published in Foreign Affairs that cross-strait ties now form a 
‘special state-to-state relationship’ (Lee 1999). Currently, the ‘two states’ theory is no 
longer mentioned in any of Taiwan’s official documents, since Lee has ended his 
presidential term. No matter what Lee’s exact wording may have been, the concept of 
the ROC (Taiwan) as an independent sovereign state was followed by the new DPP 
President, Chen Shui-bian. After 2000, one of Lee’s core political staff (Tsai Ying-
wen), who also contributed to the draft the legal issues of the two-state theory, 
became the chairperson of MAC in Chen’s administration, and in May 2008 became 
the chairperson of the DPP.  
    President Chen Shui-bian was in power between early 2000 and early 2008. In his 
first presidential term, he showed an open attitude towards the PRC. For example, in 
his inauguration speech on 20 May, 2000, Chen announced the ‘five nots’: he would 
not declare independence, he would not change the national title, he would not push 
for the inclusion of the state-to-state concept into the Constitution, he would not 
promote a referendum to change Taiwan’s status quo, and he would not abolish the 
NUC and the Guidelines (Dumbaugh 20/04/2007, p.6). In 2001, Chen also expanded 
cross-strait economic relations by suggesting a new approach, i.e. ‘active opening and 
effective management’ for cross-straits economic exchange. The new approach 
corresponded with entry into the WTO by both Taiwan and the PRC in 2001/2002. 
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This was the main reason why cross-strait trade and investment increased so sharply 
at that time.  
     However, Chen’s attitude began to change in August 2002, when he stated that the 
relationship between the PRC and the ROC is ‘one side, one country’ (yi bian yi guo) 
during a video conference. From 2002 to 2007 (especially in Chen’s second term), 
cross-strait relations were increasingly tense. Chen suggested two referendums during 
two important elections (during the legislative election in 2004 and during the 
presidential election in March 2008).209 Chen announced that the NUC was to be 
abolished on 27 February, 2006; this was in response to the PRC’s approval of an 
anti-secession Law on 14 March, 2005. During Chen’s presidential term, the PRC did 
not use military exercises as it had before. On the contrary, they adopted a more 
“flexible” strategy. The PRC required the US both to re-confirm publicly the one-
China policy and to pressure the Chen administration. Under US pressure, Chen 
changed the wording from “abolishing” the NUC to saying that it would “cease to 
function”. He also changed the referendum question in 2004 to a non-controversial 
one. The evolution proves that the US is a key actor to in cross-straits political 
relations. 
      In conclusion, although Taiwan’s industrial capital has increased economic 
interaction with China, Taiwan’s political relationship with China has however been 
tense and uncertain (although sometimes gradually opened). The uncertain and 
unstable situation places the Taiwanese state in a dilemma, and constrains the 
development of Taiwan’s industrial capital and financial capital in particular.  
 
 
                                                 
209
 The two referendums both had less than a 50% turnout, which invalidated the result. The first 
referendum in 2004 asked two questions: (1) The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait 
issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should Communist China refuse to withdraw the missiles it 
has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the 
Government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense 
capabilities? (2) Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Communist 
China on the establishment of a ‘peace and stability’ framework for cross-strait interactions in order to 
build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides? The second referendum in 2008 asked: 
In 1971, the People’s Republic of China joined the United Nations, replacing the Republic of China 
and causing Taiwan to become an orphan in the world. To strongly express the will of the people of 
Taiwan to enhance Taiwan’s international status and participation in international affairs, Do you agree 
that the government should apply for UN membership under the name ‘Taiwan’? 
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5-3-3 The China factor: the dilemma for the state’s semi-peripheral ascent 
strategy 
 
Within this the political context, the Taiwanese state has tried to restrict Taiwan’s 
industrial capital investing in China and it has tried to direct outward FDI towards 
Southeast Asia rather than to China. The Lee Teng-hui administration first 
implemented a ‘Go-South Policy’ in 1994, which encouraged Taiwanese business 
investment in Southeast Asia. He also promoted the ‘no haste, be patient’ policy on 
cross-straits relations in 1996. In 1997, three kinds of investment were forbidden in 
Mainland China, namely (1) IC and key hi-tech industries, (2) investment of more 
than US$ 60 million or exceeding 40% of the company’s capital, and (3) basic 
infrastructure industry. After President Chen Shui-bien came to power in 2000, he 
relaxed slightly these restrictions (the so-called ‘active opening; effective 
management’) by increasing the investment amount to US$80 million, and he allowed 
three IC companies manufacturing eight-inch and below semi-conductor wafers to 
invest in China.  
     Yet, Chen still claimed that Taiwan’s outward investment should go to Southeast 
Asian countries rather than relying too much on China’s economy. Furthermore, the 
government proposed a ‘Global Investment Arrangement’ in March 2006 to 
encourage Taiwanese business investment in Southeast and South Asian countries, 
some East European countries, and the twelve Latin American countries that then 
maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In sum, although the control of outward 
capital was lifted in 1987 due to financial liberalisation, the investment of the 
Taiwanese outward capital was still controlled and regulated by the state. Further, 
Taiwan’s outward investment in China is regulated by the Mainland Affairs Council 
rather than by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which means that investment in 
China is not only an economic affair but of political concern to the Taiwanese state. 
Thus, the state has two different frameworks of regulation towards Taiwan’s outward 
investment, one for China and the other for elsewhere. The state has also developed 
two different ascent strategies for Taiwan’s integration into the capitalist world-
system, as I will discuss in the following section. 
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Two semi-peripheral ascent strategies: Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre 
and Global Logistics Centre 
The China factor has caused the state not only to have two different attitudes towards 
the destination of Taiwan’s outward investment, but also caused the state to have two 
different ascent strategies for Taiwan’s integration into the world-economy: one tries 
to specifically to integrate into the East Asian regional economies (i.e. Asian 
economic regionalisation) and the other attempts to generally integrate into the global 
economy (i.e. economic globalisation).  
As discussed previously, during his term of office in the early 1990s, President 
Lee Teng-hui actively promoted cross-strait negotiations. The growth of China’s 
economic power and of the pattern of economic regionalisation caused the Taiwanese 
state to consider a regional strategy, via the Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Centre 
(APROC), in the early 1990s.210 Recent reports reveal that the idea was actually 
suggested by Ohmae Kenichi, a Japanese business strategist, who was appointed 
advisor to the APROC project in the early 1990s (Hsiao 17/06/2008). Whilst the 
South Korean government pursued a ‘full globalisation of the Korean economy’ in 
1994-1995 by introducing twelve tasks,211 the Taiwanese government proposed a 
regional strategy in the early 1990s.212 
On 13 December 1994, the chairman of CEPD, Vincent Siew, said that ‘an 
offshore transhipment centre’ would be planned to increase cross-straits trade. In the 
certre, trading goods would not need to go through customs clearance. In January 
1995, the CEPD proposed, ‘developing Taiwan to be the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre (APROC)’, which was to strengthen Taiwan’s competitiveness 
under the conditions of increasing economic regionalisation and cross-straits 
economic interaction. The Coordination and Service Centre for Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre (APROC Window for short) was established under the CEPD, and 
took charge of coordinating inter-Ministerial action to promote the project. It was 
planned that the APROC would develop six operations centres.213In the official report, 
they stated that one of the main advantages for Taiwan as the APROC as follows: 
                                                 
210
 Interview with Vincent Siew on 14 March 2006.  
211
 For the details about the South Korean government’s policies, see Gills (1996). 
212
 Taiwan’s regionalist strategy was proposed earlier than South Korea who started a regional hub plan 
in 2001, see Scofield (06/03/2004). 
213
 ‘the Manufacturing Centre’; ‘the Sea and Air Transportation Centres’; ‘the Financial Centre (this 
will be analysed in Chapter Six)’; ‘the Telecommunications Centre’; and ‘the Media Centre’ 
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‘Taiwan firms have vast and wide-ranging investments in mainland China. 
Business links across the Taiwan Straits are already extensive and steadily 
being reinforced. Our businessmen have unmatched knowledge and 
experience of doing business in the mainland China market. Taiwan firms 
have also been major investors in Southeast Asia, and have close ties with 
the economically powerful overseas Chinese communities across the 
region.’ (CEPD n.d.) 
 
The APROC can be viewed as the Taiwanese state’s ascent strategy in conditions of 
an increasing trend towards economic regionalisation and globalisation as a whole.214 
It is noteworthy that the government viewed the increasing economic interaction 
between China and Taiwan positively. Moreover, the state sensed the potential 
significance of the ‘great Chinese economic circle’ by linking Taiwanese FDI with 
overseas Chinese investment.  
     However, the “big strategy” was suspended, due to increasing tensions in cross-
straits relations from the mid-1990s. President Lee gave a speech to the Congress 
Assembly on 14 August 1996, and suggested the idea that making use of the 
Mainland as the ‘hinterland’ of the APROC should be modified (Lee 15/08/1996). In 
September 1996, President Lee claimed that Taiwanese businessmen who intended to 
invest in China should have ‘no haste; be patient.’ Nevertheless, the APROC Window 
coordinated the enactment, revision, or abolition of 90 laws, 158 administrative orders, 
and 101 administrative measures (CEPD 2003). In January 1998, Premier Vincent 
Siew215 determined that the APROC project could keep planning, but implementation 
would be suspended until national security and cross-strait relations improved (The 
Centre for Economic Deregulation and Innovation n.d.).  
                                                 
214In the interview with Vincent Siew (14/04/2006), he notes that the APROC project was Taiwan’s 
‘big strategy’ to accompany the tendency towards globalisation and regional integration. When I asked 
about any specific development within the region in the 1990s, he said that the rise of China was the 
main factor to think about such a ‘big strategy’.   
215It might be an interesting point that Vincent Siew proposed the APROC proposal when he was the 
chairman of CEPD in 1995, but claimed to suspend the plan when he became the Premier after 
September 1997. In the eyes of the media, the change in the APROC plan was mainly due to President 
Lee’s decision alone. See Lee and Liu (15/08/1996). In my interview, Mr. Siew did not talk too much 
about the background of suspending the plan; yet he did address the idea that it was because the 
‘economy was influenced by politics’.      
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The APROC project did not came back to the policy agenda again until the KMT 
regained power in 2008. In January 2000, another proposal for developing Taiwan as 
a global logistics centre was put forward and further discussed in the Executive Yuan. 
After the DPP came into power on 20 March, 2000, the APROC Window was 
renamed the Centre for Economic Deregulation and Innovation (CEDI Services for 
short) on 11 October, 2000. Thus, the Taiwanese state’s regional strategy had shifted 
to develop as a global logistics centre.  
     In the official report, the government argues that Taiwan could be an international 
hub due to its location at the regional and global centre (CEPD 2000; Ho 2003). 
Taiwan would develop to be a global logistics centre by strengthening the harbour-
related infrastructure and deregulation.216 The prospects will be (1) relaxing 
restrictions on cross-strait capital movement; (2) building up an e-logistics platform; 
(3) accelerating Taipei Port construction; (4) attracting the International logistics elite 
to Taiwan; (5) improving operations systems and integrating all bonded warehouse 
functions. Although the relaxation of cross-straits economic relations is on the agenda, 
it is not as significant as it was in the APROC plan. In the APROC plan, the 
government recognized the increase of cross-strait economic interactions and tried to 
turn it to be Taiwan’s comparative advantage. In the GLC proposal, cross-straits 
economic relations are merely a part of Taiwan’s global strategy.  
     The Taiwanese state focused more on the strategy of integrating with economic 
globalisation (The GLC proposal) rather than on the Asian-based economic 
regionalisation (APROC plan). But it would be wrong to argue that Taiwan gave up 
the regional strategy entirely and chose a global strategy instead. Firstly, Taiwan and 
China both joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, which has 
been the main regional economic cooperation institution in East Asia. Secondly, 
although Taiwan has made efforts to sign a Taiwan-US Free Trade Agreement, one of 
the main considerations behind an FTA is to increase Taiwan’s regional influence.217 
The same reason drives Taiwan to support any East Asian regional framework such as 
the APEC, particular one which will include the US as a member. Thirdly, the 
Taiwanese government promoted a ‘Go-South Policy’ for many years, which was 
intended to encourage Taiwan’s outward investment to Southeast Asian countries. As 
                                                 
216Including simplifying customs clearance operations, improinge Electro Magnetic Compatibility, 
improving land-use transshipment, opening up sea/air transshipment from an offshore shipping centre, 
and improving E-commerce.  
217Interview with Vincent Siew on 11 April 2006.  
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a matter of fact, the most significant point regards China. Taiwan’s real dilemma is 
not between Asian-based economic regionalisation and globalisation, but rather 
between further economic integration with China and political tension with China.    
Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined how changes to the capitalist world-system and the dynamics 
of state-capital relations shaped the development of Taiwan’s industrial sector since 
the late 1980s (the issue of labour will be discussed in Chapter Seven). Declining 
profit rates in the industrial sector in the core zone, the relative decline of US 
hegemony, and the attack on state power in the developing countries via neo-
liberalism, all led to the liberalisation and privatisation of Taiwan’s industrial sector. 
Taiwan’s two industrialised trajectories and bureaucratic-corporate capital were 
brought to an end. On the other hand, the Taiwanese state promoted export-led, hi-
tech industries and encouraged private industrial capital to make use of overseas 
relocation to engage in global production chains. Consequently, Taiwan is further 
integrated into the capitalist world-system through outward investment and 
production in addition to inward FDI, trade, and finance (finance will be discussed in 
the next chapter). Taiwan remained under US and Japanese influence, but China 
became a new main trading partner and production base for Taiwan.  
What are the implications of these industrial changes to Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
ascent? Firstly, Taiwan’s capitalist development is deeply influenced by the changes 
to capitalist development and the role of the state’s industrial policy. Secondly, 
although under pressure from the neo-liberal policies of the core zone, Taiwan is able 
to focus on a specific industrialised trajectory (export-led, hi-tech electronics industry) 
which has become Taiwan’s main area of industrial competitiveness. Taiwan is able 
to entrench its semi-peripheral status by extending economic relations with peripheral 
countries and by upgrading its position within global production chains. Compared 
with the FDI-led electronics industry in the previous period (1966-1986), Taiwan’s 
current hi-tech industries have “upgraded” from a peripheral status of assembly of 
manufacturing to a semi-peripheral status of contracting manufacturing (OEM, ODM, 
and CM). Taiwan is able to link with and contribute to the rising economic centre, the 
East Asian region, via outward investment and trade. These are all achievements of 
Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent. 
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However, obstacles for ascent exist and have now become a dilemma for Taiwan’s 
capitalist development. It seems that the new industrial structure is a “success” of 
industrial upgrading and of the rising “national” industrial capitalists. Yet, the shift 
from traditional industries to hi-tech industries is actually a change from the model of 
domestic production chains to the model of global production chains based on the 
specialisation division of labour in which Taiwan’s position is one of contracting 
manufacturer. Only a few Taiwanese TNCs (e.g. ACER) have achieved the same 
position as the core zone’s TNCs in terms of branding management, technology, 
market share, and revenue. The rising new industrial capitalists (the hi-tech industries) 
may be less dependent on the nation-state comparing with the traditional industries, 
but they remain dependent on the leading TNCs from core countries. Such a 
dependency will prevent Taiwan from ascending to the core. Moreover, cross-strait 
political relations contradict cross-strait economic relations. Taiwan’s economic 
development once benefited from the interstate system (as Chapter Four discussed) 
but is now constrained by the interstate system. Taiwan’s tense and unclear 
relationship with China has caused instability and an uncertain situation for Taiwan’s 
capitalist development. Furthermore, Taiwan needs to rely on US hegemony to 
maintain its status within the interstate system. Even if Taiwan is one of the main 
contributors to the increasing economic regionalisation of East Asian region, its 
complicated political relationship with China and the US causes Taiwan to de-link 
from the current process of political economic integration within the region. For 
example, Taiwan is unable to sign any bilateral economic agreements with other 
Asian countries, nor is Taiwan invited to participate at any discussion of Asian 
multilevel trading agreements. In this respect, Taiwan’s status in the interstate system 
has not been strengthened. This also adds a difficulty for Taiwan to ascend to the core. 
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Chapter Six: The Rise of Private Financial Capital and the Increase 
of Financialisation 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Five examined Taiwan’s special trajectory of semi-peripheral ascent via 
analysis of its industrial sector. This chapter will discuss the development of the 
financial sector. The financial sector is a key to analyse Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
ascent.  Based on Marx (1956[1984]), Hilferding (1981[1910]), and world-system 
analyses, Capital is viewed as taking different forms depending on its function in the 
process of capital accumulation. Financial capital plays a role in financing functioning 
capital (agricultural capital, industrial capital, and commence capital). For Hilferding 
(1918[1910]), the development and expansion of financial capital marks a new stage 
of capitalism, namely, monopoly capitalism, as the concentration of industrial capital 
will combine with financial capital to form ‘finance capital’, which dominates 
capitalism and national economy.  For the world-system perspective, the role of 
financial capital and the degree of its expansion are significant, both for national 
capitalist development and to a state’s semi-peripheral trajectory of ascent. The core 
zone is defined as those countries which control the most profitable activities with the 
highest capital return. In this respect, the development of the financial sector is key to 
ascending to the core as the financial service has been one of the most profitable 
activities during the B-phase, as I discussed in the section of ‘financialisation’ in 
Chapter three. Meanwhile, the cycle of hegemony and the challenges from new 
economic powers to the existing hegemon is through a sequence of agro-industrial 
production, commerce, and finance (Wallerstein 1984; 2004). This means that the 
core zone and the hegemon must have financial superiority to dominate the capitalist 
world-system. Accordingly, it would be incomplete to capture the nature of semi-
peripheral ascent without analysing the development of financial sector and the 
dynamics of financial capital. 
     In the case of Taiwan, the role of the financial sector in Taiwan’s peripheral ascent 
was discussed in Chapter Four. In the pre-war period, different colonial states were all 
keen to control Taiwan’s financial sector (in particular the Japanese administration) in 
order to guide agricultural and industrial production. Such a function was inherited by 
the KMT administration. The state owned the majority of financial institutions, 
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controlled the monetary and foreign exchange rate system, channelled industrial 
financing, and provided financial support measures to guide industrial capital. These 
conditions however have changed significantly since the late 1980s due to the 
liberalisation and deregulation of the financial sector, as well as Taiwan’s further 
integration into the global financial market. Another change in the financial sector 
was that financial capital no longer relies solely on industrial capital to earn profit (i.e. 
interest), but can itself also accumulate capital. This pattern was discussed in Chapter 
Three, namely financialisation. It is a process that refers to ‘the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein 2005). The process is 
characterised by three main trends: concentration and consolidation through M&A, 
the trans-nationalisation of operations, and the development of ‘non-productive 
finance’ due to it being unlinked with real production.  
The two changes above (liberalisation and financialisation) are driven by changes 
to the capitalist world-system during the B-phase; however the state-capital 
relationship also influences and limits the development in the sector. The first and 
second sections of the chapter will discuss how these changes in the capitalist world-
system have reshaped Taiwan’s financial sector via neo-liberalism and 
financialisation. The third section will focus on how the state and industrial capital 
influence and limit the development of financial capital, and what are the implications 
for Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent. Overall, during the period 1987-2007, Taiwan’s 
private financial capital dominated the domestic economy and integrated within the 
global financial market; financial capital has not yet fully developed in the global 
financial market nor has it played any significant role in the capitalist world-system. 
The main factor for the weak presence of Taiwan’s financial capital in the global 
financial market (or the weak development of trans-nationalisation of Taiwan’s 
financial capital) is that the state still restricts its overseas expansion into China where 
the majority of Taiwan’s overseas production is located.  
 
6-1. Neo-liberalism and Financial Liberalisation  
 
Similar to the industrial sector, Taiwan’s financial sector adopted neo-liberal policies 
under pressure from the core zone, in particular the US and the WTO. Liberalisation 
and deregulation of the financial sector can be understood as two phases in Taiwan. 
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The first in the late 1980s was a phase of deregulation and liberalisation. The 
government established competition mechanisms within the financial market and 
loosened controls on the outflow of industrial capital. During this phase, private 
financial capital began to form. The second phase - during the 1990s – saw financial 
institutions further liberalised, the openness of  market access and the financial 
account (called the ‘capital account’ by the IMF before 1993), and the introduction of 
non-productive financial innovations, i.e. financial derivatives. The table below shows 
the timing of each liberalisation and financial reform measure.  
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Table 6-1: The timing of financial liberalisation and reform measures 
Liberalisation and other reform measures Time 
1. Interest rate liberalisation 1975-1989 (completed in 1989) 
2. Foreign exchange rate liberalisation 1978-1989 (completed in 1989)  
3. Financial account liberalisation 
        Outward direct investment 
        Inward FDI 
        Foreign portfolio investment 
 
1987-1992 (completed in 1992)  
1963-1988 (completed in 1988)  
1991-2003 (completed in 2003)  
4. Current account  liberalisation   The late 1970s (mainly occurred in the late 
1980s)  
5. Financial institutions 
        Open new private banks 
        Privatisation of the SOE banks 
        Open new securities companies 
        Open new insurance companies 
        Open banking businesses   
        Mergers and acquisition of banks 
        Establish financial holding company 
 
1989 (established in 1992)  
1989 (did not take place until 1998)  
1988  
1992 (domestic companies)  
1989-1992  
2000  
2001 
6.Market access for foreign companies  
        Banks 
         
 
 
1959 (establishment branches); 1994 
(number and location of new branches); 
2001 (saving and loan business, foreign 
exchange derivatives business)  
Insurance companies 
        Stock market 
1987 (US life insurance companies) 
1991-2003 (QFII) 
7. Financial derivatives   
        Foreign exchange transaction 1991(margin trading, currency swap, cross 
currency interest rate swap)  
1995 (non-derivatives forward)  
        Interest rate derivatives 
        Futures 
        Equity-linked derivatives 
        Credit derivatives 
1995;  
1992 (overseas); 1993-1994 (domestic)  
2001 
2003 
8. Securitization  
        Financial assets  and real property  2002-2003 
Source: Constructed by the authors in accordance to the following discussion 
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6-1-1 Liberalisation and deregulation in the late 1980s 
 
Liberalisation significantly moved forward in the late 1980s.218 Many liberalising 
measures took place in the late 1980s. In the global context, firstly, this was due to the 
adoption of neoliberal practice and the process of financialisation. The advanced 
countries liberalised their financial system between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s; 
most of the developing countries in East Asia and Latin America came under pressure 
from the core zone (including international institutions) to liberalise their financial 
sectors from the late 1980s onwards. Taiwan was part of this global process. Secondly, 
Taiwan’s export-led industrialisation and triangular trade structure (Japan-Taiwan-
USA) accumulated huge foreign reserves and trade surpluses in the late 1980s. This 
led to pressure by the US (via bilateral trade talks) for the liberalisation of the 
Taiwanese foreign exchange rate, financial institutions and financial market. In the 
national context, the growing power of private capitalists, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, sought to participate in the finance industries and this challenged the state’s 
control over the financial sector. Finally, financial liberalisation also corresponded 
with the larger trends of political democratisation and other economic liberalisation 
from the late 1980s. The following sections will discuss each liberalisation measure in 
detail.  
 
Deregulation of the foreign exchange rate system 
From the 1950s to the early 1970s, the state implemented a multiple exchange rate 
system to encourage both the export sector and the import-substitution sector (Wen 
1996). Since the deregulation of the system, the state cannot control the system as 
before. The international exchange rate system embodied in the Bretton Woods 
Agreement broke down in 1971. The continuous depreciation of the US dollar during 
the 1970s caused the Taiwanese government to appreciate the NT dollar, and thus 
change the fixed exchange rate system, as otherwise the problem of domestic inflation 
would have been severe (Shieh 1996).  In 1978 Taiwan shifted from a fixed exchange 
rate between the NT dollar and the US dollar in terms of a central clearing and 
settlement system, to the new “soft peg” system, a managed flexible exchange rate 
                                                 
218
 The liberalisation of the foreign exchange rate and the interest rate was completed in 1989, allowing 
the separation between the business of deposits/savings and of the money market (short-term bills) 
from 1989; the opening of new privately-owned banks was completed between 1989 and 1992; and the 
privatisation of state-owned banks was planned in 1989. 
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system.219  In 1989, after further appreciation of the NT dollar forced by the US, 
Taiwan changed to a managed floating exchange rate system. Under such a system, 
the exchange rate is determined by the market, but the Central Bank will intervene 
when the market is or will be disrupted (CBC 2004).  
      Taiwan’s foreign exchange rate system is however not fully driven by free market 
forces as the state claims. Two factors are influential, namely the Central Bank and 
the price of the US dollar. Firstly, although the Central Bank claims that they only 
intervene in the foreign exchange market when the market is disrupted, the reality is 
that the Central Bank has a strong influence in determining the trend of the exchange 
rate of the NT dollar (Yang and Shea 2005). Secondly, although the NT dollar is no 
longer pegged to the US dollar, the trend of the price of the US dollar is still a 
determining factor in setting Taiwan’s foreign exchange rate.220  
 
Build up market mechanism: interest rate deregulation 
Before 1989, the Taiwanese government controlled interest rates for the following 
functions: (1) to encourage domestic savings; (2) to control inflation and stabilise 
consumer prices; (3) to stimulate investment incentives; (4) and to finance the 
strategic industries and export sectors. The debate over the deregulation of the interest 
rate in the 1980s mainly concerned the impact on industrial financing221 (Chang et al. 
2005). This deregulation began in 1975 by establishing the official money market. 
The money market includes short-term bills market and inter-bank call loan market. 
                                                 
219
 According to IMF staff classification in 1998, three groups of arrangements of exchange rate can be 
found: (1) hard pegs, a rigid fixed exchange rate; (2) soft pegs, which includes a single currency or a 
composite of currencies, the conventional fixed pegs and crawling pegs; (3) floating arrangements, 
includes managed floating and independently floating. For detail, see IMF (27/11/2007). Between 1979 
and 1989, Taiwan’s exchange rate against US dollar was decided by five nominated banks, and the 
currency fluctuated within less than +/- 2.25 % to the rate of the previous day. The exchange value of 
NT dollars was determined against a basket of currencies (included the U.S. Dollar, Japanese Yen, 
Deutsche Mark, Hong Kong Dollar, Singapore Dollar, U.K. Pound Sterling, and French Franc).  
220
 According to interviewee George Chou, there are three reasons: (1) The NT dollar is viewed by the 
players in Taiwan’s foreign exchange market as one of the Asian currencies. While most Asian 
currencies have at some point been pegged to the US dollar, the trend of the exchange rate of the NT 
dollar is inevitably influenced changes in the price of the US dollar owing to the linked changes of 
Asian currencies. (2) About 85% of Taiwanese exporters and importers still use the US dollar to price. 
(3) The US dollar is the Central Bank’s intervention tool.  
221
 Some government officials worried that the liberalisation of the interest rate would increase the loan 
burden (i.e. debt) on enterprises; scholars who promoted the liberalisation reform argued that this 
reform would build the market mechanism for the banks. 
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The government promulgated the Rules Governing Bills Finance Enterprises which 
addressed that bills finance companies would be the specific intermediates in the 
money markets (Wang 1999[1998]). As such, three bills finance companies were 
established. In 1980, the Bank Association of ROC was included in the interest rate 
decision-making process. In 1985 and 1986, financial institutions were given more 
flexibility to decide the interest rates on loans and deposits. Overall, before 1989, it 
was the Central Bank which set the accommodation interest rate and approved the 
change of bank interest rates (Wang 1999[1998]).   
      The deregulation of interest rates was completed in July 1989, with the 
enforcement of the amendment of the Banking Law.222 Officially, the Central Bank no 
longer regulates the range of the interest rate; each bank decides its own interest rate. 
Nevertheless, according to one senior government official’s comment, the Central 
Bank still supervises the banks in determining the interest rate.223 In sum, the Central 
Bank can only use the adjustment of the accommodation interest rate to control 
inflation, whereas the other three functions (especially industrial financing directed by 
the state) are no longer available.  
 
Concentration of the financial service: enlarging the banking business 
Before 1989, banks could not carry out business related to securities, bills and trusts. 
However after 1989, the boundary between the business of deposits/savings and these 
businesses was broke down. The revision of the Banking Law in 1989 gave the banks 
authority to decide their business scope. In 1990, foreign banks were allowed to 
establish savings and trust divisions. In 1992, domestic banks were allowed to operate 
in the short-term security business. The implication of the liberalisation of the 
domestic banking business was, as the government points out, ‘the trend in the global 
financial markets to foster one-stop financial services suppliers for accommodating 
the diversified financial service needs of modern customers’ (Wang 1999[1998], p.89). 
 
The rise of private financial capital: opening new financial institutions 
The amendment of the Banking Law in 1989 also allowed the establishment of new 
private banks. In June 1991, fifteen out of nineteen applications to establish new 
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 Shea (1994) notes that before the opening of private banks in 1991, most banks were state-owned 
and did not use interest rates to compete with each other.  
223
 The author’s interview with Sean Chen (no.15) on 22 March 2006.  
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commercial banks were approved. These fifteen new banks received investment from 
industrial business groups, construction business groups, KMT-owned-enterprises, 
and local political factions (Lin 1997). There were two main factors that led to the 
opening of new private banks. From an economic perspective, the liberalisation of the 
foreign exchange rate and interest rate systems, as well as the loosening of the 
restrictions on banks’ business, created an opportunity for banking competition.  From 
a political viewpoint, the opening of new banks was a tool for President Lee Teng-hui 
(president from 1988 to 2000) to strengthen his political power and to gain support 
from indigenous Taiwanese capitalists (Han 2001). The consequence of this was that 
through owning banks, domestic capitalists had increased autonomy in industrial 
financing.  
     Not only were new commercial banks allowed to be established, but also other 
financial institutions were opened to new entrants. Firstly, the government removed 
the restrictions on new securities companies in 1988. The structural factor for this was 
that Taiwan had a huge trade surplus and foreign reserves in 1987, as well as the fact 
that the domestic saving rate was as high as 38.5% in 1987 (higher than the domestic 
investment rate). This means that Taiwan had excess liquidity.  The liquidity soon 
went to the stock market to facilitate Taiwan’s capital market. As the government 
allowed establishment of new securities companies in 1988 and the number of 
securities related companies (securities brokerage firms, securities dealers, and 
securities underwriters) increased from a mere 60 in 1988 to 374 in 1998 (Wang 
1999[1998]). After opening new securities companies, the market value of Taiwan’s 
stock market grew dramatically, and the transaction value of the stock market as a 
share of Taiwan’s GDP increased from 82% in 1987 to 223% in 1988 (Yu and Wang 
2005, p.153). As this chapter will discuss later, the growth of the stock market both 
provides a new financing method for industrial capital and leads to the process of 
financialisaton. Secondly, the US pressurised Taiwan to open its markets to US 
insurance companies and thereafter European insurance companies were also 
permitted to set up in Taiwan; the opening of new insurance companies began in 1986 
(Lin 1997).  Accordingly, the government allowed the establishment of domestic 
insurance companies in 1992, and 13 life insurance companies were established in 
1993 (Wang 1999[1998]).  
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The Privatisation of state-owned banks 
The plan for the privatisation of state-owned banks, along with other state-owned 
enterprises, was proposed by the Taiwanese government in 1989, but did not take 
place until 1998, when more than 50% of the shares of four state-owned banks were 
successfully sold by the government. The main reason for the delay of bank 
privatisation was primarily political.  The following discussion will demonstrate that 
even when Taiwan was under pressure of neo-liberalist ideology to adopt privatisation, 
domestic state-capital-labour relations could still influence the speed of privatisation. 
Firstly, members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly opposed the policy (Shea 1994). 
When the KMT moved to Taiwan in 1949, they established two levels of central 
government, one being the central government of the ROC, and the other the Taiwan 
Provincial Government. Most of the financial institutions inherited from the Japanese 
colonial period were supervised by the Taiwan Provincial government. When the 
central government proposed its privatisation policy, the first plan was to privatise 
three state-owned banks supervised by the Taiwan Provincial government (Chang 
Hua Commercial Bank, First Commercial Bank, and Hua Nan Commercial Bank). 
This challenged the interests of members of the Provincial Government.224 Moreover, 
the proposal for privatising these three banks was not approved by the Legislative 
Yuan due to the opposition of the bank trade union.225 However, in 1997, President 
Lee Teng-hui proposed that the Taiwan Provincial government should cease to 
function and his proposal was included in additional articles of the Constitution of the 
ROC. The bank privatisation plan was therefore very soon put into practice in 1998. 
By 2007, nine of the 12 state-owned banks were already privatised (i.e. the 
government’s share was less than 50%). Among these nine privatised banks, two 
banks are now controlled by private financial conglomerates, and seven are still 
controlled by the government (i.e. the state is the biggest single shareholder). The 
government has tried either to sell more shares or reduce its managerial power in 
these seven banks.  
 
                                                 
224
 One interviewee said that those members of Taiwan Provincial Assembly treated the banks as their 
‘cash machine’ (interview with Sean Chen, no.15) 
225
 The National Federation of Bank Employees Union was established in 1993, together with the 
establishment of National Federation of SOEs Trade Union played an important role in lobbying the 
Legislative Yuan to stop the state’s privatisation initiative.  
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In general, the above financial liberalisation and deregulation measures had several 
significant implications. Firstly, the liberalisation of the interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate and the banking business overall created an opportunity for competition 
between the financial institutions. The state no longer directly controls the foreign 
exchange and interest rates for the purpose of increasing Taiwan’s export 
competitiveness and to finance specific industries. Secondly, mainly industrial, 
construction and real estate capital invested in the newly established privately-owned 
banks. The establishment of new private banks offered the opportunity for functioning 
capital to combine with the financial capital to form finance capital. The majority of 
the financial holdings established after 2002 are from these new banks. In January 
2008, with the privatisation of state-owned banks, their share of total banking 
business, in terms of deposit and loan business, declined to 17.8% and 18% of total 
monetary institutions (FSC 2008a, Table 2-1). The decline of the state-owned banks 
opened more market opportunities to either private owned banks or foreign banks.    
Thirdly, as with the industrial sector, liberalisation of the 1980s is the foundation for 
Taiwan’s development of private financial capital and the integration into global 
financial market. With the rise of private financial capital, the state gradually reduced 
its control on the financial sector.  
 
6-1-2 Integration into the Global Financial Market: Entry into the GATT/WTO 
in the 1990s 
  
In Chapter Five, I discussed how the industrial sector was further liberalised under the 
pressure of entry into GATT/WTO. A similar trend occurred in the financial sector. In 
the 1990s, due to Taiwan’s intention to enter GATT/WTO, Taiwan removed more 
restrictions on foreign access to the domestic market and financial account.   
 
Market access 
Taiwan submitted the first draft of the list of commitments to GATT in 1994. In 
Taiwan’s service schedule, most of commitments in the financial sector were the on-
going measures or already opened before 1994 (CHIER 2005, p.5-75). However, 
when Taiwan began accession negotiations with the members of GATT/WTO, 
Taiwan was asked to add more commitments.226 Taiwan’s financial commitments 
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 The following commitments are cited from CBC (2000), CHIER (2005). 
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further opened-up market access to foreign financial institutions (before that the 
market was mainly open to US companies). Firstly, Taiwan’s foreign exchange 
market and the financial derivatives market were expanded. Taiwan agreed to remove 
restrictions on foreign portfolio investments in the stock market. Secondly, in the 
banking industry, Taiwan agreed to loosen restrictions on foreign banks’ setting up 
new branches and on their banking business. Foreign banks in Taiwan therefore 
obtained national treatment (being treated as national banks). Thirdly, in the insurance 
industry, Taiwan agreed to open the business of some direct insurance, reinsurance 
and retrocession services, and insurance intermediation. The restrictions on new 
branches of foreign insurance companies were also reduced. The increased openness 
to foreign financial institutions brought a major challenge to Taiwan’s financial 
institutions, as the latter were less competitive than foreign financial institutions in 
terms of business scale and diversity (CBC 2000).  This is the main reason why the 
Taiwanese government proposed financial reforms after 2001, in order to increase the 
competitiveness of Taiwan’s banks.  
 
Financial account liberalisation 
The liberalisation of the financial account included the liberalisation of direct 
investment, of portfolio capital flows, and of financial derivatives227. Outward and 
inward direct investment were liberalised in the late 1980s (except for the area of 
China), but portfolio investment and financial derivatives were deregulated only after 
the 1990s, when Taiwan applied for entry into the GATT. The liberalisation of 
outward investment was discussed in Chapter Five. As for inward investment, the 
liberalisation of inward direct investment was completed in April 1988 following US-
Taiwan trade talks in the 1980s. The Taiwanese government adopted the “negative 
List for inward FDI” which reduced restrictions on inward FDI (i.e. anything not 
prohibited is allowed).  
The Taiwanese government was very cautious about the liberalisation of portfolio 
capital flows as Taiwan is not a member of any of the international financial 
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, due to Taiwan’s special 
international status, as discussed in Chapter Five.228 This was the main reason why 
                                                 
227
 According to the revised definition of ‘balance of paymen’ by the IMF in 1993, it includes current 
account (goods and service), capital account (capital transfer) and financial account (direct investment, 
portfolio investment and financial derivatives). See IMF (1993). 
228
 Author’s interview with George Chou (no.12) on 21 March 2006. 
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Taiwan did not suffer as much as some neighbouring countries in the East Asian 
financial crisis.229 There were three major factors in the East Asian financial crisis: 
excess capital liquidity, a high debt model, and a financial bubble economy, none of 
which were obvious in Taiwan (Wade and Veneroso 1998). In 1991, Taiwan began to 
allow foreign institutions to invest directly in Taiwan’s securities, the so-called 
qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII). However, the Taiwanese government 
restricted the amount invested (i.e. each QFII can only invest less than US$ 50 
million), and percentage of ownership in a stock company by foreign institutions. In 
1996, during Taiwan’s application to join GATT/WTO, Taiwan also allowed foreign 
individuals to invest in Taiwan’s stock market. The percentage of Taiwan’s stock 
market value held by foreign investors was less than 3% during the East Asian 
financial crisis and was only 6.2% in 1999.230 However, the restrictions on investment 
amounts and shares were fully liberalised in 2003, with the QFII system being 
abolished due to Taiwan’s financial commitments in its WTO negotiations. As such, 
the share of foreign investors in Taiwan’s stock market increased significantly to 
31.1% in 2007 (Securities and Future Bureau 2007).  
     As for foreign exchange financial derivatives, authorised banks were allowed to 
decide their own forward exchange rates in 1984. The deregulation of the foreign 
exchange forward market was completed in 1996. Other kinds of foreign exchange 
derivatives, such as futures, swaps, and options were also opened. Nevertheless, the 
foreign exchange derivatives market was not very large in the 1990s. The Taiwanese 
government is still very cautious about the risk of financial speculation. For example, 
Taiwan was under pressure from foreign investors to abolish the system of QFII, but 
the Taiwanese government did not abolish it until 2003.231 During the East Asian 
Financial Crisis between 1997 and 1998, the Central Bank even closed the operations 
of non-deliverable forward (NDF) by Taiwanese juridical persons because the NDF 
                                                 
229
 For general discussion of the crisis, see Wade (1998), Wade and Veneroso (1998); Lo (1999). For 
the comparison between Taiwan and South Korea, see Zhang (2002c); Chen and Ku (2000); For other 
comparisons, see Gary (2002); Hsu (2000). 
230
 Author’s calculation from two sets of data: ‘Summary data of stock market’ in various years 
(conducted by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation) and ‘Highlights of Foreign Investment in 
Taiwan's Stock Market’ (conducted by Financial Supervision Commission). 
231
 Author’s interview with George Chou (no.12) on 21 March 2006. He mentioned that many foreign 
guests who visited the Central Bank between 1995 and 1996 always complained that Taiwan’s capital 
account was not as liberalized as Thailand and South Korea.  
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has a high risk of speculation.232  According to the OECD (2003), a NDF contract is a 
‘foreign currency financial derivative instrument’. The feature of the contract is that 
this is cash-settled and short-term forward contract based on the movement of two 
currencies. Not surprisingly, when the NT dollar appreciated against the US dollar 
from US$32.4 in December 2007, to US$30.6 on 10 March 2008, the Central Bank 
called a meeting with a group of major custodian banks on 11 March 2008 and 
warned that foreign portfolio investors in Taiwan’s securities market were not 
allowed to use the equity market as a forum for speculating on the foreign exchange 
rate of NT dollars (CBC 11/03/2008).  
In sum, the financial liberalisation of the 1980s reduced the state’s power over the 
financial sector which indirectly reduced the state’s capability to guide industrial 
capital via financial means. Private financial capital became important players in the 
financial market. During the 1990s, financial liberalisation measures further opened 
the domestic financial market (i.e. foreign exchange market, financial derivatives 
market, the stock market, the banks, the insurance companies) to financial TNCs. The 
consequence was that Taiwan’s financial market was linked with global financial 
markets, as a result, and Taiwan’s private financial capital soon confronted the 
challenges from global financial TNCs. These consequences are backdrop to the 
development of financialisation in Taiwan from 2000.  
 
6-2 Extending ‘Financialisation’: Financial Reforms (2000-2007) 
 
Financial liberalisation during the 1980s and the 1990s was implemented by the KMT 
administration. The political change from the KMT to the DPP in 2000 did not change 
the policy of financial liberalisation; rather, the DPP followed and extended the 
process of liberalisation and privatisation. Furthermore, the DPP proposed financial 
reforms which facilitated the process of financialisation and strengthened Taiwan’s 
financial capital via a relaxation of restrictions on foreign investors in Taiwan’s stock 
market, an encouragement of concentration of the financial institutions, and an 
increase in financial innovations.  
                                                 
232
 When I conducted interviews with some high-level officials from the Department of Foreign 
Exchange in the Central Bank in 2006, they claimed that the Central Bank was still very keen to 
prevent financial speculation from foreign exchange derivatives. 
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  Several reasons have been put forward as to why the DPP government 
implemented further reform:  
 The opening of new private banks in the 1990s caused a problem of fierce  
       competition233 and a high ratio of non-performing loans (Chen 2001a; Chen  
       2001b; Hwang and Wu 2007); 
 The removal of restrictions across different types of financial institutions and  
       the mergers and acquisitions of the financial institutions was a global trend     
       (Legislative Yuan 21/03/2001; Chiu 2000; Hwang and Wu 2007); 
 The establishment of financial holding companies would legitimise a situation 
where some business groups already controlled different types of financial 
institutions by setting up a general administrative office.234 By 2000 Taiwan 
already had fourteen domestic financial conglomerates controlling at least 
two types of financial institution;  
  Increasing amounts of industrial financing are coming from the money and 
capital markets, which negatively affected Taiwan’s commercial banks’ 
business (Bruck and Sun 2007);  
  The most significant factor was that Taiwan’s financial institutions needed to 
confront the competition from foreign institutions after Taiwan’s entry into 
the WTO (CBC 2000; Chen 2001a). As such, under the context of increased 
international competitiveness, the year 2001 was named by President Chen 
Shui-bian the ‘first year of financial reform’ (Lee 01/01/2002, p.1).  
 
The financial reforms had two stages, one in 2001 and the second in 2004. In 
particular, there were two significant financial reforms235 that moved Taiwan’s 
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 The number of full-service domestic banks and foreign banks (including branches) increased from 
650 in 1986 to 2829 in 2001 (Yu and Wang 2005, p.93). The ratio of non-performing loans in Taiwan 
in 2001 was 7.5%, much higher than South Korea (2.9%) and Hong Kong (5.2%) (Hwang and Wu 
2007, p.22). 
234
 Author’s interview with Sean Chen (no.15). 
235
 Other reforms included reducing the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) in banks. In June 1999, 
the amendment of Value-added and Non-value-added Business Tax Act allowed the value-added 
business tax rate of the financial institutions to be reduced from five percent to two percent (i.e. a cut in 
the tax rate). In 2001, the new government set up the Financial Restructuring Fund to deal with 
problem financial institutions and implement temporary measures to safeguard depositors. The amount 
of the fund supported by the government plus the lost tax income amounted to nearly US$20 billion 
(exchange rate of one US dollar to 30 NT dollars) (Lee 27/02/2007). The banks and the enterprises that 
did not return the loan would be those responsible for the NPL problem; yet the Taiwanese government 
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economy towards financialisation and strengthened the power of financial capital: the 
first one was to encourage the concentration and consolidation of the financial 
institutions which strengthened the power of Taiwan’s private financial capital, along 
with the establishment of a new supervision system; the second one was to develop 
non-productive financial innovation. I will discuss the two reforms in details in the 
next two sections.  
 
6-2-1 Strengthening the power of financial capital: concentration and 
consolidation of financial institutions 
 
There are two means of consolidating financial institutions. The first method is to 
integrate and consolidate different types of financial institution. Financial holding 
companies236 have been established since the promulgation of the Financial Holding 
Company Law in June 2001. Fourteen financial holding companies were established 
between 2001 and 2003. A new financial supervision system, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC) under the Executive Yuan, was established in 2003 to 
integrate the supervision of banking, securities and insurance companies, and to act as 
a single regulator in the financial industry (FSC 31/05/2005).237    
     Several major financial conglomerates were formed during the process of financial 
liberalisation and concentration. In 2000, the government estimated that Taiwan had 
fourteen domestic financial conglomerates (plus five foreign financial conglomerates) 
according to the definition of the Basel Accord238 (Yu and Wang 2005). Twelve of 
these fourteen financial conglomerates come from the private banks that were 
established after 1991. In particular, seven of these fourteen financial conglomerates 
                                                                                                                                            
was unwilling to let any problem bank go bankrupt, so that eventually the government budget was used 
to tackle the problem (i.e. to re-capitalising banks to prevent insolvency).  
236
 The holding company combines bank, insurance company, with securities companies. 
237
 This is also viewed as a global trend, for example, UK’s Financial Services Authority in 1997, 
Australia’s Prudential Regulatory Authority in 1997, Japan’s Financial Supervisory Agency in 1998, 
and South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Commission in 1998.   
238
 According to the definition by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a financial 
conglomerate is ‘any group of companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant 
activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, 
securities, insurance)’. This is different from ‘mixed conglomerates’ which ‘are predominantly 
commercially or industrially oriented, but contain at least one regulated financial entity in some part of 
their corporate structure.’ See BIS (July 1995), Basel committee: The supervision of financial 
conglomerates (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf?noframes=1). 
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were also involved in the manufacturing sector; ten of the fourteen conglomerates 
were involved in the construction or real estate industries (ibid, p.327-323). Since the 
government allowed the establishment of the financial holding companies, nine 
financial holding companies239 were founded from the above fourteen financial 
conglomerates. The whole process of financial liberalisation and concentration 
promotes the rise and strength of private financial capital. The following date reveals 
the dramatic growth of financial conglomerates and reflects a tendency towards 
financialisation.  For example, since 2003, most of Taiwan’s top ten business groups 
have been from the financial sector. The share of finance, insurance, and business 
services in Taiwan’s GDP increased from 11.5% in 1987 to 18.2% in 2007, whereas 
the overall manufacturing sector decreased from 37.2% to 23.8% (CEPD 2008, table 
3-b).  In other words, the financial service has become the top industry contributing to 
Taiwan’s GDP.  
     In 2004 the government announced a second financial reform plan. President Chen 
Shu-bian proposed four main goals: (1) the market share of the three largest banks 
should be greater than ten percent by the end of 2006; (2) the number of state-owned 
banks should be cut from nine to six by the end of 2006; (3) the fourteen financial 
holding companies should be reduced to seven; (4) At least one of the financial 
holding companies should be made up of foreign investors or be listed on an overseas 
stock exchange by the end of 2006.      
    Other than the second goal, the goals have not been achieved because of severe 
criticism from the opposition party and scholars.240 Conversely, a state-owned 
financial holding company - Taiwan Financial Holdings - was established at the end 
of 2007, for the purpose of leading the international competitiveness of the financial 
sector. The new state-owned holding company accounted for 18% of market share of 
the financial sector, and its assets are ranked as being in the top 18 in Asia and 89th in 
the world.241 So far, the fifteen companies have incorporated more than ninety 
financial institutions (Lin 2005). At the end of 2007, their assets account for 66% of 
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 Fubon, Cathay, China Development, E.Sun, Yuanta, Jin Sun, Shin Kong, Chinatrust, and SinoPac 
240
 One of my interviewees argues that reducing the number of financial holding companies does not 
mean reducing the number of financial institutions, so it will not solve the problem of fierce 
competition; further, setting up the deadline and objectives of M&A will have a negative impact on the 
price of M&A (interviewee no. 14).  
241
 However, the establishment of the state-owned financial holdings has not been legitimized by the 
Legislative Yuan, and the new administration (the KMT) may change the policy after May 2008.  
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the total of all domestic banks’ assets and nearly 60% of the total of all bills finance 
companies’ assets (FSC 2007b). Under the state’s guidelines via financial reform, 
Taiwan’s private financial capital is rapidly concentrated.  
     The second method of concentration of the financial institutions is to encourage 
mergers and acquisition (M&A). This policy was initiated by the KMT administration, 
which drafted The Financial Institutions Merger Act in 1999, promulgated in 
December 2000. Between 1997 and March 2008, 26 M&As occurred in the banking 
sector242 and 71 M&As in other financial institutions243 (FSC 2007a). As noted in 
Chapter Three, M&A activity in the financial industry has been a global phenomenon 
since the 1990s, around 20% of M&A occurred in the financial sector globally, 
especially in the advanced countries (Amel et al. 2004). There have been 15,502 
examples of M&A (8,144 were between banks) in the world between 1990 and 2001 
(Amel et al. 2004).  
     The consequence of Taiwan’s financial M&A is that the distribution of monetary 
institutions and of deposits/loans business has undergone a dramatic change in ten 
years.  Amel et al (2004) argue that the commercial banking industry has two types: 
‘the retail banking units’ oriented towards households and small firms, and ‘the 
wholesale banking units’ oriented towards larger firms, yet the latter can cover the 
former’s business (p.2496). In Taiwan, the share of retail banking units (e.g. credit 
cooperatives, medium business banks, farmers’ associations and fishing associations), 
as a proportion of all monetary institutions244 was reduced from 46% in 1996 to 25% 
at the end of 2007 (CBC 2008b; FSC 2008b). Meanwhile, the share of domestic 
commercial banks grew from 28% to 52% (ibid). The change in financial institutions 
has an effect on the re-distribution of the deposits/loans business market. In the loan 
business, the share of loans from the retail banking units decreased from 27.8% in 
1995 to 9.7% in 2007; meanwhile the share of loans from domestic commercial banks 
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 Thirteen of the twenty five were between domestic banks; nine were between foreign banks; and 
four were domestic banks acquired by foreign banks (FSC 2007a). The four cases are viewed as the 
foreign banks’ strategy to obtain the customer list of overseas Taiwanese business from domestic banks. 
243Twenty nine were between credit cooperative and commercial banks; thirty six were between 
farmers’/fishing associations and commercial banks; six were between bill companies and commercial 
banks (FSC 2007a).  
244
 This includes domestic commercial banks, foreign banks, medium business banks, credit 
cooperative, farmers’ association, fishing association and the postal saving system (but the postal 
saving system does not undertake loan business).  
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grew from 67.3% to nearly 87% (CBC 2007, p.55; Lai 1997, p.72-73). The tendency 
thus limits SME industrial, personal and household finance sources.  
     In sum, the first method (integrating different types of financial institutions) led to 
the concentration of financial conglomerates. The second method (M&A) sharply 
reduced the percentage of retail banking units and had an impact on SMEs and 
personal financing.  The concentration and consolidation of the financial institutions 
not only presents a pattern of financialisation, but also strengthens the power of 
Taiwan’s private financial capital. Private financial capital, as well as private 
industrial capital, increased their dominance over domestic economy. Moreover, the 
social consequences of this pattern have been that, firstly, unemployment in the 
financial sector has increased. Taiwan’s Bank trade unions organised several 
demonstrations against the M&A policy (Han 2001). Secondly, many rural areas now 
have a problem accessing finance because of the reduction of community banking 
units.  
6-2-2 Towards financialisation: the increase in non-productive financial 
innovation 
 
As discussed in the introduction, one of the features of financialisation is to develop 
non-productive financial activities. There are two types of non-productive financial 
innovation products: financial derivatives and asset securitization (financial assets and 
real property). The global derivative market has grown sharply since the late 1990s. 
The notional amounts245 in the global derivatives markets increased from US$72 
trillion in June 1998, to US$516 trillion in June 2007 (BIS 2008). The latter is 
approximately seven times the amount of world’s GDP (US$65.8 trillion) in 2006. 
The first derivatives in Taiwan appeared in 1992 when Taiwan announced the 
Overseas Futures Trading Law. Most foreign exchange and interest derivatives were 
introduced in the 1990s, except for the equity-linked and credit derivatives, which 
were introduced in 2001 and 2004 respectively. In 1998, Taiwan’s Future Exchange 
was established. From then on, the financial derivatives market has expanded. For 
example, the notional amount of derivatives at the end of 2007 (NT$54 trillion) was 
27 times more than that in March 1998 (NT$2trillion) and four times the amount of 
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 The nominal amount is used to calculate payments made on swaps and other risk management 
products. This amount generally does not change hands, and is thus referred to as notional. See 
http://www.investordictionary.com/definition/notional+amount.aspx 
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Taiwan’s GDP in 2007 (NT$13 trillion); the volume of the derivative transactions in 
November 2007 (NT$10.3 trillion) was ten times greater than that in 1998 (NT$ 952 
billion) (CBC 2008a).    
     Foreign institutions dominate the derivatives market. Before 1998, nearly 80% of 
Taiwan’s derivative financial products were operated by foreign banks (Wang 
1999[1998]). In January 2008, foreign banks still dominated nearly 70% of the 
Taiwan derivatives market (FSC 2008a). Some of my interviewees pointed out that 
foreign banks are keener on designing and marketing new financial products than 
domestic Taiwan banks, and their branches in Taiwan only need to find customers and 
marketing.246 Some domestic banks do not have “research capability” so that they 
only can sell derivatives designed by foreign banks.247  
    As for the securitization of financial assets and real property, this is another area of 
influence from the global financial market. The US first developed mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) in the 1980s. The asset amount of 
MBS plus ABS in 2002 was US$6.2 trillion in the US (Kao et al. 2003). After the US 
and Europe developed asset securitization, Asia also developed similar new products 
since 1999, in particular Japan and South Korea are the two dominant countries 
(Gyntelberg and Remolona 2006). However, Asia’s securitisation path differs from 
those of the US and EU, and began first by financial asset securitization rather than 
mortgage securitisation. Gyntelberg and Remolona argue that Asian countries have 
used securitisation as a way to reduce the ratio of non-performing-loans (of the banks) 
after the 1997 financial crisis (2006, p.67-70).  
      Taiwan began to operate in the financial securitisation business in 2002, when the 
Financial Asset Securitization Act and Real Estate Securitization Act were announced 
in July 2002 and July 2003 respectively. According to the government’s opinion, 
financial asset securitization can break the boundary between the direct finance 
market (e.g. capital market) and the indirect finance market (e.g. banks) by giving the 
indirect financial institutions the tools of direct finance.  As such, this brings an 
increase in liquidity of capital into the indirect finance market. Taiwan’s issue of 
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  Author’s interviews with Andrea S. Lee (no.5) and Hsing-Ho Huang (no.6) on 21/02/2006. Lee is 
Deputy Director-General of Dept. of International Affairs, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). 
Huang is Section Chief of Dept. of International Affairs, FSC.  
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 One interviewee (no. 12) mention that he once suggested that the government set up a ‘financial 
ITRI (international technology research institution)’ which could undertake the function of researching 
new financial innovations and transfers to domestic banks.  
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financial asset securitization between 2003 and 2007 was US$ 41.3 billion (NT$12.3 
trillion), and the issue of real property securitization was US$2.6 billion (NT$77.9 
billion) (FSC 2007d). The total amount of these two securitisations was equal to 10% 
of Taiwan’s GDP in 2007. The securitization products also became the biggest 
product in Taiwan’s bond market, and its issues accounted for about 48% of the bond 
market in 2007 (CBC 2007). Foreign institutions still play an important role in asset 
securitisation, for example, before November 2005, thirteen out of twenty-one 
instances of financial asset securitisation cases either originated or were arranged by 
foreign institutions (Chen 07/11/2005).  
     In sum, Taiwan’s development of financial derivatives and financial securitisation 
increased the amount of non-productive finance and expanded Taiwan’s capital 
market. The derivative market (in Taiwan and in the world) is still dominated by 
foreign institutions, as well as Taiwan’s financial securitisation still relies on the 
investment and techniques of foreign institutions. Taiwan is further integrated into 
global financial markets, yet it plays a marginal role as foreign financial capital 
dominates the market of non-productive finance domestically and globally. 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Two, in Arrighi’s (1994) account, financial 
expansion is a symptom of both hegemonic transition and of the crisis in capitalism. 
In recently years, the development of non-productive finance has brought an unstable 
situation to capitalism. For example, the first country to create derivatives248 and 
financial securitisation also had the first crisis; the 2007 US sub-prime mortgage 
financial crisis shocked the global financial markets. Taiwan’s financial institutions 
hold an estimated US$2.16 billion (NT$71 billion) in investments that are linked to 
this crisis (Taipei Times 10/08/2007). During 2008-2009, the financial crisis further 
triggered a global economic crisis.  
 
6-3. The Dynamics of State-Capital Relations 
 
The previous two sections mainly examined how changes in the capitalist world-
system have reshaped Taiwan’s financial sector. As such, influenced by the changes 
to the capitalist world-system, Taiwan’s financial sector and financial capital have 
new forms which are far different from the pre-1987 period. In this section, I will 
argue that the state and industrial capital also influence the dynamics of financial 
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 Chicago Board Options Exchange was established in 1973. 
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capital. The relationship between the state, industrial capital and financial capital is 
interlinked as the main role of the financial capital is industrial finance. Thus the state 
attempts to control the financial sector for the purpose of obtaining power over 
industrial capital. Changes to the financial sector will inevitably affect the state’s 
influence on industrial capital. In this respect, I will, firstly, discuss how the state 
changes its means of financial support to industrial capital under the pressure of 
financial liberalisation. The discussion will reveal that the state still attempts to guide 
industrial capital through financial means even though the industrial and financial 
sectors are significantly altered. Secondly, financial liberalisation and financialisation 
also change the relationship between industrial capital and financial capital, as 
industrial capital attempts to find new financing methods from the “self-expanding” 
financial market, rather than from financial institutions: a situation which in turn 
promotes the development of financialisation and reduces the dependence of 
industrial capital on banking capital, and on the state’s financial support. 
 
6-3-1 Changing the State’s financial support to industrial capital 
 
Before 1989/1991, the state could allocate finance from national savings to public and 
private enterprises, as the banks were all state-owned and the interest rate was 
determined by the government. In Chapter Four, I also mentioned other financial 
support measures, included foreign exchange rate policy, selective credit 
accommodation, export and import financing, and development banking through 
state-owned specialised banks. In sum, the state could use the whole financial sector 
to guide industrial capital and domestic economy. Most of these financial support 
measures were abolished in the late 1980s and early 1990s, due to the changes in the 
financial system. However, other types of financial support measures based on the 
government’s budget have either remained or been developed, including government 
subsidies, special loans (low-interest rate loans, project finance, and zero-interest rate 
loans), credit guarantees and insurance, and direct investments. In total, there were 
forty-seven such measures in 2002, as Table 6-2 shows (Yang and Tu 2002). In 
comparison to the financial support measures of the pre-1980s period (see Chapter 
Four 4-6-2) the financial means controlled by the state are significantly limited.  
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Table 6-2: Different types of state financial support measures 
Type of supports Funders Industry or sector Period 
Low-interest rate 
loans 
The medium-and long term funding system (postal 
savings, postal life insurance, and government’s 
budget)249;The Development Fund250; The Sino-
American fund; the export-import bank of ROC251; 
Foreign reserves of the central bank; the SMEs 
development fund252 
(1) strategic industries, hi-tech, 
and heavy-chemical industries;  
(2)  overseas investment;  
(3) traditional industries and 
SMEs which match for the 
specific projects 
The medium-and long term 
funding system (1994-); The 
Sino-American Fund (1965-
2006);  
Development Fund (1973-); The 
SMEs Fund (1991-) 
Direct 
investment 
The Development Fund253 and the Sino-American fund Strategic industries, hi-tech 
industries; Venture Capital 
(VC) industries254 
1985- 
Project-based 
subsidies 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Science 
Council 
R&D projects in hi-tech 
industries, traditional industries  
1980s- 
Credit guarantee The Export-Import Bank of ROC, the SMEs 
Development Fund, SMEs Credit Guarantee Fund255 
SMEs 1974- 
Source: (Yang et al. 1994; Yang and Tu 2002) 
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 This funding system was set up by the government (the CEPD) in June 1994. It can be seen as a continuation of 
the selective credit accommodation. The funding resources came from Postal Savings, Postal Life Insurance, and 
the government’s budget. The majority of loans went to the heavy-chemical and IT industries (Yang and Tu 2002). 
250
 This was established in 1973. The financial resources of the Fund were from the privatisation of SOEs and the 
government budget. The Fund was to support the investment and funding tasks. The loan finance during the 1980s 
and the early 1990s was in particular for the strategic industries’ medium- and long-term finance needs, as well as 
for the strategic SMEs’ investment (Yang 1995). Later, the loan finance became project- based finance.  
251
 This originated from US aid to the ROC in 1948. When US aid ended in 1965, the two governments agreed to 
set up the Fund for Taiwan’s economic and social development. The Sino-American Fund had three main roles: 
firstly, to support economic development policy; Secondly, to provide low-interest loans for SMEs. Thirdly, to 
provide special lending programmes for individuals.  
252
 The SMEs Development Fund was established in September 1991. Funding comes from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs.  
253
 There were 76 cases which totalled NT$42.6 billion and were invested by the Development Fund between 1975 
and 2006 (Natioal Development Fund 2007). The fund mainly went to the financial industry and semiconductor 
industry, the latter accounting for NT$11 billion; 25.8% of the total investment by amount. 
254
 VC is seed capital, and is a kind of private equity fund, but is withdrawn from the company when the company 
is successfully listed on the stock market. Taiwan’s VC industry was introduced by the government in 1982, 
inspired by Silicon Valley. Up to 2006, the Development Fund had invested in 53 VC companies and the 
investment was NT$12.04 billion (National Development Fund 2007). As I will discuss later, VC becomes a new 
financing method for hi-tech industries. The state plays a key role to promote the development of VC industry. In 
2006, the number of VC companies was 270, and the number of accumulated investment cases was 11,200, and 
they accounted for NT$203.8 billion (TVCA 2007). 96% of VC investments have been in the hi-tech industries (i.e. 
semi-conductor, electronics, optoelectrical, telecom and information).  
255
 The SME Credit Guarantee Fund was established in 1974 by the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of 
assisting SMEs to obtain bank loans by providing a guarantee. The Fund is significant as Taiwan’s SMEs have had 
difficulty in obtaining bank loans since the reorganisation of banking industries (e.g. privatisation and M&A, as 
discussed in previous section). Since the state no longer directs the banks to provide loans to SMEs (e.g. 
through the Medium and Small Business Banks), the function of the credit guarantee fund becomes a major tool to 
assist SMEs (Taiwan SMEG 2008).  
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From the table above, it can be seen that the major methods of state financial support 
since the 1990s have been through the special funds: the Development Fund, the Sino-
American Fund, the SMEs Development Fund, and the SMEs credit Guarantee Fund. 
Although the specialist banks jointly arranged low-interest rate loans with the Funds, 
these Funds, in fact, make up the difference in interest rates to the banks that jointly 
arranged them. Where the state no longer acts as the financial capitalist directly 
guiding and promoting industrial capital, they can still use the government budget (i.e. 
special funds) to finance industrial capital.256 The industry which receives most 
financial support is the strategic industry, namely the hi-tech electronics industry. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, this industry has received much more support than other 
industries from the state (e.g. R&D, the Science Park, tax incentives), and financial 
support is one of examples that demonstrate that the state has exclusively promoted 
the industry. 
Thurbon (2001; 2007) has argued that Taiwan’s financial liberalisation does not 
reduce the ‘developmental logic’ of the previous period, because while Taiwan has 
implemented financial liberalisation, development financing has expanded. She gave 
several examples: the CBC’s role in development financing (i.e. use of foreign 
exchange reserves to finance overseas investment and re-financing aid to strategic 
industries), the use of postal savings to finance long-term investment, and the 
encouragement of private enterprises to cooperate with large-scale public 
infrastructure (Thurbon 2001). Indeed, the financial support measures discussed in the 
section are more than those mentioned by Thurbon, but I cannot, however, agree that 
these measures are an indication of the continuing ‘developmental logic’ in Taiwan’s 
financial system.  
Firstly, these support measures are all concerned with how the state promotes 
strategic industries, important investment, and SMEs. It is the relationship whereby 
the state still tries to guide industrial capital by using the government budget, rather 
than the state’s direct controls upon the financial sector. In other words, the 
‘developmental logic’ remains the relationship between the state and industrial capital, 
rather than between the state and financial capital. Secondly, even if the state tries to 
maintain the development logic in industrialisation, the state’s tools are now limited. 
In the past, it was the whole formal financial system (interest rate, foreign exchange 
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 The medium-and-long-term funding system is an exception, as the government still owns the Postal 
Saving System.  
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rate, state-owned banks, central bank, postal saving and so forth) that mobilised 
national savings to finance specific industrial capital, because the state acted as the 
financial capitalist. However, after the liberalisation and privatisation of the financial 
system, the support methods become limited and indirect. The remaining methods are: 
tax incentives, R&D assistance, and special funds, all of them are funded from the 
government budget. In this sense, the amount of development financing has not 
expanded but is actually limited to the fiscal method.  
6-3-2 New industrial financing methods: reduce the power of financial capital 
 
I have analysed the relations between the state and financial capital, and this section 
will discuss the relations between industrial capital and financial capital. Hilferding 
(1981[1910]) argues that the concentration of industrial capital, the development of 
financial capital, and the expansion of credit will lead to a combination of financial 
capital and industrial capital. The core characteristic of the combination is that within 
the close integration of the two capitals, the financial capital (the bank capital) 
dominates the direction of industrial capital (Bottomore 1983).  
In the pre-1987 period, it was the (state) financial capital that dominated the 
direction of industrial capital. However, as Taiwan’s private financial capital grows, 
private financial capital no longer has the same power over industrial capital as before. 
There are two factors to the change. Firstly, the development of the capital market and 
new financing methods (e.g. venture capital and overseas funding257) have reduced 
the dependence of industrial capital on banking capital, in particular in the case of the 
hi-technology industrial sector. What Hilferding did not see is that industrial finance 
does not need to fully rely on banking capital, as financialisation expands the channels 
of industrial finance. The second factor that leads to the incapability of Taiwan’s 
industrial capital control over financial capital is the limits of the trans-nationalisation 
of Taiwan’s financial capital. The development of financial capital has been de-linked 
from the development of industrial capital, because industrial capital has already 
expanded to overseas production but financial capital has been restricted in expanding 
to overseas markets (especially in China). 
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 Taiwan had no inward investment from foreign private equity funds until 2005. The first investment 
was the Carlyle Group that invested in one of Taiwan’s media companies. Recently, they increased 
their interests in investing in Taiwan by considering the ‘use Taiwan firms as a springboard for 
acquisitions in China.’ See Hung (07/05/2008).  
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New financing methods 
Domestic banks had intended to provide loans to traditional industries. For example, 
70% of bank loans were provided to traditional industries in 1993 - the other 30% was 
for the technology-intensive industries258 (Yang and Lung 2004). One of the main 
reasons is that the hi-tech companies (especially at a Science Park) do not own the 
land to enable them to obtain secured loans, and their machinery and factories are 
difficult to re-sell to other industries due to technological differences (Yang et al. 
1994). Another reason is that most domestic banks are no longer state-owned, so the 
government cannot force domestic banks to provide loans to the strategic hi-tech 
industry as before. Only since 2003 have more than 50% of bank loans been provided 
for the hi-tech industry. As such, as Liang (1998) points out, several new methods of 
industrial financing have been raised for hi-tech industries: raising funds overseas, 
venture capital, and emergence of direct finance.  
     There are three major methods of raising funds overseas. Taiwanese enterprises 
were allowed to issue Euro Convertible Bonds (ECB) in 1989, Global Depository 
Receipts (GDR) and American Depository Receipts (ADR) in 1992. According to 
Hsu’s study (2006), in the early 1990s, the traditional industries were the major actors 
in raising overseas fund. However, from the mid-1990s, the hi-tech industries (in 
particular the semi-conductor industry) have become the major actors259. Venture 
capital was discussed in previous section. 96% of VC investment has been invested in 
the high-tech industries (i.e. semi-conductor, electronics, optic-electrical, telecom and 
information)260. 
     The final method, direct finance, refers to a financing method without financial 
intermediaries. Such a method in Taiwan includes listed stock, short-term bills, 
corporate bonds, government bonds, overseas bonds, and asset security. In contrast, 
indirect finance is the traditional financing method which means going through 
monetary institutions (i.e. banks, credit cooperatives, farmer and fishing associations), 
the postal savings system, trust and investment companies, and insurance companies. 
                                                 
258
 The high-tech industry refers broadly to eight industries: chemical materials, chemical products, 
electronic parts and components, computer and electronic and optical products, electronic equipment, 
machinery and equipment, transport equipment, and precision optics.  
259
 For example, between 1997 and 2001, the semi-conductor industry accounted for 64% of total ADR 
plus GDR issued, and 93% of total ECB issued (Hsu 2006). 
260
 Up to 2006, there were two hundred and seventy VC companies which had accumulated eleven 
thousand two hundred investment cases was, and the value of the investments amounted to NT$203.8 
billion (TVCA 2007). 
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In 1986, the share of direct finance of all financing methods was only 11.3%; it had 
doubled to 24.2% by the end of 2007 (CBC 2008 Financial statistics; Chang and 
Wang 2005). 
      In mainstream economics, direct finance includes two markets; the money market 
and the capital market. The money market is for short-term bills (less than one year) 
and the inter-bank call loan market, which includes Treasury bills, bankers’ 
acceptance, commercial paper, and negotiable certificates of deposit (CD). The capital 
market includes stocks and bonds with maturities of over one year. Such a distinction 
based on the period of the capital is misleading, however, as it does not reveal the true 
relationship between financial capital and real production.    
     Hilferding (1981[1910]) distinguished between two types of securities: (1) the bill 
of exchange, which is a certificate of indebtedness; (2) bonds (fixed-interest paper) 
and shares, which do not represent a sum of money but its yield (p.130). The first type, 
bills of exchange (the so-called ‘money capital’ in the mainstream definition), is a 
payment credit which is ‘limited only by the number of business transaction actually 
concluded’ as bills are ‘a substitute for the additional capital that would otherwise 
have been required to bridge over the period (p.131).’ But the second type, the so-
called ‘capital market’, is indeed a misleading term, as the ‘capital’ that stocks and 
bonds represent is in reality ‘fictitious and its magnitude is calculated on the basis of 
its yield’ (p.131). As such, it is the growth of the capital market rather than direct 
finance that reflects the enlargement of ‘fictitious finance’.261 It is the growth of the 
‘capital market’ that has become a growing industrial financing method and has 
caused Taiwan’s financialisation. Yan and Lung’s comparison between the growth 
rate of GNP and of the market value of Taiwan’s stock exchange between 1959 and 
2003 shows that there is no correlation between the two figures (2004, p.51). Overall, 
the growth rate of the market value of the stock exchange is much higher than the 
growth rate of GDP.  
     Accordingly, traditional indirect finance plus the bills of exchange (the so-called 
money market) have declined because of the development of the (fictitious) capital 
market. Most technology-intensive industries have made use of the capital market. 
From 1991, in the stock market, the listed electronics companies have become the 
major industry to issue new shares as a means of increasing capital through second 
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 For example, the significance of the bills exchange has declined from 28.9% of total direct finance 
in 1986 to 5.3% in 2006 (CBC 2008 Financial statistics; Chang and Wang 2005). 
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public offerings (SPO) on the stock exchange (Yang and Lung 2004, p.39).262 The 
market value of listed companies in technology-intensive industries, as a proportion of 
the market value of all manufacturing sectors, was as high as 82.7% in 2001, while 
the traditional industries only accounted for 12.7% (Yang and Lung 2004, p.20). 
Similarly, between 1996 and 2004, most of the convertible corporate bonds have been 
issued by the electronics industries (p.46). In 2004, more than 20% of information 
technology companies issued corporate bonds, compared with fewer than five percent 
of the other industries (MOEA 2004, Table 4).  
In sum, Hilferding (1981[1910])’s argument is that, within the combination of 
industrial capital and bank capital, the latter will increasingly dominate industrial 
capital and domestic economy as a whole.  This is however not the case in Taiwan. 
While the manufacturing sector shifts from the traditional industries to the 
technology-intensive industries, the financing method has also changed: financing 
from the capital market has expanded and now includes other new methods (e.g. 
raising funds overseas and venture capital). All of these have inevitably reduced the 
dependence of industrial capital on bank capital.  Accordingly, even though private 
financial capital was formed in the 1980s through financial liberalisation and was 
strengthened in the 1990s through consolidation, bank capital has not increased its 
dominance over industrial capital.  
6-3-3 The limits of transnationalisation of Taiwan’s financial capital: unlinking 
financial capital and industrial capital 
 
The second factor is that the state is still dominant over financial capital in the cross-
strait financial business. This has led to a de-linking of the expansion of industrial 
capital from financial capital. Taiwan’s financial capital is not able to fully integrate 
into the economic regionalisation process.  Moreover, the Taiwanese government 
plans to develop Taiwan as a regional funding and asset management centre. However, 
without solving the restrictions on cross-strait finance, such a semi-peripheral ascent 
plan is more of a slogan rather than a realistic prospect. 
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 Before 1991, it was textile and food industries. After 1998, the financial industry has become 
another major industry to make use of ‘capital increase’. 
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Restrictions on cross-strait finance 
The government lifted the constraints on the number and location of banks’ overseas 
branches in November 1988, due to the liberalisation of Taiwan’s overseas investment 
(Shea 1994). As a result, the number of Taiwan’s banks’ overseas branches, 
representative offices, and subsidiaries, increased from 24 in 1989, to 140 in 2007; 86 
are in Asia, 33 are in North America and 21 are in other areas (CBC 2008c; Shea 
1994, p.264). However in Asia, only seven representatives (not branches) have been 
set up in China.  
 
Table 6-4: The distribution of Taiwan’s outward FDI and banks’ foreign branches 
(1987-2007) (unit: %) 
Outward FDI and banks’ branches Asia (excluding 
China) 
China Other Total areas 
Taiwan’s outward FDI 13 54 33 100 
Taiwan’s outward manufacturing FDI 7  74 19 100 
Taiwan’s outward financial FDI 15.5 2.1 83.3 100 
Taiwanese banks’ overseas 
branches, subsidiaries, and representatives 
56.4 5.4 38.2 100 
Sources: (CBC 2008c; Investment Commission 2008) 
 
Between 1987 and 2007, Taiwanese outward manufacturing FDI accounted for 66% 
of total outward FDI, while outward financial FDI accounted for nearly 17% 
(Investment Commission 2008). The financial industry is now the second largest 
outward investment sector. However, the direction of Taiwan’s outward financial FDI 
is very different from that of manufacturing FDI, as the above table shows. I have 
already mentioned in Chapter Five the high percentage of financial investment in 
Bermuda and the British overseas territories of the Caribbean Sea (69% of Taiwan’s 
outward financial FDI) (Investment Commission 2008), which is mainly because of 
the tax-free factor and because some of the investments may be re-invested in China. 
Overall, the share of Taiwan’s financial investment in China (2.15%) is much lower 
than the share of Taiwan’s manufacturing investment in China (74%). This contrasts 
with the principle that the development of financial services is a consequence of the 
growth of TNCs in the manufacturing industries, and the financial services needed to 
serve the TNCs’ industrial financing (Dicken 2004). Similarly, the distribution of 
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Taiwan’s overseas branches is completely different from the direction of outward FDI, 
as the above table shows.  
      The main reason for this distortion is the Taiwanese government’s restrictions on 
outward financial investment and banking operations in China. Before 1987, there 
were no formal cross-strait financial exchanges at all. According to the Mainland 
Affairs Council (MAC), the development of cross-strait finance has had three 
historical phases (FSC 30/12/2004). The first phase was between 1987 and 1992. The 
Taiwanese government began to allow Taiwanese people to visit relatives in China in 
1987, so that the government then allowed a few banks to arrange indirect outward 
remittance business in 1990 and 1991. Thereafter following the development of 
Taiwan’s outward investment in China which began in 1991, the Central Bank started 
to allow foreign-exchange designated banks to arrange export negotiation businesses 
(shipment from the Mainland, negotiation in Taiwan). The second phase was between 
1993 and 2000. The Taiwanese government gradually opened an indirect exchange of 
cross-strait financial activities (FSC 30/12/2004).263The third phase began in 2001 and 
extended the openness a little further (FSC 06/01/2006; 12/01/2005; 30/12/2004).264  
From the above overview, it can be seen that in the last two decades, cross-strait 
financial exchanges have gradually become more open. However, compared with the 
changes to Taiwan’s industrial structure and domestic financial system, the openness 
of cross-strait finance is still limited. The amount of Taiwan’s export and import 
remittances with China, although it grew sharply between 2002 and 2007, in 2006 
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 (1)Opened-up business exchanges between Taiwanese banks’ overseas branches and Chinese banks’ 
overseas branches or foreign banks’ branches in China (April 1993); (2) Opened up indirect cross-strait 
inward and outward remittance  business (July 1994); (3) Due to the development of triangular trade 
between Taiwan, China and the external market, the government allowed the foreign exchange 
department of domestic banks to arrange the business of issuing Letters of Credit (L/C) in Taiwan for 
imports from China (May 1994); (4) Allowed foreign-exchange designated banks and OBUs of 
domestic banks to jointly arrange indirect import/export negation business with overseas branches of 
Chinese banks (July 1995); (5) Allowed domestic banks to send staff to visit China for business 
purposes (July 1995); (6) Permitted OBUs to arrange cross-strait indirect remittance business (May 
1997).  
264
 (1)Allowed domestic banks and their overseas subsidiary banks to establish representative offices in 
China (June 2001); (2) Permitted foreign-exchange designated banks and Postal Savings to engage in 
direct cross-strait financial transactions (August 2002); (3) Permitted passengers to carry Renminbi 
(RMB) in amounts not exceeding 6,000 RMB when they depart from or arrive in Taiwan (March 2004); 
(4) Released domestic banks’ Hong Kong branches to apply to do RMB business with Hong Kong 
residents (May 2004); (5) Allowed OBUs to authorize domestic banking units (DBUs) of banks to deal 
with cross-strait financial business (January 2006). 
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they merely accounted for 40% of the total import cross-strait trade and 28.7% of total 
export cross-strait trade.265  
Most importantly, domestic banks are not allowed to establish branches in 
Mainland China. Although the establishment of representative offices has been 
allowed since June 2001, the function of representative offices is very different from 
that of branches, as the latter cannot accept deposits. China’s financial market has 
been a big target for global financial capital since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 
(China committed to opening-up its financial sector in 2006). Up to June 2006, of the 
197 foreign banks set up in China, 41 were Hong Kong-based, 20 were Japanese, and 
17 were American (FSC 2007c). So far, Taiwan’s financial capital has remained 
outside of this fierce international competition. Moreover, more and more Taiwanese 
businesses who invest in China have changed their financing sources from domestic 
banks to foreign banks in Taiwan, because of the restrictions on domestic banks’ 
cross-strait finance business (Lu 21/08/2007). In recent years, the cases of three 
domestic banks merging with foreign banks are seen as examples of foreign banks 
obtaining overseas Taiwanese business customers (ibid.).  
 
Prospect or slogan? Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent strategy 
The proposal for the Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Centre, introduced by the KMT 
administration in 1994, included a financial centre as one of six regional centres. The 
proposal can be seen as the state’s semi-peripheral ascent strategy to integrate into the 
Asian economic regionalisation process. In particular the idea of Taiwan being the 
financial sector in the Asian-Pacific economies can be viewed as Taiwan’s ambitions 
to ascend to the core. Although the whole proposal was withdrawn in the late 1990s, 
the idea of a financial centre, the only one, was introduced again by the DPP 
administration. In July 2004, the DPP administration suggested ‘promoting the 
regional financial service centre.’ While the proposal of a second financial reform was 
criticised by scholars and the media, the proposal for a regional financial centre was 
later incorporated with the goals of the second financial reform and extended the 
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 The amount of export remittance increased from US$1.1 billion to US$19.5 billion and the amount 
of import remittance grew from US$0.46 billion to US$10.2 billion (FSC 2008a). In 2006, imports 
from China were US$24.7 billion, and Taiwan’s exports to China were US$63.3 billion; the amount of 
export remittance was US$18.2 billion (accounting for 28.7% of Taiwan’s exports to China) and the 
import remittance was US$10.1 billion (40.8% of the imports from China) (FSC 2008a; MAC 2008, 
Table 5).  
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timeline from 2006 to 2008.  Apart from reform of domestic financial institutions, two 
other significant projects were also suggested: (1) Establish Taiwan as a regional 
funding centre. This project includes: removing restrictions on cross-strait financial 
exchange, developing offshore banking units (OBUs) as a regional funding centre, 
attracting foreign financial investors, and expanding the stock and bond markets; (2) 
Promote asset management. This project was the increase in the use of the insurance 
and retirement pension funds, and to develop offshore funds.  
     However, the plan was problematic. One of my interviewees (a senior high-level 
government official) argues that ‘it is nothing more than a slogan.’266 Firstly, there are 
already so many competitors within this region. Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo 
were rated as the third, fourth, and tenth financial centres in the world in 2007 
(Yeandle et al. September 2007). In terms of the number of foreign exchange 
transactions, the size of stock exchange, the share of foreign investors in the stock 
exchange, the number of foreign banks, and the extent of the globalisation of 
Taiwan’s financial market/institutions is far less than the above financial centres (Wu 
2001). According to various international institutions’ (i.e. IMD and WEF) ranking, in 
items related to access to the international financial market, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) are the first, second, and fourth countries in the Asia-
Pacific area, while Taiwan was only sixth in 2006. Equally, other Asian countries also 
planned to develop financial centres. South Korea has proposed to establish Seoul as a 
regional financial hub since 2003 (Berger 06/13/2007; Urade 2005); Shanghi and 
Mumbai also planned to join the fierce competition to become regional financial 
centres (Tucker 18/07/2007, 19/07/2007).  
      Secondly, the restrictions on cross-strait financial exchanges and the ban on direct 
cross-strait links (postal, transportation, and trade) have reduced the possibility of 
developing a financial centre or logistics centre (ADB 2008a, p.152). There is no 
obvious way to develop a regional financial centre while ignoring the significance of 
China’s financial market and of cross-strait finance. For example, the Taiwanese 
government assumes that one of Taiwan’s advantages in developing a regional 
financial centre is the amount of Taiwanese overseas capital and assets (the estimate 
is between US$ 500-700 billion); in principle, the establishment of a financial service 
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centre would lead to the return of Taiwanese overseas capital/assets267 (CEPD 2004). 
However, these Taiwanese overseas capital/assets are related to serve Taiwan’s 
overseas investments, so how could the overseas capital/assets return to Taiwan when 
the cross-strait financial exchanges are still highly controlled? The Central Bank of 
ROC also notes that two factors determine why Taiwanese enterprises prefer funding 
overseas: one is the tax-free environment, and the other is the lack of restrictions on 
investments in China from overseas (CEPD 2004). Finally, the original idea of a 
regional financial centre was indeed accompanied by five other regional operation 
centres, meaning that the design of the regional finance centre was based on industrial 
development. However, the revised plan for a regional financial centre was not 
combined with any other industrial regionalisation perspective and ignored the 
restrictions on cross-strait finance.  
Conclusion 
The development of the financial sector and the dynamics of financial capital is one of 
the keys to understanding semi-peripheral ascent as the sector provides industrial 
finance and has become one of most profitable sectors during the B-phase. Between 
1945 and 1987, the KMT state controlled the financial sector and used the whole 
sector to guide and promote selective industries for development. The contemporary 
function of state intervention in finance is very different to the pre-liberalisation 
period. Under the influence of the changes to the capitalist world-system during the 
B-phase, state financial capital has been replaced by private financial capital; financial 
support measures adopted by the state are limited; Taiwan has been integrated into the 
global financial market; and the process of financialisaton has begun. The state no 
longer acts as the primary conduit for financial capital to finance industrial capital. 
Even though the state still supports the financing of target strategic industries, the 
financing method has now been limited to a fiscal one. Overall Taiwan’s financial 
sector and financial capital are transformed into a new stage, seemingly one where 
Taiwan attempts to expand the power of financial capital.  
     However, although both industrial capital and financial capital were influenced by 
the changes to the capitalist world-system, the two types of capital have different 
developmental processes.  Due to political tension between Taiwan and China, the 
                                                 
267
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state is more cautious with regard to cross-strait finance than cross-strait investment 
and trade. Although the concentration of financial capital follows the concentration of 
industrial capital, the expansion of industrial capital overseas has not been 
accompanied by the enlargement of Taiwan’s financial capital trans-nationally. As 
such, the trans-nationalisation of Taiwan’s financial capital and Taiwan’s semi-
peripheral strategy via the aim of an Asian-Pacific regional financial sector cannot be 
developed within the limitations on cross-strait finance. The restriction on cross-strait 
finance has also caused Taiwan’s domestic financial market, following financial 
liberalisation, to be less globalised than the state predicted.            
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Chapter Seven: Labour in Taiwan’s Semi-peripheral Ascent 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapters Five and Six, I discussed how changes to the capitalist world-system and 
state-capital relationship shaped Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent trajectory, via 
analysis of the dynamics of the industrial and financial sectors. The study of the two 
sectors demonstrates the strategies, achievements and obstacles of Taiwan’s semi-
peripheral ascent. I also examined the special role of the Taiwanese state in the 
interstate system (US-Taiwan-China nexus), the structure of capital accumulation 
(semi-periphery), and domestic state-capital relations. However, the state-capital 
relationship is not the full picture of domestic social relations in the process of capital 
accumulation as the subject of labour is absent. This is one of the problems in the 
national model approach of development, in particular in the study of East Asian 
economies, as the issue of labour is under researched. 
      Why is the subject of labour a necessary part of the analysis of domestic social 
relations of national capitalist development? As discussed in Chapter Two, the subject 
of labour has two different roles in capitalism. One is as the producer of value and the 
other is as a social force. As Ougaavd (2004) argues, a group or individuals might not 
constitute a social force even if they are in the same position of production. Only if 
the group shares a collective interest and has the capacity for collective action can it 
be called a social force (p.153).  To examine these dual roles, we can realise on the 
one hand that labour is structured in the capital accumulation process to contribute to 
national ascent, but also on the other hand labour can act as anti-systemic movement 
to resist the logic of capital accumulation.  
      As such, this chapter attempts to analyse the dual roles of labour in Taiwan’s 
capitalist development during the period of 1987 and 2007. In particular, the chapter 
will focus on labour in the industrial sector because: (1) Taiwan’s industrial capital 
and industrial production determine Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent trajectory268; (2) 
the industrial sector is the main engine of production and Taiwan’s economy as a 
whole since the 1970s. Although the industrial sector as a share of total GDP has 
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decreased, from 37.6% in 1986 to 23% in 2006 (CEPD 2007), it does not mean that 
the sector is no longer as important as before. The main reason for the “decline” in the 
sector in the domestic economy is due to an increase in overseas relocation by 
Taiwanese firms269; (3) Taiwan’s organised labour resistance is mainly found in the 
industrial sector. 
   How does labour as labour force contribute to Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent, 
and how does organised labour as a social force resist the logic of national capitalist 
ascent? How does organised labour change the dynamics of domestic social relations 
and Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent trajectory? The discussion of these questions 
will be laid out as follows: firstly, the chapter will discuss how labour, as labour force, 
has contributed to Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent in the last two decades. New types 
of labour forces rise in response to industrial restructuring, namely hi-tech and high-
skilled labour; migrant labour from East Asia; and overseas employment. Overall, 
Taiwan’s labour market has increased the degree of economic globalisation and 
regionalisation. Secondly, the existing old type of labour force needs to adjust under 
industrial restructuring. As such, labour flexibility and structural unemployment have 
increased. In general, the annual growth rate of labour’s average wage has reduced (as 
figure 7-1 will show). Under the changing labour structure, how does organised 
labour respond? Has organised labour been able to strengthen its power and change 
domestic social formation? Has organised labour been able to act as an anti-systemic 
movement regionally and globally in order to resist the logic of capital accumulation? 
These questions will be examined in the third section via the analysis of Taiwan’s 
labour movement. Overall, Taiwanese organised labour has successfully prolonged 
the impact of neo-liberalism and industrial restructuring on the domestic labour 
pattern. However, the structure of the Taiwanese labour movement has not been 
strengthened in confronting the new employment structure. Taiwanese organised 
labour has neither significant political influence over the state and capital, nor does it 
play an active role as an anti-systemic movement.  
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 The size of Taiwanese overseas manufacturing investment reached its first peak in 1986 (since 
1952), and it was higher than domestic fixed capital formation by the manufacturing sector. In 1982, 
the size of Taiwanese overseas manufacturing investment was still lower than domestic gross fixed 
capital formation by the manufacturing sector (CEPD, 2007, table 3-12a; Investment Commission 2007, 
table 17). The share of outward FDI flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation thus 
surpassed 1% in 1987 (3.5%), and increased to 10.3% in 2006, see UNCTAD (16/10/2007). 
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7-1 The Rise of New Types of Labour Force and Polarisation of the Labour Market 
 
This section will focus on the rise of new types of labour force that have resulted from 
Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent. In Chapter four, I mentioned that the specific feature 
of Taiwan’s labour pattern in the period between the 1950s and the 1980s was flexible, 
unprotected, low-skilled female labour in the export-led sectors while semi-skilled 
male labour was in the upstream and intermediate stream sectors. The pattern was 
significantly changed as, firstly, skilled-labour in the electronics industry increased 
due to Taiwan’s dual industrialisation trajectories that shifted to Taiwanese-led, 
export-led, hi-tech electronics industries. This skilled labour undertakes technical and 
professional work as part of a supply chain for global electronic brands in the core 
zone. The second change is with industrial restructuring and the decline of traditional 
industries, where Taiwan now imports low-skilled migrant labour from Southeast 
Asia to provide a cheap labour-supply. Taiwan’s industrial relocation overseas also 
for the most part employs cheap, low-skilled labour in peripheral countries. In other 
words, the unprotected, flexible, cheap, and low-skilled Taiwanese labour has been 
replaced by migrant labour from Southeast Asian and from overseas. As such, these 
three new types of labour force are now Taiwan’s main labour pattern. In particular 
the hi-tech electronics industry not only represents Taiwan’s specific trajectory of 
semi-peripheral ascent, but also demonstrates the employment feature of semi-
peripheral ascent: the industry is composed of a mixture of hi-skilled labour, and low-
skilled cheap (migrant and overseas employed) labour. Such a labour pattern 
structures Taiwan’s position in the capitalist world-system, and leads to a polarisation 
of the domestic labour market.  
Dicken (2004), Luthje (2002) and Henderson (1989) all argue that the 
semiconductor industry is characterised by a specific labour pattern. The industry not 
only has a division of labour in terms of skills, but also has geographical, gender, and 
ethnic divisions of labour (Dicken 2004; Luthje 2002).  As Dicken (2004) notes, the 
labour structure is ‘a polarization of skills in the semiconductor industry between 
highly trained professional and technical workers on the one hand and low-skilled 
production workers on the other hand’ (p.408-409). Their description resembles 
Taiwan’s changing labour structure. On the one hand, Taiwan has developed many hi-
tech technicians with professional skills who enjoy a special wage system (e.g. stocks 
and bonus). In the past two decades, Taiwan’s domestic labour pattern has been 
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upgraded and skilled-labour (technicians and associated professionals) has increased 
from 9.8% in 1988 to 19.6% in 2007; while the numbers of blue-collar workers has 
reduced from 43.2% to 32.3% (CEPD 2008; DGBAS 2008). However, on the other 
hand, the existence of migrant labour and overseas employment shows that Taiwanese 
enterprises still exploit cheap, disciplined, flexible, and non-unionised labour through 
their overseas production.     
     
7-1-1 The rise of a highly-skilled labour force 
 
As the hi-tech electronics industry rises to become the dominant industry in Taiwan, it 
also becomes the industry with the highest employment. At the end of 2007, the 
number of workers in the electronics industry among the total number of 
manufacturing workers in Taiwan was nearly 31% (DGBAS 2008). The electronics 
industry can be divided into three sectors: (1) Computer, communication, and 
consumer electronics (3C); (2) Electronic components; (3) Electronic equipment and 
suppliers. The first two expanded sharply in Taiwan in the 1990s. The percentage of 
workers in the first two sectors only accounted for 8.9% in 1980, and grew to a 
quarter (25.4%) of total manufacturing workers in 2007.  
There is no specific data available about the industry, but the statistics for Hsinchu 
Science Park (HSP) demonstrate the major characteristics of the industry. According 
to the government’s definition, employees who have obtained at least a Bachelor’s 
degree are regarded as R&D researchers at Hsinchu Science Park. In 1990, nearly 
74% of the employees did not hold a Bachelor degree. This declined to 54% in 2007. 
The average age of employees at the science park is 30 years old.  
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Table 7-1: Number and percentage of Taiwanese employees in Hsinchu Science Park 
by education (1990, 1999, and 2007). 
Education 
1990 1999 2007 
person share Person share person share 
PhD 166 0.7 1,078 1.3 1,420 1.1 
Master 1,324 5.9 13,494 16.3 24,465 19.5 
Bachelor 4,348 19.5 17,973 21.7 32,013 25.5 
Junior college 4,312 19.2 19,618 23.6 26,782 21.3 
High school 9,460 42.3 25,310 30.5 32,177 25.6 
Other 2,746 12.2 5,349 6.4 8,732 6.9 
Total 22,356 100 82,800 100 125,589 100 
Source: (HSP Administration various years) 
 
According to the data above, nearly half of HSP employees hold a Bachelor’s degree 
or above and are employed in the position of ‘engineer.’ Currently, there are only a 
few studies available regarding the labour process of engineers in the HSP (Chang et 
al. 2006; Fang 1997; Lin 2004). They are classed as technical and mental labour. Hi-
tech employees’ monthly salaries are much higher than the average manufacturing 
workers (by 25% in 2001). Fang (1997) and Ling (2004) both mention that they have 
longer working hours of between ten and twelve working hours per day, for example. 
However, these engineers do not claim overtime payments. Fang (1997) argues that 
this ‘volunteer overtime work without pay’ occurs for two main reasons: one is the 
adoption of ‘responsible autonomy’270 by engineers; the other is pressure to speed-up 
the production process.  The latter feature (speeding-up production) is due not only to 
the fast business cycle of the hi-tech industries, but also to Taiwan’s position as a 
contract manufacturer in the global electronics industry, as analysed in Chapter Five.      
Two other significant features not only explain why engineers at HSP accept 
voluntary overtime work, but also make clear the reason for the lack of labour 
organisation consciousness in HSP. The first feature is the ‘supervision system’: each 
new engineer is allocated to a senior engineer or a manager who is responsible for 
technical training and resource coordination. These engineers call their tutors “boss.” 
Fang (1997) states that the relationship between the junior engineer and the tutor does 
not conflict because the managers/tutors do not play a role similar to that found in 
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traditional industry, namely monitoring and controlling labour. Rather, these tutors 
offer technical supervision and help to solve technical problems. It is noteworthy that 
such a relationship exists only among engineers. As for low-skilled operators, they 
have to wear clean clothes with a specific number on their back, and their work is 
monitored through television monitors (Lin 2004).  
The second feature is a ‘share-save scheme’, whereby engineers will be given 
stocks (depending on their work performance) as a bonus at the end of the year. Due 
to the fact that hi-tech industries have been booming since the 1990s, the stock price 
in hi-tech listed companies has been rising. Therefore, the earnings engineers gain 
from their stock are usually higher than their regular salary (Lin 2004). Thus, helping 
their company earn more profit in order to obtain more stock is the most important 
concern of these engineers. If the engineers feel dissatisfied with their company, they 
can always choose to change to another company. For example, by conducting a 
questionnaire, Hsu (1999) found that there was high employee turnover (e.g. as high 
as 35% in some companies)271 within HSP companies.     
As mentioned previously, the industry features a polarisation of skills.  In 
Henderson’s (1989) study into the semiconductor industry in the US in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, he found that ‘the development of the semiconductor industry’s component 
labour process resulted in a polarisation in the skill structure of the labour force and 
subsequently the emergence of socially/spatially segregated labour market (p.38)’. He 
concluded that the segregated pattern was that white males dominated skilled jobs, 
while immigrant females, mainly Latinos and Asians, were doing unskilled and semi-
skilled jobs. In Taiwan’s hi-tech industry, a similar segregation of labour can be found; 
namely, local male workers dominate skilled jobs (e.g. engineers) while local female 
workers and migrant workers undertake semi-skilled and low-skilled jobs.  
Firstly, these hi-tech companies still prefer female workers to undertake low-
skilled jobs. In general, female workers are paid less than male workers. Between 
1991 and 2007, the average wage of male workers was between NT$ 29,690 and NT$ 
49,219, while that of female workers was between NT$ 17,946 and NT$ 34,401 
(DGBAS various years-b). In the hi-tech industry, for example, the computer and 
optoelectronics manufacturing industry, the gap is even larger. The average wage of 
male workers in that industry was between NT$ 32,143 and NT$ 60,684, yet for 
female workers it was between NT$ 16,690 and NT$ 37,051 (ibid.). There are more 
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female than male workers in the electronics industry (and in the two hi-tech sectors), 
even though in general more males work in the manufacturing sector. The media often 
reports the increase of females working in the hi-tech sectors, meaning that the quality 
of the female labour force and gender equality is improving. This is a 
misunderstanding, as the majority of female workers in these sectors still undertake 
low-skilled jobs. For example, a top semiconductor company which employs 6,000 
employees, Powerchip Semiconductor Corp., said that female ‘indirect employees’ 
(administrative and engineers) only accounted for 23% of their employees (Tseng 
2006). Yan (1999) points out that between 1984 and 1994, female workers were 
mainly concentrated in lower job positions, such as operators and administration, 
while male workers mainly worked as engineers and professionals. The government’s 
statistics also show that the percentage of female researchers in private enterprises 
was only 13% between 1996 and 2003 (NSC various years).  
Secondly, HSP began to employ migrant labour in 1994. In some years, the share 
of migrant labour of the total labour force at HSP was as high as 8.8 % (in 2003 and 
2004). This migrant labour mainly worked in the downstream factories of the hi-tech 
industry. We will discuss this point in next section.  
 
7-1-2 The import of low-skilled migrant labour272 
 
Following the issue of migrant labour, this section will discuss the new type of labour 
force and their specific labour pattern. Taiwan adopted a labour migration policy (i.e. 
importing migrant labour from Southeast Asia) in 1989, which was not a unique case 
but a common pattern in Asia. The share of intra-regional Asian labour migration of 
Asia’s total labour migration grew from 10% during the 1970s-1980s to 40% during 
1995-2000 (ILO August 2006). In 2000, the ILO estimated the number of Asian 
labour migrants as 2.6 million. According to Wickramasekera (2002), the receiving 
countries include Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Brunei.  
Migrant labour only represented 4.2% of the receiving countries’ total labour 
force (ILO 2006).273 By taking into account that the majority of migrant labourers are 
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“low-skilled” labour.    
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low-skilled workers,274 the share of migrant labour of the total low-skilled labour 
force is higher. For example, in Taiwan, the figure (of low-skilled workers) was 10% 
in 2006. Other common characteristics can be found in Asian labour migration in 
terms of skill composition, gender, and duration of work contracts (Athukorala 2006; 
Dent 2008; ILO August 2006; Wickramasekera 2002). According to these studies, 
Asian migrant labour is mainly low-skilled and semi-skilled; fixed-term temporary 
contract; feminised (in particular more than 60% of Indonesian and Philippino 
migrant workers in Asia are female); and concentrated in construction, labour-
intensive manufacturing, and domestic care sectors. In addition to these “non-decent” 
working conditions, Asia’s increasing labour migration also creates a 
‘commercialisation’ of the private recruitment business that can not be found in other 
regions (ILO August 2006). All of these characteristics can be discovered in Taiwan’s 
immigrant labour.     
In 1989, the Council of Labour Affairs (CLA) outlined a plan for the import of 
migrant labour for companies who were involved in the Fourteen Major Construction 
Projects and Six Year Development Plan.275 The plan was a response to pressures 
from the construction business. In 1991, with the declining trend of traditional labour-
intensive industries, capitalists from these industries requested to expand the quota of 
imported migrant labour to six industries (having fifteen sub-sectors).276 In 1992, the 
Employment Service Act was announced. It has had two implications: firstly, it was 
the first legal/institutional framework to regulate migrant labour; secondly, the quota 
was extended to the service sector (e.g. household maids, domestic nursing, and 
crewmen) and some key export-led industries. As such, the above fifteen sub-sectors 
were extended to 73 sub-sectors in 1993. In 1994, EPZs, Science-based Industrial 
Parks and thirty-eight industries277 were allowed to apply for migrant labour. In 1995, 
another seven industries were allowed to import migrant labour. Accordingly, the 
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 The number of skilled and professional migrant labour is also increasing, due to the growth of FDI 
from Japan and NIEs, but the share is still much lower than low-skilled migrant labour (Athukorala 
2006;Dent 2008) 
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 This paragraph, about the evolution of the government’s migrant labour policy, is drawn from Lee 
(2002, Table one, p.44-45) and Liu (2000, p.86-89). 
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 including construction, textiles, the basic metal industry, fabricated metal, machinery and equipment, 
and electrical and electronic machinery industries 
277
 including major investment-manufacturing which invests more than NT$ 0.2 billion) 
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number of migrant labourers increased from 15,924 in 1992 to 338,755 in 2006 
(Council of Labour Affairs 2007, Table 11-1).  
Several points are noteworthy. Firstly, the idea of importing migrant labour was 
initially only for governmental construction projects. However, following requests 
from industrial capitalists, soon the manufacturing sector employed more migrant 
labour than the construction sector (i.e. in 1995 nearly 77% of migrant labour was 
employed in the manufacturing sector) (Lee, 2002). Secondly, within the 
manufacturing sector, the import of migrant labour was originally for traditional 
labour-intensive industries such as textiles, plastic products, and metal products. 
However, migrant labour in the electronics industry became the largest group in the 
manufacturing sector after 1997 (Table 7-2) following requests from these industries. 
The hi-tech industry employs more migrant labour than the traditional electronics 
industry. For example, the ‘computer, communication and video, radio’ and 
‘electronic parts and components’ industries accounted for 14.25 % of total migrant 
labour employment in 2006 (see Table 7-2).  
 
Table 7-2: Distribution of migrant workers by main sector over various years (person; %) 
 Sector 1992 1995 1997 2006 
1. Total Manufacturing 17,938(35.07) 126,403(76.62) 160,401(65.28) 169,903(50.2) 
     (1) Textiles 4,369 (8.54) 23,435(14.21) 32,956(13.41) 22,454(6.62) 
     (2-1) Electrical &   
electronic machinery 
1,492(2.92) 21,230(12.87) 35,825(14.58) 10,261(3.02) 
(2-2) Computer,  
communication & video,  
radio 
-- -- -- 11,264(3.32) 
(2-3) Electronic parts &  
components manufacturing 
-- -- -- 37,031(10.93) 
(3) Basic metal products 1,704(3.33) 15,363(9.31) 14,885(6.06) 10,434(3.08) 
(4) Fabricated metal products 3,520(6.88) 14,578(8.95) 18,994(7.73) 19.533(5.76) 
(5) Plastic products 2,184(4.27) 11,566(7.01) 11,211(4.56) 10,255(3.02) 
2. Construction --- --- --- 11,745 (3.4) 
3. Nursing workers & home-
maids --- --- --- 153,785(45.39) 
Total migrant labour 51,155(100) 164,973(100) 2456,97 (100) 338,755(100) 
Source: (1) 1992-1997: Lee (2002, Table 2, p.48-49); (2) 1998-2006: Council of Labour Affairs (2003 
and 2007, Yearly Bulletin of Labor Statistics, Table 11-2). 
Note: ‘Electronic parts & components manufacturing’ and ‘Computer, communication & video, radio’ 
began to be calculated from 2003. 
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Thirdly, migrant labour mainly comes from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam (after 1999): intra-regional labour migration. Only a small number come 
from Malaysia and Mongolia (since 2004). Indonesian and Vietnamese workers are 
mainly employed in domestic nursing and as home-maids. The Philippine and Thai 
workers are mainly employed in the manufacturing sector, but the former are 
concentrated in the electronics industry and the latter in the traditional industries 
(Council of Labour Affairs 2007, Table 11-2). Fourthly, initially male migrant labour 
was much greater than female migrant labour, yet in 2001 the share of female labour 
out of the total migrant labour reached 52%, increasing to 62% in 2006.278 This is due 
to an increase in the employment of domestic nurses and home-maids, fields 
dominated by women. Even in the manufacturing sector, the share of Philippine 
female workers out of the total migrant labour from the Philippines (the major 
migrant labour in this industry) in Taiwan grew from 47% in 1998 to 68% in 2006 (it 
was 72% in 2004) (ibid.). From the above data, it can be observed migrant female 
labour is much more favoured by Taiwanese capitalists than male labour. Employers 
prefer female labour because, firstly, hiring migrant labour through temporary 
contracts can help to meet urgent business orders; secondly, it reduces training costs, 
as Philippine workers speak English and are well-educated; Thirdly, female labour is 
generally preferred for low-skilled jobs at HSP (Yang 2001).  
The government claims that the purpose of importing migrant labour in the 
manufacturing sector is to complement labour shortages in the market and to help 
traditional industries with their upgrading. Such a claim is problematic. As Liu argues, 
from 1993 the government used the migrant labour policy as a tool to encourage 
investment (Liu 2000, p.63). It was the major investment sectors, rather than SMEs, 
that were allowed to employ migrant labour. The employment rate of Taiwanese 
labour among the low-skilled job categories declined from 56.8% in 1988 to 45.9 % 
in 1998 (Liu 2000). Even the government argues that the share of migrant labour 
among Taiwan’s total labour force is not significant, for example it only stood at 
3.22% in 2006. However, migrant labour is concentrated in low-skilled jobs and the 
share of migrant labour accounted for 10.3% of Taiwan’s total low-skilled jobs in 
2006. The electronics industry has become the main manufacturing sector to import 
migrant labour, which is increasingly female. This labour serves as a cheap and low-
skilled labour force for the export-led electronics industry. The following section will 
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discuss how the special working conditions of migrant labour in Taiwan contributed 
to Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. The condition resembles another side of Taiwan’s 
semi-peripheral ascent, namely using a cheap and low-skilled labour force from 
peripheral zone. 
 
Guest labour 
Low-skilled workers have been treated as ‘guest workers’ because the Taiwanese 
government only allows low-skilled migrant workers to work temporarily for two to 
three years,279 and migrant labourers thus have no chance to apply for a longer 
residence permit and for naturalisation. Lan (2006) has argued that the system of 
‘guest workers’ in Asia is the most restrictive one, as most of the industrialised Asian 
countries are concerned about their limited territorial space and high population 
densities. In addition, these countries do not tolerate ethnic diversity (p.114). Taiwan 
is one such country. For example, the Taiwanese government forbade migrant labour 
workers marrying in Taiwan, and female migrant workers have to undergo a 
pregnancy test before they arrive in Taiwan, repeating the test once every six 
months.280 Being a guest worker worsens her/his power relationship with their 
employer and agent.281 The workers are non-unionised labour and their temporary 
contract worsens their already weak political position.  
 
Bonded labour 
The discussion above links to a second point: the high placement fee paid by migrant 
workers and their restrictive labour contracts. If migrant workers want to apply for 
jobs in Taiwan, they have to contact their local agency and the latter will contact a 
Taiwanese agency. The Taiwanese agency will contact employers who obtain a quota 
of the number of migrant workers they can employ. As part of this process, migrant 
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 According to the Employment Service Act, low-skilled migrant labour can only work in Taiwan for 
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 Except for the pre-arrival pregnancy test, other regulations were lifted on 7 November 2001 and on 
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 The issue of the relationship between migrant labour and citizenship can be found in Cheng (2002) 
and Tseng (2004)’s study. They analysed the exclusion of migrant workers from citizenship in the 
context of Taiwan’s nationalist politics and state building ideology.  
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workers have to pay placement fees to both agencies.282 The fee varies depending on 
nationality and industry. For example, a Philippine worker has to pay anything from 
US$3,966 to US$6,641 to work in Taiwan for two years; this amount is equal to 
her/his salary in Taiwan for between eight to thirteen months (Asia Pacific Mission 
for Migrants 2002). In addition to this, after they sign a contract with an employer, 
they cannot change this employer unless the latter dies or the company is closed. As 
Chan (1999) notes, this high debt burden and inadequate management leads to many 
migrant workers to runway.283 Before 2001, the government even gave employers the 
right to ask migrant labour to pay “saving funds” each month, which could be up to 
30% of their monthly salary.284 Migrant workers could not have this money back until 
they had finished their contract. The so-called “saving fund” was indeed a kind of 
“deposit” to prevent workers from running away and gave employer more control 
over their migrant labourers. The system operated as a form of bonded labour. 
 
Cheap labour 
The third point relates to wages. Liu (2000) has argued that Taiwan’s shortage of 
labour is indeed a shortage of ‘cheap labour’. According to the CLA’s report, the 
wage gap between migrant labour and local labour was only 10% between 1993 and 
2002 (Lee 2002 and 2007). However, this data has two problems. Firstly, the term 
‘local labour’ in the CLA’s data only means “junior” local labour (those who have 
worked for less than two years). Secondly, the working hours of migrant workers are 
far higher than that of local workers as Table 7-3 shows (working hours gap between 
foreign labour and local junior labour). It is more accurate to compare their “hourly 
wage”. As such, the hourly wage gap between migrant labour and ‘local junior 
labour’ was around 24% between 1993 and 2002 (see Table 7-3). The hourly wage 
gap between migrant labour and ‘local labour’ was more than 50% in 1998, 2000, and 
2003 (Table 7-4). Currently, migrant workers in the manufacturing and construction 
sectors are covered by the Labour Standard Law, which means that they are 
                                                 
282
 Although the Taiwanese government only allows Taiwan’s agencies to charge a placement fee to 
migrant labour of no more than their first month’s salary, they allow agencies to charge a ‘service fee’ 
no more than US$ 1,875 for three years (Lan, 2006, note 16). The Taiwanese agency might ask a 
migrant labour to pay a placement fee as a “personal loan” every month (Asia Pacific Mission for 
Migrants, 2002).  
283
 By the end of 2006 there were 21,051 runaway migrant workers (CLA, 2007). 
284
 This regulation was lifted on 7 November 2001.  
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guaranteed a basic monthly wage (currently US$ 480). Yet business groups continue 
to lobby the government to “delink” the relationship between migrant workers’ wages 
and the basic wage of the LSL.   
 
Table 7-3: Wage and working hours’ gap between local junior labour and foreign 
labour in the manufacturing sector  
  
Wage gap: foreign 
labour/local junior 
labour (%) 
Working hours gap: 
foreign labour/local 
junior labour (%) 
Hourly wage gap: foreign 
labour/local junior labour 
(%) 
1993 88.22 118 74.8 
1994 89.27 113 79 
1995 90.70 122 74.3 
1996 94.20 115 81.9 
1997 96.90 121 80 
1998 96 119 80.7 
1999 95 121 78.5 
2001 80.40 122 65.9 
2002 83.90 124 67.7 
Source: (Lee, 2002 and 2007, Table 1-10). 
Note: The original data is from the CLA. “Local labour” means those junior workers who have worked 
for less than two years.  
 
 
Table 7-4: Average monthly salary and working hours in the manufacturing sector 
(unit: NT$). 
Period Local workers Migrant workers 
1998 
36,546 (198 hrs) 21,006 (239.77 hrs) 
185 / per hr 88 /per hr 
2000 
39,080(198.7 hrs) 21,083 (251.1 hrs) 
197 /per hr 84 /per hr 
2005 
41751 (188.8 hrs) 21, 577 (231.16 hrs) 
221/per hr 93 /per hr 
Source: CLA (1999, 2001 and 2006), Report on the Foreign Workers Administration and Utilization  
Survey; DGBAS (various years), Time Series of Earning and Productivity Statistics Tables  
(http://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas04/bc5/earning/ht456e.asp). 
  249
 
7-1-3 Sweatshops: working conditions in Taiwan’s overseas employment 
 
Apart from migrant labour from Southeast Asia, another way to use cheap and low-
skilled labour from the peripheral zone is through overseas industrial relocation, and 
the method is increasingly important to Taiwan’s industrial capital. The government 
does not collect any data on the number of employees in Taiwanese overseas 
investments. However, the yearbook of Taiwan’s top 100 corporations published by 
the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) started to include the number of 
employees in Taiwan’s overseas investments in 2003. Their figures only show the 
total number of employees in the top 100 corporations. According to the CCIS data, 
between 1990 and 2002 the growth rate of the number of employees in the top 100 
corporations (in Taiwan only) was around 10%. 
     There have been few academic studies into the labour process and working 
conditions in Taiwanese overseas companies, e.g. Kung (2002) and Chen (2005). 
However, several international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Taiwanese 
NGOs, and the media have produced empirical reports on Taiwanese TNCs in China, 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Mexico, and Nicaragua. The Taiwanese TNCs 
investigated in these reports were Taiwan’s top manufacturing enterprises; they either 
have their own brand (e.g. Acer) or are contractors for US and EU electronic TNCs 
(such as OEMs, ODMs or CMs). Chapter Five has discussed the semi-peripherisation 
of the IC and IT industries. This section reveals how Taiwanese overseas enterprises 
manufacture for the branding companies from the core zone by making use of 
workers from peripheral companies.  
According to eleven empirical reports, eight common features of workers’ 
conditions in these Taiwanese enterprises can be identified: (1) Low wages. Some 
companies do not pay minimum wage and overtime wage. Some only pay daily wage 
system. (2) Excessive working hours and enforced overtime work. Workers are forced 
to work overtime and their working hours are more than 60 hours a week (or more 
than 12 hours a day). Some workers need to work for seven days a week. Some are 
forced to sign an agreement to work unlimited overtime if necessary. (3) 
Occupational safety and health risks. Several heath problems are reported but the 
companies refuse to provide appropriate protection. The dormitories are overcrowded 
(e.g. 10-12workers a room). There is no sick leave and a lack of social insurance. (4) 
Inhuman management. Unequal and discriminative management can be found. These 
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reports also found verbal and physical abuse of workers by managers. (5) Prefer 
female workers. These cases are found to prefer hiring female labour. (6) Child labour. 
Some companies employ child labour whose age is under 16 years old. (7) Insecurity 
of work contract. Some workers only have short-term contracts; some are temporary 
workers on a one-year contract. (8) No right of free association. These companies 
forbid workers to organise trade unions, and excludes trade unionists when they 
recruit.  
These eight features are part of the exploitive working conditions (further details 
can be found from Appendix Two).  These reports were investigated in the following 
ways: 
 Kung (2002) analyses a special labour pattern in Taiwan’s overseas enterprises 
in Malaysia: the ethnic division of labour. Taiwanese overseas firms in Malaysia 
prefer to employ Chinese-Malaysians for management, administration and 
technical positions, and to recruit indigenous Malay and migrant labour 
(especially Bangladeshis)285 as production operators. Taiwanese employers treat 
their employees based on their ethnicity.286 
 Tsai (2006) was the former director of a Taiwanese NGO, Ching-Jen Labour 
Service Center. He has studied the working conditions of a Thailand subsidiary 
for one of Taiwan’s top consumer electronics company, Tatung. The subsidiary 
was set up in 1989 and employed 2,000 workers in 2000. However, this number 
was reduced to 409 in 2005 when the main business shifted to China.  
 CEREL (2007), a Mexican-based NGO, published a report in 2007 which 
explored working conditions in fifteen electronics TNCs in Mexico. CEREL 
contacted nearly 2,000 workers and chose 237 cases to document; 74 cases were 
presented in the report. The report refers to the working conditions in Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese company which is a supplier and CM for many international brand 
companies.  
                                                 
285
 Around 16% of labour in Malaysia is migrant labour.  
286
 They offer high wages and give managerial power to Chinese-Malaysians. Apart from cultural and 
religious background, the government’s employment policy is another factor that influences Taiwanese 
employers’ attitude towards workers of different ethnicities. The Malaysian government requires all 
foreign companies to have employees who are at least 30% indigenous Malay workers. Although 
Taiwanese employers have many complaints about indigenous Malays (e.g. not as disciplined as 
migrant labour), they still need to employ them by law.   
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 On 11 June 2006, The Mail on Sunday reported the inhumane working 
conditions at a Foxconn factory in Shenzhen, China (The Mail 18/08/2006; 
Webster 14/06/2006). Following this report, media in the UK, the US, and China 
did follow-up reports (BBC 14/06/2006; Musgrove 16/06/2006).287 Foxconn in 
Shenzhen is an assembly factory for Apple’s iPod. Apple subsequently sent an 
audit team to investigate the working conditions and released a report on 17 
August 2006 (Apple 17/08/2006).  
 SACOM (2006; 2007), a Hong Kong based NGO, produced two reports about 
working conditions of Taiwanese enterprises in China. In their 2006 report they 
interviewed seven Taiwanese companies. In their 2007 report they researched 
Lite-on, a contracting company for Dell, and Lite-on’s two outsourcing factories.  
 SOMO (2005; 2007), a Dutch NGO, published two reports regarding labour 
rights and the corporate social responsibility of Acer’s supplier chain companies. 
The report of 2005 researched five suppliers in the Philippines and China, and 
the report of 2007 studied twenty suppliers in Thailand, China, and the 
Philippines.  
 TSNW (2001), Ralph (2005), and Chen (2005) all discuss one particular 
Taiwanese company in Nicaragua. Nien-Hsin is a Taiwanese textile enterprise 
which invested in a company in Nicaragua called Chentex in 1994. Nicaraguan 
workers tried to organise a trade union but were severely oppressed by the 
employer.  
 
The empirical research mentioned above has demonstrated that the Taiwanese TNCs 
being investigated have not provided “decent” working conditions and have 
suppressed trade union activities. These companies are Taiwan’s top enterprises, and 
are often considered by the Taiwanese government and the media to be “successful” 
cases of overseas investment. However, labour NGOs and international trade unions 
see that these TNCs export not only their capital, but also inhuman management and 
anti-trade union activity.  In these reports, the Taiwanese companies being criticised 
                                                 
287
 It is noteworthy that among these reports, only one Chinese newspaper, the First Financial Daily, 
was sued for US$ 3.8 million by the president of Foxconn, Mr. Terry Guo on 3rd July 2006. The 
company even requested the freezing of two journalists’ assets. Eventually the company reached an 
arrangement with the First Financial Daily in September by abating the charge.  
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are, for example, Foxconn (the world’s top one contract manufacturer in the 
electronics industry), ACER’s supplier chain (ACER is now the world’s second 
largest computer manufacturer), and Lite-on (a contract manufacturer for Dell). The 
common feature that links this labour pattern with these Taiwan companies is that 
these Taiwanese electronics firms are either contract manufacturers made use of 
peripheral employment for a core zone’s TNC, or make use of a supplier chain from a 
peripheral zone to develop its own brand. In other words, the peripheral zone is a 
necessary element for Taiwan’s top enterprises to develop either as the world top 
contract manufacturer or as a world leading brand. Different from migrant labour, 
these peripheral labour patterns do not appear domestically but are located overseas, 
but they nevertheless serve as a distinguishing feature of Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
ascent.  
 
7-2 Impact of Industrial Restructuring on Labour 
 
Section 7-1 discussed how new types of labour are structured into Taiwan’s semi-
peripheral ascent process, and their various working conditions. As for the domestic 
labour pattern, the overall working conditions are affected by Taiwan’s semi-
peripheral ascent via industrial restructuring. The section will examine the impact, 
namely the increase of labour flexibility, the growth of structural unemployment, and 
the declining rate of growth in the real wages of workers.  
 
7-2-1 The increase in labour flexibility   
 
Although Taiwan’s labour pattern before 1984 was already flexible and unprotected, 
the pattern was found mainly in the export-led small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(see the discussion in Chapter 4-3-3).  However, since the early 1990s, the state has 
actively promoted a labour flexibility policy to all industries.  
There is a considerable amount of literature discussing the definition of ‘labour 
flexibility’288 (Huang 2005).  For example, Guy Standing’s six criteria of labour 
flexibility (Standing 1999, p.83-127) - namely production/organisational flexibility,289 
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 Huang (2005) lists ten definitions of labour flexibility from eleven literature sources.  
289
 (1) The increase of TNC global commodity chains has produced a diversity of production systems, 
while also causes a decline of Fordism. (2) The growth of global downsizing, outsourcing and 
contracting out. (3) The increase of small firms and sub-contracting. 
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wage system flexibility,290 labour cost flexibility,291 employment/numerical 
flexibility,292 work process/functional flexibility,293 and job structure flexibility294. 
Since the late 1970s, the Regulation School also analysed the increase of labour 
flexibility as a consequence of economic restructuring in the advanced countries (for 
example, see Jessop 2001).   
      The enforcement of the Labour Standards Law (LSL) in 1984 (a result of Taiwan-
US trade talk of the 1980s) and the creation of the Council of Labour Affairs in 1987 
marked the beginning of a regulated labour market,295  However, a few years later, the 
pressure of industrial restructuring and the emergence of labour protests in the late 
1980s led to the government’s proposal of a new labour flexibility policy in 1991. 
These policies amended the LSL to adopt functional flexibility (extend overtime work 
and shift work) and employment flexibility (the relaxation of contract restrictions). 
The amendment was not approved until the end of 1996, when the government agreed 
to the expansion of LSL coverage to include the service sector; an amendment raised 
by the opposition DPP. After 1996, the government continually presented labour 
flexibility proposals related to wage system flexibility (e.g. the minimum wage, 
individualisation of wage determination), employment flexibility (e.g. encouraging 
the employment of part-time workers) and labour cost flexibility (changing the 
retirement pension payment system). However, none of these amendments were 
successfully approved because of resistance by the labour movement. 
                                                 
290
 (1) The proportion of state benefits and enterprise benefits of the worker’s total social income has 
fallen. (2) The erosion of the minimum wage. (3) Decentralisation and individualisation of wage 
determination. (4) The wage share of GDP has decreased.   
291
 Labour costs include wages as well as non-wage costs. There are ten categories of indirect and 
variable labour costs, namely overhead costs, fiscal costs, training costs, co-ordination costs, protection 
costs, labour turnover costs, motivation costs, productivity costs, adaptability costs, and bureaucratic 
costs. 
292
 (1) In developing countries, migratory labour, labour circulants, contract work, outwork, and sub-
contracting are forms of employment flexibility that are often seen. (2) In developed countries, 
numerical flexibility occurs through forms of casual/ temporary work, consultants or self-employed 
individuals, sub-contractors, agency workers, home-workers, tele-workers, part-time workers, and 
concealed workers. 
293
 (1) Increased managerial control. (2) Working time flexibility (shift working, weekend working, and 
overtime work).   
294
 The “federal” job structure, or the virtual firm, has been developed recently. This job structure is 
“loosened” and emphasises business specialisation. An example of this is that “core” enterprises 
outsource some business to self-employed individuals or teams. 
295
 The service sector was not covered by the Labour Standards Law until 1996.  
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 When the DPP came to power in 2001, the most serious economic recession296 since 
1971 occurred in the third quarter of 2001 (Hung and Li 2001). The real growth rate 
in terms of GDP dropped from 5.8% per annum in 2000 to minus 2.2% in 2001. The 
growth rate of fixed capital formation declined from 8.4% in 2000 to negative 21.1% 
in 2001, and unemployment rate increased from 2.99% to 4.57 % in 2001 (CEPD 
2008, p.4). Under these circumstances, the DPP administration introduced a ‘Scheme 
of Human Resource Development in the New Era’ in April 2001. The DPP followed 
the KMT’s labour flexibility policy to help capitalists to reduce labour costs, 
including proposals to reform retirement pension payments, to withdraw the 
minimum/basic wage, to increase the flexibility of working hours and wage system 
flexibility, to withdraw severance payments, and to increase flexibility of labour 
contracts (CEPD 2001; 2005). Of these proposals, two policies were approved and 
enforced: (1) the expansion of working time flexibility in 2002 (the increasing of 
female workers’ legal overtime working hours, the relaxation of the restrictions on 
female workers in undertaking night work, and the measurement of legal weekly 
working hours on either a fortnightly or an eight week basis); and (2) reform of the 
retirement pension system in 2005 (i.e. shifting responsibility from enterprises to 
individuals).  
As a result, the increase of labour flexibility is particularly evident in large 
enterprises and the hi-tech industries. According to a government survey in 2006, 
33% of employees out of the total number of employees working in companies which 
employ more than 500 workers were classed as ‘agency workers’ (DGBAS various 
years-b). This figure was found to be 15% in companies which employ between 200 
and 499 workers (DGBAS various years-b). In terms of industries, the hi-tech 
industries have a larger share of dispatched labour than did other industries (ibid).  
 
7-2-2 The increase of structural and involuntary unemployment  
 
Taiwan’s national unemployment rate increased from a mere 1.79% to 5.17% in 
2002.297 Taiwan’s rate has been higher than the average unemployment rate in East 
                                                 
296
 According to Hung and Li (2001), Taiwan had seven economic recessions between 1971 and 2001 
(p.8). Hung and Li argue that the main international factor is the over production and business 
recession of the global ICT industry in 2001 (negative growth rate). 
297
 The data in this paragraph is from the official database of unemployment statistics of the DGBAS 
(http://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17144&ctNode=517). 
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Asian countries from 2001 onwards.298 Structural unemployment and involuntary 
unemployment have increased more than the usual cyclical, frictional and voluntary 
employment. Firstly, the number of non-first-jobseekers increased from 58.9% in 
1982 to 80% of the total unemployed in 2006. This shows that, increasingly, 
unemployment is not caused by the “frictional” unemployment of new entrants. 
Secondly, the percentage of company closures as a factor causing unemployment 
increased from 15% in 1982 to 30% in 2007, which surpassed the factor of being 
‘dissatisfied with jobs.’ Finally, the average period of unemployment grew from 15 
weeks in 1993 to nearly 28 weeks in 2005. The above data confirms that there has 
been an increase in structural and involuntary unemployment. 
     Unemployment has mainly occurred in the manufacturing sector. Although the 
number in general employment has increased, the number of manufacturing workers 
has decreased since 1986. For example, according to DGBAS data, the total 
manufacturing labour force reduced from 2,751,153 in 1986 to 2,418,492 in 2001; a 
reduction of 12% (DGBAS various years-a). However, employment in the hi-tech 
sectors increased, while employment in the major industries of the 1960s and 1970s 
(the traditional industries of textiles, clothing, and plastic products) decreased. This 
data reflects an underlying structural change in Taiwan’s economy, from labour 
intensive industries to hi-tech industries. Statistical data from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs reveals that the total number of enterprises that closed between 
1992 and 2006 was as high as 79,138 (MOEA 2007a). In addition, the privatisation of 
SOEs between 1989 and 2003 caused some 100,000 SOE workers to lose their jobs 
(Kong 2006, p.372). In sum, it is evident that the sharp increase in the unemployment 
rate from the 1990s up to the present has mainly been caused by the industrial 
restructuring of the manufacturing sector.  
 
7-2-3 Harder working, but greater inequality  
 
The IMD’s (Graduate Institute of International Management in Lausanne) world 
competitiveness report of 2006 shows that Taiwan was among the top five countries 
with the longest working hours (annual hours: 2,256) (IMD 2007). Indeed, the 
                                                 
298
 According to ILO’s World Employment Report and Global Employment Trends in various years 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/stratprod.htm), the unemployment rate of the East 
Asian region was between 3% and 4% from 2001 to 2006, which was lower than Taiwan’s rate 
(ranging from 3.91% to 5.17%). 
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working hours in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector in previous years were even longer. 
Between 1994 and 2006, the annual working hours in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector 
amounted to 2,335 hours (DGBAS various years-b). However, long working hours 
did not bring about an equal increase in wages and welfare. The annual average 
growth rate of ‘real wages’299 for manufacturing labour began to decline in1989 
(Figure 7-1). Before 1994, the annual growth rate of real wages in the manufacturing 
sector was higher than that of labour productivity. However, after 1994 the latter 
became more than double the former (Figure 7-1). 
 
 
Figure 7-1:  The annual growth rate of average real wages and of labour productivity 
in the manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author’s calculation from DGBAS (various years) and Time Series of Earning and 
Productivity Statistics Tables (http://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas04/bc5/earning/ht456e.asp). 
 
One of the major consequences of the phenomena above was a growth in income 
inequality. The following data illustrates this trend. Firstly, the gap between the rich 
and the poor has grown by 53% over the past twenty years. If one divides all 
households into five groups based on disposable income per household, the income 
gap between the highest fifth of households and the lowest fifth of households stood 
at 4.17 times in 1980. Yet, the gap increased to 6.39 times in 2001 (6.01 times in 2006) 
(DGBAS 2007, Table 3). Secondly, with regards to the number of employed persons 
per household, the gap between the highest fifth of households and the lowest fifth of 
households was 1.8 times in 1980, and grew to 3.93 times in 2006 (ibid, Table 25). 
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 The annual average ‘wage’ growth rate minus the consumer prices index (CPI). 
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Third, the Gini’s coefficient300also shows a similar trend; it was lower than 0.3 during 
the 1970s and the 1980s, but grew to more than 0.3 after 1988, reaching 0.339 in 2006 
(ibid, Table 3). Finally, the income gap within the labour market has also increased. 
The government divides all employees into seven occupational groups.301 The highest 
group earned 3.8 times more than the lowest group in 1980, but the gap reached 4.5 
times in 2006 (ibid, Table 27).  
 
7-3 Strengthening or Weakening of Organised Labour’s Resistance? 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that the structure of Taiwan’s labour pattern has 
changed significantly, corresponding with Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent. Under the 
changes of labour structure, how does organised labour respond? Has organised 
labour been able to strengthen its power and change domestic social formation? Has 
organised labour been able to act as an anti-systemic movement in order to resist the 
logic of capital accumulation? 
Before I discuss these questions, I shall make it clear what is meant by “organised 
labour’s resistance.” Although labour has a dual role, not all labour can be organised 
labour nor may organised labour necessary be transformed into resistance. Firstly, 
labour might not want to change their subordinate position (this is the most common 
case) for a number of reasons. For example, they are satisfied with their work welfare, 
are able to transfer jobs (they have transferable skills or the industry is booming), 
there is entrepreneurship in SMEs. In Marx’s argument (1936 [1847]), class 
consciousness determines if labour is a ‘class-for-itself’ (i.e. one with a class 
consciousness) or a ‘class-in-itself’ (i.e. one defined objectively by its socio-economic 
conditions). This links to the second point, class consciousness and organised forms 
of labour are neither pre-given nor automatic responses to their subordination 
situation. Education, organisation, and campaigns (or struggles) are all necessarily 
methods to awaken class consciousness, and thereby transform labour into organised 
resistance. The role of radical intellectuals (‘organic intellectuals’ in Gramsci’s 
                                                 
300
 The Gini coefficient can assess the degree of concentration (inequality) of a variable in distribution 
of its elements. 
301
 (1) Legislators, government administrators, business executives and managers; (2) Professions; (3) 
Technicians and associate professionals; (4) Clerks; (5) Service workers, shop and market sales 
workers; (6) Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry workers and fishermen; (7) Craft and related 
workers, plant and machine operators labourers.  
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terms)302 and labour movement leaders are thus significant. As the section will discuss, 
these roles actually determine the agenda for organised labour’s resistance in Taiwan.  
 
7-3-1 The resurgence of labour resistance 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the dynamics of organised labour in the pre-1980s 
period was “silent and disciplined” as they were oppressed by the authoritarian KMT. 
The silent situation however has changed since the mid-1980s and there has been a 
rise of labour resistance against the state and capital. What are the factors behind the  
increase in strength of labour resistance? Firstly, the enforcement of the Labour 
Standards Law (LSW) of 1984 provided the legal framework for labour to struggle for 
their basic rights. It was a milestone for Taiwan’s labour to voice their concerns over 
working conditions. However, it needs to be born in mind that the LSW was a 
consequence of US-Taiwan trade talks in the 1980s (see Chapter 5-1) rather than an 
outcome of labour resistance. Labour disputes thus grew sharply after 1985, and cases 
increased from 907 in 1984 (with 9,069 workers involved) to 1,443 in 1985 (with 
15,486 workers involved). Secondly, industrial restructuring had a negative impact on 
labour’s working conditions, as discussed in the previous section, in terms of the 
increase of structural and involuntary unemployment and the growth of labour 
flexibility. The type of labour dispute shifted from bonus payment disputes to the 
protection of employment (e.g. contract disputes) after 1989.303 Thirdly, 
democratisation and the lifting of Martial Law gave organised labour the right to 
industrial action under some restricted conditions. There were more than 15 cases of 
strikes and slowdowns within six months in 1988304, mainly occurring in the public 
transportation and manufacturing sectors. Most of these cases concerned workers’ 
year-end bonus payments and overtime wages. Finally, radical intellectuals have 
                                                 
302
 Organic intellectuals are a particular group of intellectuals that work with the working classes. They 
behave as organizers or a thinking element that leads to the ideas of their class. The organic intellectual 
is distinguished from the traditional intellectual, those who regard themselves as independent from the 
dominant social group. 
303
 Between 1976 and 1988, the largest three dispute types were bonus payments (28.6%), contracts 
(28.2%) and wages (19.3%)303. From 1989 to 2006, the order was contract disputes (40.6%), wage 
disputes (35.5%), and occupational hazards disputes (7.3%).  
304
 This information is from the database of a major newspaper, the United Daily Newspaper. The 
author searched the database with the term “strike” between 01/07/1988 and 31/12/1988, and found 15 
cases among 537 reports.  
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actively played an important role in mobilising the resistance of organised labour, 
which will be discussed in 7-3-2.   
 Most labour disputes are dealt with through legal means of conciliation between 
labour, employers, and local government. However, the legal procedure is not very 
helpful to labour, in particular when the dispute involves a large number of workers 
and a great deal of money. Labour can apply for conciliation of a labour dispute in the 
locality where their workplace or the head-office of the company is located. A local 
government officer will call a conciliation committee meeting attended by the 
company, the employees and mediation members standing for both parties. However, 
it is not compulsory for the company to attend the meeting. The only enforceable 
regulation is that the company cannot refuse investigation by the mediation committee 
members.305 As such, some labour disputes needed “additional” methods, such as to 
organise protests and strikes.306 The first (illegal) significant strike occurred in 
February 1988, after the lifting of Martial Law on 15 July 1987.307 In general, the 
main issue of concern that caused the collective action of labour in the late 1980s was 
the violation of the LSL by employers (Hsiao, 1992a; Lin 1987), the same as the 
pattern of labour disputes. The resurgence of labour resistance in the 1980s was also 
part of a broader social movement of dissent and the political democratisation 
movement.308 As Hsiao (1992b and 2006) argues, a broad range of social movements 
and civil protests in the 1980s (including labour movements, consumer protection, 
farmers, environmentalism, gender equality, minority identity, and urban housing) 
significantly challenged state-civil society relations, and thus facilitated Taiwan’s 
political democratisation. 
     The intensity of labour strikes was reduced after 1989 due to the failure of two 
significant strikes. The first of these failures was the Far-East Chemical Fibre 
Worker’s strike of May 1989, which was led by the strongest trade union in existence 
at that time.309 After their failure, more than 400 workers and labour movement 
activists were either fired or prosecuted (Academic Sinica and Taipei National 
                                                 
305
 See the Settlement of Labour Disputes Law, Articles 9-23 from 
http://laws.cla.gov.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp.  
306
 For details of cases between 1986 and 1989, see Ho (1990).  
307
 Between 1983 and 1987 there were several strikes that occurred in local bus companies. They 
neither involved more than 60 workers nor lasted over 20 hours, see Lin (1987).  
308
 Chu’s (1994) study points out that the frequency of social protests grew from 143 in 1983 to 676 in 
1987. 
309
 For an introduction to this strike, see Chu (1996). 
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University of the Arts 2001). The second failure was a strike that occurred in the 
export processing zone in December 1989. The leader of the strike was arrested and 
sentenced to one and half a years in prison. In 1990, the new Prime Minister, Ho Pei-
Tsun, claimed that labour movement activists were ‘social movement gangsters’ who 
should be controlled by the special police force (i.e. Taiwan Garrison General 
Headquarters) (Kuai 1990/08/28). These two failures can be viewed as a “victory” of 
the state and capitalists over the rise of a militant labour resistance.  
      In the 1990s, the majority of labour protests concerned employment rights and 
severance pay. Many factories suddenly closed without notice to workers, and 
overdue wages were owed for several months. The large number of labour protests 
that took place over the closure of factories caused the government to draw up a draft 
bill, the ‘Enterprises Closure Law’, and the government has provided unemployment 
allowance since 1996.310 Unlike the strikes and protests led by autonomous trade 
unions in the late 1980s, the labour movement in the 1990s was led by non-unionised 
labour. The pressure of losing jobs enabled workers to organise themselves to protest 
in a short time. However, such an ad-hoc organisation is easily dissolved after 
requests are more or less conceded to.     
     Apart from the manufacturing sector and transportation sector, organised labour’s 
resistance was also raised by state-owned-enterprises’ (SOEs) trade unions. They 
either struggled for the improvement of working conditions or against the 
privatisation policy. Not only were their concerns different from private sector 
workers, but also their method of resistance. The SOEs trade unions did not strike, but 
applied for sick leave or a day off to organise a public rally. In 1995, SOE trade 
unions and a labour NGO (Taiwan Labour Front) proposed a draft bill, the Industrial 
Democracy in State-owned Enterprises bill (Chang 2002). The bill had three core 
demands: (1) Employees should have representatives on the board of directors of their 
enterprise (the so-called Labour Directors on the board). (2)The appointment of high-
level managers should be approved by trade union members. (3) The opinions of the 
trade union should be obtained in advance for both the design of work rules and the 
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 The draft ‘Enterprises Closure Law’ was withdrawn as the government thought the draft regulated 
the enterprises too much. The draft was modified to a less radical and less restrictive, ‘the Protective 
Measures for Mass Redundancy of Employee’, in 1999. The unemployment allowance amounted to six 
months pay based on the basic wage (US$ 495 per month). It was extended to a system of the 
unemployment insurance payment in 1999. The insurance fee was paid by the government and 
enterprises, and the payment is half a worker’s wage.    
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structural change of the enterprise’s business. However, the bill was not approved by 
the Legislative Yuan. Only the first demand was approved as an amendment of the 
Act of State-owned Enterprises Management in 2000.311 In general, the above 
organised labour’s resistance (either from the private or the public sector) was 
concerned with the “legal” working conditions that existed after the Labour Standard 
Law was enforced in 1984, but soon shifted to protesting for employment rights due 
to industrial restructuring.    
 
 
7-3-2 Organised labour as a social and political force 
 
The resistances mentioned above were raised either by trade unions at a basic level 
(the plant-based union mentioned in Chapter Four) or by groups of non-unionised 
workers. Few of these massive labour protests were assisted by their superior unions 
(industrial federation or local/national federations). These organised resistances 
highlighted the weakness and inability of the official trade union federations. As such, 
several alliances of militant trade unions were formed in the late 1980s.312 These new 
organisations do not have official registration (except for the bank employees unions), 
and accordingly, they are called “unofficial federations of trade unions.” From 1997, 
these unofficial federations formed a joint preparatory committee called the Taiwan 
Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU). They argued that the monopoly national 
federation, the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL), had neither represented trade 
unions’ interests nor struggled for workers rights. The demand for the establishment 
of a new official national trade union federation was accepted in 2001 by the 
government313 when the DPP came to power. Overall these unofficial trade unions 
                                                 
311
 Under the new amendment, at least a fifth of the directors from the government’s share should be 
trade union representatives. 
312
 The national level includes: the Brotherhood Union (1987.12-1989.3), the National Alliance of 
Autonomous Unions (1988.5- current), and the National Federation of SOEs Trade Unions (1994.9- 
current).The industrial or regional level alliances include: the Alliance of Trade Unions in the Taiwan 
Taoyuan International Airport (1990.4-2000), the National Federation of Bank Employees Unions 
(1993.9-current), the Federation of Warehouse and Transportation Workers (1993.11-current), and the 
Federation of Mass Communication Workers (1996.1-current). 
313
 Taiwan’s Trade Union Law only allows one national level of federation of labour for registration, 
thus legitimising the monopoly of the CFL. The DPP government lifted this restriction, however, in 
2001.  
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and labour resistance are termed as ‘autonomous labour organisations’, in contrast to 
official trade unions which were controlled by the KMT and by the enterprises.  
     In Chapter Two, I argued that radical intellectuals played a role to transform 
organised labour into resistance. This is the case for Taiwan. The role of the labour 
movement NGOs is very significant because they advocate working-class awareness 
and research labour policies and laws. They also provide a resistance strategy and 
legal assistance, all of which help to transform “labour” into “organised labour 
resistance”. The core members of these NGOs are trade union leaders, intellectuals, 
former student movement activists, journalists, and lawyers. Their relationship with 
trade unions has several forms: (1) to play the role as an advisor; (2) to work in the 
trade union secretariat; (3) to invite trade union leaders to join the NGO’s executive 
board. In sum, it is the labour NGOs that have primarily led the direction of Taiwan’s 
organised labour resistance.314 The policies and issues raised by labour NGOs tend to 
become the objectives of struggle by the labour movement. The NGOs serve as the 
“strategic” intellectuals of the broader labour movement. Apart from issues related to 
working conditions,315 how do they view about Taiwan’s ascent strategy and the 
impact of industrial restructuring? The labour movement proposed some agendas 
related as illustrated in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314
 The relationship between trade unions and these labour NGOs is not always harmonious, especially 
for the trade union leaders who have political and social resources. Trade union leaders are aware that 
only trade unions have mobilisation capability. However, they still rely on the policy supervision 
provided by the labour NGOs.   
315
 e.g. the reduction of working hours, labour retirement reform, protection of irregular workers, 
extending the LSL coverage, unemployment insurance, and so on 
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 Table 7-5: Demands Made by the Labour Movement 
Ascent strategy 
and industrial 
restructuring 
Labour NGOs’ demands Adapted by 
the 
government 
or the 
business 
The 
regionalisation/ 
globalisation of 
Taiwan’s 
industry 
(1) Against Taiwanese companies moving overseas 
(1992); (2) Restrict the international movement of 
Taiwanese capital; (3) Overseas Taiwanese 
companies should pay an ‘employment security 
fund’ to Taiwan’s government; (4) The government 
should require overseas Taiwanese companies to 
neither close Taiwan’s factories nor lay off 
workers; (5) Overseas Taiwanese companies’ 
Taiwan branches should stop employing migrant 
labourers and should employ more middle-aged 
workers (2000).    
None of 
them  
The decline of 
traditional 
industries 
Increase the penalty to those closure enterprises’ 
owners. 
None of 
them 
The 
concentration of 
private capital 
(1) Nationalisation of business groups (1997); (2) 
Reform Tax system. 
None of 
them 
The privatisation 
of SOEs 
(1) Against privatisation (1993); (2) Transferring 
SOEs’ shares should involve distribution to all 
citizens; (3) The government should review and 
reconsider the privatisation policy (2000); (4) The 
representative forms of industrial democracy 
(1995) 
Only part of 
the fourth 
demands 
Source: (Lin, 2005, p.104-159; TLF, 2000). 
 
Overall, the labour movement successfully organised many protests and helped 
workers when their enterprises closed. The labour movement put forward one Labour 
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bill that was turned into legislation316and they have helped to modify the law.317 They 
also successfully pressurised the government to introduce new labour laws.318 They 
have stopped proposed amendments to labour laws made by the government when 
these proposals would seriously damage labour and trade union rights. However, it is 
hard to conclude that Taiwan’s labour movement has either been strengthened under 
industrial restructuring, or has influenced Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent trajectory. 
Firstly, resistance from organised labour failed to stop two amendments related to the 
increase of labour flexibility. Secondly, most of the labour movement’s issues and 
proposals regarding Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent and industrial restructuring are 
neither adopted by the government nor business, as the above table shows. Thirdly, 
the fragmentation of the trade union structure has not changed. The labour movement 
requested the opening of organising federation unions at the national level. Such a 
request was approved when the DPP came to power. Nevertheless, the fragmentation 
of the trade union structure at the shop-floor level has largely been ignored. So far, 
there is no industrial union to which all workers in the same industry are affiliated. All 
trade unions newly established after the late 1980s are still either enterprise-based or 
plant-based, which lack financial resources. The concentration of Taiwanese capital 
has not brought about a parallel concentration of trade union structure and organised 
labour’s power. Another two significant factors related to the weakening of Taiwan’s 
organised labour resistance will be introduced in the next two sections, namely the 
lack of political power, the absence from the new type of labour force (including the 
weak link with the anti-systemic movement). 
 
Organised labour as political force 
Organised labour is both a social force and a political force. What is meant by 
“political force” here is a narrow term that refers to organised labour that can organise 
as an independent political party to directly influence politics. After the establishment 
of the DPP, one of the founders was disappointed about the DPP’s labour policy and 
pro-independence stance. He organised the Workers Party on 1st November 1987. 
This party was composed of militant trade union leaders and socialist intellectuals, 
                                                 
316
 Protection for Workers Incurring Occupational Accidents Ac (31/10/2001) 
317
 The Labour Standards Law (02/12/1996) and the Act of State-owned Enterprises Management 
(19/07/2000). 
318
 Enforcement Rules of the Employment Insurance Law (01/01/2003) and the Protective Act for Mass 
Redundancy of Employees (07/02/2003). 
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and they were actively involved in many labour protests. However, internal conflicts 
within the Workers Party caused some members to leave the party and establish 
another class-based party, the Labour Party (Ladodang), in 1989.319 In the election 
which combined legislator, city councillor, and city mayor in 1989, the Workers Party 
won only one seat in the city council whilst the DPP obtained 22% of all votes. From 
then on, they no longer had any political power. As for the Labour Party, they 
maintain a pro-unification plus socialist stance. They have neither won any election, 
nor have they ever nominated candidates after the congressional elections of 1996. In 
sum, the labour movement’s political power through their own political parties has 
been marginalised. 
     However, the mainstream parties are still influential on the labour movement even 
after Taiwan’s democratisation. Apart from the political control by the KMT over the 
official trade unions, the DPP has a strong influence on the autonomous trade union 
movement. The DPP formed a Labour Group in 1991. One of the DPP’s factions, 
New-tide, was very active in the new social movements. One of their missions was to 
organise activists from student movements, labour movements, peasant movements, 
and environmental movements into the DPP’s political movement against the KMT 
and in favour of pro-independence. In the labour movement, the Labour NGO 
mentioned above, The Labour Front (TLF), was viewed as an arm of their 
organisation (Hsu 2003; Lin 2005). The TLF drafted a white paper on labour policy 
for the DPP during the first presidential election in 2000. When the DPP came to 
power in 2001, the Trade Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) was recognised as 
another official national federation. This was viewed by some labour activists as a 
victory for the autonomous labour movement. However, thereafter there was a power 
struggle within the secretariat and executive boards of the TCTU, a situation that, not 
only showed a weakening of the labour movement, but also showed the long-term 
conflict that existed among the three labour movement NGOs. The TLF fully controls 
the secretariat of the TCTU. The consequence is that the TCTU has been viewed as 
maintaining a pro-DPP stance320. 
                                                 
319
 According to Lin’s interview, the members who remained in the Workers Party insisted that the 
labour movement’s current objective should be to engage in parliamentary democracy, yet members 
who left and established the Labour Party argued that the current objective should be strengthening the 
trade union system (2005, p.32).   
320
 Indeed, three chairpersons of the TCTU were appointed as a DPP legislator, advisor to the 
President’s Office, and the Minister of the Council of Labour Affairs.     
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On the other hand, when the KMT lost the presidential election in 2001, the 
subsequent election in the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL) was influenced by the 
political change. One independent candidate, Lin Hua-Kuan (1957-2009), from the 
Taiwan Rail Workers Union, was elected as the chairman of the CFL. This was the 
first time that the chairman of the CFL was not decided by the KMT. When Lin came 
to power in the CFL, he tried to cooperate with other labour movement NGOs who 
were excluded from the TCTU secretariat. Such a temporary alliance led to a 
successful campaign in 2001 to reduce the legal working hours from 48 hours per 
week to 84 hours fortnightly. The successful campaign led by the CFL against the 
DPP administration gained the attention of both the KMT and the People First Party 
(PFP).321 Accordingly, by the end of 2002, Lin was appointed by the PFP as a 
legislator. During his two terms in the CFL, Lin worked closely with the PFP. In 2007, 
one candidate (who is also a KMT legislator) won the CFL’s election, so the CFL has 
now “returned” into the hands of the KMT.  
     The above discussion shows that Taiwan’s trade union movement has been 
influenced by the main parties and political change, rather than vice versa. The end of 
the authoritarian regime contributed to political democratisation in terms of the 
growing opposition party and social movement, but did not bring about the 
strengthening of the trade union movement in terms of political influence. Although 
more and more trade union leaders (even from the camp of the autonomous labour 
movement) are being appointed to political positions in the government and in the 
Legislative Yuan, the political power of organised labour is actually weakening. The 
development of the TCTU and the CFL has actually had a negative impact on the 
trade union movement as the leadership in the two unions pursue more personal 
political advantages rather than organised labour’s collective strength.  
7-3-3 Absence of organised labour resistance in new types of labour force 
 
Another weak presence of organised labour’s resistance is the absence of labour 
resistance in Taiwan’s new types of labour force. The discussion in section 7-1 has 
mentioned that the number of hi-tech workers accounted for nearly 25% of the total 
labour force in 2006, and migrant labour accounted for 10% of the total low-skilled 
labour in the same year, while employees of overseas Taiwanese enterprises was the 
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 It is the third biggest party which spilt from the KMT in 2001.  
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same, amounting to 9-12% of Taiwan’s employed persons. These workers (in the hi-
tech sector, migrant labour and overseas employees) are the main actors that have 
contributed to Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent. However, none of these types of 
labour have been paid attention by Taiwan’s trade unions.  
 
Non-unionised labour in the hi-tech industry and in migrant labour 
For the hi-tech electronics industry, so far no single trade union or employees’ 
association have existed in the Science Parks. Only a few trade unions exist in the 
electronics companies which were transformed from electronic equipment 
manufacturing to ICT manufacturing. However, the members of these trade unions 
are mainly operators. Several reasons account for the difficulty of organising a trade 
union in the industry. Firstly, a zero-unionised pattern is the global situation in the hi-
tech industries (Steiert 2006). Secondly, both the EPZs and the Science Park are not 
supervised by the Council of Labour Affairs, but rather by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. These workers are in no doubt protected by the Labour Standard Law, but 
once they have a labour dispute, the settlement system is different from that of 
industries outside the EPZs and the Science Park. The EPZs and the Science Parks are 
“special labour zones” that have a different labour system from labour outside the 
zone. Thirdly, features of the labour process of technicians/engineers are very 
different to the labour processes found in the traditional manufacturing sectors, as I 
discussed in section 7-1-1. Thirdly, the internal differences within the sector (e.g. 
engineers vs. low-skilled operators) also cause difficulty in organising enterprise-
based trade unions. It might be ineffective if the labour movement activists try to use 
the ‘old’ way to organise workers in the hi-tech sector.322   
As for migrant labour, the majority of trade union leaders are from the traditional 
industries. They are aware of the issue of migrant labour; however, they are more 
concerned that migrant labour might take their jobs than the migrant labour’s 
inhumane working conditions. The Trade Union Law allows migrant labour to join a 
trade union on the condition that they cannot be elected to the executive board. In 
reality, no migrant labourers have joined a trade union. Their temporary contracts and 
huge debt burden are the main reasons for this, as section 7-1-1 mentioned. Separation 
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 For example, labour movement activists normally begin to organise labour when the latter have a 
labour dispute. For conservative trade unions, these activists will help them to transform to a militant 
one; for non-unionised workers, these activists will help them to set up either a plant-based or an 
enterprise-based trade union.  
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between local labour and migrant labour is a further problem. Only some NGOs from 
the Catholic and labour NGOs have tried to organise migrant labour. Their main 
concerns are the general working conditions of migrant labour and related policy, e.g. 
to lobby the government to extend employment contract periods regulated in the 
Employment Service Act, to contend that domestic care workers should be included 
in the Labour Standard Law. They organised rallies on Human Rights’ Day in 2003, 
2005, and 2007.   
 
 International solidarity or networking? 
As discussed previously, the feature of Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent is to export 
industrial capital and to make use of global production chains. In particular in the hi-
tech electronics industry, Taiwan is now the leading contract manufacturer for top 
brands from the core zone. Such an achievement is also based on the use of peripheral 
labour in China and Southeast Asia. In the industry, labour from Taiwan, the core 
zone and the peripheral zone have formed global production chains. Taiwan’s position 
in the capitalist world-system provides an opportunity for labour to organise 
themselves internationally.  
Taiwanese trade unions have participated in international trade unions for decades 
(see the list in Appendix three). However, some of this participation originated more 
from “diplomatic” factors than from concerns about worker solidarity. When the 
Kuomintang came to Taiwan, they not only dominated the settlement of the trade 
union structure, but assisted the trade unions in joining the international labour 
community. Due to Taiwan’s weak international status, the opportunity to join the 
international community through unofficial ways (e.g. through NGOs) was 
encouraged by the government.323 Most trade unions complained that they did not 
have enough resources, including finance, language capability and knowledge, to 
participate in international organisations. It needs to be noted that “participation” here 
means attending/hosting conferences, meetings and networking. Few trade unions 
really made use of international networking to deal with cross-national industrial 
disputes.324 One major reason for this was that the unions which actively participated 
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 Some membership fees to join the international trade union federations were met by the government.  
324
 In the past five years, only Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union and Taiwan Railway Workers’ 
Union have asked for international support for an anti-privatisation strike.  
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in international networking were state-owned-enterprise unions and craft unions and 
the nature of their industries did not link to cross-national networks of production.  
     On the other hand, some Taiwanese labour NGOs are very actively engaged in 
international worker solidarity networking. Two famous cases, the Niensien-Chentex 
Corporation industrial dispute in Nicaragua, and the Tainan Enterprise industrial 
dispute in El Salvador, originated from Taiwanese enterprises325 repressing local trade 
unions’ rights and thereby causing trade unions and labour NGOs in the US, Taiwan, 
and Nicaragua/El Salvador to form an international campaign network. Chen (2005) 
has provided a detailed study of the two cases.  
      The above two cases concerned Taiwanese corporations in Latin America. 
Regarding Taiwan’s main investment area, East Asia, some regional networks have 
been organised by Hong Kong labour NGOs, AFL-CIO (American labour federation), 
and European NGOs.326 In 1995, two occupational safety incidents occurred in Asia: 
one in Thailand and the other in China. In these incidents a number of female workers 
were killed by fires at two toy factories. Initially, Hong Kong labour NGOs 
cooperated with Thai labour NGOs to start an international campaign about the two 
toy factories, with the issues of occupational safety and health later being extended to 
include other workers’ rights and issues. Most importantly, the cross-national network 
was widespread in other Asian countries, including Taiwan. In 2002, a Hong Kong 
NGO, the Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC), suggested enacting an ‘Asian 
Transnational Corporation-ATNC Monitoring Network’ to organise 37 organisations 
within Asia. As Chang (2003) argues, Asian TNCs in labour intensive industries in 
Asia not only supply Asia’s lesser-known brand names, but also ‘enjoy the lack of 
social pressure on their suppressive labour control’. The ATNC project therefore 
targeted Asian NIEs’ TNCs - mostly those of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. However, in the three years that have passed since its inception, the project 
seems to be mainly a cross-national network that exchanges information and 
resources. Since 2006 there has been no update of the information about the project 
on their website (http://atnc.org/html/aboutus). No cross-national industrial disputes 
have been settled via the network (unlike the two Taiwanese cases mentioned above). 
Most of the participants are from labour NGOs, with few trade unions being involved. 
                                                 
325
 The two corporations both produce textile and garment products which supply well-known brand 
TNCs like Levi’s, Gap, and Ann Taylor.  
326
 The following descriptions are based on the author’s interview with Tsai Jin-je on 27 April 2006. 
Tsai was the director of the Ching-Jen Labour Service Centre.  
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Another significant problem is related to the finance of the project, which has mainly 
been derived from a British NGO and will, in the near future, stop.327 However, the 
project at least has made an effort to collect information and analyse the special 
situation of Asian FDI and labour; a move which could facilitate future solidarity.  
     Two further two regional networks have been established by the Solidarity Centre 
of AFL-CIO and some Western NGOs such as Oxfam and the Clean Cloth Campaign 
(CCC). The Solidarity Centre ran the ‘Corporation Social Responsibility (CSR) of 
Taiwanese business’ project between 2001 and 2003, which included organising 
seminars and workshops, as well as arranging international trips to certain Asian and 
Latin American countries. They tried to cooperate with two national federations (CFL 
and TCTU), labour NGOs and the Council of Labour Affairs (CLA)328 in order to call 
for Taiwanese businesses to respect trade union rights and CSR. The program was 
finished when the funding from the CLA ended. One of the participating 
organisations mentioned that even though the idea of CSR was brought to Taiwan, it 
had no practical implementation, with the issue so far only being raised occasionally 
by the government. As for the meetings of the ‘East Asian Labour’s Round Table 
Forum’ facilitated by Oxfam and CCC, they invited Asian NGOs and some trade 
unions to join the Olympic Games Campaign and targeted large, famous brand TNCs 
from the EU and the US. This is, however, a case-oriented network more than a long-
term institutional linkage. In sum, it is the labour NGOs that mainly undertake cross-
national labour solidarity projects, and there is still no strong interaction between 
Asian regional trade unions and Asian labour NGOs. Finance is the main difficulty for 
Asian labour NGOs in organising regional networks.  
Conclusion 
In the 1950s and the 1960s it was the agricultural sector, composed of smallholders, 
that was the engine of Taiwan’s economy as the main producer and exporter). When 
Taiwan was transformed from an export-led agrarian economy to export-led 
industrialisation from the late 1960s, Taiwan’s export-led sectors were constituted by 
surplus labour from the agricultural sector and several kinds of flexible/irregular 
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 According to the interview, there is only one full-time member of staff in Hong Kong working for 
this project. According to the author’s email with Tsai Jin-je on 18 September 2008, this ATNC project 
is still ongoing as they have received other funds, their website is http://www.atnc.org 
328
 Some Taiwanese trade unions complained that the Solidarity Centre received funding from the 
Taiwanese government (the CLA) to host these activities.  
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labour in SMEs. This labour formed an international division of labour with TNCs 
from the core (mainly the US and Japan) (Frobel et al. 1980; Gereffi 1993). When 
Taiwan became a capital-export country after 1988, Taiwan made use of migrant 
labour and various flexible workers from peripheral zones, something similar to the 
TNCs from the core previously in Taiwan.  What has happened since then? 
Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent since the late 1980s not only needed a state’s 
ascent strategy and capital’s expansion, but also needed an adjustment of the labour 
force. As such, three new types of labour force have become the main producers, 
namely hi-tech skilled labour, migrant labour from Southeast Asia, and overseas 
employed workers. Taiwanese labour upgraded their skills and improved their 
working conditions, yet Taiwanese capitalists still require a large, cheap, low-skilled 
labour for capital accumulation.   
     In domestic social relations, Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent and industrial 
restructuring have had an impact on Taiwanese labour working conditions (in 
particular in the declining traditional industries), namely the increase of labour 
flexibility, the increase of structural and involuntary unemployment, and the growth 
of income inequality. Except in the hi-tech industries, Taiwanese labour has not 
benefited from the semi-peripheral ascent and industrial restructuring. Such a conflict 
between the expansion of Taiwanese capital and the impact on Taiwanese labour is 
not unique. It is what the expansion of capitalist world-system requires: in order to 
expand the scale of capital accumulation, labour costs need to be reduced as much as 
possible. Since labour is a necessary part of capital accumulation, organised labour 
exists to counter the logic of capital accumulation and to alter their weak position.  
     In the case of Taiwan, before the 1980s, the “silent” labour movement was due 
more to the nature of the authoritarian regime. Since the late 1980s, political 
democratisation, although it promoted a resurgence of organised labour’s resistance, 
such resistance has not turned into a powerful political force. Although semi-
peripheral ascent and industrial restructuring have shaped the structure of the labour 
force and have had impact on working conditions, Taiwanese organised labour has 
not yet demonstrated a powerful response. The resistance has been mainly based on 
“defensive” and “legal” struggles over employment rights and working conditions. 
Overall, the resistance has not altered the trajectory of Taiwan’s semi-peripheral 
ascent and the logic of capitalism, nor has resistance been transformed into an anti-
systemic movement.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
How can national capitalist development be analysed? The national model approach 
argues that domestic institutional framework, domestic economic policy, or domestic 
state-capital relations are keys that determine national development. Once a country 
follows a “correct” policy or institutional framework, it will be able to ascend. The 
approach first studies advanced countries (e.g. Britain in modernisation theory, Japan 
and Western Europe in the school of varieties of capitalism), and then researches East 
Asian NIEs (i.e. the school of developmental state). The approach provides useful 
analysis on the domestic context of national development, in particular in the role of 
the state in the ascent of NIEs. However, their fundamental assumption about national 
capitalist development is that it is primarily driven by the domestic context, and there 
is more than one national model of development in which one model is superior to 
another. The thesis argues that national economies are not isolated, independent, self-
contained systems from the world-economy, but are structured as part of the world-
economy via a hierarchy of capital accumulation. Although national policies and 
national institutional arrangements can to some extent be learned and copied from 
others, a country’s fundamental ascent trajectory of integration into the capitalist 
world-system cannot be simply by imitation.  
     On the other hand, the world-system perspective provides an analytical framework 
that places national capitalist development in the context of the capitalist world-
system. The system operates through a hierarchy of capital accumulation (i.e. core-
semi-periphery-periphery nexus), the interstate system (hegemonic transition and 
geopolitics), the cyclical movement of capitalism and hegemony, and anti-systemic 
movements. National ascent is conditioned and constrained by the dynamics of the 
capitalist world-system. I agree with their analytical framework for capitalism and its 
relations with national economies. However, the weakness of the perspective lays in 
the lack of sufficient studies of the semi-peripheral zone and lack of sufficient 
analysis on domestic social relations. Since national capitalist development is not 
limited to three types (i.e. core, semi-periphery, periphery), the context of the 
capitalist world-system is not the only factor that determines national development.  
As such, this thesis adopted the basic framework of world-system analysis but 
added new analysis (domestic state-capital-labour nexus) into the study of a semi-
peripheral case, Taiwan. The central argument of the thesis was that national capitalist 
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development is both determined by changes to the capitalist world-system and the 
dynamics of domestic state-capital-labour relations. The thesis thus examined the 
changes to the capitalist world-system during the K wave B-phase, and concludes that 
the main features of changes are: (1) The declining rate of profit in the industrial 
sector in the core zone. This tendency thus brings about the increase of industrial 
relocation (from the core to the semi-periphery, and then to the periphery), the growth 
in the trans-nationalisation of capital and financialisation, and the rise of neo-
liberalism and economic globalisation and its attack on state power. (2) The relative 
decline of US hegemony in economics and finance, which gives the chance for a new 
centre of capital accumulation to emerge, East Asia. All of these changes significantly 
influenced Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent during the B-phase.   
 
Research Findings: Taiwan’s semi-peripheral ascent and changing national 
social formation   
 
By applying the new analytical framework to the case study and considering the main 
changes to the capitalist world-system, this thesis has several findings. The first 
finding is, based on a historical study of Taiwan’s capitalist development from the 
seventeenth century to 1987, that through several hegemonic influences, Taiwan has 
ascended from the periphery to the semi-periphery. Some hegemonic powers (i.e. the 
Dutch and Japan) not only dominated the order of the interstate system, but also acted 
as the state in Taiwan domestically. Different phases of leading hegemonic power 
placed Taiwan’s development in various positions. The changing capitalist world-
system put conditions on the Taiwanese state’s capability, and determined the path 
and position of Taiwan’s integration into the capitalist world-system. Overall, with 
the support of the interstate system, the state was powerful enough to guide Taiwan’s 
developmental route (in particular the Dutch colonial government, Japanese colonial 
government, and the KMT administration), and Taiwanese capital was subordinated 
to transnational capital and the state. Anti-systemic movements in the form of peasant 
movements and organised labour were absent. During the post-war period, under the 
auspices of US hegemony, links to the US and Japanese economies, and the KMT 
authoritarian state, Taiwan shifted from being an export-led agrarian economy to an 
export-led industrialising economy. Taiwan was able to ascend from periphery to the 
semi-periphery through two industrialising trajectories: export-led industrialisation 
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and the integration of domestic production chains. In sum, Taiwan’s ascent trajectory 
was both shaped by the capitalist world-system and its specific domestic social 
formation.    
     The second finding is that Taiwan shifted from the periphery to the semi-
periphery during the 1970s, but as yet it has not ascended to the core in the past three 
decades, although there are opportunities for Taiwan. The core zone experienced a 
decline in the rate of profit in the industrial sector and started to relocate production to 
selected semi-peripheral zones: Taiwan is one of those. The East Asia region has risen 
to become a new centre of capital accumulation in terms of trade, production, and 
investment, while the core zone has experienced sluggish economic growth. Taiwan is 
among the dynamic high performing East Asian economies. Domestically, the 
Taiwanese state attempts to ascend via arrangements in financial and industrial policy, 
the encouragement of overseas investment, the promotion of the Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operation Centre and the Global Logistics Centre. Taiwanese capital tries to 
expand and relocate production overseas, and upgrades its position in the global 
production chain. Although Taiwan’s organised labour resists the logic of semi-
peripheral ascent, they are not powerful enough to alter the ascent trajectory. Given 
this, why has Taiwan not yet ascended in the last three decades? 
     The first reason is that the state on the one hand promotes the development of 
industrial and financial capital, but on the other hand limits their expansion into China 
due to the complicated US-Taiwan-China nexus. Yet, as Chapter Three shows, China 
is a key engine in driving the rise of the new centre of capital accumulation (the East 
Asian region) in the capitalist world-system. The state’s restriction on Taiwan’s 
industrial capital and financial capital not only limits further development, but also 
reduces the possibility of Taiwan realising its ascent strategy via the Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operation Centre, Regional Financial Centre, and the Global Logistics 
Center. The limits on Taiwan’s financial sector are particularly restrictive, where the 
increasing power of financial capital domestically and internationally is a key to 
ascend to the core. As such, Taiwan’s financial capital is only significant in its 
domestic economy. The overseas expansion of Taiwan’s financial capital delinks the 
expansion of Taiwan’s industrial capital.  
     The second reason is that most of Taiwan’s industrial capital still relies on capital 
from the core zone as Taiwan’s industry is mainly based on its intermediate semi-
peripheral position in various kinds of contract manufacturing. Taiwan’s semi-
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peripheral ascent shows the “success” of industrial upgrading (in terms of 
technological development, the shift of the position in the global production chain, 
and the increase of skilled-labour) and of the rising “national” industrial capitalists (in 
terms of shifting from peripheral production led by the TNCs in Taiwan to semi-
peripheral production of the global electronics industry led by Taiwanese capital). 
Nevertheless, the actual change is from the model of integration of domestic 
production chains to the model of integration into global production chains. The 
emerging Taiwanese industrial capitalists might be less dependent on the Taiwanese 
state, but they remain dependent on leading TNCs from the core countries. The shift 
of these two production models also demonstrates that Taiwan’s overall 
industrialisation is still in a process of deepening its semi-peripheral position, rather 
than in the process of transforming into a core economy.  
     The third reason is that Taiwan’s financial capital is not only limited in its overseas 
expansion in China, but it also relies on foreign finance capital in the areas of non-
productive financial innovation. The process of financial account liberalisation 
benefits foreign financial capital more than Taiwanese financial capital. It is evident 
from the data that the financial inward FDI has become the principle inward FDI since 
the late 1980s (nearly 30% of total inward FDI between 1998 and 2007); yet Taiwan’s 
outward financial FDI only accounts for 4.6% of total outward FDI between 1987 and 
2007 (Investment Commission 2008). Foreign financial capital gains access to 
Taiwan’s financial market but Taiwanese financial capital can neither compete with 
foreign capital nor is capable of expanding its power overseas.  
The third finding of this thesis relates to the changing national social formation 
in a semi-peripheral country such as Taiwan. As argued previously, Taiwan’s ascent 
from the periphery to the semi-periphery was aided by a specific social formation, 
namely a strong state’s guiding function, which dominated Taiwanese capital and 
organised labour. Has this social formation changed?  
For the role of the state, under the changing capitalist world-system during the B-
phase, the case of Taiwan does not fit either the argument of ‘the retreat of the nation-
state’ or the simple assumption that ‘the state still matters.’ We can examine the 
argument from the study of Taiwan’s industrial and financial sectors. Taiwan’s 
industrial and financial sectors presents two aspects of the same development, namely 
that the Taiwanese state still promotes “targeted industries” within the overall 
framework of neo-liberalism and economic globalisation. In the industrial sector, the 
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state’s strategic industrial policy has remained, and has even been strengthened in 
fiscal support methods (e.g. tax incentives and R&D assistance), which is a key factor 
in promoting Taiwan’s hi-tech industries. The proposal for an Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operation Centre (APROC) and the Global Logistics Centre are examples of how the 
state has attempted to lead a “grand ascent strategy” for capitalists and to upgrade 
Taiwan’s “competitiveness.” In the financial sector, the Taiwanese state (especially 
after the DPP administration) has encouraged the concentration of financial capital, 
thus Taiwan’s financial holding companies have been the top ten enterprises since 
2003. The state thereafter proposed a plan to become a regional financial service 
centre. Although the plan is problematic, as discussed in Chapter Six, it can be seen 
that the state has not given up its guiding function to private industrial and financial 
capital.  Overall, the role of the state in Taiwan has been transformed from the 
domination of bureaucratic-corporate capital and state finance capital to become the 
promoter/facilitator for private industrial and financial capital.  
The Taiwanese state still attempts to maintain its strategic and guiding functions 
within the national economy even if Taiwanese transnational capital has increased its 
power. Such an attempt is indicative of the long-term continuity of Taiwan’s state-
capital relations ever since the Japanese colonial period. However, the state’s ability 
and instrumental tools have been limited since the 1980s, due to the changes to the 
capitalist world-system. In sum, for semi-peripheral ascent, there is a need for the 
state’s ability to offer guidance and promotion; yet, the semi-peripheral state’s ability 
to guide national capitalist development is also constrained by the capitalist world-
system. In the case of Taiwan, while the Taiwanese state was supported by the 
hegemonic power and the interstate state system, the state was able to fully guide and 
control national development; however, when the interstate system and the hegemonic 
power constrained the development of the Taiwanese state’s power (e.g. via neo-
liberalism), the function of the state was inevitably limited.         
     There are opportunities for Taiwanese organised labour to offer resistance as a 
social and political force, and as an anti-systemic movement, as the structure of labour 
changes to reflect new patterns and links Taiwanese labour with the core and the 
peripheral zones. Due to the concentration on hi-tech electronics industry, there is an 
increase of hi-tech skilled labour and migrant labour domestically. The same industry 
is also Taiwan’s leading outward investment and the world’s leading contract 
manufacturer; accordingly, there is a growth in overseas employed cheap and low-
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skilled labour. Coinciding with economic change is political change, as Taiwan began 
political democratisation in 1987, and there have been various political and social 
resistances. However, Taiwanese organised labour has not yet become a social force 
that is able to alter its power relations with the state and with capital in society as a 
whole. Rather, organised labour in Taiwan is still manipulated by major political 
parties and remains distant from real political power. The concentration of capital, the 
increasing power of industrial and financial capitalists, and the end of the formal 
authoritarian state, all have not necessarily brought about the strengthening of the 
labour movement or its ability to act as an anti-systemic movement. 
 
What do we learn from the case of Taiwan?  
 
The case study demonstrates that to analyse semi-peripheral ascent, both the context 
of the capitalist world-system and domestic state-capital-labour dynamics are needed 
for analysis. Such an analytical framework breaks the dichotomy between the national 
model approach, which primarily focuses on domestic context, and the world-system 
approach, which mainly pays attention to the international context. The thesis 
developed a specific way of combining the two contexts. Firstly, a general historical 
study is needed to examine how individual countries have been integrated into the 
capitalist world-system, the course of national social formation, and historical 
achievements. Since capitalism is a historically continuous system, historical 
evolution cannot be ignored. Secondly, the thesis analysed three sectors as one semi-
peripheral ascent case, namely the industrial sector, the financial sector, and the 
labour sector. The three sectors demonstrate the dynamics of semi-peripheral ascent 
trajectory, namely the development of production and finance power, and the anti-
systemic movement. The three sectors also show how the changing capitalist world-
system and domestic state-capital-labour dynamics shape semi-peripheral ascent.  
Another contribution of the thesis was the study of a semi-periphery case. As 
Chapter Two discussed, given the complicated role of the semi-periphery and the lack 
of sufficient study, the case of Taiwan explores the particular route of semi-peripheral 
ascent. Firstly, on the one hand, semi-peripheral states attempt to ascend to the core, 
but on the other hand, they are constrained by the core zone. The capitalist world-
system might “invite” some countries to ascend, but such an invitation is not 
unlimited. A peripheral or semi-peripheral economy is able to ascend, but they are not 
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capable of ascending by their own will. As Arrighi and Drangel (1986) argue, 
economic mobility in terms of GNP per capita for 93 countries between 1938 and 
1983329, only Japan and Italy moved upward from the semi-periphery to the core, and 
South Korea and Taiwan shifted from the periphery to the semi-periphery (p.21). As 
Martin (1995) well points out, semi-peripheral states may find forward movement 
blocked by the very forces that generated their membership of that zone (p.8). In the 
case of Taiwan, it is evident that the US once supported Taiwan’s ascent via political, 
economic, and military means; however it began to restrict Taiwan’s development by 
imposing neo-liberal practice. Another example is the hi-tech electronics industry: 
Taiwan has successfully upgraded its position from peripheral production to semi-
peripheral production as contract manufacturers in the global production chain. The 
industry in Taiwan is no longer dominated by foreign capital but by “national” capital. 
However, just one Taiwanese company (ACER) was able to develop as a world 
leading brand, and most Taiwanese capital serves TNCs from the core zone which 
were once the leading FDI contributors in the industry in Taiwan.     
Secondly, the case of Taiwan also shows that a semi-peripheral state is not 
necessarily a ‘revolutionary’ one, as Chase-Dunn (1989) argues. Even the semi-
periphery plays a significant intermediary role in integrating the core zone and the 
peripheral zone via a global production chain. The reason is that in Taiwan, there was 
no revolution in social relations domestically, nor has Taiwanese organized labour 
acted in the role of an anti-systemic movement. Whether the semi-peripheral state 
functions to stablise or transform the system depends on its domestic state-capital-
labour relations.  
Thirdly, as Chapter Two argued, the semi-peripheral process is in tension between 
interstate struggle and global accumulation. In the case of Taiwan, the situation is far 
more serious, as the specific US-Taiwan-China nexus is at the core of Taiwan’s 
interstate struggle and Taiwan is in a very weak position in the interstate system. 
Taiwan once benefited from the US-led hegemonic order in East Asia, but changes to 
interstate system in East Asia after the 1980s have constrained Taiwan. This 
constraint presents itself as the tension of cross-strait political relations on the one 
hand and the increase in cross-strait economic interdependence on the other hand. 
Taiwan’s present economic connection with China is in fact at its highest ever level, 
higher than during the 212 years that Taiwan was part of the Qing Empire. However, 
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 Arrighi and Drangel’s study only focused on the period between 1938 and 1983; there is no recent 
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the US-Taiwan-China nexus contradicts the general structural tendency of capital 
accumulation. Under the present ‘dilemma’ between interstate struggle and capital 
accumulation, Taiwan can only find a “midway” course between pursuing greater 
capital accumulation and accepting declining power in the interstate system. This 
condition will hold unless other alternatives occur, for example, if China were to no 
longer be concerned about Taiwan’s sovereignty, or the US changes policy to strongly 
support Taiwan’s claim to sovereignty (both of which seem very unlikely to happen).  
    
Future research direction  
    
Firstly, it would be interesting to do a comparative study of Taiwan and South Korea 
(especially during the period after the late 1980s/early 1990s) with regard to how the 
two countries as semi-peripheral countries have different trajectories in maintaining or 
upgrading their positions in the capitalist world-system. Based on the analytical 
framework that this thesis has suggested, the difference might be driven by a distinct 
position within the interstate systems (e.g. South Korea does not have the political 
conflict with China that Taiwan does, and it has been a major political actor in East 
Asian regionalism); by the state’s and capital’s strategies (e.g. South Korea has 
focused more on the integrated device model than on pure-play foundry, and has 
developed their own brands in the hi-tech and car industries, such as Samsung, LG, 
and Hyundai); and by different relationships between the state, capital, and labour 
domestically (e.g. the South Korean labour movement is more militant than in Taiwan, 
and their individual industrial capital concentration is also larger than in Taiwan).   
Secondly, the following questions concern Taiwan’s future capitalist development. 
Will the new Taiwanese government further lift the restrictions on Taiwanese 
financial and hi-tech industrial capital investment in China? Will this openness 
increase the capitalists’ direct power over the state? Will Taiwanese finance capital be 
able to make use of China’s economy in the same way as Taiwanese industrial capital? 
In particular, there is an economic shift underway in relation to China as it attempts to 
transform itself from the world’s factory to the world market. (As of December, 2008, 
China has become the biggest market for cars.)330 Further openness in China and 
increased Chinese influence may change the relationship between state and capital 
further.   
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 See the report from Hogg (10/02/2009). 
  280
 
Thirdly, Taiwan’s IT and IC industries have led the export-led industrialization 
process for nearly two decades, but which will be next? Will Taiwan be able to 
upgrade its position in the global electronics industry to be a core candidate through 
developing it own brands or innovating core technology? Alternatively, will Taiwan 
enter another rising industry (e.g. biotechnology) with a similar trajectory, as part of a 
global production chain? Whichever of these, it is likely that Taiwan will experience 
another industrial restructuring when other developing countries compete in global 
contracting manufacturing, or when this industry experiences global recession (e.g. 
surplus production). Taiwanese labour might confront another structural impact, and 
this time, hi-tech industrial labour might be able to organise themselves for the first 
time, as was the case before with the workers of traditional industries.    
Finally, will increasing East Asian regional integration through industrial capital, 
financial capital, and perhaps the state, diminish organized labour’s ‘anti-systemic 
movement’ in Taiwan and in this region? There is a great deal of literature on the 
regionalisation of trade, investment, and financial capital in East Asia (e.g. ADB 
2008b; Cowen et al. 2006; ARIC various years; Fouquin et. al 2006; METI 2005; 
Ando and Kimura 2003). However, little has been written on the study of the 
regionalisation of labour and organised labour’s response in this region as a whole 
(although there are some excellent comparative studies and national cases studies 
considering East Asian region in particular).331 Such a study needs both detailed 
national cases and a broad regional perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
331
 For example, Custers (1997), Deyo (1989), Frenkel (1993), Gills and Piper (2002), Horton (1996), 
Hutchison and Brown (2001).  
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Appendix  
One: Inrviewee List  
No. Name Institution and position when conducted the interview [their current positions] Interview date 
1 Shr-shian Hang  General Secretary of the National Federation of Bank Employees' Union 16/02/2006 
2 Wa-Zing Lai Chair of Steering Committee of National Federation of Bank Employees' Union 23/03/2006 
3 Wan-yu Shen General Secretary of International Commercial Bank of ROC Labour Union 24/02/2006 
4 Shih-Feng Yu Former General Secretary of First Commercial Bank Industrial Union   24/02/2006 
5 Andrea S.Lee Deputy Director-General, Dept. of International Affairs, Financial Supervisory Commission 21/02/2006 
6 His-Ho Huang Section Chief, Dept. of International Affairs, Financial Supervisory Commission 2102/2006 
7 Susan S. Chang Administrative Vice Chairperson, Financial Supervisory Commission 07/03/2006 
8 Te-Ming Peng Senior Economist, Dept of Economic Research, The Central Bank of China 23/02/2006 
9 GH. Young Senior Economist, Dept of Economic Research, The Central Bank of China 23/02/2006 
10 Chen, Pei-Wen Assistant Specialist, Dept. of Economic Research, The Central Bank of China, Taipei 23/02/2006 
11 S.S. Ou Chair of R&D Committee, Chinese Federation of Commercial Bank Employer’ Union 16/03/2006 
12 A-Ting Chou Director General, Dept. of Foreign Exchange, The Central Bank of China, Taipei 
[Vice-Chairman of the Central Bank: 2007-] 
21/03/2006 
13 David Huang Assistant DG, Dept. of Foreign Exchange, The Central Bank of China, Taipei 21/03/2006 
14 Maggie Y.F.Lin Senior Specialist, Dept of Foreign Exchange, The Central Bank of China, Taipei 2103/2006 
15 Sean C.Chen Chairman of Taiwan Cooperative Bank Former Political Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance 23/03/2006 
16 Eric S.H. Chiang Director of Second Bilateral Trade Division (The Americans, Europe& Africa) 2703/2006 
17 Jerry J.R. Ou DG of Industrial Development and Investment Centre (IDIC), Ministry of Economic Affairs 30/03/2006 
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(MOEA) * Quoted for by IDIC 
18 Chih-Peng Huang Direct General of Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA (* Quoted for by BFT) 30/03/2006 
19 Vincent C. Siew Chairman of Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research,  
Former Premier (1997~2000), Head of negotiators of ROC-USA trade talks (1972-1988) 
[Vice President of ROC government: 2008-] 
11/04/2006 
20 Hua-yin Chen  Assistant Director of Division of Industrial Policy, Industrial Development Bureau , Ministry of 
Economic Affairs   
27/04/2006 
21 Jin-je Tsai Director of Ching-Jen Labour Service Centre; Executive broad member of Taiwan Labour 
Information & Education Association 
27/04/2006 
22 L.S. Shen,  Former Deputy Representative of Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the 
US (TERCRO);[Taiwan/ROC Representative in the EU: 2008-] 
04/06/2006 
23 John C.C. Deng Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
to the WTO (2002-2006); Deputy Representative, TECRO (2006-); [Deputy Minister of 
Economic Affairs: 2008] 
 
04/06/2006, 
08/06/2006 
Note: no. 17 and 18: The interviewees were abroad so that the staff from IDID and BFT provided answers to my interview questions. 
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Two: Summary of working conditions in Taiwanese overseas enterprises. 
 
Low wage  Tatung in Thailand: Only white collar officers have paid holiday, production line operators receive only 26 days wage per 
month. Their wage is one-fifth or one-sixth of Taiwanese labourers’ (Tsai 2006) 
 Acer’s suppliers: Six out of twenty suppliers do not pay minimum wage, overtime wage, or have unreasonable wage 
deductions (SOMO, 2007). Workers from twelve suppliers of Acer indicate that the wage is not enough to live on (SOMO 
2007). One supplier in the Philippines does not pay an overtime wage (SOMO, 2005). One supplier in China only pays 
workers a daily wage, which is lower than the legal minimum wage (SOMO 2005).   
 Lite-on and its outsourced companies: do not pay overtime wages (SACOM 2007). 
 Zhon Han in China: The overtime payment is lower than the legal regulation (SACOM 2006).  
 Foxconn in China: Unnecessary complicated wage structure which is difficult for workers to understand, and inappropriate 
reporting system for overtime wage (Apple 17/08/2006).  
 Foxconn in Mexico: A worker from Guadalajara area reports that his salary was deducted by US $18.04 for his one-day off 
(his daily wage is only US $8.04) (CEREL 2007).  
Excessive 
working 
hours and 
enforced 
overtime 
work 
 Seventeen suppliers of Acer have forced labour working overtime, and working hours are more than 60 hours a week (SOMO 
2007).  
 Acer’s suppliers: More than 30% of workers in one supplier in the Philippines need to work 12 hours a day, six days a week. 
Workers in another supplier in China do not have a day-off for four months (SOMO 2005). 
 Zhon Han in China: Workers work seven days a week. When workers begin their job they are required by the HR department 
to sign an agreement in which workers agree to work unlimited overtime if necessary (SACOM 2006).   
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 Chentex in Nicaragua: Shifts of twelve hours a day, six days a week. Forced overtime with no additional pay (Ralph 2005, 
p.117). 
Occupational 
safety and 
health risk 
 Acer’s suppliers: Several health problems are reported from five suppliers, including skin allergies, respiration problems, 
noise hazards, dizziness, loss of appetite, nausea, eye irritation and deterioration of eyesight. However, factories neither 
provide appropriate protection nor provide specific health checks regularly (SOMO, 2005). Thirteen suppliers have 
occupational health and safety problems (SOMO 2007).  
 Lite-on in China: Around 10-12 workers live in a single room in the dormitory. Workers need to stand up for 12 hours a day 
and there is no appropriate protection. It is difficult to apply for sick leave. Lack of social insurance. (SACOM 2007).  
 Zon Han in China: Around 8-12 workers live in a single room; limited supply of hot water and food; poor working 
environment (has neither an air conditioner nor workable fan in a hot environment, limited toilet access) (SACOM 2006).  
 Tatung in Thailand: High risk in terms of occupational health and safety. For example, fuel and chemical products are 
exposed in the air; easily-broken lifts; few toilets; fire alarm is broken, emergency exit is locked; no dormitory provided to 
female workers who work at night (Tsai 2006).  
 Foxconn in China: The dormitories are not in a reasonable condition, a single room has 100 workers living in it (The Mail, 
18/08/2006). Three dormitories are not suitable for workers stay in (Apple 17/08/2006). 
 Chentex in Nicaragua: Workers live in overcrowded stick and tin-roof rooms with cardboard walls, dirt floors, no running 
water and outdoor latrines (Ralph 2005, p.117).  
Inhumane 
management 
 Acer’s suppliers: Eight suppliers have inhumane treatment, or unequal and discriminative management (SOMO 2007).  
 Malaysia: Migrant Bangladeshi workers are managed in a military-like way. For example, migrant workers have to work for 
12 to 16 hours a day and have no holiday. The employers use two ways to push migrant labour to follow the managerial 
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order: threatening either to not sign a new contract or not allowing labour to work overtime. These migrant labourers are 
eager to work overtime because they have huge debts to pay (i.e. the placement fee) and they are only allowed to stay in 
Malaysia for three years (Kung 2002). 
 Tatung in Thailand: The managers use discriminatory words and behaviour towards the Thai workers; for example, they shout 
at workers, sexually harass them, and ask some of them to do the manager’s personal work (i.e. clean his house) (Tsai 2006).  
 Foxconn in China: workers are treated like an army; for example, they are asked to stand still for three hours and no outsider 
can visit their dormitories (The Mail 18/08/2006). 
 Chentex in Nicaragua: Verbal and physical abuse of workers (Ralph 2005, p.117). 
Prefer 
female 
workers 
 Tatung in Thailand: Only 50 out of 409 (12%) employees are male. 
 Zhong Han in China: Around 85% of workers are female. 
 Foxconn in China: Prefer to employ cheap female workers (The Mail 18/08/2006). 
 Chentex in Nicaragua: Fire pregnant female workers and sexually harass others (TSNW 2001). 
Child labour  Two suppliers of Acer employ child labour whose ages are under 16 years old (SOMO 2007).  
 Zhong Han in China: employ child labour as apprentices (SACOM 2006). 
Work 
insecurity 
 Malaysia: They hire indigenous Malays mainly on short-term contracts and an outsourcing system (Kung 2002).  
 Foxconn in Mexico: They have plants in three areas; there are 7,000 workers in Chihuahua and Guadalajara, and around 50-
70% are outsourced workers. They are temporary workers on a one-year contract, but they are in fact fired and rehired each 
year. In high season, the company gives only one or two month contracts. Some workers in the factory, which produces 
equipment for HP, are asked by the agency to sign both a 15 day contract and an advanced resignation letter (CEREL 2007).  
No right of  Malaysia: No trade unions exist in Taiwanese enterprises in Malaysia (Kung 2002) 
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free 
association 
 Foxconn in Mexico: More than 50% of the 7,000 workers are recruited by one agency. The agency excludes two kinds of 
people when recruiting: tattooed people and trade unionists (CEREL 2007, p.21).  
 Acer’s supplier in the Philippines: Workers attempted to organise a trade union but this was opposed by the company 
(SOMO 2005, p.32). SOMO also finds that between eight and fifteen suppliers of ACER violate the ILO’s convention on 
freedom of association (SOMO 2007).  
Note:   There are a few cases of independent trade unions in Thailand and Nicaragua. In Thailand, a trade union was established in 2000 when a company intended to 
change its wage structure. However, the company fired fifteen trade union leaders when the union was established. These leaders were returned to work when the company 
realised that it was illegal to lay-off union leaders. In 2002, the company employed an extra 1,000 temporary workers who exclusively received daily pay at the legal minimal 
wage. Yet in 2003 the company began to lay-off many workers, which included all trade union leaders from the executive committee. In Nicaragua, when Chentex workers 
organised a trade union in 1998, the employer established another union. When the Chentex trade union planned a strike in 1999 for an increase in wages, the Chentex 
employer sacked twelve trade union leaders and threatened workers not to join the trade union. They even fired 200 workers in 2000 (TSNW 2001).   
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Three: Taiwanese trade union’s international participation 
Global Unions Union that joined the global union 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)/ International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) 
Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL) 
World Confederation of Labour (WCL) The National Alliance of Autonomous Unions 
Building and Wood Workers International (BWI) National Federation of Construction Workers 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Union (ICEM) Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ Union   
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) Federation of Aviation Employees, Chinese Federation of Railway Workers’ Union, Federation of Aviation Employees, National 
Chinese Seamen’s Union, Taipei Travel Craft Union 
Public Services International (PSI) Taiwan Power Labour Union 
Union Network International (UNI) Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union, Chunghwa Postal Workers’ Union, National Federation of Bank’s Employee Union 
Education International (EI) National Teachers’ Association 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF) Taiwan Province of Federation of Textile Workers Union 
International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) National Federation of Metalworkers’ Union 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied 
Workers' Association (IUF) 
Alliance of Tobacco and Alcohol Workers  
Source: Author’s interview and each global union’s website 
 
 
